What if Hitler aimed *only* for Leningrad and Stalingrad in 1941?

[Argothair]

Everyone makes very strong points – it’s intimidating how intimately you all know the Barbarossa campaign!

As Wolfshanze figured out, my argument isn’t really about Stalingrad – it’s more about what would have happened if Army Group Center had been stripped down to a small garrison and its assets divided among Army Groups North and South. How far could the reinforced Army Groups North and South have advanced in 1941 if Hitler allowed both groups to press forward to the limits of their abilities? Would the hypothetical territory they could conquer have been more or less valuable than what the Germans actually did occupy in 1941? Why? I take CWO Marc’s point that Lend-Lease didn’t start until after the war, and I take Kreuzfeld’s point that western Russia was a lot more industrialized than you might guess by looking at a satellite image in 2016, but is it just obvious that western Russia was one of the two best regions of the Soviet Union for the Germans to occupy, or were there other plausible candidates?

Finally, assuming the Germans did split north and south while ignoring the center – would the hypothetical territory they conquered be a useful staging ground for a 1942 assault on Moscow, or would it leave the Germans out of position?

[Kreuzfeld]

When we talk about the economic regions of russia there is a few ways we can start to grasp it.

The first way is to look at the size of the legal dvisions. This works well for most countries.  Go to https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_subjects_of_Russia . Here what you need to do is to look at the actual size of the oboloast. you can see that in general, around moscow, and west of moscow, the obolasts are small, while they become bigger and bigger the futher east they are. Small obolasts is a sign of much denser population. This effect was much more pronounced in 1941 before they evacuated alot of people to the east to avoid the whermacht.

The second way is to look at the infrastructure at the beginning of the war. More infrastructure = more people. USSR had a grand total of ONE paved highway in 1941. it was the highway from moscow to smolensk to minsk. This highway is there because it was the road which was deemed to give the highest return for people and industry. Which again points to how densly populated the region was. The second type of infrastructure to look at is the railnetwork. The soviet union had a very dense railroad network on some areas. The general area with good railroad network was the area around moscow (limited by kalinin in the north, yaroslav in the northeast, gorki in the east. From gorki you could either take the train to astrakan or to moscow (more or less).  If you then look south of moscow, the basically eastern limit of the railnework runs from tula, to voronezh to stalingrad and back west again to rostow.  In conclusion, the area occupied by germany in 1942 more or less only had a few north/south raillines east of it. The third infrastructure to look at is the rivers. There are three major rivers that had a lot of transport (facilitating industry) and waterpower. Those rivers where dnjepner, don and volga. Of these rivers, volga was the only one germany didn’t occupy both banks off. So in total, the germans ended up taking more than half of the russian prewar infrastructure.

The third way is to look at russia today, and figure our what actually constitutes russia, and what is the republics. you will very quicky see that the “russia” part of the russian federeation is an entirely european thing, while the republics is the area outside of europe, and some of the area inside europe.

The fourth ways is to have a guy like me guessing where the economic and populational center of gravity for russia was. If I where to guess, I would guess somewhere between smolensk, kursk and kiev :).

The general thing is that moscow was one of the easternmost russian states, and it ended up dominating the entire russian region.

[Wolfshanze]

@Argothair:

Finally, assuming the Germans did split north and south while ignoring the center – would the hypothetical territory they conquered be a useful staging ground for a 1942 assault on Moscow, or would it leave the Germans out of position?

As I briefly pointed out in my initial response, I believe Germany more or less came out of Barbarossa with a large AG North/AG South push, because AG Center was bungled badly by Hitler’s interference, making an otherwise capture-able Moscow an unobtainable objective. In the end, AG Center’s panzers were mostly misused because of a lot of wasted travel back and forth uncalled for except for Hitler’s interference.

For the sake of your argument, lets say AG Center’s panzers and extra formations were more evenly split between AG North and AG South and Center was left more or less to “hold” or “stay a tad behind” advances in the North and South. I really don’t see anything to gain for Germany with this strategy… lets say with more forces in the North Leningrad would have fallen instead of being surrounded and besieged… what does that give Germany? Not much really… Leningrad was for all intents and purposes completely taken out as a factor in the war as a result of the siege which began in 1941… so not much gained there… had they pressed on further after sacking Leningrad in your scenario, what then? Maybe the Soviet ports to the NE of Leningrad? In 1941, that would have mattered little as there wasn’t any real Lend/Lease occurring at that time, so the Northern push ends with a fizzle after Leningrad is taken… the elimination of Leningrad as a factor happened in 1941 with or without actually taking the city.

If Moscow is not a factor, that leaves us with a pronounced push in the south… with little change in the center or north… hmmm… this sounds familiar… Case Blue anyone? So the Germans push further in the south in 1941 then historically happened… given their starting position for a southern push would have been the Balkan/Soviet border in 1941, and not hundreds of miles further in as was the start of Case Blue in 1942, I don’t really see the Germans succeeding in pushing to the Caucasus oil fields in 1941 (or Stalingrad, not that it held any real importance to the war). Personally… I just don’t see your proposal of focusing North/South at the expense of Center being a viable strategy to end the war in 1941 against Russia (or give them a vastly superior position in 1942).

Your final argument would be to put them in a great position to take Moscow in 1942… I don’t see this as an option… a LOT changed over the winter of 1941 into 1942… massive fortifications and defenses around Moscow that did NOT exist in the summer/fall of 1941 were by the spring of 1942 massively improved and prepared… Extra armies and divisions of tough soldiers from Siberia that were not present in summer/fall of 1941 were by the spring of 1942 in place. Production of the T-34 tank, which was in very limited numbers in 1941, were far more greatly available by the spring of 1942. Finally, Soviet strategy, at the behest of Stalin, who was OBSESSED with Moscow, made sure that almost everything the Soviets had to spare was sent to the defense of Moscow to prepare for the assured attack on Moscow that was to happen in 1942… this in large part was why the Germans chose Case Blue into the Caucasus instead of going for Moscow in 1942 as it was… and because of Russia’s drive to protect Moscow, was why Case Blue was so successful at its launch because most Soviet forces were committed to the defense of Moscow.

Simply put, the best chance (and maybe the ONLY chance) the Germans had at seizing Moscow was in 1941, and preferably before the fall mud and winter frost set in. This could have occurred in two different scenarios, #1, the delay of Barbarossa caused by the German invasion of the Balkans in spring 41, and #2, as I had mentioned earlier, the interference of Hitler with AG Center’s panzers during Operation Barbarossa. Either alone or both combined spelled doom for the chance of taking Moscow before it was too late. I don’t see your proposed change in strategy bearing any fruit for Germany in 1941 or 1942.

[CWO Marc]

@Argothair:

is it just obvious that western Russia was one of the two best regions of the Soviet Union for the Germans to occupy, or were there other plausible candidates?

“Occupying a position” and “occupying a position which is strategically defensible over the long term” aren’t the same thing.  To save myself some typing, I’ll paste here…

http://www.axisandallies.org/forums/index.php?topic=36148.0

…a link to an earlier thread in which (in my Reply #10) I talked at some length about whether Barbarossa (in any form) had any reasonable prospect of putting the USSR into the same “not dead, but not much more than that” position in which Britain found herself in 1940 after Germany reached the Channel and occupied France.

[Wolfshanze]

I’m firmly in the belief that Barbarossa as initially planned had obtainable goals, including Moscow, which to be honest, was really about the only part of Barbarossa that didn’t come to fruition in historical terms.  Yes, Russia had issues to be dealt with, but none were insurmountable.  I am also a firm believer that just because you invade Russia, doesn’t mean you’ve automatically doomed your country to failure… no nation is impossible to conquer, and yes, this includes Russia.

I’ve read tons on the 1941 invasion… things that impacted it, variables that could have changed things, timetables, troop positions, defenses that were or were not in place… simply put, there were many mistakes made on the German’s part, that, under the right set of circumstances, could very easily have been avoided or dealt with in a manner that would have allowed Barbarossa to succeed on all levels.  Russia is not invincible simply because one invades Russia… it could have been done, and Germany had favorable conditions for a successful campaign… in the end, they blew it, and it eventually led to Germany’s defeat… but just because Germany invaded and eventually failed, does not mean that was the only outcome that could have come from invasion.

[Argothair]

CWO_Marc, I think your concept of a strategically defensible front line is very important. I enjoyed all of your replies in the other thread – as always, they are very informative and well-organized. I want to build on your concept of a defensible front line by distinguishing between a line that you can hold for two years (i.e., a line that you can hold during wartime against a known counter-attack), and a line that you can hold for twenty years (i.e., a line that you can hold even in peacetime, with only a small garrison force protecting against surprise attacks).

In my opinion, neither the Ural Mountains nor the Archangel - Astrakhan line you mention would be a viable twenty-year line. They’re both thousands of miles wide without any sharply defined bottlenecks. Yes, it’s challenging to cross the Urals against a hostile force, but it’s not like the Andes, where you have a long, straight, tall mountain chain with only a couple of narrow passes. The Urals are more like the Appalachians: rugged terrain over all, but with many plateaus and many moderately hilly areas that would require hundreds of miles of guard towers and active patrols. This is a pretty good topographical photo: https://ceipntrasradelapiedad.files.wordpress.com/2010/04/europe-map-of-europe-physical-relief-wikipedia.png. You can see that the Urals are a much weaker boundary than the Balkan Mountains or the Carpathian Mountains, both of which were successfully crossed by hostile forces during World War II.

Wolfshanze, I agree with you that things could easily have turned out differently during Barbarossa. I’m posting a couple of graphics – one showing the actual front line in December 1941, and the other showing my proposed alternate goal for a front line in December 1941. I don’t think my line requires the penetration of much more land area or many more miles than Hitler’s line did – it could have happened! The line I’m proposing gives up the chance to take Moscow in 1941, but I think it could have offered a much greater chance of seizing the Caucasus oilfields in 1941, or at least in the spring of 1942. My line isn’t a defensible twenty-year line either, but I think it would more likely than not have given Germany access to the oil it needed to keep fighting a mobile war with tanks and planes.

[Narvik]

@Wolfshanze:

r… hard to say, but I think it likely Stalin would have gone down with Moscow…

Like in chess, when you capture the King, you win the game. Its kind of like that in real wars too, especially with dictators like Stalin and Hitler. We must assume that if Stalin or Hitler were killed, then the war would stop. This is a general pattern in history. When a King, a Dictator or his capitol is taken, then the war ends. This was true when Hitler and Berlin fell, the rest of the nazis surrendered, they could not keep on fighting for the nazy cause, because the Head was cut off. The same was true with Mussolini and Italy. When the Russian Tsar was killed in 1917 and his capitol St. Petersburg captured, then the Russian empire was out of the war. Or look to France, every time Paris fell, then the rest of France surrender, always, even if the French rulers are still alive, or the French Army is still undefeated on the Battlefield.

Base on this, it is obvious that if Stalin was killed, then all Russians would surrender. And I don’t think Stalin would survive losing Moscow. So the conclusion is, that Moscow was the decisive object that needed to be taken to win the war. I say that to take Moscow was the only victory condition for Germany. Hitler did not have to beat the Red Army in the battlefield, or capture the Baku oilfields, or bomb Russian industry. He just had to take Moscow. Simple as that. Hitler failed doing this, just because he found it more important to kill Jews.

[Narvik]

@Argothair:

, but I think it would more likely than not have given Germany access to the oil it needed to keep fighting a mobile war with tanks and planes.

I figure a better way to get oil would be to conquer the Middle East oilfields in Iraq and Persia. The Germans had already established both railroads and pipelines through Turkey during WWI, so the infrastructure needed were in place. They just needed to kill a tiny British guard in Palestine, and then they would get plenty of oil. Stalin would even support Germany in doing this. The only reason Hitler attacked Russia was to kill Jews and Commies, as he had promised in his infamous book Mein Kampf.

[Wolfshanze]

@Narvik:

Base on this, it is obvious that if Stalin was killed, then all Russians would surrender. And I don’t think Stalin would survive losing Moscow. So the conclusion is, that Moscow was the decisive object that needed to be taken to win the war. I say that to take Moscow was the only victory condition for Germany. Hitler did not have to beat the Red Army in the battlefield, or capture the Baku oilfields, or bomb Russian industry. He just had to take Moscow. Simple as that. Hitler failed doing this, just because he found it more important to kill Jews.

Agreed with everything you said about Hitler, Moscow and Stalin, up till the “more important to kill Jews” line.  Hitler, of course, was a terrible man in regards to his treatment and extermination of the Jews under his control, but his failure to take Moscow in 1941 had little to do with prioritizing the killing of Jews over seizing Moscow.  The Final Solution had not yet been in play in 1941 (certainly terrible treatment of military and civilians on the Eastern Front was occurring in 1941, but the full blown, all hands on deck, lets kill every jew and tie up every rail system moving Jews about, was not in play in 1941).  Moscow was not seized during Barbarossa because of multiple military blunders, mostly caused by Hitler’s constant meddling in priorities over what OKW had planned. I really think 1941 was Germany’s best shot at taking Moscow… much had changed in the defense of Moscow by Spring 1942 and the sideshow in the Caucasus in 1942 ended up costing Germany the war in Russia.  Germany’s best chance to take out Moscow was in 1941… so much had changed by Spring 1942, I think few realize just how much stronger Russia was, and the defense of Moscow just a few months after Germany failed at the gates of Moscow, I think by then, seizing Moscow was a slim-to-nil affair no matter what Germany did… regardless, the failure to seize Moscow in 1941 was attributed directly to military and strategic blundering by Germany… not by the Holocaust.

Similarly, putting up maps of proposals of what the lines could have looked like after 1941 had come and gone is fine and all, but I honestly think by then, the war in Russia was lost.  I agree with Narvik, Moscow was indeed the key… and that opportunity was ripe for taking in 1941, and could have, with the right mistakes having not occurred, or had been avoided in 1941, Moscow would have fallen.  I sincerely believe, by 1942, the war in Russia was lost by all accounts… oh sure, they could have done better here or there, prolonged the war they could, but by 1942, the writing was on the wall… Germany’s chances of seizing Moscow in 1941 were far greater than most people assume… and similarly, no matter where the front lines were drawn up, Germany’s chances of seizing Moscow in 1942 or beyond were far less than most people assume.

[CWO Marc]

@Narvik:

Like in chess, when you capture the King, you win the game. Its kind of like that in real wars too, especially with dictators like Stalin and Hitler. We must assume that if Stalin or Hitler were killed, then the war would stop. This is a general pattern in history. When a King, a Dictator or his capitol is taken, then the war ends. This was true when Hitler and Berlin fell, the rest of the nazis surrendered, they could not keep on fighting for the nazy cause, because the Head was cut off. The same was true with Mussolini and Italy. When the Russian Tsar was killed in 1917 and his capitol St. Petersburg captured, then the Russian empire was out of the war. Or look to France, every time Paris fell, then the rest of France surrender, always, even if the French rulers are still alive, or the French Army is still undefeated on the Battlefield.

Base on this, it is obvious that if Stalin was killed, then all Russians would surrender. And I don’t think Stalin would survive losing Moscow. So the conclusion is, that Moscow was the decisive object that needed to be taken to win the war. I say that to take Moscow was the only victory condition for Germany. Hitler did not have to beat the Red Army in the battlefield, or capture the Baku oilfields, or bomb Russian industry. He just had to take Moscow. Simple as that. Hitler failed doing this, just because he found it more important to kill Jews.

The chess king analogy only partially works when it’s applied to real warfare.  In chess, victory or defeat depend entirely on just one factor which can exist in just one of two possible conditions: whether or not the opponent’s king is still in play.

Real warfare isn’t like that.  In a real war, continued resistance by the enemy depends on four things: 1) to what extent the military forces retains the physical ability and psychological willingness to keep fighting; 2) to what extent the nation’s economic and industrial infrastructure can keep supplying the war effort with the resources it needs; 3) to what extent the political leadership retains the will, the skill, and the command-and-control mechanisms it needs to keep fighting; 4) and to what extent the civilian population retains its ability and its willingness to keep producing (because they are a part of the  economy mentioned in my second point) and to maintain their consent to be governed (because they are a part of the overall political situation that related to the third point).

The concept that “When a King, a Dictator or his capitol is taken, then the war ends” correlates with a number of historical examples, but doesn’t correlate with others.  The war between Napoleonic France and Tsarist Russia didn’t end when the French occupied Moscow – and in fact France ended up losing it.  The war between Germany and Russia in WWI didn’t end with the February 1917 which overthrew the Tsar; the armistice only came in December 1917.  In WWII, Germany didn’t surrender when Hitler committed suicide on April 30th 1945, nor when  Berlin capitulated to the Russians on May 2nd; it ended a week later.

Also keep in mind that, even if capturing the enemy’s capital and/or overthrowing (or killing) the enemy’s leader does sometimes mark the end of a war, you usually can’t reach that point unless you’ve already pretty much defeated the enemy’s armies in the field.  During the US Civil War, Richmond eventually fell and the Confederate government scattered, both events occurring shortly before the end of the war…but it took four years of hard slogging for the Union to achieve those two results, and by that point the Confederacy was at the end of its tether militarily and economically.  And those two results aren’t generally regarded as the end-point of the war; the surrenders of the main remaining Confederate forces in the field, notably the armies of Lee and Johnston, were arguably more decisive.

[Wolfshanze]

The correlation isn’t correct, but the fact that Moscow was critically important on multiple levels is… 1812 and 1941 are very different years with very different circumstances, and cannot be compared equally.  Napoleon made a straight drive for Moscow… he didn’t invade all of Russia, he didn’t even really bother holding anything other than the immediate vicinity around his army… when he finally did reach Moscow… nobody was there… they all packed up and left, including the Tsar of Russia.  Napoleon occupied a few buildings, didn’t hold any part of Russia, beyond a toehold on a supply line (that was usually broken) and didn’t capture the Tsar.  This just is NOTHING like the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941.  Germany invaded with millions across a very wide front from the Baltic to the Black Sea, and it was an invasion to sieze, destroy and hold territory.  Entire armies were annihilated, cities across all of Russia were being captured, the Germans had a pretty solid control of what they were seizing (certainly in comparison with Napoleon), and Moscow was not going to be an empty trophy if captured… it was more than just a symbolic seat of power, it was the most important rail hub, it was an important industrial and communications center, it had stocks of food and munitions and supplies for the Russians, and, as previously mentioned, Stalin was there… and it is my firm belief, that he would not have fled.  When Moscow was under fire and looked doomed, and Stalin was begged to leave for safety, he had the same attitude Hitler did about Berlin and refused to leave… I don’t think Stalin would have left if the Germans had arrived earlier and with a better chance to capture the city… in that case, Stalin most likely would have been captured or killed, and the Soviet Union was very much STALIN’S RUSSIA… as much as the Third Reich was HITLER’s GERMANY.

Moscow was not the only objective of Barbarossa… it was not going to be taken in a vacuum like Napoleon did to Tsarist Russia in 1812… The Soviet Union was being dismembered by Nazi Germany… they were encircling and destroying entire armies, seizing vast swathes of land and capturing city after city from the Baltic to the Black Sea, and Moscow would have been the final piece of the jigsaw puzzle, with Stalin likely to go down with the city… this is an entirely different scenario than Napoleon, and they simply cannot be compared in the same light.

[Narvik]

When I talk about the King in chess, I don’t necessary talk about a person, but rather an abstract decisive issue that will make or brake a specific nations ability to survive. In German its named a Schwerpunkt, this strategically important point that the King in chess is supposed to represent. Lets call it a weakness, and if you successfully target this weakness, then that nation will die. In some cases this will be a dictator like Hitler or Stalin, or a king or other authorian ruler. Like when Alexander the Great died, the day after all of his vast empire vanished. In a democracy things are a bit different, like when Roosevelt died in 1945, USA was not knocked out of the war, they just replaced him with Truman. Now who could replace Hitler or Stalin ? I guess that if Churchill died or London got captured, then the Brits would keep on fighting, maybe from a government in exile in Canada and with some other guy as a new leader. In a Dictatorship the Leader is the weak spot, but in a Democracy the opinion is the weak spot. As in the Vietnam war, USA was military supreme in the battlefield, but still lost the war because the commies was able to target the US domestic opinion and create resistance against the war. Other weak spots can be industry, production, lack of oil, food or supply, convoy routes over the sea, international trade and 100 other things. Even the army or navy can be a weak point, if out of supply or with poor leaders.

So back to my statement. I stress that in this case, Stalin was Russias weak point that Hitler had to hit if he wanted to win the war. As others have already said, to conquer Leningrad, Stalingrad, Murmansk or Siberia would not matter, that would be like killing a lot of cheap prawns in chess. A lot of fun but don’t make a victory. But Hitler failed to recognize this. Hitlers aim, or national objective if you want, that he published with his book Mein Kampf in 1920, and won the 1933 election on, was to colonize the Eastern Europe to the Ural mountains, and simoultanesly ethnical cleanse about 30 million of the local people living there, making living space for the Ubermensch farmers. And this is basically why Hitler lost the Eastern Front, and in the end the war. Now, if Hitler had been cunning, skilled and smart, he would have gone directly for Moscow, with full strength and all resources, captured Moscow, jailed Stalin and demobilized the Red Army. Now Germany would have won the war, and with less then a half million germans as casualties, no cities in ruins, dominated all of Europe, and then Hitler could have started to kill Jews and Slaves and probably succeeded, much in the same way that Stalin succeeded in killing 30 million of his own population during the Great Terror in the 1930 ies. Its a lot easier to kill people when they are not armed and shooting back. Luckily to my family and country, Hitler was narrow minded and stubborn.

The Napoleon campaign 1812 was another kind of war, since Napoleons national objective was to win honor in the battlefield by chasing and beating the Russian Army. If Napoleon had wanted to conquer and govern Russia he could just have invaded the capitol, St. Petersburg, that was almost adjacent to his staging point, which would give him short supply lines, and the city was light defended too since the Tsar had his army around Moscow.

King Karl XII campaign in 1700 was different too, since his objective was to capture Tsar Peter I and steal his money, so he followed him to an ambush outside Poltava.

[Imperious Leader]

Leningrad first should be taken, only to shorten the front and allow Finnish forces ( and German) to further reach Archangel and cut about 25% of lend lease shipments. Moscow is obviously the #1 target, but taking Leningrad and shortening the front would allow forces to bear from the northern flank and cut rail lines, which Moscow is the main hub for all areas. Stalingrad offers very little prospects for any military value w/o Moscow being taken. You might say Germany poked her head too far into protected Soviet support lines ( not much different than Kursk) and her offense got bogged down.

[Wolfshanze]

I think most of us are in agreement here that Moscow was a very important target, both militarily and politically, and should have been more of a focus of Nazi Germany than dabbing around the northern and southern fronts… which while important for not making a linear drive to Moscow without securing the flanks, doesn’t hold as much importance as Moscow itself.  We may all have slightly different opinions on what makes Moscow the important target and why it failed, but in the end, back to the original point of this thread, it would seem most of us agree that Moscow was indeed very important, and aiming only for Leningrad and Stalingrad/Caucasus, would have been a mistake.

[Argothair]

Fair enough! Thanks, everyone, for your expert analysis.

[ABWorsham4]

@Imperious:

Leningrad first should be taken, only to shorten the front and allow Finnish forces ( and German) to further reach Archangel and cut about 25% of lend lease shipments. Moscow is obviously the #1 target, but taking Leningrad and shortening the front would allow forces to bear from the northern flank and cut rail lines, which Moscow is the main hub for all areas. Stalingrad offers very little prospects for any military value w/o Moscow being taken. You might say Germany poked her head too far into protected Soviet support lines ( not much different than Kursk) and her offense got bogged down.

Army Group North would need more infantry divisions to seriously take Leningrad. The 4th Panzer Army would have been better used in Army Group South; replacing the terrain of lakes and swamps with the wide open wheat fields of the Ukraine. Germany could have pulled twenty divisions from the West in a quest to take Leningrad.

[KurtGodel7]

Very good thread. Thanks to everyone who took the time to create well thought-out contributions. Before getting into my own recommendations, I think it’s important to review the background.

The Soviet Union was not expecting a German invasion. Therefore, the Soviet military was in a purely offensive posture. Also, Germany was more ready for war than Soviet military planners had realized. This created a window of opportunity, during which Germany was able to achieve a 10:1 exchange ratio against Soviet soldiers. (10 Soviets killed or captured for every German.) However, that situation didn’t last forever: the Soviets eventually got their act together, after which the exchange ratio declined to 3:1. At Stalingrad, the Soviets achieved nearly a 1:1 exchange ratio against the Germans. However, there were a number of times when General von Manstein achieved a much better than 3:1 ratio against the Soviets, well after Barbarossa had ended. For example, in the Third Battle of Kharkov (fought in the aftermath of Germany’s defeat at Stalingrad), von Manstein and the Germans achieved a 10:1 exchange ratio. The Soviet Union had a prewar population of 169 million, compared to just 69 million for prewar Germany. The Soviets could afford many more losses than could the Germans.

Any operation against the Soviet Union necessarily had two phases. During phase 1 (quick gains), Germany’s main objective should have been to advance as quickly as possible wherever possible, while capturing or destroying as much Soviet strength as possible. Phase 2 begins once the quick, easy gains end. Phase 2 would be slower and more deliberative than phase 1.

The gains Germany could make during phase 1 were limited not just by the Soviet military, but also by Germany’s supply situation. Germany was a coal-rich, oil-poor nation. Romanian oil production helped offset that, as did Germany’s synthetic oil facilities. But ideally from an oil conservation perspective, Germany’s soldiers would be supplied via coal-powered trains, and horses carrying food from train drop off sites to the soldiers in the field. However, the Soviet rail network was far more limited than Germany’s, the Soviets used a different rail gauge than the Germans, and Stalin had ordered Soviet rail lines destroyed as part of his scorched earth policy. The Wehrmacht was therefore far more dependent on petroleum than it would liked to have been. Germany had only enough petroleum for 2 - 3 months of active operations, after which its operational tempo would slow due to lack of oil. Lack of oil also implied an inability to deliver to German soldiers the things they needed: ammunition, food, medical supplies, and winter uniforms.

I agree with the OP that the Caucasus oilfields were of absolutely vital importance to both Germany and to the Soviet Union. However, Germany’s reach during Barbarossa was shorter than Germans would have liked. (Due to lack of oil.) The closer any given objective was to the front, the easier it would be for Germany to take. The Caucasus oilfields were considerably farther from Germany’s “starting line” than were any of the objectives it actually took during Barbarossa. The conquest of those oilfields would have fundamentally altered both the German and Soviet war efforts. But the capture of those oilfields was not an achievable goal for 1941.

Hitler had initially chosen to de-emphasize Moscow as an objective, preferring instead to focus on territory in the southern portion of the Soviet Union. That southern advance proved fruitful, and resulted in the capture of large numbers of Soviet soldiers. It did not, however, prove decisive. Hitler later changed his mind, and decided to go after Moscow. In an operation such as this, it is typically better to commit to one objective, than it is to vacillate between two different (individually tempting) options. Moscow almost certainly could have been taken, had taking it been a central focus from day one.

I’m skeptical of claims that the capture of Moscow would have resulted in the capture or death of Stalin. Yes, Stalin had remained in the city after the government had been evacuated. But I think the theory there was that it was easier to quietly evacuate one man than a whole government. My understanding is that there was a contingency plan to evacuate Stalin from Moscow if the situation had required it. Had Stalin been killed while trying to evacuate, that obviously would have been a tremendous bonus for the Germans. But the chance of that happening was probably well under 50% even if the city fell, so they would have been rather foolish to rely on it.

However, the capture of Moscow would have deprived the Soviet Union of a major source of industry and of population. It would also have been deprived of its most vital rail network hub; making it extremely difficult for the Soviets to concentrate their soldiers in preparation for an offensive. From a military and industrial perspective, Moscow was the single most valuable target Germany could have taken in 1941, even assuming Stalin escaped. There was also a good opportunity to have taken it in '41–an opportunity which would no longer exist in '42. Germany had also wasted an opportunity to take Leningrad in '41. Once that opportunity slipped away, Leningrad became much better-defended.

Germany needed to have come away from phase 1 owning Moscow, Leningrad, the Ukraine, and a lot of other territory in the western Soviet Union. With that territory in hand, it would then have been well positioned to launch a good summer offensive in 1942.

[Wolfshanze]

@KurtGodel7:

I’m skeptical of claims that the capture of Moscow would have resulted in the capture or death of Stalin. Yes, Stalin had remained in the city after the government had been evacuated. But I think the theory there was that it was easier to quietly evacuate one man than a whole government. My understanding is that there was a contingency plan to evacuate Stalin from Moscow if the situation had required it. Had Stalin been killed while trying to evacuate, that obviously would have been a tremendous bonus for the Germans. But the chance of that happening was probably well under 50% even if the city fell, so they would have been rather foolish to rely on it.

Yes, there were also contingency plans to evacuate Hitler from Berlin if the situation had required it… oddly enough, neither Hitler nor Stalin acted on either contingency plan when the situation required it.  The Soviet government LEFT MOSCOW… except that one guy named Stalin… You see, there’s something Hitler and Stalin both shared, besides messed up families… they were both megalomaniacs who were stubborn and refused to listen to the advice of anyone around them… they both had bunker mentalities and neither had any intention of leaving their capitals… both of them just KNEW that their capitals would not fall, and if they did, well then they didn’t deserve the greatness that was Hitler or Stalin.

Neither Stalin nor Hitler were going anywhere… Stalin ignored his contingency plan… Hitler did too… one city was a little better defended than the other, so one survived while the other did not… but if you think for one moment either megalomaniac was going to abandon his capital after everyone else and left and begged him to come too, you’re crazy for thinking they would.

[Kreuzfeld]

@Wolfshanze:

@KurtGodel7:

I’m skeptical of claims that the capture of Moscow would have resulted in the capture or death of Stalin. Yes, Stalin had remained in the city after the government had been evacuated. But I think the theory there was that it was easier to quietly evacuate one man than a whole government. My understanding is that there was a contingency plan to evacuate Stalin from Moscow if the situation had required it. Had Stalin been killed while trying to evacuate, that obviously would have been a tremendous bonus for the Germans. But the chance of that happening was probably well under 50% even if the city fell, so they would have been rather foolish to rely on it.

Yes, there were also contingency plans to evacuate Hitler from Berlin if the situation had required it… oddly enough, neither Hitler nor Stalin acted on either contingency plan when the situation required it.  The Soviet government LEFT MOSCOW… except that one guy named Stalin… You see, there’s something Hitler and Stalin both shared, besides messed up families… they were both megalomaniacs who were stubborn and refused to listen to the advice of anyone around them… they both had bunker mentalities and neither had any intention of leaving their capitals… both of them just KNEW that their capitals would not fall, and if they did, well then they didn’t deserve the greatness that was Hitler or Stalin.

Neither Stalin nor Hitler were going anywhere… Stalin ignored his contingency plan… Hitler did too… one city was a little better defended than the other, so one survived while the other did not… but if you think for one moment either megalomaniac was going to abandon his capital after everyone else and left and begged him to come too, you’re crazy for thinking they would.

I would not say he ignored it. I think the planned on staying as long as he thought it would help. He could see that him staying would increase the moral of the troops. He would stay as long as that benefit was greater than the possible risks of him losing his life. You could argue that if he left, the chance of moscow falling would increase and the chance of russia losing the war would increase. What would his survival odds be then?

If he waited until the germans where close to kremlin, he could be fairly safely behind the front lines and drive away by car… He could be evacuate by car on 5  minutes notice, the government coudn’t.  If USSR loses stalin but the government survives, the war is not lost, if they lose the beurocrats, the archives, gold reserves and reccords, the war is lost even if stalin survives.

There is a youtubevideo that touches upon the plans and the strategic misstakes. I agree alot with the guy, it is very relevant to this thread

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7Clz27nghIg

[CWO Marc]

@Kreuzfeld:

I would not say he ignored it. I think the planned on staying as long as he thought it would help. He could see that him staying would increase the moral of the troops. He would stay as long as that benefit was greater than the possible risks of him losing his life. You could argue that if he left, the chance of moscow falling would increase and the chance of russia losing the war would increase. What would his survival odds be then?

If he waited until the germans where close to kremlin, he could be fairly safely behind the front lines and drive away by car… He could be evacuate by car on 5  minutes notice, the government coudn’t.  If USSR loses stalin but the government survives, the war is not lost, if they lose the beurocrats, the archives, gold reserves and reccords, the war is lost even if stalin survives.

The 1970s BBC TV series The World at War includes an interview with a Russian general who says that, during the German advance towards Moscow, the morale of the Red Army was boosted enormously when Stalin – whose initial reaction to Barbarossa was to go into seclusion, and who was apparently worried for a while that he might be the target of a coup d’etat – appeared in public somewhere in Moscow (at Red Square, as I recall) and gave a rousing speech to the troops.  According to the general, the soldiers were encouraged and impressed (perhaps because they had doubts beforehand) by the fact that Stalin was there in the capital, that he had not run away, and that he had retained his nerve.  It’s a believable reaction because soldiers, regardless of their nationality or of the political system by which they are governed, are greatly influenced (for good or bad) by the way in which they perceive their leadership, and by the signals that their leaders send out about how the leaders themselves view a war situation.  A case in point: on the night before the Royal Navy caught up with the Bismarck and sank her, Admiral Lutjens sent a radio signal to his superiors ashore saying, if I remember correctly, “Ship unmaneuvrable.  We fight to the last shell.  Long live the Fuehrer.”  News of this message promptly ran through the ship’s company, and it had the effect of a huge wet blanket being thrown over the crewmembers, who basically interpreted it to mean “We’re doomed.”  Captain Lindemann tried to restore morale by getting on the ship’s intercom and giving the crew a more optimistic appraisal of the situation (pointing out, among other things, that the ships’ main and secondary armaments were completely intact), but the damage had already been done.

So getting back to Stalin, I can see that the optimal strategy for him (the one he appears to have taken) was to stay in the capital – and to make a public show of the fact that he was still in the capital – for as long as possible in order to bolster morale, while at the same time quietly keeping a quick escape route open for use at the last minute in the eventuality that Moscow was about to fall.  Conversely, the worst option would have been for him to decamp while the Germans were still far away from Moscow, since this would have sent a pretty clear signal to the troops (and the civilian population) that he was convinced that the capital would fall.  This signal would actually have increased the chances that Moscow would fall, since it would have demoralized its defenders.