@Private:
I watched an interesting documentary the other night that argued that the higher loss of British ships was caused by shortcuts taken to deliver shells to the gun turrets more quickly, with doors propped open, allowing exploding gun turrets to propel the explosion down into the weapons stores below.
A lesser suggestion was that Beatty’s gung-ho bellicosity and poor communications (i.e. relying on signal flags in poor visibility across miles of ocean) resulted in his force being outgunned for much of the battle.
Any thoughts on those points?
The part you mentioned about shell delivery in the turrets is what I was talking about when I mentioned the lack of proper anti-flash shutters. Such shutters slow down the delivery of shells, but they offer protection against one of the biggest dangers that big-gun ships face: having an enemy shell burst inside a main gun turret at the same moment when an unprotected (meaning non-shuttered) shell hoist is open, thus allowing the flash of the exploding shell to travel all the way down into the powder magazines, whose detonation can blow a battleship apart. Proper anti-flash shutters can limit the damage to the struck turret; its crew will be killed, but the ship will survive. The 1989 Turret 2 explosion on the USS Iowa is a sad but dramatic example: the turret crew was lost, but the anti-flash shutters saved the ship itself from being destroyed, which is exactly what they were designed to do.
I’m not familiar with the Beatty element you mentioned, so I can’t really comment on its specifics. However, the German and British battlecruiser forces at Jutland (the latter commanded by Beatty) were each trying to lure tne opposite force towards their main body of battleships (which they both did successfully), so I’m not sure it’s correct to say that Beatty was outgunned for most of the engagement.