We would have cut off all ties with them. The next one would have been a declaration of war.
What if Hitler aimed *only* for Leningrad and Stalingrad in 1941?
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I think most of us are in agreement here that Moscow was a very important target, both militarily and politically, and should have been more of a focus of Nazi Germany than dabbing around the northern and southern fronts… which while important for not making a linear drive to Moscow without securing the flanks, doesn’t hold as much importance as Moscow itself. We may all have slightly different opinions on what makes Moscow the important target and why it failed, but in the end, back to the original point of this thread, it would seem most of us agree that Moscow was indeed very important, and aiming only for Leningrad and Stalingrad/Caucasus, would have been a mistake.
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Fair enough! Thanks, everyone, for your expert analysis.
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@Imperious:
Leningrad first should be taken, only to shorten the front and allow Finnish forces ( and German) to further reach Archangel and cut about 25% of lend lease shipments. Moscow is obviously the #1 target, but taking Leningrad and shortening the front would allow forces to bear from the northern flank and cut rail lines, which Moscow is the main hub for all areas. Stalingrad offers very little prospects for any military value w/o Moscow being taken. You might say Germany poked her head too far into protected Soviet support lines ( not much different than Kursk) and her offense got bogged down.
Army Group North would need more infantry divisions to seriously take Leningrad. The 4th Panzer Army would have been better used in Army Group South; replacing the terrain of lakes and swamps with the wide open wheat fields of the Ukraine. Germany could have pulled twenty divisions from the West in a quest to take Leningrad.
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Very good thread. Thanks to everyone who took the time to create well thought-out contributions. Before getting into my own recommendations, I think it’s important to review the background.
The Soviet Union was not expecting a German invasion. Therefore, the Soviet military was in a purely offensive posture. Also, Germany was more ready for war than Soviet military planners had realized. This created a window of opportunity, during which Germany was able to achieve a 10:1 exchange ratio against Soviet soldiers. (10 Soviets killed or captured for every German.) However, that situation didn’t last forever: the Soviets eventually got their act together, after which the exchange ratio declined to 3:1. At Stalingrad, the Soviets achieved nearly a 1:1 exchange ratio against the Germans. However, there were a number of times when General von Manstein achieved a much better than 3:1 ratio against the Soviets, well after Barbarossa had ended. For example, in the Third Battle of Kharkov (fought in the aftermath of Germany’s defeat at Stalingrad), von Manstein and the Germans achieved a 10:1 exchange ratio. The Soviet Union had a prewar population of 169 million, compared to just 69 million for prewar Germany. The Soviets could afford many more losses than could the Germans.
Any operation against the Soviet Union necessarily had two phases. During phase 1 (quick gains), Germany’s main objective should have been to advance as quickly as possible wherever possible, while capturing or destroying as much Soviet strength as possible. Phase 2 begins once the quick, easy gains end. Phase 2 would be slower and more deliberative than phase 1.
The gains Germany could make during phase 1 were limited not just by the Soviet military, but also by Germany’s supply situation. Germany was a coal-rich, oil-poor nation. Romanian oil production helped offset that, as did Germany’s synthetic oil facilities. But ideally from an oil conservation perspective, Germany’s soldiers would be supplied via coal-powered trains, and horses carrying food from train drop off sites to the soldiers in the field. However, the Soviet rail network was far more limited than Germany’s, the Soviets used a different rail gauge than the Germans, and Stalin had ordered Soviet rail lines destroyed as part of his scorched earth policy. The Wehrmacht was therefore far more dependent on petroleum than it would liked to have been. Germany had only enough petroleum for 2 - 3 months of active operations, after which its operational tempo would slow due to lack of oil. Lack of oil also implied an inability to deliver to German soldiers the things they needed: ammunition, food, medical supplies, and winter uniforms.
I agree with the OP that the Caucasus oilfields were of absolutely vital importance to both Germany and to the Soviet Union. However, Germany’s reach during Barbarossa was shorter than Germans would have liked. (Due to lack of oil.) The closer any given objective was to the front, the easier it would be for Germany to take. The Caucasus oilfields were considerably farther from Germany’s “starting line” than were any of the objectives it actually took during Barbarossa. The conquest of those oilfields would have fundamentally altered both the German and Soviet war efforts. But the capture of those oilfields was not an achievable goal for 1941.
Hitler had initially chosen to de-emphasize Moscow as an objective, preferring instead to focus on territory in the southern portion of the Soviet Union. That southern advance proved fruitful, and resulted in the capture of large numbers of Soviet soldiers. It did not, however, prove decisive. Hitler later changed his mind, and decided to go after Moscow. In an operation such as this, it is typically better to commit to one objective, than it is to vacillate between two different (individually tempting) options. Moscow almost certainly could have been taken, had taking it been a central focus from day one.
I’m skeptical of claims that the capture of Moscow would have resulted in the capture or death of Stalin. Yes, Stalin had remained in the city after the government had been evacuated. But I think the theory there was that it was easier to quietly evacuate one man than a whole government. My understanding is that there was a contingency plan to evacuate Stalin from Moscow if the situation had required it. Had Stalin been killed while trying to evacuate, that obviously would have been a tremendous bonus for the Germans. But the chance of that happening was probably well under 50% even if the city fell, so they would have been rather foolish to rely on it.
However, the capture of Moscow would have deprived the Soviet Union of a major source of industry and of population. It would also have been deprived of its most vital rail network hub; making it extremely difficult for the Soviets to concentrate their soldiers in preparation for an offensive. From a military and industrial perspective, Moscow was the single most valuable target Germany could have taken in 1941, even assuming Stalin escaped. There was also a good opportunity to have taken it in '41–an opportunity which would no longer exist in '42. Germany had also wasted an opportunity to take Leningrad in '41. Once that opportunity slipped away, Leningrad became much better-defended.
Germany needed to have come away from phase 1 owning Moscow, Leningrad, the Ukraine, and a lot of other territory in the western Soviet Union. With that territory in hand, it would then have been well positioned to launch a good summer offensive in 1942.
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I’m skeptical of claims that the capture of Moscow would have resulted in the capture or death of Stalin. Yes, Stalin had remained in the city after the government had been evacuated. But I think the theory there was that it was easier to quietly evacuate one man than a whole government. My understanding is that there was a contingency plan to evacuate Stalin from Moscow if the situation had required it. Had Stalin been killed while trying to evacuate, that obviously would have been a tremendous bonus for the Germans. But the chance of that happening was probably well under 50% even if the city fell, so they would have been rather foolish to rely on it.
Yes, there were also contingency plans to evacuate Hitler from Berlin if the situation had required it… oddly enough, neither Hitler nor Stalin acted on either contingency plan when the situation required it. The Soviet government LEFT MOSCOW… except that one guy named Stalin… You see, there’s something Hitler and Stalin both shared, besides messed up families… they were both megalomaniacs who were stubborn and refused to listen to the advice of anyone around them… they both had bunker mentalities and neither had any intention of leaving their capitals… both of them just KNEW that their capitals would not fall, and if they did, well then they didn’t deserve the greatness that was Hitler or Stalin.
Neither Stalin nor Hitler were going anywhere… Stalin ignored his contingency plan… Hitler did too… one city was a little better defended than the other, so one survived while the other did not… but if you think for one moment either megalomaniac was going to abandon his capital after everyone else and left and begged him to come too, you’re crazy for thinking they would.
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I’m skeptical of claims that the capture of Moscow would have resulted in the capture or death of Stalin. Yes, Stalin had remained in the city after the government had been evacuated. But I think the theory there was that it was easier to quietly evacuate one man than a whole government. My understanding is that there was a contingency plan to evacuate Stalin from Moscow if the situation had required it. Had Stalin been killed while trying to evacuate, that obviously would have been a tremendous bonus for the Germans. But the chance of that happening was probably well under 50% even if the city fell, so they would have been rather foolish to rely on it.
Yes, there were also contingency plans to evacuate Hitler from Berlin if the situation had required it… oddly enough, neither Hitler nor Stalin acted on either contingency plan when the situation required it. The Soviet government LEFT MOSCOW… except that one guy named Stalin… You see, there’s something Hitler and Stalin both shared, besides messed up families… they were both megalomaniacs who were stubborn and refused to listen to the advice of anyone around them… they both had bunker mentalities and neither had any intention of leaving their capitals… both of them just KNEW that their capitals would not fall, and if they did, well then they didn’t deserve the greatness that was Hitler or Stalin.
Neither Stalin nor Hitler were going anywhere… Stalin ignored his contingency plan… Hitler did too… one city was a little better defended than the other, so one survived while the other did not… but if you think for one moment either megalomaniac was going to abandon his capital after everyone else and left and begged him to come too, you’re crazy for thinking they would.
I would not say he ignored it. I think the planned on staying as long as he thought it would help. He could see that him staying would increase the moral of the troops. He would stay as long as that benefit was greater than the possible risks of him losing his life. You could argue that if he left, the chance of moscow falling would increase and the chance of russia losing the war would increase. What would his survival odds be then?
If he waited until the germans where close to kremlin, he could be fairly safely behind the front lines and drive away by car… He could be evacuate by car on 5 minutes notice, the government coudn’t. If USSR loses stalin but the government survives, the war is not lost, if they lose the beurocrats, the archives, gold reserves and reccords, the war is lost even if stalin survives.
There is a youtubevideo that touches upon the plans and the strategic misstakes. I agree alot with the guy, it is very relevant to this thread
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I would not say he ignored it. I think the planned on staying as long as he thought it would help. He could see that him staying would increase the moral of the troops. He would stay as long as that benefit was greater than the possible risks of him losing his life. You could argue that if he left, the chance of moscow falling would increase and the chance of russia losing the war would increase. What would his survival odds be then?
If he waited until the germans where close to kremlin, he could be fairly safely behind the front lines and drive away by car… He could be evacuate by car on 5 minutes notice, the government coudn’t. If USSR loses stalin but the government survives, the war is not lost, if they lose the beurocrats, the archives, gold reserves and reccords, the war is lost even if stalin survives.
The 1970s BBC TV series The World at War includes an interview with a Russian general who says that, during the German advance towards Moscow, the morale of the Red Army was boosted enormously when Stalin – whose initial reaction to Barbarossa was to go into seclusion, and who was apparently worried for a while that he might be the target of a coup d’etat – appeared in public somewhere in Moscow (at Red Square, as I recall) and gave a rousing speech to the troops. According to the general, the soldiers were encouraged and impressed (perhaps because they had doubts beforehand) by the fact that Stalin was there in the capital, that he had not run away, and that he had retained his nerve. It’s a believable reaction because soldiers, regardless of their nationality or of the political system by which they are governed, are greatly influenced (for good or bad) by the way in which they perceive their leadership, and by the signals that their leaders send out about how the leaders themselves view a war situation. A case in point: on the night before the Royal Navy caught up with the Bismarck and sank her, Admiral Lutjens sent a radio signal to his superiors ashore saying, if I remember correctly, “Ship unmaneuvrable. We fight to the last shell. Long live the Fuehrer.” News of this message promptly ran through the ship’s company, and it had the effect of a huge wet blanket being thrown over the crewmembers, who basically interpreted it to mean “We’re doomed.” Captain Lindemann tried to restore morale by getting on the ship’s intercom and giving the crew a more optimistic appraisal of the situation (pointing out, among other things, that the ships’ main and secondary armaments were completely intact), but the damage had already been done.
So getting back to Stalin, I can see that the optimal strategy for him (the one he appears to have taken) was to stay in the capital – and to make a public show of the fact that he was still in the capital – for as long as possible in order to bolster morale, while at the same time quietly keeping a quick escape route open for use at the last minute in the eventuality that Moscow was about to fall. Conversely, the worst option would have been for him to decamp while the Germans were still far away from Moscow, since this would have sent a pretty clear signal to the troops (and the civilian population) that he was convinced that the capital would fall. This signal would actually have increased the chances that Moscow would fall, since it would have demoralized its defenders.
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Don’t forget, unlike France or Norway surrender was no survivable option for the Russian population. Hitler made very clear quite early that he considered them “subhuman” and GeStaPo and SS did their deadly job in notorious german thouroughness in Poland, Belarus and Ukraine. So I’m not sure if taking the capital would have ended the war in Russia - perhaps the regular war, but not the need for massive amount of troops there. I’m pretty sure the long term need and lack of administrational staff and police for this vast area with millions of deads causing disobeyance and riots would have been more than a pain in the a… for the Reich.
The Nazi dictature based on nationalism including/featuring hatred towards Jews and Slaws, denunciation and a powerful police - that wouldn’t have worked there. But on second thought, they might have been able to get some russians to help and give some incentives like surviving a month longer… It would have been hell on earth.In the end Hitler had not enough of his beloved true blood Germans to realize his megalomaniac ideas - you don’t make many friends by hating them constitutionally.
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@Wicked:
Don’t forget, unlike France or Norway surrender was no survivable option for the Russian population. Hitler made very clear quite early that he considered them “subhuman” and GeStaPo and SS did their deadly job in notorious german thouroughness in Poland, Belarus and Ukraine. So I’m not sure if taking the capital would have ended the war in Russia - perhaps the regular war, but not the need for massive amount of troops there. I’m pretty sure the long term need and lack of administrational staff and police for this vast area with millions of deads causing disobeyance and riots would have been more than a pain in the a… for the Reich.
The Nazi dictature based on nationalism including/featuring hatred towards Jews and Slaws, denunciation and a powerful police - that wouldn’t have worked there. But on second thought, they might have been able to get some russians to help and give some incentives like surviving a month longer… It would have been hell on earth.In the end Hitler had not enough of his beloved true blood Germans to realize his megalomaniac ideas - you don’t make many friends by hating them constitutionally.
An important part of German planning for the postwar period included the intention of forcibly relocating 30 - 50 million Poles eastward, to make room for German expansion. Had the Allied food blockade still been in effect, the deaths of large numbers of Poles along the way would have been considered an acceptable way of relieving pressure on Germany’s food supply; thereby preventing the starvation of an equal number of non-Poles.
During the war, the combination of the Allied food blockade and Stalin’s scorched earth tactics made it impossible for Germany to feed all the people within the lands it had conquered from the Soviet Union. The physical impossibility of Germany feeding those people proved a boon for Soviet propagandists; who took advantage of the situation by claiming that Germany planned to starve or kill all the people of the conquered Soviet Union. Soviet propagandists were not normally considered a highly reliable source of information. In this instance, however, the fact that large numbers of people in German-occupied portions of the Soviet Union were actually starving seemed to lend a hint of credibility to these claims.
As the war in Europe became increasingly less favorable for Germany, large numbers of Soviet civilians fled west into Germany. The westward flight of many Soviet civilians demonstrates that not all Soviet citizens believed Soviet wartime propaganda.
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