Taking charge of the wehrmacht in late 1941

  • '17 '16

    1. End the racism side of National Socialism and and act like a liberator in the Soviet Union. A lot of people didn’t like being under the yoke of Stalin and the Soviet Union.    2. A very high priority given to getting winter gear now to the troops.  3. The  no retreat order was wrong the line needed to be pulled back and settled in for some winter quarters. Winter offences take a toll on your troops and equipment. Only in hindsight do we now know that the no retreat order worked but I feel that still they should have put the troops in a position of staying warm,refitting,defending and making plans for the '42 drive on Moscow or the Caucasus. You really need to end this war in the east this '42 year so you can turn your attention to the defense of the Third Reich. America is coming. I don’t think the Germans realized what America’s production was really capable of, it boggles the mind.  4. Do not declare war on the U.S. Plan for a war but make them declare it. Make sure that U.S. flagged ships are off limits that will be the catylist for the U.S. to declare war. i.e. WWI.


  • @General:

     1. End the racism side of National Socialism and and act like a liberator in the Soviet Union. A lot of people didn’t like being under the yoke of Stalin and the Soviet Union.Â

    Yes, a lot of people in the western USSR would have been quite happy to be freed from Stalinist domination if the Germans had marched into the region with a progressive agenda and tolerant attitudes, which in turn would have been beneficial to the German war effort since controlling a region as liberators is a lot less work-intensive than controlling it as conquerors.  However, the chances of “ending the racism side of National Socialism” were basically zero since racial and ethnic intolerance was a concept woven throughout the fabric of Nazi ideology, and a core principle of Hitler’s view of the world.  The only way for the German war effort on the Eastern Front to have been divorced from its anti-Semitic, anti-Slav, anti-Bolshevik elements would have been for the Wehrmacht to assassinate Hitler prior to Barbarossa, arrest and/or kill the other senior members of the Nazi regime, neutralize the SS, and to take control of the country as part of some sort of alternate regime – possibly a military junta fronted by a nominally civilian administration – which would want to extend the war to Russia rather than keeping it confined to Britain (or better yet seeking peace with Britain by blaming the war on Hitler).


  • @General:

    1. End the racism side of National Socialism and and act like a liberator in the Soviet Union. A lot of people didn’t like being under the yoke of Stalin and the Soviet Union. 2. A very high priority given to getting winter gear now to the troops. 3. The no retreat order was wrong the line needed to be pulled back and settled in for some winter quarters. Winter offences take a toll on your troops and equipment. Only in hindsight do we now know that the no retreat order worked but I feel that still they should have put the troops in a position of staying warm,refitting,defending and making plans for the '42 drive on Moscow or the Caucasus. You really need to end this war in the east this '42 year so you can turn your attention to the defense of the Third Reich. America is coming. I don’t think the Germans realized what America’s production was really capable of, it boggles the mind. 4. Do not declare war on the U.S. Plan for a war but make them declare it. Make sure that U.S. flagged ships are off limits that will be the catylist for the U.S. to declare war. i.e. WWI.

    Good post! :)

    1. End the racism side of National Socialism and and act like a liberator in the Soviet Union.

    I agree with this up to a point. However, it’s worth noting that the Western democracies had imposed a food blockade on Germany; and the Soviet Union used scorched earth tactics to destroy or remove food supplies, crops, and farming equipment. Germany’s food situation/food shortfall was so dire that 20 - 30 million people would starve or otherwise be exterminated.

    The German government had the ability to influence–but not completely control–which 20 - 30 million people starved. The plan had been to starve captured Soviet cities. But Germany lacked the manpower needed to prevent food from flowing from captured Soviet farms to captured Soviet cities. The plan to starve these cities mostly failed. As a consequence of this failure, Germany was unable to feed the Soviet POWs working in German weapons plants; even though Hitler had ordered this latter group to be fed.

    2. A very high priority given to getting winter gear now to the troops.

    Agreed. Germany’s inability to adequately clothe its troops was a consequence of its lack of oil and its resultant supply problems. Given a relatively static front, Germany would use coal-powered trains to move supplies most of the way toward its troops, and horses to move supplies the rest of the way. This supply system could not work as intended during a rapid advance; both because Stalin destroyed the rail lines leading into the Soviet Union (scorched earth) and because the Soviet rail gauge was different from Germany’s anyway. To supplement this supply system, Germany used a limited number of military trucks and a limited amount of fuel.

    This allowed its supply system to stretch somewhat beyond the limits of the normal train-and-horse system. But toward the end of '41, Germany had reached the limits of even this motorized supply system. Not only were German troops inadequately supplied with winter gear, they lacked adequate food supplies, ammunition, or medical supplies. Your suggestion of a minor withdrawal would have helped the supply situation.

    You really need to end this war in the east this '42 year so you can turn your attention
    to the defense of the Third Reich. America is coming.

    The Reich leadership was aware of the above. Had Germany conquered as much Soviet territory in '42 as it had in '41, Stalin’s ability to offer further resistance would have been crippled. Unfortunately for Germany, the Soviet Union’s production was overwhelming. During '42, the Soviets produced 3 - 4 times as much as Germany in nearly every major land weapons category; and produced almost twice as many military aircraft. Add to that the fact that no German medium tank from '42 was as good as the T-34, and the situation became dire. To make matters worse, Germany had expected to encounter 200 Soviet divisions. By late '41, the Red Army consisted of a staggering 600 divisions–several times the strength of its German opponent.

    4. Do not declare war on the U.S. Plan for a war but make them declare it.

    Agreed. Pro-war politicians and members of the economic elite would have succeeded in getting the U.S. into the war eventually, almost no matter what Hitler did. But the strategy you have suggested would have bought Hitler some time. Granted, the U.S. would still have been wildly producing weapons, and would have sent those weapons to the Soviet Union and Britain. But if the U.S. was technically at peace, perhaps that flow of weapons into Europe would have been somewhat slower. Also, Germany wouldn’t have had to deal with the U.S. Army–at least not until the U.S. eventually declared war. That army was in Algeria in late '42, in Italy in '43, in France in '44, and in Germany in '45. Had Hitler been able to delay the U.S. declaration of war by two years, that would have bought him two extra years in which the German Army could focus most of its attention on the Soviet problem.

    The reason Germany declared war in December of '41 was because Hitler believed, probably correctly, that war with the U.S. was inevitable; and because he thought he saw an opportunity to sink the massive numbers of American ships sending tanks, planes, artillery, and other weapons to the Soviet Union and to Britain. Germany’s sub war against those ships was initially a success, and may have allowed German summer offensives against the Soviet Union to have been more successful than would otherwise have been the case.

    Possibly Germany’s best strategy would have been to seek to conserve its strength and delay Allied successes. Between '42 and '44 Germany tripled its weapons production. Also by '44, Germany had deployed or was close to deploying some very advanced new weapons. Jets, air-to-air missiles, air-to-surface missiles, smart bombs, by far the best handheld anti-tank weapons of the war, assault rifles, Entwicklung Series tanks, and Type XXI U-boats. If by '45 its strength had remained relatively intact, it’s quite possible these new weapons would have allowed it to defeat the Soviet Union in the east, while holding its own in the air and sea war in the west.


  • …but what would be your decissions as a leader in charge of the Wehrmacht in’41 KurtGodel7 and General Haig ??

    @poloplayer15:

    The Battle of Moscow has just ended in a German Defeat. Hitler is killed in an automobile accident and you are now in charge of leading the Germans through the Winter and subsequent summer offensive. You are still convinced that the war can be one so surrender or making peace is out of the Question. Leningrad and Sevastopol are sill being besieged. You have the strength for only one of your three army groups to launch an offensive. What is your proposed offensive to the OKW?

    Racism was only a political instrument so as the Food blockade, but what would you choose to do in 41?

  • Customizer

    @poloplayer15:

    The Battle of Moscow has just ended in a German Defeat. Hitler is killed in an automobile accident and you are now in charge of leading the Germans through the Winter and subsequent summer offensive. You are still convinced that the war can be one so surrender or making peace is out of the Question. Leningrad and Sevastopol are sill being besieged. You have the strength for only one of your three army groups to launch an offensive. What is your proposed offensive to the OKW?

    Another crack at Moscow was not going to happen.  That is obvious.

    Likely I would have felt just as the Germans did that Leningrad would fall with more pressure, but I would not have deprived them of the units needed to complete the task as Hitler did.

    For a major offensive, I probably would have gone with Operation Blue and driven to the Caucasus as well.  It would have made sense in that the oil (assuming the wells could be captured intact) were sorely needed.  The success of the operation would have gone a long way in persuading Turkey to join the Axis, thereby contesting all of the Middle East.

    Hopefully I would not have been caught in the same trap as Hitler and divide up my forces and try to accomplish 2 tasks at the same time, and leave Stalingrad alone until the south was secured.  But chances are I would have gambled on trying to  take it quickly, just as Hitler did.  (I may be a wargame addict, but I am no real life general).

    With Hindsight, I agree with the others that a negotiated settlement was the best way to go to end things.

  • Customizer

    At this point in time, I think the US was the major exporter of oil.  The big oil fields in Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia hadn’t been discovered or exploited yet.

    I believe.


  • @jim010:

    At this point in time, I think the US was the major exporter of oil.  The big oil fields in Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia hadn’t been discovered or exploited yet. I believe.

    The oil industry in Saudi Arabia at that point was still in its infancy, but Iran and/or Iraq were significant producers (I can’t recall if it was one or both).  Richard Overy’s book Why The Allies Won states (based on a reference I can’t recall to a book which analyzes the role of oil in WWII) that by around 1941 most of Britain’s oil was coming from the Americas.


  • @aequitas:

    …but what would be your decissions as a leader in charge of the Wehrmacht in’41 KurtGodel7 and General Haig ??

    Excellent question. Hitler had two problems:

    1. The Western problem. The U.S. in particular had more weapons production capacity than Germany. Neither FDR nor Churchill had any interest in a negotiated settlement. FDR’s death didn’t help anything: Truman dropped two atomic bombs on Japan because the Japanese wanted a conditional surrender (with very reasonable conditions); whereas Truman insisted on an unconditional surrender. Any German war strategy has to assume that British and American willingness to reasonably negotiate was precisely zero.

    2. The Soviet problem. There was a concern that, once Stalin felt the U.S.S.R. was ready for war, and once he felt Germany had been sufficiently weakened by the Western democracies, the Soviet Union would invade. Even the mere threat of Soviet invasion would force Germany to deploy large numbers of divisions on its eastern front; thereby weakening its ability to resist an Anglo-American invasion of France or Italy. If Germany ever became sufficiently weak, or Stalin sufficiently strong, a potential Soviet invasion would become an actual invasion.

    Had Germany been able to completely solve one of these problems, it would probably have been strong enough to hold out indefinitely against the other. But the combination of these two problems spelled near-certain strategic doom. Germany had several options for solving these problems:

    1. Chemical weapons. German chemical weapons technology was at least ten years ahead of the Allies’. The United States was willing to use nuclear weapons against civilian populations. A civilian killed by a nuclear weapon is no less dead than a civilian killed by chemical gas. If the U.S. was willing to use nuclear weapons to force Japan to exit the war in '45, perhaps Germany should have considered using chemical weapons on London or Manchester to force Britain to agree to peace in '40. Chemical weapons could also have been productively used on the eastern front; both in pitched battles such as Kursk; and against besieged cities like Leningrad. The downside to this strategy is that the Allies would have responded with chemical weapons of their own; albeit with less effective chemical weaponry than Germany.

    2. Delayed war against the Soviet Union. As Imperious Leader pointed out, there was a period in late '41 when Stalin wanted peace. Had Germany contented itself with the Soviet territory it had already conquered, it could have bought itself several years of having no eastern front. Hitler could have also delayed the U.S. entry into the war by several years by refusing to declare war against the U.S. With neither the U.S. nor the Red Army turned against Germany, Hitler could have turned his attention to Turkey. Turkey could have become a springboard into the Middle East. Not only would Middle Eastern territorial gains weaken Britain’s ability to resist; Germany would also gain vital oil supplies. Its food problems could be resolved through grain imports from the Soviet Union, as part of the peace treaty between Hitler and Stalin.

    It could be pointed out that this second option would merely delay Germany’s problems without actually solving them. An actual solution would need to come from four things. 1) Use the threat of chemical weapons to offset the strategic threat of America’s nuclear program. 2) Recruitment of large numbers of non-Germans to serve in the German Army. 3) Dramatic increases in military production. 4) A significant technological edge over the Allies in jets, handheld antitank weapons, tanks, aircraft-launched missiles, u-boats, and other important categories. Had Germany been successful at all four categories, the world might have entered a three-way cold war; with the democracies on one side, Germany on another, and the Soviet Union on a third side.

  • Customizer

    1. The Western problem. The U.S. in particular had more weapons production capacity than Germany. Neither FDR nor Churchill had any interest in a negotiated settlement. FDR’s death didn’t help anything: Truman dropped two atomic bombs on Japan because the Japanese wanted a conditional surrender (with very reasonable conditions); whereas Truman insisted on an unconditional surrender. Any German war strategy has to assume that British and American willingness to reasonably negotiate was precisely zero.

    Well said.

    2. The Soviet problem. There was a concern that, once Stalin felt the U.S.S.R. was ready for war, and once he felt Germany had been sufficiently weakened by the Western democracies, the Soviet Union would invade. Even the mere threat of Soviet invasion would force Germany to deploy large numbers of divisions on its eastern front; thereby weakening its ability to resist an Anglo-American invasion of France or Italy. If Germany ever became sufficiently weak, or Stalin sufficiently strong, a potential Soviet invasion would become an actual invasion.

    I thought that I had read somewhere that Kruschev (or some other political figure) stated that Stalin viewed the Soviet Nazi Non-aggression Pact as stalling for time.  That the intention was to act when the timing was right and teh German invasion f’ed that all up.  That would support your statement if I remembered that right.
    Had Germany been able to completely solve one of these problems, it would probably have been strong enough to hold out indefinitely against the other. But the combination of these two problems spelled near-certain strategic doom. Germany had several options for solving these problems:

    1. Chemical weapons. German chemical weapons technology was at least ten years ahead of the Allies’. The United States was willing to use nuclear weapons against civilian populations. A civilian killed by a nuclear weapon is no less dead than a civilian killed by chemical gas. If the U.S. was willing to use nuclear weapons to force Japan to exit the war in '45, perhaps Germany should have considered using chemical weapons on London or Manchester to force Britain to agree to peace in '40. Chemical weapons could also have been productively used on the eastern front; both in pitched battles such as Kursk; and against besieged cities like Leningrad. The downside to this strategy is that the Allies would have responded with chemical weapons of their own; albeit with less effective chemical weaponry than Germany.

    Might have also hardened the Allied stance against Germany even more.

    1. Delayed war against the Soviet Union. As Imperious Leader pointed out, there was a period in late '41 when Stalin wanted peace. Had Germany contented itself with the Soviet territory it had already conquered, it could have bought itself several years of having no eastern front. Hitler could have also delayed the U.S. entry into the war by several years by refusing to declare war against the U.S. With neither the U.S. nor the Red Army turned against Germany, Hitler could have turned his attention to Turkey. Turkey could have become a springboard into the Middle East. Not only would Middle Eastern territorial gains weaken Britain’s ability to resist; Germany would also gain vital oil supplies. Its food problems could be resolved through grain imports from the Soviet Union, as part of the peace treaty between Hitler and Stalin.

    Are you suggesting an invasion of Turkey or winning them over?  An invasion I think is a non-starter.  Terrain would be VERY difficult to conduct operations on the scale needed.

    It could be pointed out that this second option would merely delay Germany’s problems without actually solving them. An actual solution would need to come from four things. 1) Use the threat of chemical weapons to offset the strategic threat of America’s nuclear program. 2) Recruitment of large numbers of non-Germans to serve in the German Army. 3) Dramatic increases in military production. 4) A significant technological edge over the Allies in jets, handheld antitank weapons, tanks, aircraft-launched missiles, u-boats, and other important categories. Had Germany been successful at all four categories, the world might have entered a three-way cold war; with the democracies on one side, Germany on another, and the Soviet Union on a third side.

    Interesting thought.

    I still think gas attacks would simply have justified the use of nukes in the eyes of the Allies.  As you pointed out, they had no problems with dropping the bomb … twice.  And fire bombing was just another means to an end.


  • Pull back make lines shorter and hope withe a good defense you can force a peace at some point no way the Germans could of ever win world war 2 . The biggest mistake they made was a invasion of Poland cause that brought the United Kingdom into the fight and the sun never sets on the British empire


  • How to win it in late 41…  good one.

    To begin with I would kill corp. Hitler.  That dumb ass got Germany in the predicament it was in in the first palce.

    That being said you keep pushing on Moscow because the logistics of moving troops is what killed Germany.  Is the Caucus a better objective - yes.  But Corp. Hitler didn’t figure that out until it was too late.  Germany may not have gotten the same fruits of capturing the oilfields (which should have been their major objective in 41), but they would have taken Moscow which was the locomotive hub of the USSR (not to mention, the capital.

    The logistics of transferring the troops was a stupid play at that point.  He should have kept the focus on Moscow and broke them there, than take his Moscow forces and move them where they needed to go.  At all 3 Russian fronts Corp. Hitler never won… because when he had overwhelming force he never finished the fight.

    WW2 history is kind of funny in that you think “thank god Hitler was so crazy that he lost the war”, but at the same time it is also “how did this crazy person get in charge in the first place?”

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