Surrender of Japan

[John Brown]

Like Baron said, when the Soviets declared war on Japan, it was too much for them. It would be better to surrender to the US than to be occupied under the communist rule.

[baron Münchhausen]

@John:

Like Baron said, when the Soviets declared war on Japan, it was too much for them. It would be better to surrender to the US than to be occupied under the communist rule.

Noteworthy argument I think, John B., from the Japanese perspective.

This quote from CWO Marc is much on the topic here to be read by more people:
@CWO:

It’s no more correct to say that the Soviet invasion of Machuria was the single factor that caused Japan to surrender (whereas other factors did not) than to argue that the A-bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was the the single factor that caused Japan to surrender (whereas other factors did not).  Japan’s capitulation was brought on by a combination of factors, so it’s simplistic to declare one to be decisive and to discount the others.  The American submarine campaign against the Japanese shipping routes had the effect, over several years, of starving Japan of oil and other vital supplies.  The American advance in the South-West Pacific and in the Central Pacific dealt Japan a succession of military defeats, thus eroding the twin myths 1) that Japanese troops and sailors and airmen were invincible, and 2) that the decadent, undisciplined, un-militaristic and soft-living Americans did not have any convictions for which they were willing to fight and die.  The American advance ultimately enabled the US, once it had seized the Marianas, to reach Japan from their air with large-scale strategic bombing missions, and in the following months they gradually burned most of Japan’s major cities to the ground.  The American capture of Okinawa, right on Japan’s doorstep, demonstrated that the US had the means and the will to mount a full-scale invasion of the Japanese home islands.

So: by the time of the summer of 1945, Japan was economically and militarily close to collapse.  It could still have managed to stay in the war a while longer by scraping the bottom of the barrel – much as Germany managed to stay in the war until its tropps were practically fighting back to back down the middle of a devastated Germany – but its situation was hopeless and its only two options were to either give up or to fight to the proverbial last man (including, as was envisioned by some Japanese leaders, starving civilians armed with bamboo spears) in an act of national suicide.  Japan’s leadership dithered between these two options, unable to reach a consensus.  By hesitating, they allowed the Allies to administer three massive additional blows in quick succession: Hiroshima, Manchuria and Nagasaki.  To use the trite analogy about the straws that broke the camel’s back, these blows – which were as much psychological as physical in their impact – finally gave the logjammed Japanese leadership the excuse it needed to let the Emperor make the decision for them, and gave Hirohito the excuse he needed to surrender without admitting anything more precise than the fact that “the war situation has developed not necessarily to Japan’s advantage” – arguably the most massive understatement in recorded history.

[John Brown]

@Baron:

@John:

Like Baron said, when the Soviets declared war on Japan, it was too much for them. It would be better to surrender to the US than to be occupied under the communist rule.

Noteworthy argument I think, John B., from the Japanese perspective.

This quote from CWO Marc is much on the topic here to be read by more people:
@CWO:

It’s no more correct to say that the Soviet invasion of Machuria was the single factor that caused Japan to surrender (whereas other factors did not) than to argue that the A-bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was the the single factor that caused Japan to surrender (whereas other factors did not).  Japan’s capitulation was brought on by a combination of factors, so it’s simplistic to declare one to be decisive and to discount the others.  The American submarine campaign against the Japanese shipping routes had the effect, over several years, of starving Japan of oil and other vital supplies.  The American advance in the South-West Pacific and in the Central Pacific dealt Japan a succession of military defeats, thus eroding the twin myths 1) that Japanese troops and sailors and airmen were invincible, and 2) that the decadent, undisciplined, un-militaristic and soft-living Americans did not have any convictions for which they were willing to fight and die.  The American advance ultimately enabled the US, once it had seized the Marianas, to reach Japan from their air with large-scale strategic bombing missions, and in the following months they gradually burned most of Japan’s major cities to the ground.  The American capture of Okinawa, right on Japan’s doorstep, demonstrated that the US had the means and the will to mount a full-scale invasion of the Japanese home islands.Â

So: by the time of the summer of 1945, Japan was economically and militarily close to collapse.  It could still have managed to stay in the war a while longer by scraping the bottom of the barrel – much as Germany managed to stay in the war until its tropps were practically fighting back to back down the middle of a devastated Germany – but its situation was hopeless and its only two options were to either give up or to fight to the proverbial last man (including, as was envisioned by some Japanese leaders, starving civilians armed with bamboo spears) in an act of national suicide.  Japan’s leadership dithered between these two options, unable to reach a consensus.  By hesitating, they allowed the Allies to administer three massive additional blows in quick succession: Hiroshima, Manchuria and Nagasaki.  To use the trite analogy about the straws that broke the camel’s back, these blows – which were as much psychological as physical in their impact – finally gave the logjammed Japanese leadership the excuse it needed to let the Emperor make the decision for them, and gave Hirohito the excuse he needed to surrender without admitting anything more precise than the fact that “the war situation has developed not necessarily to Japan’s advantage” – arguably the most massive understatement in recorded history.

So it was basically a multitude of factors that led Japan to surrender is that what he is saying? If Japan said that then I can believe it because it would be another two front war, just like Germany had to deal with.

Thanks Baron! That is very interesting. :-)

[baron Münchhausen]

So it was basically a multitude of factors that led Japan to surrender is that what he is saying? If Japan said that then I can believe it because it would be another two front war, just like Germany had to deal with.

Thanks Baron! That is very interesting.  :-)

It’s a pleasure to share good analysis and interesting post.

The question is still sound, amongst all these factors, which ones is the main one?
The one drop which make the glass overflow or the main drop which fill up the glass?

[Witt]

Thank you for posting Marc’s thoughts, which are succinct, intelligent and well written as usual.
I will go with the loss of the Navy, including the all important Merchant Navy as the one deciding factor, however.

[ABWorsham4]

I was surprised to learn just how many JIA personal the Soviet Steamer destroyed and captured, around 600,000.

[CWO Marc]

@John:

So it was basically a multitude of factors that led Japan to surrender is that what he is saying?

Yes, that’s what he’s saying.  :-)  To put it another way, if we look at ABW’s four-item list at the top of this survey, the answer I’d give would be “all of the above”.

[John Brown]

@CWO:

@John:

So it was basically a multitude of factors that led Japan to surrender is that what he is saying?

Yes, that’s what he’s saying.   :-)  To put it another way, if we look at ABW’s four-item list at the top of this survey, the answer I’d give would be “all of the above”.

Ha Ha, thank you buddy! I like these discussions, because I learn something new every time, and it makes me go look it up myself.

Thanks for clarifying your posts for me, LOL :-D

[axisandalliesplayer]

Japan had already been seeking a conditional surrender and tried going through the Soviets to achieve this peace. The Soviets rebuffed them since they were already planning on going to war with the Japanese themselves. Regardless, the allies had no intention of allowing Japan to set any conditions to it’s surrender.

It’s hard to separate the nukes and the Russian invasion as they both happened inside of the Japanese information and decision loop. Part of the problem was how complete the destruction of Hiroshima was. This contributed to the slow and fragmentary reports that went up to the IGHQ. Japanese officials were still coming to grips with what happened and what it meant several days later when the twin blows of Soviet invasion and 2nd nuke landed.

It does look like the Japanese were willing to continue fighting after Hiroshima, at least that was the initial reaction. Who knows what the decision ultimately would’ve been had the 2nd bombing and the Soviet invasion not happened so close to the 1st bombing. If Japan’s leadership had a couple weeks free of further shocks would they have stuck to a conditional surrender or war? No one really knows.

The first bombing was on the 6th of August and the 2nd happened on the 9th. August 9th was also the three month mark of Germany’s defeat and Russia honored it’s promise to open up their war with Japan three months after the German defeat. One of the reasons why the Americans dropped when they did was because they were trying to force a Japanese surrender prior to the Soviet involvement. I don’t know if they knew the details about the planned Soviet offensive, but President Truman did not want the Soviets to reap the political clout and rewards they would if they contributed (however belatedly) to Japan’s defeat.

So the Soviet offensive started on the 9th and the second bomb was dropped the same day around 11am local time. Coupled with the earlier shock of the first bomb and these twin blows were enough for the Japanese to surrender on the 12th.

[DarthShizNit]

Well, all of the above and more really, but just to pick one, the defeat of her Navy. Once the navy was officially gone, it was only a matter of time, and America managed to essentially pull that off by 1943.

[KurtGodel7]

I voted for the Soviet invasion of Manchuria.

Prior to the dropping of the first atomic bomb, the Japanese were already willing to agree to a conditional surrender.

The Soviet Union was fundamentally hostile to the Western democracies. Some Japanese leaders hoped for an alliance between Japan and the Soviet Union–an alliance against the U.S. and Britain. Their hope was that the Soviet Union would enter the war on Japan’s side.

The Soviet invasion of Manchuria demonstrated that any kind of diplomatic arrangement with the Soviet Union was no longer an option. With its diplomatic options exhausted, Japan’s only way of avoiding the Americans’ demands was to achieve some kind of military victory. There was a shortage of Japanese military victories from '43 - '45, and the Soviet invasion of Manchuria only made things worse. That invasion was regarded by both sides as a prelude to the invasion of Japan itself. The quick collapse of Japan’s Manchurian forces inspired little hope that Japan would do well in a follow-up Soviet invasion of its home islands. Still less did it seem possible for Japan to defeat a combined invasion of American and Soviet forces. At that point, it was concluded that it was better to unconditionally surrender to the Americans, than to have unconditional surrender imposed anyway by a combined Soviet-American force.

Why wasn’t Stalin interested in joining Japan’s war against the U.S. and Britain? I see two main reasons: 1) He wasn’t yet ready for such a war, and 2) By 1945, Japan’s military had little left to offer. By the early '50s, Stalin may have felt himself ready or close to ready for war against NATO. Some historians feel that Stalin permitted the Korean War to proceed because he wanted to test American military readiness. The results in that war were such that Stalin felt comfortable moving forward with his plans for WWIII. However, he died before putting those plans into effect.