IJN Meltdowns

[ABWorsham4]

I have always found it strange that in World War Two the Japanese code of not surrendering and retaining one’s honor in battle seemed to have left the minds of the IJN high command in some key battles. There seems to be no IJN  Banzai charge.

In the Battle of Savo Island Japan had the Allied Invasion fleet at he mercy of the IJN guns but lost the nerve and retired.

In the Battle of Komandorski Island, the Japanese, who had the larger force, left a US cruiser dead in the water, and retired.

Leyte Gulf, The Battle off Samar, Japan had a chance to inflict huge damage to the Japanese but lost the nerve.

What’s your thoughts?

[Gargantua]

Seems to me culturally, that there was a BIG difference between the officers and the grunts.

The grunts were always tricked by the officers to die for nothing, but the officers weren’t ever willing to die for anything.

That or the potential SHAME of losing a battle - outweighed risk of finishing it properly.

[Clyde85]

Historically the IJA was trained by and under the Prussians, and they instilled a deep sense of Honour and duty in its cadets. The IJN was trained by and under the British, who were no less dedicated and honourable, but the qualities instilled by the British were far harder to twist into a demented form and reckless suicidal bravery like it was with the army.

[Octospire]

@ABWorsham:

I have always found it strange that in World War Two the Japanese code of not surrendering and retaining one’s honor in battle seemed to have left the minds of the IJN high command in some key battles. There seems to be no IJN  Banzai charge.

In the Battle of Savo Island Japan had the Allied Invasion fleet at he mercy of the IJN guns but lost the nerve and retired.

In the Battle of Komandorski Island, the Japanese, who had the larger force, left a US cruiser dead in the water, and retired.

Leyte Gulf, The Battle off Samar, Japan had a chance to inflict huge damage to the Japanese but lost the nerve.

What’s your thoughts?

I never really thought about it that way, it really is an interesting perspective. Like Gargantua and Clyde said the IJN was always so afraid of loosing that they wouldnt finish the fight even when Victory was very likely.

I don’t think that the IJN needed the fanaticism of the Bushido code in order to win victories, in their place a good British or American Admiral/Commander like Andrew Cunningham or Raymond Spruance would of pressed the advantage and destroyed the enemy. This is very much reflected at the Battle of Samar (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_off_Samar), a small ill prepared US Navy force of 6 escort carriers, 3 destoyers and 4 destroyer escorts held off and defeated a massive Japanese fleet of 4 Battleships (one of those being the Yamato), 6 heavy cruisers, 2 light cruisers and 11 destroyers. Had the Japanese easily defeated the U.S Navy force and pressed the advantage they could of potentially gone on to attack the invasion fleet at Leyte Gulf, this attack could of potentially sunk the troopships and transports that made the invasion possible. This action alone would of at least bought the Japanese valuable time in the war and possibly even scuttled McArthur’s plans for an invasion of the Phillipines, the U.S may of instead of gone with Nimitz’s plan to attack Taiwan (Formosa) and by pass the Phillipines and “let it wither on the vine”.

Also I think you can add Pearl Harbor to that list of unpressed victories AB. Had Nagumo actually attacked the oil storage and dry docks at Pearl Harbor the U.S would not be able to make any serious operations in the Pacific for more than a year according to military historians. If the war turned out the way it did in South East Asia then yes it would of massively hampered American efforts. However if the Allies managed to hold Singapore which would of been a necessity after the destruction of the facilities at Pearl Harbour then it is likely that the war would of been fought from Singapore for at least the first year of the war in the Pacific.

Never the less it would of greatly changed the dynamic of the war in the Pacific instead of having a base so far away in Hawaii, they would be right on the Japanese door step with a base at Singapore. Had that been the case it is likely that the Japanese would of got the “decisive battle” that their naval doctorine to vigorously demanded.

[ABWorsham4]

@Gargantua:

That or the potential SHAME of losing a battle - outweighed risk of finishing it properly.

That a great philosophical look at this topic.

[ABWorsham4]

Two of those battles i listed many months ago had long term possible effects on the Allied Fleet had the Japanese chose to fight close engagement.

[Noll]

Ijn had different values. They wanted to keep casualities at minimum. For example during the Pearl Harbour attack, Japan originally planned 3 air raids, but after the second raid they decide to retire “cause they could lose aircrafts now that there’s no more surprise” (in reality a third raid would have caused more havoc with almost no casualities)

[Razor]

@Noll:

" (in reality a third raid would have caused more havoc with almost no casualities)

They couldn’t know that. Two US carriers were missing, they could be everywhere, waiting to ambush the Japanese carriers. I figure Nagumo would not gamble on the last raid, risking the total IJN carrier force.

[CWO Marc]

It’s my understanding that Nagumo, as he went into the Pearl Harbor operation, had expected to lose about a third of his carrier forces.  When the first and second air strikes achieved their spectacular successes, with very few casualties to the Japanese planes and not a single scratch to the carriers, the effect on Nagumo – according to Gordon Prange – was to put him in the position of a man who had braced himself to smash a door open with his shoulder only to see it opened for him at the last second.  He went from being mentally prepared to lose a third of his carriers to putting a high priority on avoiding damage to his forces…hence he vetoed the third strike that Genda was urging him to launch.  Prange argues that Nagumo was never a full-blown disciple of the Japanese naval airpower doctrine the way Genda was, so his inclination was to do what was required of him (attack the ships at Pearl Harbor) but nothing more (such as hitting the fuel tank farms and naval dockyards).