What country had the best trained infantry in WWII?


  • I would give it to the Germans for most of the war up until the final year or two but even then they always seemed to give the Allies a few surprises. The only other Nation that could compete would be the British commonwealth (all countries fighting as members of the commonwealth since there were so many and on so many fronts) because they had at least a very professional army in the pre war years where as countries like USA, had a very small standing army. However we are talking about man to man and this would have to go to the Germans because they were physically fit like athletes, very dedicated to their commanders and leaders, and they had very good understanding on how to use their equipment. However as the war progressed the crack troops Germany started the war with became less and less do to losses on all fronts. To sum it all up  Germany had the best soldiers through most of the war right up untill the end where as the allies would spend the war trying to catch up and would often get caught by the German tactics examples being the battle of the buldge, the battle of Normandy, the Battles of Sicily and Italy.


  • Kurt, you’re making counter-points to arguments I’m not making. I never said the German tanks in '41 were not obsolete. The Panzerwaffe had already demonstrated an alarming degree of ineffectiveness against the Char Bs and other heavy tanks during the campaign against France, they would run into the same problem in the Soviet Union against the T-34 and KV-1 series but they were fortunate enough to catch the Reds with their pants down.

    I never asked for the specifications of the BT-7, so I’m not sure why those are provided. I must also take issue with the assertion that the Soviets started the war with better tanks. The T-34 and KV-1 certainly were better, but as already mentioned these were but a fraction of the Soviet tank fleet. The BT-7 and T-26 made up the great bulk of Soviet’s armoured forces, and saying that they were superior is overstating their abilities. At best, they were equally matched against the Panzer III, IV, and 38T models.

    As for your Wikipedia facts, I’m not sure if you’re misrepresenting your source or if it’s flat out incorrect, but the Germans certainly did not enjoy aerial supremacy or artillery support to such an extent that they explain away most of the T-26s lost in action. The Luftwaffe was still recovering, and indeed would never recover, from the staggering losses it suffered against the British the year prior to Barbarossa. Furthermore, many pilots were still tied up in Western Europe and unavailable for service in Russia. This meant that the Germans only ever enjoyed local superiority in the air. The situation with their artillery was largely the same story, they never had enough shells to go around and were constantly undergunned in comparison to the Red Army. There is absolutely no way air attack and artillery support account for the poor performance of the T-26.

    Finally, I will add that the existence of 4,000 amphibious tanks does not prove that Stalin was planning to invade Germany in the summer of '41. Nor does the existence of those tanks explain how such an invasion would be possible in the midst of the massive rearmament and reorganization being undertaken by the Red Army at the time Barbarossa occurred. I don’t know if you fully appreciate the extent of these reforms, none of them could have been accomplished in the time frame we’re talking about here. Stalin was YEARS away from invading Western Europe, not weeks.

    The more I’m reading the less credible I find this Suvorov, these are very fantastic claims that completely go against the historical narrative. I may have to give his book a shot if for nothing else than to look at his sources.


  • Creeping Deth wrote:

    Kurt, you’re making counter-points to arguments I’m not making

    Not everything I’ve written in the last few posts was intended as a counterpoint. Suvorov painted a clear picture of a Soviet Union preparing for the invasion and subjugation of Europe, and presented large amounts of data in support of that picture. My intention here had been to give people a glimpse of that picture; a task which seemed more worthwhile than getting into a nitpicky, point-by-point argument with someone who hasn’t yet read Suvorov’s book.

    I must also take issue with the assertion that the Soviets started the war with better tanks.

    The Soviet Union’s best tanks (KV series) were much, much better than Germany’s best tanks (Panzer IVs). An argument could be made that in 1941, a KV-1 or KV-2 was worth about ten German tanks. The Soviets’ production of 1300 KV-1/KV-2 tanks in 1941 could have balanced out a total German tank production of 13,000 for 1941. Germany produced 3,600 tanks in 1941, which means that Soviets’ KV production for 1941, alone, provided about 3.5x the combat value of Germany’s total tank production for that year.

    The Soviets’ second-best tank in 1941 was the T-34. Obviously a T-34 was more than a match for Germany’s best tank of 1941 (the Panzer IV), let alone Germany’s second-best tank (the Panzer III). The Soviets built 2,800 T-34s in 1941, almost as many as Germany’s total tank production for the year (3,600). The combat value of those 2,800 T-34s greatly exceeded the combat value of the 3,600 obsolete tanks Germany had produced in '41. Combined, KV production and T-34 production for 1941 was 4,100; 500 more than Germany’s total tank production for the year. The worst of those 4,100 tanks (the T-34) was worth several times as much as the best of Germany’s 3,600 (the Panzer IV). Even if we ignore all the tanks the Soviet Union produced in 1941 that weren’t T-34s or KVs, it still produced more and better tanks than Germany.

    Of the 3,600 tanks Germany produced in 1941, less than 500 were Panzer IVs. Another 2,200 were Panzer IIIs, and the rest (about 900) were weaker than Panzer IIIs. The Soviet Union could have countered every Panzer IV produced in 1941 with 2.5 KV-series tanks produced that same year. Bear in mind that a KV was many times better than a Panzer IV. The Soviets could have countered every Panzer III produced in 1941 with 1.25 T-34s produced in '41.

    In addition to the 4,100 KVs and T-34s the Soviet Union produced in '41, it also produced 2,300 light tanks. Granted, Soviet light tanks weren’t particularly well-suited to tank-on-tank combat. (Though they were better at this than German light tanks.) But tank-on-tank combat was not the purpose for which those light tanks were intended. The idea was to use medium and heavy tanks to achieve breakthroughs, then use light tanks to exploit the breakthroughs.

    As for your Wikipedia facts, I’m not sure if you’re misrepresenting your source

    Rather than idly speculating on whether I’d “misrepresented” that or any other source, you should have clicked on the link (which I’d provided) to see for yourself what the source had indicated. Had you done so, you would have seen that I’d simply copied and pasted a sentence from the Wikipedia article; and that the surrounding context did not negate the clear and obvious meaning of the sentence in question.

    but the Germans certainly did not enjoy aerial supremacy or artillery support to such an extent that they explain away most of the T-26s lost in action.

    On June 22 1941, the Soviet Union had 13,500 military aircraft near the Nazi-Soviet front, as opposed to 4,400 for Germany. During the ensuing months, the Soviets would lose 21,000 military aircraft, as opposed to 3,800 for Germany. From a different article


    The VVS [Soviet Air Force], although continually resisting, was powerless to prevent the Luftwaffe inflicting heavy losses to Soviet ground forces, and for the rest of 1941 the Luftwaffe could devote much of its energy to these ground support missions. . . .

    The Luftwaffe was particularly effective in breaking up and destroying Soviet armored divisions. The Soviet tank force had an estimated strength of 15,000 tanks at the beginning of the invasion. By October that force had, in the central sector, been reduced to 150.[51]


    There is absolutely no way air attack and artillery support account for the poor performance of the T-26.

    Had both sides’ aircraft, artillery, anti-tank weapons, and other non-tanks somehow been excluded from the eastern front, the Soviets’ tanks would have annihilated the Germans’. The T-26 was not a great tank, but neither was it horrible. The main gun of a T-26 could penetrate 35 mm of vertical armor from a distance of 1000 meters. The main gun of a Panzer III could penetrate 44 mm of vertical armor from a distance of 1000 meters. The Panzer III had significantly thicker armor than the T-26. (As one would expect, given that the Panzer III was a medium tank, and the T-26 was a light tank.) I’m not trying to suggest that a somewhat older Soviet light tank, like the T-26, was the equivalent of a German medium tank like the Panzer III. (It wasn’t.) But the fact that the (light tank) T-26’s armament was 80% as good as the (medium tank) Panzer III’s suggests that even the Soviet Union’s least powerful, light tanks were still pretty good.

    Finally, I will add that the existence of 4,000 amphibious tanks does not prove that Stalin was planning to invade Germany in the summer of '41.

    I had to read a very big chunk of Suvorov’s book before becoming convinced Stalin had planned to invade Germany in '41. Light, amphibious tanks were far better-suited to offense than defense. In '41, the Soviet Union had more light, amphibious tanks than Germany had total tanks. But that datum was just one puzzle piece in Suvorov’s larger picture. (And not the most convincing puzzle piece, at least not to me.)


  • @KurtGodel7:

    Not everything I’ve written in the last few posts was intended as a counterpoint. Suvorov painted a clear picture of a Soviet Union preparing for the invasion and subjugation of Europe, and presented large amounts of data in support of that picture. My intention here had been to give people a glimpse of that picture; a task which seemed more worthwhile than getting into a nitpicky, point-by-point argument with someone who hasn’t yet read Suvorov’s book.

    An admirable intention, but I don’t think you realize how unconvincing your arguments are. Most of your posting so far has contained irrelevant information on the specifications of the Soviet Union’s armoured vehicles, as if these alone are proof that Stalin was planning to invade in 1941. Several posts later, you still haven’t once addressed my counterpoint that an invasion would have been practically impossible amidst the refit and reorganization of the Red Army.

    I must also take issue with the assertion that the Soviets started the war with better tanks.

    The Soviet Union’s best tanks (KV series) were much, much better than Germany’s best tanks (Panzer IVs). An argument could be made that in 1941, a KV-1 or KV-2 was worth about ten German tanks. The Soviets’ production of 1300 KV-1/KV-2 tanks in 1941 could have balanced out a total German tank production of 13,000 for 1941. Germany produced 3,600 tanks in 1941, which means that Soviets’ KV production for 1941, alone, provided about 3.5x the combat value of Germany’s total tank production for that year.

    This is exactly what I’m talking about. My VERY NEXT SENTENCE after the one you quoted above was an admission that the T-34 and KV series tanks were objectively better vehicles, and for some reason you decided to spew out 4 paragraphs saying how much better they were and talking about production numbers. This kind of selective quoting and response is generally looked down on in discussion forums, you shouldn’t do it.

    Rather than idly speculating on whether I’d “misrepresented” that or any other source, you should have clicked on the link (which I’d provided) to see for yourself what the source had indicated. Had you done so, you would have seen that I’d simply copied and pasted a sentence from the Wikipedia article; and that the surrounding context did not negate the clear and obvious meaning of the sentence in question.

    I didn’t click your link because I’ve read enough scholarly work and memoirs on this subject to know that your assertion was erroneous. Wikipedia is notorious for unreliable information, it is by no means a gold standard to hang up your argument.

    On June 22 1941, the Soviet Union had 13,500 military aircraft near the Nazi-Soviet front, as opposed to 4,400 for Germany. During the ensuing months, the Soviets would lose 21,000 military aircraft, as opposed to 3,800 for Germany

    This is not a counterpoint. Nothing in the above two sentences contradicts the fact that the Luftwaffe was spread incredibly thin on the Eastern Front and was only capable of local air supremacy. It absolutely could not be responsible for destroying the vast bulk of the T-26 series tanks as you earlier stated.

    Had both sides’ aircraft, artillery, anti-tank weapons, and other non-tanks somehow been excluded from the eastern front, the Soviets’ tanks would have annihilated the Germans’. The T-26 was not a great tank, but neither was it horrible. The main gun of a T-26 could penetrate 35 mm of vertical armor from a distance of 1000 meters. The main gun of a Panzer III could penetrate 44 mm of vertical armor from a distance of 1000 meters. The Panzer III had significantly thicker armor than the T-26. (As one would expect, given that the Panzer III was a medium tank, and the T-26 was a light tank.) I’m not trying to suggest that a somewhat older Soviet light tank, like the T-26, was the equivalent of a German medium tank like the Panzer III. (It wasn’t.) But the fact that the (light tank) T-26’s armament was 80% as good as the (medium tank) Panzer III’s suggests that even the Soviet Union’s least powerful, light tanks were still pretty good.

    Who cares what would have happened if both sides were missing their aircraft, artillery, and anti-tank weapons? That’s not relevant to our discussion at all, and there is no way for you to know what would have happened had they been absent. The fact that you believe the Soviets would have walked through the Germans without these shows how elementary your understanding of the Eastern Front really is. The technical fallout rate of the Soviet vehicles was astronomically large, and German success in Barbarossa had just as much to do with poor Soviet leadership and training as it did with the professionalism and skill of the Wehrmacht. These very large and substantial factors to the outcome of the fighting in 1941 are not at all affected by some absurd hypothetical where aircraft, artillery, and field guns are missing.

    I had to read a very big chunk of Suvorov’s book before becoming convinced Stalin had planned to invade Germany in '41. Light, amphibious tanks were far better-suited to offense than defense. In '41, the Soviet Union had more light, amphibious tanks than Germany had total tanks.

    Again you’re harping on the amphibious tanks. The existence of these vehicles is not evidence of a Soviet invasion in 1941. I don’t know how many times i’m going to have to say that.


  • Creeping Deth wrote:

    Most of your posting so far has contained irrelevant information on the specifications of the Soviet Union’s
    armoured vehicles, as if these alone are proof that Stalin was planning to invade in 1941.

    The specifications are evidence of the correctness of my earlier assertion: that the Soviet Union had more and better tanks.

    My VERY NEXT SENTENCE after the one you quoted above was an admission that the T-34 and KV series tanks were objectively better vehicles.

    Yes, but you then minimized that admission by stating that the KV series had been produced in small numbers. In 1941, the Soviet Union produced more KVs and T-34s than Germany produced total tanks. The fact that Stalin’s tank force was much stronger than Germany’s is not itself evidence of an intention to invade.

    I didn’t click your link because I’ve read enough scholarly work and memoirs on this subject to know that your assertion was erroneous.

    You’ve claimed this several times, and thus far haven’t supported your claims with evidence. Several sources I’ve read have indicated that the Luftwaffe destroyed large numbers of Soviet tanks and artillery pieces in 1941. I am not going to disbelieve those sources based on your unsupported assertions. According to page 132 - 133 of this book:


    In July 1941 the Luftwaffe was undisputed mistress of the sky on the Eastern front. The Russians were in full retreat from the Baltic to the Black Sea, harassed by the Stukas that blasted a path for advancing armor. . . .

    On the third day of the invasion [Barbarossa], General Ewald von Kleist’s 1st Panzer Group suffered heavy losses near Kovel during a tank battle with the Soviet Fifth Army, but the Luftwaffe’s overwhelming air superiority saved the situation and the Russian armored formations were broken up by concentrated Stuka attacks.


    (See Hitler’s Stuka Squadrons by John Ward.)

    Below is a quote from a different book


    1. . . . On this date [June 22nd, 1941] [the Soviet Air Force] had no less than 20,450 combat aircraft. . . . As we have seen, the attacking Luftwaffe forces contained only 3,297 combat aircraft on 21st June 1941. The magnitude of the task facing the Luftwaffe forces in June and July 1941 cannot be overstated. . . . Given these numbers alone, it is rather astonishing that the Luftwaffe was able to conduct effective offensive operations at all without being eliminated. . . .

    2. Remarkably, the Luftwaffe managed to rapidly establish air superiority along most of the East Front by mid-July 1941. It had established air superiority among almost all major front sectors by late July, especially in the most critical central and northern sectors, and the approaches to Moscow. Post-war reports by Red Army units in these sectors reveal that they repeatedly complained of enemy air support destroying and/or disrupting a particular defense line or attack formation. It was only in the far south (around Odessa) that the Axis air-forces achieved what could only be described as air parity.

    3. This level of air superiority and air interdiction against Red Army units was maintained until late October and early November 1941, when Luftflotte 2 and II. Fliegerkorps, along with almost a third of Luftwaffe strength in the East, was ordered to the West. . . . In fact the OKW . . . didn’t even rate the VVS [Soviet Air Force] as a serious threat at the operational level until late 1942. . . .

    5. The Luftwaffe achieved an incredible kill to loss ratio of over 5.5 to 1 (including aircraft destroyed on the ground) on the East Front from June to December 1941, and it was probably considerably higher.


    See Operation Barbarossa: the Complete Organisational and Statistical Analysis, and Military Simulation by Nigel Askey.

    [The Luftwaffe] absolutely could not be responsible for destroying the vast bulk of the T-26 series tanks as you earlier stated.

    In my earlier statement, I wrote that the bulk of T-26s were destroyed by the Luftwaffe and German artillery. (Not the Luftwaffe only.) The above quotes confirm the Luftwaffe was in a position to destroy large numbers of Soviet tanks and other land units in 1941. I will add that the highest scoring fighter ace in history, Erich Hartmann, had 352 victories. (Almost all of which were against Soviet aircraft.) The highest-scoring anti-tank pilot in history, Hans Rudel, destroyed 519 Soviet tanks. The idea that the Luftwaffe couldn’t have destroyed very many Soviet tanks because it was too busy fighting the Soviet Air Force seems far-fetched. Rudel only had nine aerial victories against Soviet planes, consistent with the fact that the Stuka and other dive bombers or attack planes were better-suited to the destruction of land targets than air-to-air dog fighting. During Barbarossa a fairly large percentage of Germany’s total air units were dive bombers or ground attack planes. Those air units were given the primary task of destroying targets on the ground.

    The fact that you believe the Soviets would have walked through the Germans without [the presence of
    air and other non-tank units] shows how elementary your understanding of the Eastern Front really is.

    I’m rapidly losing patience with your failure to grasp the fact that in June ‘41, the Soviet tank force was stronger than the German. On June 22nd, 1941 the Germans had 3,266 tanks on the eastern front. Of those, only 1,146 had a 50 mm gun or larger. On June 22nd 1941 the Soviets had 1000 T-34s and 500 KV series tanks, giving them 1,500 tanks which could cut through any German tank like a knife through hot butter. What effect did the Germans’ 50 mm guns have against the T-34?


    Half a dozen anti-tank guns fire shells at him [a T-34], which sound like a drumroll. But he drives staunchly through our line like an impregnable prehistoric monster… It is remarkable that lieutenant Steup’s tank made hits on a T-34, once at about 20 meters and four times at 50 meters, with Panzergranate 40 [50 mm caliber] without any noticeable effect. [-a German battle report from Barbarossa.]


    Again you’re harping on the amphibious tanks. The existence of these vehicles is not evidence of a Soviet
    invasion in 1941. I don’t know how many times i’m going to have to say that.

    Repeating an unsupported assertion over and over does not make it any more convincing the fifth or tenth time than it had been the first time. A light, amphibious tank is far more useful on offense than on defense. The fact that Stalin had more tanks in that category than Germany had total tanks is evidence that Stalin had planned on invading Germany sooner or later. Obviously, pinning down the year of the invasion is not something which can be achieved by pointing at sheer numbers of amphibious tanks. To pin down the invasion date as best as possible, Suvorov looked at troop movements.

    Suvorov also pointed out the following. During 1941, Germany had moved large numbers of soldiers to the Nazi-Soviet border. Those soldiers were not ordered to construct winter quarters for themselves, because the German high command believed its soldiers would be someplace else by winter. The Soviet Union had also moved large numbers of soldiers to the Nazi-Soviet border in '41. Newly arrived Soviet soldiers were also not ordered to construct winter quarters for themselves. Where did the Soviet high command expect its soldiers to be by the time winter came?


  • @KurtGodel7:

    Yes, but you then minimized that admission by stating that the KV series had been produced in small numbers. In 1941, the Soviet Union produced more KVs and T-34s than Germany produced total tanks. The fact that Stalin’s tank force was much stronger than Germany’s is not itself evidence of an intention to invade.

    Just because the T-34 and KV series vehicles were produced in larger numbers than the German panzers does not mean that they weren’t a small portion of the Soviet tank force, which is what I originally said. I never once stated that more panzers were produced than either T-34 or KV series vehicles, just that they were definitely a minority in the Soviet armoured forces.

    You’ve claimed this several times, and thus far haven’t supported your claims with evidence.

    I haven’t been supporting my claims with footnotes because this is an internet forum, not a university research paper. I don’t have time to go fishing for specific quotes from texts that are sitting on my Kindle. I’ve read books by David Stahel, Antony Beevor, Lloyd Clark, David Glantz, Robert Forcyzk, and have read memoirs by Erhard Raus and Wolfgang Faust; all very well respected historians and scholars, and every single one of them paints the same picture for the Luftwaffe and the state of German logistics in general: stretched bare with never enough to go around. There is no way Kraut aircraft and artillery accounted for most of the over ten thousand T-26 tanks.

    The idea that the Luftwaffe couldn’t have destroyed very many Soviet tanks because it was too busy fighting the Soviet Air Force seems far-fetched.

    I never once said it was because they were too busy fighting the Soviet Air Force. Please do not put words in my mouth.

    I’m rapidly losing patience with your failure to grasp the fact that in June '41, the Soviet tank force was stronger than the German

    Define ‘stronger.’ If you mean it was larger, yes it was certainly stronger. However, this does not mean it was better. Throwing production numbers around is only going to get you so far in this argument, there is much more to it than raw numbers. If available models were all that mattered, it wouldn’t have taken the Russians 3 and a half years to push the Wehrhmacht all the way back to Berlin.

    Repeating an unsupported assertion over and over does not make it any more convincing the fifth or tenth time than it had been the first time.

    Oh this is rich. I’m not the one making the assertion, you are. YOU are the one saying that the existence of all these amphibious tanks is evidence the Russians were going to invade in 1941. By challenging you on this point, I’m not making an assertion. I’m just taking issue with yours.

    By the way, I’m still waiting for an explanation as to how the Red Army was going to invade in the middle of their herculean reorganization and refitting efforts taking place in 1941.


  • Creeping deth wrote:

    every single one of them paints the same picture for the Luftwaffe and the state of German logistics in general: stretched bare with never enough to go around.

    I’ll go along with that. But limited logistics would have been at least as much a problem for German tanks as it was for the Luftwaffe. If (for example) adequate amounts of fuel could not be delivered to the front, the effectiveness of German tanks would have been reduced. In discussing the merits and demerits of your argument and mine, the limited state of German logistics is not evidence either way. Limited logistical support would have, and did, hamper all aspects of the German war machine (not just tanks only, and not just Luftwaffe only).

    I never once stated that more panzers were produced than either T-34 or KV series vehicles, just that they were definitely a minority in the Soviet armoured forces.

    Fair enough. But my argument is that the Soviet tank force was stronger than the German tank force in June of '41; and that Soviet industry produced more tank strength during '41 than did German industry. The 1,500 KV series tanks and T-34s which the Soviet Union had on June 22nd, alone, represented more combat power than Germany’s entire tank force (of slightly over 3,000 tanks). Any combat value the Soviets derived from the BTs or T-26s was just a bonus.

    Throwing production numbers around is only going to get you so far in this argument, there is much more to it than raw numbers.

    Granted. A Panzer III or Panzer IV was certainly a better tank than a BT or a T-26. If the Soviet tank force had consisted only of BTs and T-26s, an argument could be made that Soviet quantity was counterbalanced by German quality. But the Soviets could have celebrated the summer solstice of ‘41 by scrapping every BT and T-26 they had; and at the end of that celebration they still would have had a stronger, better tank force than the Germans’.

    Oh this is rich. I’m not the one making the assertion, you are.

    Your unsupported assertion was that the Luftwaffe “was only capable of local air supremacy. It absolutely could not be responsible for destroying the vast bulk of the T-26 series tanks.” I have presented evidence that the Luftwaffe enjoyed air superiority in the central and northern portions of the eastern front, and that it destroyed large numbers of ground targets during Barbarossa.

    YOU are the one saying that the existence of all these amphibious tanks is evidence the Russians were going to invade in 1941.

    From my previous post: “A light, amphibious tank is far more useful on offense than on defense. The fact that Stalin had more tanks in that category than Germany had total tanks is evidence that Stalin had planned on invading Germany sooner or later. Obviously, pinning down the year of the invasion is not something which can be achieved by pointing at sheer numbers of amphibious tanks.” You are putting an argument in my mouth after I had specifically contradicted that argument.

    By the way, I’m still waiting for an explanation as to how the Red Army was going to invade in the middle of their herculean reorganization and refitting efforts taking place in 1941.

    Suvorov did not address this point in detail in the book of his I’ve read. However, he’s also written another book on this subject, and it’s possible he’s addressed it there. In the book I did read, Suvorov pointed to the excellent success the Red Army had enjoyed in its undeclared war with Japan in 1939. He expressed the view that, by August '41, the Soviet Union could have employed a greatly scaled-up version of its Khalkhin Gol offensive; directing this larger offensive against Germany. If the Red Army was ready for war in 1939 (as seemingly indicated by its success at Khalkhin Gol), it’s reasonable to suppose it might also have been ready for war in '41. However, it had prepared for an offensive war against Germany only, and was completely unprepared for the defensive war it actually faced.


    Three [Soviet] infantry divisions and a tank brigade crossed the river, supported by massed artillery and the Soviet Air Force. Once the Japanese were pinned down by the attack of Soviet centre units, Soviet armoured units swept around the flanks and attacked the Japanese in the rear, achieving a classic double envelopment.


    We tend to think of BT-7s and T-26s as being of little use. Such tanks were of little use in a defensive war. But they would have been well-suited to the task of attacking the flanks and rear of German forces, just as they had done to the Japanese at Khalkhin Gol. You will recall that German tanks were no match for French Char-Bs. But that didn’t stop Germany from using its tanks to cut off and encircle Allied forces in France. The Soviet Union would have used its T-26s and BT-7s in a similar manner. A single Panzer III or Panzer IV could probably have taken out several BT-7s or T-26s before being destroyed. But Stalin began with a better than 7:1 advantage in the starting number of tanks, including a force of T-34s and KV series tanks half as numerous as Germany’s entire tank force. The BT-7s and T-26s were probably not a major component of the plan to destroy the German tank force. But those Soviet light tanks were a major component of the Soviet plan to encircle and destroy German armies.

    Prior to Barbarossa, Soviet tanks and the fuel intended for them had been moved very, very close to the front. Suvorov points out that there were places where the Nazi-Soviet border jutted westward, and other places where it jutted eastward. There were large concentrations of Soviet forces (including tanks, fuel, and ammunition) wherever that border jutted westward. Just as there were large German concentrations of forces wherever it jutted eastward. (The Germans wanted to begin their offensive from as far east as possible.) This starting deployment of forces ensured a tremendous advantage for whichever side struck the first blow. Moreover, Stalin’s troop movement was still weeks away from completion when Germany struck. On June 22nd, Soviet tanks and their crews were often in widely disparate locations. The fuel intended for those tanks was often destroyed, or captured by the Germans. With the Soviets facing rapidly advancing German forces, and with the fuel needed to evacuate their tanks mostly gone, the typical decision was to fuel the medium and heavy tanks only, while abandoning/destroying the light tanks. Light tanks would have been far more useful for the war Stalin expected than the war he actually had.


  • Does Infantry operate tanks now??? :? :?

    Man I got the whole WWII thingy wrong…tz tz tz


  • Yea don’t read Shirer.


  • Maybe Multi Tasking infantry does ?


  • All Purpose Infantry, we operate Tanks, Aircrafts and Rifles, and we cook your food too

  • '20

    Germany because of the SS’s elite training and morale stemming from their admirable mission to defend Europe from Bolshevism. Kurt is absolutely right about the Soviets planning to invade Europe, and yes, including Germany. This is why the Germans had such success at first by attacking a mere 2 weeks before the Soviets. All The Soviets’ airfields and other pertinent facilities and equipment was DIRECTLY behind the front lines in preparation for supporting the advancing army proceeding kilometers ahead. See Operation Groza(Thunderstorm). http://defence.pk/threads/operation-groza-soviet-invasion-of-western-europe-july-6-1941.293859/
    Btw, the Germans would have won if they had implemented “total war” production practices that the British had done in 1940 and Soviet Union had done at the outbreak of hostilities with Germany. They did not do so until 1943 because they cared about citizens’ well-being and morale. This is why they were so far behind regarding equipment totals.

Suggested Topics

  • 8
  • 6
  • 1
  • 3
  • 8
  • 1
  • 17
  • 181
Axis & Allies Boardgaming Custom Painted Miniatures

28

Online

17.0k

Users

39.3k

Topics

1.7m

Posts