MOVED: Could Germany have won WWII if the Halocaust never Happened?

Here’s a great project that a filmmaker has been working on. And I think it’s especially nice that he’s a young man, not someone from a generation closer to WWII.

Thursday, February 28, 2019 6:38AM EST

A young American filmmaker is on a mission to interview every last Second World War veteran to share the stories of as many combat veterans as possible – before it is too late.

Rishi Sharma has spent the past three years documenting the lives of living Second World War veterans in the U.S., U.K. and Canada for his non-profit organization Heroes of the Second World War.

The average age of Second World War vet is now 93 years old, and the number of survivors is slowly diminishing with the passing of time.

After three years of visiting seniors’ homes to record veterans’ stories, Sharma says has filmed more than a thousand interviews.

https://www.ctvnews.ca/lifestyle/american-filmmaker-on-a-mission-to-interview-every-last-second-world-war-veteran-1.4316271

The last of the raiders will participate in anniversary events.

_At 101 years old, Dayton native Richard E. Cole is the last Doolittle Raider standing.

On Monday and Tuesday, he’s set for a homecoming of sorts to mark the 75th anniversary of the audacious raid commemorated in ceremonies and a World War II era B-25 bomber flyover at the National Museum of the U.S. Air Force.

On April 18, 1942, 80 Army Air Forces airmen climbed into 16 B-25B Mitchell bombers in groups of five to fly off deck of the USS Hornet and travel across hundreds of miles of ocean to bomb Japan.

Cole was co-pilot to the raid leader, then Lt. Col. Jimmy Doolittle, a legendary record-setting aviator._

https://www.stripes.com/news/veterans/last-doolittle-raider-standing-wwii-vet-to-attend-homecoming-75th-anniversary-event-1.463757#.WPLg3dKGOUl

Good post. However, I would like to make a correction. During WWII, Winston Churchill (later joined by FDR) imposed a food blockade on Germany. The Hunger Plan was the Nazi government’s effort to deal with the resulting food crisis. The Hunger Plan involved the starvation of captured Soviet cities; so that the food which would otherwise have fed those cities could instead be used to prevent starvation elsewhere in the Reich.

The plan had never been to starve Soviet POWs. Those POWs were conscripted to work in German weapons factories. Everyone, from Hitler on down, recognized those POWs were an essential component of Germany’s war machine. That is why Hitler ordered the POWs to be fed.

However, the Reich lacked the manpower necessary to cordon off captured Soviet cities from the Soviet countryside. Due to the lack of that manpower, the Nazis were unable to prevent food from flowing from the captured Soviet countryside to captured Soviet cities. The Hunger Plan mostly failed: the planned starvation in captured Soviet cities mostly did not occur. That failure didn’t result in fewer deaths. Just different deaths than those the Nazi government had envisioned with their Hunger Plan. Due to the failure of the Hunger Plan, the man tasked with feeding the Soviet POWs didn’t have the food he needed to carry out the order Hitler had given to him: the order to feed the Soviet POWs. Because it was physically impossible for that man to carry out his orders, millions of Soviet POWs starved to death while in German captivity.

The Nazi leadership had deep-seated fears about Germany’s food situation. One of the reasons Hitler wanted lebensraum was so that Germany could physically feed itself, even if Britain imposed a food blockade. (As it did in WWI, and as Churchill again did in WWII.) The two most vital resources Hitler required from the western Soviet Union were food and petroleum. For Barbarossa to have been successful from the Nazi perspective, Germany needed to capture a considerable portion of Soviet oilfields, and a considerable portion of Soviet farmland.

To address your question of what Hitler should have done differently: he should have placed von Manstein in charge of Barbarossa in its entirety. Doing so would have resulted in a far greater level of success. Moscow and Leningrad almost certainly would have fallen in 1941, paving the way for additional German successes in 1942.

I voted advantage Axis. As others have explained, the Allies didn’t have very good methods of detecting u-boats–at least not after the first year of the war. However, that changed as the war progressed. The Germans did not anticipate the Allies miniaturizing radar to the point where it could be equipped on board an aircraft. (Even though they later duplicated that feat.) When the British began using such aircraft against u-boats, it fundamentally altered the equation in the Atlantic.

During the last year of the war, the Germans were taking steps to reclaim the edge in the war of the Atlantic.

One of those steps involved torpedoes. A standard-issue WWII era torpedo involved a diesel engine, as well as fuel and compressed air so that the engine could work. The compressed air took up plenty of space. Early in the war, Germany’s torpedoes were based on this model. But there are problems with diesel-powered torpedoes. They are noisy, and can be detected by enemy ships. As they burn diesel fuel, they leave a telltale trail of bubbles in the water. If this trail is observed from the air, it alerts the target ship a torpedo is coming, and guides planes back to the sub which launched the torpedo in the first place. Something better was needed–or at least desired.

The Japanese dealt with these problems by providing their torpedoes with compressed oxygen, not compressed air. Separating the oxygen out from the rest of the air was very difficult, and the Japanese closely guarded their secret of how to do it. A diesel engine requires only 1/5 as much compressed oxygen to burn a given quantity of diesel fuel as it would compressed air. Due to the enormous space savings gained by using compressed oxygen, Japanese “Long Lance” torpedoes had about triple the range of anyone else’s. Also, the air bubble trail they left was much less pronounced than typical for a WWII-era torpedo. This was particularly important for the South Pacific at night, because the presence of luminescent algae meant that those bubble trails glowed in the dark!

The Germans dealt with the torpedo problem in a different way. As the war progressed, they began making use of battery-powered electric torpedoes. At first these torpedoes represented a very serious trade-off. Their range was much shorter than a standard-issue diesel torpedo’s. On the other hand, the electric torpedoes left no bubble trail, and were very, very quiet. They were therefore a mixed blessing–at least until the Germans began to improve their range. Later in the war, Germany’s electric torpedoes had about the same range as standard-issue diesel torpedoes. (Japan’s torpedoes, of course, had a much longer range than anyone else’s.)

Good torpedoes were useful, but not alone enough to swing the Battle of the Atlantic back in Germany’s favor. What it needed was a submarine much harder for the British to detect than the submarines it had. In addition, the submarine in question needed a long range, and it needed to be mass produceable in large quantities. The Type XXI u-boat was all these things and more.

The Type XXI was fast. Its hydrodynamic shape allowed it to actually travel faster underwater than it could on the surface. It had a very advanced (for the time) electronics suite and sonar system. Its electric torpedoes had a range comparable to most diesel-powered torpedoes of the era. Its hull was coated in a layer of rubber, making it very difficult to detect via radar or sonar. It had a very large complement of batteries–batteries which allowed it to remain submersed for 2 - 3 days at a time. When it did finally have to emerge, it didn’t need to come all the way to the surface. Instead, it would go most of the way to the surface, then raise its snorkel. With the snorkel above the surface it could run its diesel engines. (Necessary to recharge its batteries.) This submarine was much, much quieter than almost any other sub of WWII. The Type XXI u-boat and associated models were by far the most advanced submarines of the war. In many ways they had more in common with nuclear submarines of the postwar era than with their WWII contemporaries.

Albert Speer began producing this type of submarine in large quantities in 1944. These subs were built in sections to make them easier to mass produce. However, there were some initial glitches in the production process, slowing things down. Also, a submarine this sophisticated required a relatively long working up period. No Type XXIs saw action before the war ended. Had the war lasted another six months, the story would have been very different. :o

A sister ship–the Type XXIII–was put into service, in limited numbers, before the war ended. The Type XXIII was very similar to the Type XXI in most ways, except much smaller and with a shorter range. The Type XXIII could hold only two torpedoes (compared to twelve for the XXI). The Type XXIII was intended for use in coastal waters. Type XXIIIs sank or damaged five Allied ships; and the Allies did not sink or damage any Type XXIIIs. The rather one-sided track record of the Type XXIII reinforces the suspicion that it would have been very, very difficult for the Allies to detect or destroy the Type XXIs.

From the OP: please explain what you do at this time if you are the Axis or Allies?

Am I allowed to use 20/20 hindsight? If I am, my choice would be to accelerate the development and production of the Type XXI as quickly as possible. Had the Type XXI appeared in the Atlantic in large numbers in 1943, it could have decisively tipped the Battle of the Atlantic in Germany’s favor.

@KurtGodel7:

@Red:

Perhaps the greatest A&A gameplay weakness is that tanks and aircraft don’t take attrition losses.  Historically, even very successful attacks severely depleted these forces.  Examples would be heavy losses in Poland and France as well as pilot/aircraft losses in several of the major early war IJN/USN encounters.Â

Aircraft were particularly prone to heavy attrition just operating.  And they were easy to target in suprise attacks at the outbreak of war.  But since the game allows them to be chosen last they don’t attrit.  Plus they can be held away from the front.  This is why the USSR’s air force is almost completely absent in the initial placement.

Perhaps the greatest A&A gameplay weakness is that tanks and aircraft don’t take attrition losses.

They do in my rules set!  8-) Every round of ground or naval combat begins with the dogfight phase. In the dogfight phase, all units present fire at their air combat values. Any hits you receive must be applied to air units. Once you have applied a single anti-air hit to one of your air units, you must apply additional hits to that same unit until it’s dead, or until combat ends. (The same is true if you apply an anti-land hit to one of your land units, an anti-naval hit to one of your ships, or an anti-sub hit to one of your submarines.)

There are other ways aircraft can be destroyed as well. In strategic bombing raids, there is one round of dogfight phase, followed by strategic bombers attacking their targets using their strategic bombing values. Strategic bombing raids do permanent damage. For every ten points of damage a production facility experiences in a strategic bombing raid, it is reduced by one level. While nations receive some money from territory income, most of their late game production will come from production facilities. A sufficiently powerful strategic bombing offensive can destroy all those facilities; as well as the underlying cities in which they would exist. The correct defense against a strategic bombing offensive is to build air superiority planes; such as piston fighters or jet fighters.

There is a second way of defending oneself from strategic bombing raids: airfield attacks. To initiate an airfield attack, send your planes to a space with enemy aircraft, and declare an airfield attack. There will be two rounds of dogfight phase. Any of your planes which survived that dogfight may launch one attack against enemy aircraft, using their land combat values.

Interesting. At one time I had an idea for a variant of A&A where unit placement was at the start of your turn and the purchase phase was at the end. The units purchased were considered “in production” and set aside until placement at the beginning of the next turn. While the units are in production the enemy can strategic bomb them before they even get deployed.

By doing this the intention was to make strategic bombing more important and more costly. The other difference was that interceptors defended at full combat value and escorts attacked at full combat value for one round. I have never play-tested this so it might be a game breaker. It seems kind of fun to me though.

@Der:

Mine was probably one of the books in the Time-life series published about WWII.

Same, my Great-Grandfather had a bunch of those Time-life books that he gave to me.

The recent Lybian Civil War has been one of the more interresting post WWII conflicts.

It is amazing how much resources Hitler put into the defense of the British owned Channel Islands. He demanded between 10 to 25% of all Atlantic Wall material get dedicated to these Islands.

Lucky for us, Hitler was really dumb and was a terrible commander. He crippled his air force, threw away an army (6th), wasted his Kriegsmarine,he made Normandy an allied victory.
I believe that Germany would have won if they had been a competent military mind as head of state, or even if Hitler just didn’t interfere in military decision.