@Private:
Hi KG7
The quicker response to my previous post might have been no!
Seriously, though, your passion and your knowledge do you credit.
My argument on whether R or G was the greater threat was that it was G’s geographical location in central Europe and its militarised border with the foremost continental democracy that ratcheted up its threat status.
Unless you are simply arguing that G was not a threat at all, the above point must have got lost in the noise.
Cheers
PP
Seriously, though, your passion and your knowledge do you credit.
Thanks for the kind words.
My argument on whether R or G was the greater threat was that it
was G’s geographical location in central Europe and its militarised
border with the foremost continental democracy that ratcheted up its threat status.
In Hitler’s second book, he mentioned Germany’s centralized location within Europe. He considered that position a very serious liability. He would much rather Germany have been off to the side and out of the thick of things, so that it would be much less likely to experience the danger of a multi-front war against multiple enemies at once.
You will recall that after WWI, the Allies disarmed Germany. The disarmament of Axis nations was supposedly a prelude to a more general disarmament, in which Allied nations would also be disarmed. “The war to end all wars” and all that. But the Allies never disarmed. More importantly, they never pressured the Soviet Union to disarm.
The Soviet Union had a three step plan:
1. Industrialize
2. Militarize
3. Conquer Europe
Stalin initiated step 1 of this plan in the '20s. Step 2 was scheduled to be complete–or at least complete enough by July or August of 1941. At that point it would have been time to embark on step 3.
What was the Western democratic plan to stop this growing Soviet threat? Nothing! Except for a few French military advisors, they did nothing at all to help Poland withstand Soviet invasion back in 1920. As the Soviet Union grew in power during the late '20s and early '30s, the Western democracies responded by not relenting on the harsh terms of the Versailles Treaty. That treaty crippled Germany both economically and militarily, leaving it completely unable to defend itself against any would-be Soviet invasion. Recall that Germany was a democracy during this time, with a democratic government set up by the victorious Allies themselves. And yet they saw no need to “make the world safe for democracy” if the threatened democracy was inside Germany. They signed no treaties which would have protected Germany from the Soviet threat, and did not allow Germany to have a military with which to defend itself.
When Hitler came to power, he recognized that if Germany was going to defend itself against the Soviet threat, it would have to be through its own efforts. He recognized that Western democracies were no more interested in defending Germany from the Soviet threat than they’d been in defending Poland from Soviet invasion back in 1920.
The Western democracies had their chance to make an anti-Soviet pact with a nice, moderate, democratic German government in the form of the Weimar Republic. They urinated that chance away. So now, due to their own failings, they were stuck dealing with a hardline leader in the form of Hitler.
Hitler began his rule by opting out of the economically crippling portions of the Versailles Treaty. Due to that and other measures, Germany’s economy began to boom. Hitler also built up Germany’s military. Germany had been prohibited tanks or military planes under Versailles, so there was plenty of work to do to create good tank and plane designs. Only about 10 - 12% of German military spending went to the navy–clear evidence that whatever military ambitions Hitler may have had were confined to the European mainland. The nature of Germany’s military buildup offered reassurance to Britain, but not to France.
France had pursued an anti-German foreign policy for many centuries. The harsh, vindictive Versailles Treaty was simply a continuation of a pattern which had begun a very long time ago. That pattern continued into the '30s, with France pursuing a policy of anti-German encirclement. Ignoring the 7 million innocent victims of the Ukrainian famine, the French government signed a defensive alliance with the Soviet Union in 1935. France’s leaders seemed to lack the ability to imagine a world in which Germany and France were not enemies.
Daladier wanted war with Germany. But he didn’t want to go in alone. He felt that to achieve victory he needed one major ally: Britain, or the United States, or the Soviet Union. In 1938 Chamberlain’s approach prevented Daladier from getting the war he wanted. Things were different in 1939.
Unfortunately, there was no way for Hitler to prove to Daladier or other French leaders that his military buildup was intended for use against the Soviet Union, and not against France. Even if there had been a way for Hitler to prove that, it’s very likely Daladier would have pursued an anti-German foreign policy anyway. France’s foreign policy was anti-German back in the '20s, at a time when Germany was weak and crippled economically, militarily, and politically. If France was going to be anti-German even when Germany was as weak and non-threatening as possible, it would certainly also be anti-German as Germany grew strong under Hitler.
Dalaider himself had strong anti-German sentiments. Back in 1935, he’d served as Minister of War in France’s Popular Front government. 40% of that government consisted of the French section of the Workers International, 20% consisted of the French Communist Party, and the remaining 40% consisted of Daladier’s own Radical Party. During the '30s, the Soviet Union promoted “anti-fascism” in Western democracies, as part of its broader strategy of fostering war between Germany and the West. Dalaider was a good Minister of War for an “anti-fascist” government like the Popular Front: he had the right pro-war, pro-Soviet, anti-German spirit.
In order to get the war he wanted, Daladier deliberately threw Poland under the bus. He made Poland promises he never intended to keep. Specifically, he promised the Polish that France would launch a general offensive against Germany within 15 days of mobilization. Daladier’s lie formed the basis of Poland’s entire diplomatic and military strategy for 1939. Polish leaders’ foolish belief in that lie is the primary reason all their plans failed.
In Mein Kampf, Hitler had written about the need to go to war against the Soviet Union. Around the year 1920 the communists came very close to taking over Germany. Hitler was almost unknown at that time. When a pair of communists came to arrest him, he drew his pistol. The communists looked into his eyes, saw he meant business, and retreated, with no shots fired. Later in the '20s the communists came very close to taking control of northern Germany. By this point Hitler had built a somewhat successful political movement, and decided to respond to this communist threat by taking control over southern Germany. Hitler’s putsch attempt failed, and he spent over a year in prison. The communist attempt to seize northern Germany failed as well.
Having finally taken control over Germany, Hitler had every reason in the world to focus his attention on the east. Especially given the fact that even before Hitler had come to power, Stalin had already embarked upon a massive program of industrialization and militarization. Stalin and other Soviet leaders openly advocated a long-term goal of world conquest. As Hitler had already seen, communist plans for world domination definitely included Germany.
You will recall that Spanish dictator Franco pursued a policy of neutrality toward Germany. Hitler responded by leaving Spain alone. Suppose that France had pursued that same policy of neutrality. Might Hitler have left France alone too? Might he have focused his attention on his one foreign policy goal–war against the Soviet Union–while leaving things well enough alone in the west?
