sigh It’s always got to be harsh criticism with you, huh? Fine, let me put it this way: I agree that Iraqi fighters fled to Iran in 1991, as I’ve said and posted links for. However, I do not know of any similar action in 2003. If you post a link, I’ll judge that on it’s merits, but I have been unable to find any references to it, not that I was searching that hard. Also, I agree that Iran is a plausible destination for arms.
However, I contend that Syria is a better destination and more likely to have occurred. This, however, is assuming that Saddam moved his WMDs to another country, which I am not certain he did. Scott Ritter, who was a top inspector in Iraq, contends in his book that the IAEA had catalogues of destroyed and preserved equipment and weapons.
(This is in a small response to Jen - btw, glad to have you back and that you’re safe!) :-)
So, we’re dealing with quite an amount of hypotheticals here. And, I believe you mischaracterize the situation on the ground between 1991 and 2003, and are using the penumbra of action to justify your argument, rather than articulating something more in line with ground-level realities of interest and power in that period. For example, Saddam was denied air capability and the ability to enact an atrocity in the southern no-fly zone, this is true. However, he still had an extensive police and security presence right up to the US invasion in 2003. In the records that inspectors uncovered, that police system was as advanced as any in the world, perhaps not in terms of technological capability, but certainly in terms of information on each individual in the country. However, you are ignoring this fact to assert that Saddam had little control over the weapons in the area, which is not the case.
And this is because of the Iraqi military’s force structure, and in particular the WMD program. After all, I am not concerned with the transfer of conventional arms, and I don’t think that’s what we were really talking about. Critical weapon systems - WMD, airforce - were staffed and controlled by people directly loyal to Saddam, either through the Republican Guard as opposed to the regular army, or more generally based on tribal affiliations with direct familial ties to Hussein. And those people did not come from the Shiite tribes in the south. Remember, the inspectors concentrated their efforts in and around Baghdad, precisely because those were Saddam’s power bases and he hid his weapons there. Shiites therefore did not have access to critical weaponry, and as a result, I find your assertion of a transfer of arms doubtful.
In addition, we still have the question of Shiite motivation to transfer arms. First you argue that Saddam had relatively less control in the south, which I take as a partial concession to my point. Then you say he is still able to kill a wide number of Shiites in the south. These aren’t necessarily contradictory statements, but they should give some pause to your assertions. Secondly, you keep missing the Arab-Persian dimension of relations. As stated in the latest issue of the Atlantic Monthly, Shiites in Iraq have not always liked Shiites in Iran. In fact, most are generally hostile. I said that Iran tried to foment disruption, not that it was successful. Indeed, success has most often come from working with the Kurds, not the Shiites. Again, just because certain people share a common religion, doesn’t mean they don’t kill each other or hate each others’ guts.
I have to go, but I’ll finish this up a bit later.