@Cmdr:
I apologize, I did accidentally replace the names of the two Cavalry commanders. I am sure that Brigadier General John Buford was spinning in his grave being mistaken for Major General JEB Stuart.
For that I apologize. However, your condescending attitude about a simple mistake of using the wrong name only proves your position has no strength of its own and relies on attacks on the character of other conversation participants, Mr. Smacky.
it was quite a gaffe, and I think rather telling.
Now, with that said, here’s how I see Gettysburg going down.
2) General Buford, realizing that there were 12 major roads passing through Gettysburg, and realizing that the Army of Northern Virginia (here-after referred to as ANV) would have extremely good positioning if he allowed them to pass and waited for General Mead (who was commonly seen as a man who would be patient and move slowely so as to not over extend himself) and that Gettysburg could mean the difference between stopping the AVN or not; put up a scrap (fight.)
Buford had no idea what he was fighting against. The union had only the vaguest idea of Lee’s position. Lee had abolutely no idea where Meade even was. Heth had sent two brigades into Gettysberg. That’s ALL Buford had. He held Heth off for about an hour, then he found himself up against an entire division and fell back. Reynolds arrived and was promptly killed.
The confederates, through sheer luck, were able to get more men into the fight, and the Union withdrew to the hills. Ewell was in an excellent position to take the heights, but hesitated because he had lost a leg and just assumed command of Stonewall’s old Corps.
Meade was a very competent general (Grant kept him on throughout the entire war), and shored up his position, wisely preferring to let Lee come to him. If Sickles hadn’t fucked up the entire line, the 2nd day would have gone disastrously for Lee.
3) General Heth, assuming he was attacking local militia, directed two brigades forward (under Gen. Archer and Davis), however he miscalculated, he was actually attacking dismounted cavalry who were soon supported by 1st Corps.
Heth caused the Union to abandon the town, and just as soon as he was exhausted, Pender’s division rode up and attacked. The Union was in full retreat, and took a defensive position at cemetary Hill and Seminary Ridge. Ewell could have stormed the heights but didn;t.
4) Gen. Buford’s tactics won The Army of the Potomac (hereafter referred to as AP) the strong defensive positions.
Luck (and Ewell’s temerity) got them the position.
Thus, I say that General Lee’s army lost on Day 1. They failed to achieve their primary objectives (getting the shoes)
LOL, so Lee’s primary objective was to get shoes? He was there to compell Meade’s army to battle, and destory it.
Day 2:
1) With the strong positions on Culp’s Hill, Cemetary Ridge and both Round Tops (Round Top and Little Round Top) dugin and defended with artillery batteries and infantry units; the AP deserted the less secure Gettysburg city for the stronger positions to the south of Gettysburg.
Dug in? LOL, Little Round Top was defended by a Signal Corps. Both sides saw the danger/oppurtunity. There was a race to take it, Chamberlain got there with about ten minutes time to spread out his unit and dig in.
Meanwhile, Sickles (an idiot who got his commission through politics) rode out ahead of everyone, and got his a** handed to him. Give him this though: he took the loss of his leg well, and donated it to a museum later. I think it’s still there.
2) Lee, smelling victory, directed General Longstreet’s First Corps to attack Little Round Top where he could roll up the APs “Fish Hook” emplacements. Unfortunately, General Stuart’s cavalry was not present to give Lee accurate intelligence, and this allowed the 20th Maine, under the direct command of Colonel Chamberlain, as well as the defense of the Peach Orchard sent General Longstreets divisions reeling.
Longstreet’s problem was he got lost. If he’d taken the right road, he would have been in a much better position to attack the Union’s flank. Longstreet hardly went “reeling”. The Peach Orchard was abandonded after Sickels was attacked on all three sides.
It should be noted that in this engagement it was Union Commanders such as Colonel Chamberlain, who lead bayonet charges against superior numbers, that allowed the AP to destroy Caldwell’s Division, Anderson’s division, and many other of Lee’s armies.
Highly doubtful. Chamberlain was in command of about 500 men. And as I showed before, both sides suffered similar casualties BEFORE Pickett’s charge. None of Lee’s divisions were “destroyed”.
Meanwhile, the Union, having the defensive advantage, the strong defensive positions, and good internal lines, was able to switch out units as needed to keep the ground.
So it is, on Day 2, after the Peach Orchard Battle, the Battle of Little Round Top, the Plum Run Valley (“Valley of Death”) and other scirmishes along the Union lines, and with the retreat of Gen. Lee without gain, that I award day 2 to the Union.
Except that there was a whole nother attack going on against Hancock’s line. Ewell again delayed and the attack didn’t begin until 4. The confederates broke through in some spots, but it was too late to exploit anything.
Ewell has a great quote about Gettysberg: “It took a lot of mistakes to lose Gettysberg, and I made most of them”. You have to admire people who were willing to accept responsbility for failure.
The Union held there position due to several factors:
1. Meade recognized the value of good defensive terrain
2. Longstreet got lost
3. Ewell lost his nerve (again)
4. Chamberlain had been born
Lee had come SO close attacking the flanks, the only thing left was to either retreat to fight another day (hard to do since the Confedrates were foraging from the countryside and were far away from their base of supply), or attack the center.
Now. After being bested twice in a row, not having achieved your objectives and not destroying your enemy. With your enemy in control of the best defensive positions on the field and with you attacking from the worst possible angle. With your general staff advising against your attack plan for day 3, your common sense as an experienced field commander telling you the battle is lost, why would General Lee order a suicide run with 3 divisions through an open field (a LARGE open field, it was over a mile from the tree line to the top of the ridge), over a picket fence which was sure to disrupt your formations and slow your infantry advance; against every gun the Union had in the region first firing concussive rounds and later firing grape shot?
1. Lee WON the first day. The Union was in full retreat to the hills. It wasn’t a tactical decision. They got their asses kicked in the town itself. The hills were the only place left to go.
2. Lee’s general staff supported Lee. Picket was raring to go. Only Longstreet was adamantly opposed.
3. Lee had done a MUCH MORE daring attack at Chanclersville, seperating his smaller army into two smaller pieces. A capable general would have destroyed Lee. Lee had Jackson, and Fortunately, for Lee, Hooker had been in charge. The confederates had also won at 2nd Manassas, forced McCellan to abandon the Peninsula Campaign, won Frederickberg, tied at Antietam (DESPITE having their battlke plans fall into McClellan’s hands). All against long odds.
Lee’s mistake was in believing that Meade was like all the other commanders he had bested. He finally ran up against a good commander with an excellent general (Hancock) in his command. Lee might still have done it (as someone else poiinted out), but his artillery barrage overshot the union lines.
By the way, this was the mistake quite a few competent generals made in WWI. They believed that massive artillery barrages would pave the way for massed infantry assaults. Doesn’t work that way- the defenders just burrowed deeper, waited for the guns to fall silent, and mowed down the attackers. Tactics almost always lag behind technology. Guderian was probably the best general in history to RECOGNIZE, in THEORY, what the power of artillery, the tank, infantry, and plane could do, in combination.
The only two options I have to chose from are:
1) Lee lost his mind and suffered from temporary insanity after having to admit he lost a battle for the first time in the war.
2) Lee sabotaged his own army for reasons personal to him, but which I will speculate relate to his desire to end the war to save further punishment on his home state of Virginia (who was suffering greatly as the AP roamed about pillaging and destroying.)
Start with Sharra (Killer Angels), then read Foote and Catton for more indepth history. You will soon abandon this ridiculous theory.