Dreadful Axis Mistakes

For the Italians not taking Malta in the opening days of the war.

For Germany declearing war on the U.S after Pearl Harbor.

What you say makes sense, but its also possible to look at alternative mistakes as being the decisive decisions.

In the case of Japan, they started a war they knew they could not win over the long term (as it turned out to be a longer war than they hoped - the US had no desire to negotiate a peace).  However, I think their mistake was their invasion of China.  This was the reason for the US oil embargo, and all negotiations prior to Pearl Harbor regarding the oil embargo was dependent on Japan leaving China (which they obviously could not do for political reasons).  China was also too large of a country for them to take and hold it all, so the Chinese kept up the fight from Chongqing as well as by guerrilla warfare.  A war they could not win, could not leave and cost them their badly needed oil imports.

One must ask why Germany attacked the Russians, when the Russians were giving them everything they wanted before the attack?  (Though some theorize Stalin was preparing to attack Germany by surprise, but was attacked first by the Nazis) So it is indeed easy to say this was Germany’s main mistake.  But I think instead the mistake was not attacking Russia, but not taking Moscow before winter.

In the case of Germany, they came very, very close to defeating the Russians.  Had they done so, it is unclear if they would have been in a similar situation as the Japanese.  Bogged down with both a strong guerrilla force to contend with and a large never-ending front to defend and fighting (and losing) a naval and aerial battle against superior forces.

Alternatively, perhaps a defeat of the Russians would have instead provided the resources Germany needed for at least a stalemate.  Certainly, the Germans could have maintained sufficient manpower and technological advantage to hold off the US/UK forces had they won in Russia early.  As this is quite possible, the mistake probably wasn’t the invasion of Russia so much as some decision made which prevented victory against the Russians.  IMHO, the failure to take Moscow before winter was the key mistake.

Winter arrives in Moscow a full month before either Leningrad or Stalingrad.  Moscow was the last Railway which permitted the Soviets to transport North-South, taking of Moscow would have effectively fractured the nation into separate units…making simple a divide and conquer strategy.  Taking the capital would have been an immense political statement.  As such, I think the Nazi failure was devoting insufficient resources to Moscow.  As their plan was three massive invasion forces (north, center, and south); they could have sent far less towards the North and the South so that victory in the Center (Moscow) was absolutely assured.  The rest of Russia could have been taken the following spring, if necessary, under this scenario.

I agree, I hate it when people say that invading russia was a bad idea, the situation was far more complicated than that.  And Germany did not have the resources for a prolonged war with the UK, especially when the BEF was evacuated from Dunkirk and the failure of the BoB.  Invading Russia was based all on economic neccesity, and  ideological rivalry.

@221B:

Winter arrives in Moscow a full month before either Leningrad or Stalingrad.

Moscow is about 500 miles north of Stalingrad, so I can understand winter arriving there a month earlier, but it’s about 200 miles south of Leningrad, so I’m puzzled at the notion that winter would arrive in Leningrad a month later.

Germany should have concentrated on getting United Kingdom out of the war before attacking the Soviets.  If the Soviets had made the preemptive attack then the Germans would have the propaganda advantage (and of course, the Soviets were not actually planning to go through with a preemptive attack any time soon).  If Germany had secured the Suez Canal and Jordan it probably could have bent Turkey to its will, and potentially had access to all the fuel it needed.

As IL and many others have pointed out earlier in similar threads, Germany was not (enough) ready for a war against Russia in 41. And Germany should never have attacked Russia before finishing off UK.

And if Germany and Japan was as “alliefied” as UK+US they would have had a much better chance of winning the WW2, conducting different strategies which was not coordinated was a bad choice, but “playing together” would have made a very big difference.

@CWO:

@221B:

Winter arrives in Moscow a full month before either Leningrad or Stalingrad.

Moscow is about 500 miles north of Stalingrad, so I can understand winter arriving there a month earlier, but it’s about 200 miles south of Leningrad, so I’m puzzled at the notion that winter would arrive in Leningrad a month later.

Leningrad is by the sea which delays, and moderates, winter.

While it would make sense (as others have stated here) for Germany to win against the UK prior to any military action against the USSR, I would like to point out that a German victory against the UK at the time of Barbarossa had become most unlikely.

Operation Sealion was unlikely to succeed even had it been undertaken in ideal conditions in July 1940.  The longer time went on, the better prepared the UK was against a German invasion.

Likewise the U-boat campaign never destroyed sufficient shipping to really force England to negotiate a peace; and the British (and Americans) were continuously improving their defenses against the U-boats.

The African campaign faltered; but even had it succeeded, might not have been sufficient to bring the UK to the negotiating table.

Even with the Soviets providing the Germans pretty much everything they wanted, Germany would be hard pressed to keep up with the UK with virtually unlimited manpower from her colonies and immense industrial support from the US.  And how for long would Stalin be so accommodating?  Doing nothing seems like simply waiting for defeat as Germany is still in a strategically weaker position over the long term.

What other options (besides a successful invasion of the UK) did Hitler have to either negotiate a peace, or ensure at a minimum a stalemate?  Invade Gibraltar via Spain? Pour resources into the African campaign? Go to the middle east via Turkey?  Technological advances (jet planes, V-1, V-2, etc. - this was attempted later in the war without success)? or grab the rich resources of the USSR to ensure sufficient resources to compete?

Of these choices, the attack of the Soviets seemed the most likely to succeed, with most Germans believing their war would be over in a matter of weeks (just like the rest of Europe). No one, believed they would hold out for long at all, let alone turn the Germans back.  Russia was easily accessible to Germany (sharing a border across what used to be Poland), unlike most of the other strategic options.  And of these choices, the Soviet territory was by far the richest in potential return, with large surpluses of Ukrainian wheat, Caucasus oil, and other resources the Germans needed.

But I think more importantly, the attack on the Soviets was something the Nazi party had advocated all along.  Ideologically, it was the perfect next move.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leibensraum

(German for “habitat” or literally “living space”) was one of the major political ideas of Adolf Hitler, and an important component of Nazi ideology. It served as the motivation for the expansionist policies of Nazi Germany, aiming to provide extra space for the growth of the German population, for a Greater Germany. In Hitler’s book Mein Kampf, he detailed his belief that the German people needed Lebensraum (“living space”, i.e. land and raw materials), and that it should be found in the East. It was the stated policy of the Nazis to kill, deport, or enslave the Polish, Russian and other Slavic populations, whom they considered inferior, and to repopulate the land with Germanic peoples.

In my opinion, while there are obviously many factors that one can look at when analyzing the Axis loss, I think the biggest mistake was getting the US involved. However, by the nature of the war and the goals of the Axis, US involvement may have been inevitable from the start.

Honestly, I don’t see how you can beat American production. When a unified and willing nation has the capacity to build more guns, tanks, planes, and ships than much of the rest of the world combined, how can any opponent possibly oppose it?

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_production_during_World_War_II#Summary_of_production

Check out the first table and compare just how much more the US alone produced than the rest of the Axis combined. If you’re a power that has massive goals (control and military domination of large swaths of territory), and you try to wage war against that kind industry, you’re in for a walloping. Of course, in a situation like Vietnam, where the flexing of industrial might is limited by small scale guerilla-warfare in jungles, American power isn’t invincible.

@221B:

While it would make sense (as others have stated here) for Germany to win against the UK prior to any military action against the USSR, I would like to point out that a German victory against the UK at the time of Barbarossa had become most unlikely.

Operation Sealion was unlikely to succeed even had it been undertaken in ideal conditions in July 1940.  The longer time went on, the better prepared the UK was against a German invasion.

Likewise the U-boat campaign never destroyed sufficient shipping to really force England to negotiate a peace; and the British (and Americans) were continuously improving their defenses against the U-boats.

The African campaign faltered; but even had it succeeded, might not have been sufficient to bring the UK to the negotiating table.

Even with the Soviets providing the Germans pretty much everything they wanted, Germany would be hard pressed to keep up with the UK with virtually unlimited manpower from her colonies and immense industrial support from the US.  And how for long would Stalin be so accommodating?  Doing nothing seems like simply waiting for defeat as Germany is still in a strategically weaker position over the long term.

What other options (besides a successful invasion of the UK) did Hitler have to either negotiate a peace, or ensure at a minimum a stalemate?  Invade Gibraltar via Spain? Pour resources into the African campaign? Go to the middle east via Turkey?  Technological advances (jet planes, V-1, V-2, etc. - this was attempted later in the war without success)? or grab the rich resources of the USSR to ensure sufficient resources to compete?

Of these choices, the attack of the Soviets seemed the most likely to succeed, with most Germans believing their war would be over in a matter of weeks (just like the rest of Europe). No one, believed they would hold out for long at all, let alone turn the Germans back.  Russia was easily accessible to Germany (sharing a border across what used to be Poland), unlike most of the other strategic options.  And of these choices, the Soviet territory was by far the richest in potential return, with large surpluses of Ukrainian wheat, Caucasus oil, and other resources the Germans needed.

Very interesting post…however I’m inclined to think the Africa campaign would have had a good chance of succeeding if a large part of the air and armor slotted for Barbarossa had been sent to Africa instead.  If Axis succeeded in shutting down the Suez Canal then perhaps amphib operations against Malta, Gibraltar, and Cyprus could have been considered.  Every little colonial defeat was a further blow to British morale and prestige.  Hitler didn’t necessarily need to Sea Lion–just keep conquering one colonial possession after another, and keep offering peace to UK at terms the common people of UK could accept (eg the autonomy of UK and its colonies).

Hitler himself had decried 2-front wars.  I see Barbarossa as the Nazi party falling victim to his own hubris.  It wasn’t even clearly winning the war with UK, and somehow the solution is start another war with an even more powerful state.  They should have at least obtained the cooperation and assistance of Japan before embarking on such an absurd all-in bet.

@Zhukov44:

Very interesting post…however I’m inclined to think the Africa campaign would have had a good chance of succeeding if a large part of the air and armor slotted for Barbarossa had been sent to Africa instead.  If Axis succeeded in shutting down the Suez Canal then perhaps amphib operations against Malta, Gibraltar, and Cyprus could have been considered.  Every little colonial defeat was a further blow to British morale and prestige.  Hitler didn’t necessarily need to Sea Lion–just keep conquering one colonial possession after another, and keep offering peace to UK at terms the common people of UK could accept (eg the autonomy of UK and its colonies).

Another thing which would have put Britain in a difficult position would have been a German seizure of the Middle East, thus cutting Britain off from its source of oil there (and redirecting that oil to Germany, which needed it badly).  This move would probably not have been fatal to Britain in itself, since it was also getting oil from the U.S., but it would have put significant added strain on Britain’s war effort.  It’s a bit like the remark made by Nimitz (if I remember correctly) about what the effect would have been if Japan had destroyed Pearl Harbor’s shipyard facilities and oil storage tanks on December 7: the U.S. would still have won in the end, but the blow would have been so damaging that it would have prolonged the war by a year.

@Zhukov44:

Hitler himself had decried 2-front wars.  I see Barbarossa as the Nazi party falling victim to his own hubris.  It wasn’t even clearly winning the war with UK, and somehow the solution is start another war with an even more powerful state.  They should have at least obtained the cooperation and assistance of Japan before embarking on such an absurd all-in bet.

During the planning for Barbarossa, Hitler was apparently reminded by his generals of his own statement (in Mein Kampf, I believe) that it would be folly for Germany to fight a two-front war.  Hitler responded that, given Britain’s weakened condition in mid-1941, an invasion of Russia would not violate the two-front war principle because the fighting would only be on one front…provided the war against Russia was a short one.  And that’s where things fell apart.  Germany and Japan, for a variety of reasons, were both only in a position to win relatively short wars, not lengthy wars of attrition.  Both planned to do so through the application of innovative tactics, good training, good leadership, and in some cases superior weaponry, combined with exploiting the fact that their potential enemies were not well prepared (again for a variety of reasons) to deal with an attack.  It was an approach that worked brilliantly for Germany in Poland and France, and for Japan in the Dutch East Indies and the British territories in the Far East.  Germany, however, failed in its bid to deliver a quick knock-out blow to Britain and Russia, and Japan likewise to the United States, and both countries ended up in lengthy attritional conflicts.

@Zhukov44:

…however I’m inclined to think the Africa campaign would have had a good chance of succeeding if a large part of the air and armor slotted for Barbarossa had been sent to Africa instead.  If Axis succeeded in shutting down the Suez Canal then perhaps amphib operations against Malta, Gibraltar, and Cyprus could have been considered.  Every little colonial defeat was a further blow to British morale and prestige.  Hitler didn’t necessarily need to Sea Lion–just keep conquering one colonial possession after another, and keep offering peace to UK at terms the common people of UK could accept (eg the autonomy of UK and its colonies).

Hitler himself had decried 2-front wars.  I see Barbarossa as the Nazi party falling victim to his own hubris.  It wasn’t even clearly winning the war with UK, and somehow the solution is start another war with an even more powerful state.  They should have at least obtained the cooperation and assistance of Japan before embarking on such an absurd all-in bet.

I agree with you that Africa could have been made a decisive front…Not sure if the closer proximity to Axis would have compensated enough for the much smaller merchant marine available, but it was certainly a good possibility.  In hindsight, it is perhaps a better option than Barbarossa (though at the time the Germans believed the weakened British to still be much superior to the Russians in terms of military capacity).

It would have had the bonus of perhaps bringing the French fleet completely over to the axis side.  From Egypt, further forays into Iraq, and (perhaps via the French fleet) to the colonies on the East coast of Africa, perhaps even to India (though I think the sheer manpower available to the British in India would be an impediment to any action there).

I will think about the relative sizes of the Axis (Italian) and British shipping capacity and in the distances the men, equipment, and supplies would need to traverse to engage in this front some more.  Perhaps I’ll post more later…

@221B:

It would have had the bonus of perhaps bringing the French fleet completely over to the axis side.

I doubt that.  Vichy France wanted to keep its fleet in French hands, not hand it over either to the Allies or to the Germans.

When German forces retaliated against the Anglo-American “Torch” landings in North Africa by occupying the southern “unoccupied zone” of France (the zone had up to then been under Vichy control), the Vichy forces in North Africa considered this a breach of the armistice terms France had signed with Germany.  To quote Wikipedia on what happened next: “The Germans formulated Operation Lila with the aim of capturing intact the demobilised French fleet at Toulon. French naval commanders, however, managed to delay the Germans by negotiation and subterfuge long enough to scuttle their ships on 27 November, before the Germans could seize them, preventing three battleships, seven cruisers, 28 destroyers and 20 submarines from falling into the hands of the Axis powers.”

japan attacking perl harbour

I am fairly well-read on Germany, so I can offer my own opinion on them, but as for Japan, all I really can say is Pearl Harbor?

Germany–
Stopping the bombing of Britain- British morale was in decline during the bombing, and despite what Axis and Allies represents, strategic bombing raids are pretty effective. With Britain being bombed, more Allied planes had to be focused on defense and less attacks on Germany. However, this mistake isn’t very severe, because Germany didn’t have the industrial capacity to match Britain plane for plane forever, especially with the UK’s colonies.

Calling off the attack on Moscow, which led to…

Capture of Leningrad, Stalingrad, and Moscow simultaneously- Huge mistake. Hitler, in his infinite wisdom, decided he needed three important cities, and that he had the capacity to take all three at the same time. The Germans were losing numerical superiority as more and more Russians from the far east were redeployed.

Stalingrad- Bombing the daylights out of the city created so much rubble that the Soviet troops could hide and fight an attrition war with the Germans. Without defined parameters, German tanks were easily stuck in what used to be streets and were easy prey for antitank weapons.

Inferior tank designs- The T-34  Soviet tank, while less manuverable and operated by inexperienced crews, was strong enough to resist shells of some German tank models completely. German tank crews were disheartened to find out in one incident, after they hit a T-34 and surrounded it, the surrendered Soviet crew was uninjured, just dazed from the impact, and the tank was fully operational. While this would be remedied with the Tiger tank, it was too late in the war.

At one point in the seige of Stalingrad, Hitler was so desperate to achieve victory he ordered experienced tank crews be armed with pistols and act as infantry. This cost the Germans immensley in terms of valuable soldiers.

The surrounding of the 6th army. Rather than place competent commanders, Hitler promoted those who followed orders, so when the 6th German army was counterattacked outside of Stalingrad, Field Marshal Paulus, rather than assemble a quick mechanized force of tanks and half-tracks which could have possibly repelled the disorganized Soviet attack, he patiently waited for orders from Fuhrer headquarters, which led to the defeat at Stalingrad.

The holocaust- so many resources were diverted into genocide rather than helping the Wehrmacht.

In general, Barbarossa was a huge mistake. Soviet industry was simply moved from the Ukraine and Belorussia to the Urals, and Soviet tank production was vastly superior to German tank production, something Hitler refused to believe.

@M:

I am fairly well-read on Germany, so I can offer my own opinion on them, but as for Japan, all I really can say is Pearl Harbor?

Japan’s best chance to win in the Pacific was to avoid a war with the United States entirely.  If Japan had (as was the case historically) attacked British and Dutch territories in the Pacific and South-East Asia, but had NOT attacked any U.S. (or U.S.-controlled) territories – and if for good measure Japan had publicly announced that it had no intention of ever doing so unless attacked by America – this would have at least delayed and just possibly prevented U.S. entry into the war.  There was still a lot of isolationist sentiment in the States at the time, and no great love for European “imperialist” powers like Britain and Holland, so the idea of going to war with Japan to defend the British and Dutch colonial empires would not have been an easy sell.

Let’s assume, however, that U.S. entry into the war was inevitable – for example, because of American pro-China sentiment (which was strong), or whatever reason.  Japan’s best chance to win under those circumstances would still have been to avoid attacking the U.S., in order to give the U.S. few reasons to fight, and to put the U.S. in the position where it would have to be the country to open the hostilities.  Japan’s strategy, in other words, should have been to make sure that the Americans lacked motivation, so that:  a) America would mobilize its people and its industry to the smallest possible degree, and b) America would be inclined to accept a negotiated settlement once they realized how long the war would have to be and/or once they suffered a few big early defeats at Japan’s hands.  But what did Japan do instead?  It launched a surprise attack against Pearl Harbor while its diplomats were still (more or less) involved in discussions with Washington.  It did the one thing which guaranteed that American public opinion would be outraged, and that the nation would unite in an all-out effort to win at all costs in order to punish Japan for what was seen as an act of treachery.