• '12

    I would agree with assessment past my original thinking of 1946-1947 even.  The soviets were worse off than I thought originally.  It seems it would take them until past the start of the Korean war to mount serious offensive operations that could result in the over-running of western europe.  I found some interesting estimates of the soviets here on page 75.

    https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol44no3/pdf/v44i3a06p.pdf

    Document JIC 397 seems to be a key document as well.


  • Did you know Adolf Hitler was named Man of the year During WWII.


  • @TheDictator:

    Did you know Adolf Hitler was named Man of the year During WWII.

    Apparently everyone “knows” Hitler was insane and evil.  No way he could have been named Time Magazine’s Man of the Year in 1938.  Which incidentally was before World War II started.  Ya hobo.


  • That man of the year thing is interesting, I assume it was in fact in 1938 though.

  • Moderator

    well He (Hitler) did bring Germany back from a Great depression, and was widely popular not only in his country but others as well. of course this was in 38, b4 he went insane


  • @Deaths:

    well He (Hitler) did bring Germany back from a Great depression, and was widely popular not only in his country but others as well. of course this was in 38, b4 he went insane

    I don’t think Hitler “went insane” at all.  There is what I consider this consistent, stupid, and dangerous view of things.  And yes, that is inflammatory.  But to my mind, shock value is appropriate and necessary to a navel-gazing collective consciousness.  Others are dismissed as “insane” by those that are themselves insane!

    1.  Why worry about insanity?
    2.  Defining insanity
    3.  Popular conception of insanity
    4.  An insane world
    5.  Identifying self as insane through induction
    6.  Relativism and Pope Benedict XVI
    7.  History, and why we are doomed to repeat it
    8.  Personal responsibility

    1.  Why worry about insanity?

    So you go around in your every day life, pointing fingers, calling this insane or that insane.  But what if you yourself are insane?  Of course you don’t think of yourself as insane.  But then again, not thinking of oneself as insane does not mean one is not insane.  So the question is really, is self-knowledge important to you or not?  If you don’t care about self-knowledge, or if you happily accept the label of insanity for yourself, then fine.  But if you claim self-knowledge, if you claim to be sane, and if you claim others are insane, then you are a delusional hypocrite.

    2.  Defining insanity

    Insanity is by definition the inability to function in society.  Society and individuals are two different things, so it is natural that there will be some conflict between the two.  That is, it is perfectly natural that any given individual will to some degree be unable to function in society.  So insanity then becomes not a question of black and white, but simply a question of degree.

    Now consider the fact that different societies will have different requirements for an individual to function within them.  Combined with the observation that insanity is a question of degree of disparity between individual and society, it is directly consequent that what is considered sane in one society will be considered insane in another society, and vice versa.

    Clearly, insanity is subjectively defined.  So why is it inappropriate to simply slap a label of “insanity” on anything?

    3.  Popular conception of insanity

    There is a popular conception of insanity, that, as Plato would say, it is “the bad” or “the stupid”.

    Insanity has already been defined as subjectively defined by one individual, often relating to another individual’s relation to the first individual’s conception of social norms.  But considering there is a popular conception of insanity as well as the definitional conception, titling something as “insane” goes beyond simple relativism.  It attaches an absolute value judgment of “the bad” and “the stupid”.

    That is to say, what is actually subjectively defined has gained the color of absolute definition.  This doesn’t seem so bad when put in abstract terms.  But let us put forth a practical example.

    _Let us say that I like Caucasians more than other ethnic groups.  That is a subjective judgment, by stating a preference I do no more than state a preference.

    Now let us say that Caucasians are superior to other ethnic groups.  Other ethnic groups are bad and stupid when compared to Caucasians.  When measured in terms of being Caucasians, other ethnic groups simply fall short.  It isn’t just a question of melanin production in the skin.  Questions regarding the cultural background of Caucasians tend to be answered incorrectly by non-Caucasians far more often than Caucasians.  It is therefore clear that non-Caucasians simply lack the ability to make finer contextual judgments like Caucasians do.  Furthermore, questions regarding value judgments depending on Caucasian norms are similarly incorrectly answered.  I therefore say, with scientific evidence, that Caucasians are superior in every sense, and that non-Caucasians are stupid and lack morality.

    You might get a bright “darky” every now and then that imitates its Caucasian superiors.  But such mimicry is just like that of a very bright monkey._

    So now that I start attaching absolute judgments to subjective preference and demonstrating it in practice, the distasteful stupidity hopefully becomes apparent.

    4.  An insane world

    To this point, I have demonstrated that “insanity” is a stupid term, because of the attachment of absolute values to subjective preference.  But there are still going to be those, like lemmings, that point to others and claim it must be okay because everyone else is doing it.  But I deny this stupidity.

    One’s understanding of the world largely comes about not through direct observation, but from inference and indirect observation.  To support this, there are not a lot of people that go through life firing loaded shotguns into their skulls or jumping naked from suspension bridges.  This is clearly not because such people have directly observed that doing so is dangerous.  It is because such people (just about everyone) has been instructed in the danger of doing so.

    Similarly, people tend to associate with certain particular groups, and their views become normalized to those groups.  For some people, it is normal to purchase a $6 purse.  Others will regard such expenditure as low-class, and will not spend less than $600 on a purse.  Yet others draw the bottom line at $6,000, or $60,000.  To spend outside a certain range is stupid and wasteful.  That is, some will think spending $6 on a purse is a complete waste of time - not that the $6 is significant to them at all, it’s simply that the time spent buying such a piece of crap is wasted time.  Others will think spending $60,000 on a purse is completely insane, when they could pay for their child’s college education with that money.  The same is true for other subjective judgments, like “insanity”.

    You associate with a particular group of people that all have certain common value judgments.  Though they may differ on some points, or even wildly on some important points, they have an understanding of what is “appropriate” and what is “inappropriate”, and that which meets certain criteria will be defined by you and these others as “insane”.  Since they share and support your judgments for the most part, even if there are individual dissenters, by and large your view of the world is static.

    But the fact is, there are other groups of people that also have certain common value judgments, only THEIR common value judgments are quite different to your groups.  So certain things that you consider distasteful or even insane, they view as normal, while certain things you do that you consider normal they consider distasteful or insane.

    Among these I number - eating the flesh of a cow, having sexual intercourse with those under 10 years of age, drinking alcoholic beverages to intoxication, usage of heroin, eating the flesh of a human being - each of these is normal to some groups but considered aberrant or insane in others.

    My earlier point was that insanity is correctly understood as a subjective and relativistic.  My point later was that insanity is in practical terms understood as an absolute, and that this is problematic.

    My point here is that conception of insanity as an absolute comes from continued association with a particular group of people or even of a number of like-minded groups.  Continued exposure to a consistent worldview convinces the individual that the subjective group opinion is actually objective fact.  Although a consistent group worldview will usually naturally include actual and real objective facts (such as the danger of loaded shotguns or jumping naked from suspension bridges), one must distinguish between subjective and objective.

    5.  Identifying self as insane through induction

    Insanity is not only a judgment that one makes about oneself and others, it is also a judgment that others can make of you.  Since there are so many differing groups, it is certain that your particular viewpoints are considered aberrant or even insane.
    To be clear.  Others think you are insane, and they are perfectly correct.

    6.  Relativism and Pope Benedict XVI

    This brings me to someone I am a great personal fan of, Pope Benedict XVI.

    http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/speeches/2005/june/documents/hf_ben-xvi_spe_20050606_convegno-famiglia_en.html

    ADDRESS OF HIS HOLINESS BENEDICT XVI
    TO THE PARTICIPANTS
    IN THE ECCLESIAL DIOCESAN CONVENTION OF ROME

    Basilica of St John Lateran
    Monday, 6 June 2005

    Today, a particularly insidious obstacle to the task of educating is the massive presence in our society and culture of that relativism which, recognizing nothing as definitive, leaves as the ultimate criterion only the self with its desires. And under the semblance of freedom it becomes a prison for each one, for it separates people from one another, locking each person into his or her own “ego”.

    With such a relativistic horizon, therefore, real education is not possible without the light of the truth; sooner or later, every person is in fact condemned to doubting in the goodness of his or her own life and the relationships of which it consists, the validity of his or her commitment to build with others something in common.

    What I have done with “insanity” is what I do with many moral and ethical judgments, which is to bring it into the debate of relativism.  Pope Benedict XVI’s answer to the question of relativism is to, in essence, step beyond it and provide a fundamental answer to an even more fundamental question.  If he had done nothing else with his papacy, for that alone I would consider him one of the truly great popes.

    But even so, it does not answer what I consider to be the real danger.

    7.  History, and why we are doomed to repeat it

    As George Santayana wrote, “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.”  To put it more fully,

    Progress, far from consisting in change, depends on retentiveness. When change is absolute there remains no being to improve and no direction is set for possible improvement: and when experience is not retained, as among savages, infancy is perpetual. Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it. In the first stage of life the mind is frivolous and easily distracted; it misses progress by failing in consecutiveness and persistence. This is the condition of children and barbarians, in whom instinct has learned nothing from experience. In a second stage men are docile to events, plastic to new habits and suggestions, yet able to graft them on original instincts, which they thus bring to fuller satisfaction. This is the plane of manhood and true progress. Last comes a stage when retentiveness is exhausted and all that happens is at once forgotten; a vain, because unpractical, repetition of the past takes the place of plasticity and fertile readaptation.

    I say similarly that there is far more necessary to progress than simple recollection of past events.  It is comprehension of past events that leads to progress.  The confusion of subjective and absolute conditions when attached to such concepts as “insanity” obliterates comprehension.  It obliterates progress.

    I have four pans, each made wholly of iron, with handles of red, blue, yellow, and green, respectively.  Now I put the blue handled pan over a bonfire for ten minutes, then firmly grasp the handle.  A burn!  I therefore conclude that blue is a problem, a troublemaker.  Everything blue can hurt me.  I start to hide from people in blue uniforms.  When athletic teams take to the field wearing blue uniforms, I am frightened.  Blue Man Group takes me to new levels of horror and fright.  But blue will not harm me again, because I avoid blue.  I am smart.  In the meantime, I put the red handled pan over a bonfire, so it will be ready for someone else to pick up . . . since there isn’t anything blue around, nothing could be harmful . . .

    That is what it is to call Hitler insane.  People avoid the color blue, because they associate it with harm.  From that association, some will go so far as to call blue itself harmful!  And to be truthful, avoiding blue is often not overtly problematic.  It could cause one some degree of inconvenience, but it does not actively lead to harm.  So everyone avoids blue, and it becomes commonly accepted that blue actually is harmful!  Likewise as for calling Hitler insane.  Hitler is dead, so who does it really harm?  Then it becomes accepted that Hitler was insane.  After all, everyone else thinks he was!

    And now we come to this time, in which everyone “realizes” blue is “the problem”.  But red, yellow, and green are all right.  This continues to be the case, until someone picks up the red handled pan from the bonfire and burns him/herself.  Then, sudden shock!  There is a new evil that has appeared in the world, and it is “red”!  The red menace!  And a new pan is put over the fire, maybe not the blue one, but what harm could there be in touching green or yellow?  And so it goes, until one day everyone knows green and yellow are certainly evil, but that blue and red are no longer dangerous, so the blue pan goes back on the fire again . . .

    So you see, this is why I object to calling Hitler insane.  The exact same circumstances will no longer repeat, but SIMILAR circumstances will.  As long as people are hysterically focusing on “blue” (i.e. calling Hitler “insane”), they are not focusing on the real problem, so the general situation continues.

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethnic_cleansing

    Butchery of particular ethnic groups predated Hitler, and POSTDATES him as well.  It is stupid simplification to classify all such incidents as simple insanity.  How incredibly convenient it is to say that groups of people collectively go insane, on a regular basis!  It allows one to deny all personal responsibility!  After all, what could you really do to stop groups of people from collectively going insane?  If someone wants to go and drink the Kool-Aid, well, what could you possibly do about it?  So you wring your hands and point fingers and call others insane, and make no progress.

    8.  Personal responsibility

    By calling others insane and denying personal responsibility, a collective mindset is created that (such and such) is SOMEONE ELSE’S PROBLEM.  This is understandable.  After all, nobody wants to deal with the stress of personal responsibility.  So what ends up being done is delegation of responsibility and decision making power to others.  But if those others are themselves disinterested, or worse, exploitative, you end up with an even worse mess.  This is how you end up with wage slavery and any number of other social ills; this explains also and is corroborated by the increasing disparity in wealth between the rich and the poor.  What is taught in schools is language, mathematics, and particular cultural norms, because that is the system that everyone has an immediate interest in perpetuating - the rich, because they need others to exploit (even though such exploitation is typically consensual, particularly with the expanding roles of taxation and government and decreasing personal liberties), and the poor because it is only through serving the rich that they can put bread on the table.  And certainly, there is some degree of movement between rich and poor; there are poor that can become rich, or rich that can become poor.  But the mobility of particular individuals within society do not point to the tendencies of individuals within the society as a whole, and the only conclusion that makes sense with continual denial of personal responsibility is inevitable systemic failure.

    The key to change in the future is not simply the alteration of curriculum on the personal level - that is, teaching new students how to simply “survive” in society, or how to use instruments and tools, or even scientific methods for technological advancement, and so forth.  Curriculum needs to advance on the social level, and there needs to be social advancement, so individuals do not merely survive in society, but prosper.


  • Great post by Bunnies P. Wrath! :)

    Just to add to what he’s written: if there is a deep, wide gulf between group X’s and group Y’s ideology, and if the two groups are at war, and if group X’s leaders label group Y’s leaders insane, one should be very suspicious about accepting that diagnosis at face value. Group X’s leaders have a vested interest in discrediting Group Y’s leaders. Successfully discrediting Y eliminates an alternative to their own ideology, justifies the war, and draws attention away from any misdeeds X’s leaders may have committed.


  • @KurtGodel7:

    @Herr:

    It’s rather off topic considering the question asked by the original poster, but as far as a potential Soviet attack on Western Europe is concerned, I find it very hard to believe that the nuclear bomb would have stopped Stalin. We’re not talking about a man here who was particularly concerned about the possible death of millions of his soldiers or civilians. Besides, at the time that Stalin would potentially arrive at such a decision, it wasn’t at all clear how devastating the nuclear bomb would be - but it was clear that they wouldn’t be produced by the dozen any time soon.
    Say that it’s July 1, 1945. The Trinity test hasn’t happened yet, so nobody knows whether or not the bomb will even work. US troops stationed in Europe are being relocated to the Pacific to finish off Japan, and the USSR military has an overwhelming numerical superiority. If Stalin intended to conquer the West, that would seem like a perfect opportunity.

    So why didn’t he? I suppose that only historical research could provide the answer, and maybe it already has, now that many the old Soviet archives are accessible - I’m no expert there. But there are two reasons I can think of:

    1. While the communist doctrine of the first half of the century was aimed at world domination, the typical route to achieve that would have been by means of worker’s revolutions similar to that in Russia itself. The USSR was more than willing to promote that, typically by supporting communist parties around the world. Stalin believed military conflict with the West to be inevitable, but didn’t intend to start an all-out war unless the West had been weakened by internal dissension.
    2. At the end of World War II, Stalin’s grip on the Soviet Union itself had been severely compromised by the events of the war. During his reign of terror of the late 1930’s, he had been in full control - but the purges of those years had severely weakened the Red Army and the entire administration of the country. The German attack left Stalin with no other choice than to allow more freedom, to loosen the reins to a degree that was required to fight the war in a somewhat effective manner. So he had to delegate power to others to a degree that he wouldn’t have been comfortable with in peace time. The war created celebrities and heroes, and in 1945, Stalin was probably not even in a position to start a war with the West - there would have been a lot of opposition, and it might have led to his downfall. It took Stalin several years to reassert his power - a prime example was the case of the highly popular field marshal Georgy Zhukov, who was relegated to a relatively unimportant post.

    You’ve raised excellent points. To add to what you’ve written, the Soviet army had become disorganized toward the end of the war in Europe. They were more interested in robbing, raping, shooting civilians, getting drunk, etc. than they were in remaining a disciplined fighting force. There was a celebratory atmosphere which made it unfit for a major new conflict–at least at the time. Another problem it faced was a lack of supplies. While the soldiers could eat by stealing what they needed from civilians, ammunition was another matter.

    Stalin was a man who believed in thorough preparations for war. During the '30s, he purged his army of anyone he suspected might prefer Nazism to communism. (Mostly people on the right.) Leading up to a war with the United States, a different sort of purge would have been used. The United States and Israel had formed a strong alliance. Stalin suspected that Jewish Zionists (read: Jews generally) might prefer an American victory to a Soviet one. In the early '50s, Stalin began show trials of Jewish doctors–trials which supposedly unveiled a Zionist conspiracy aimed against the Soviet Union. It is felt that, had Stalin lived, these trials would have been expanded to target Jews generally. It has also been noted that during this time, Stalin ordered the construction of two large new concentration camps. While the intended victims of these camps are not known with certainty, they were widely rumored to be for use against Jews.

    The extermination of the Soviet Union’s Jewish population would have been one of two facets of Stalin’s overall effort. The other would have been an invasion of Western Europe. The MiG had been specifically designed to shoot down American strategic bombers. (Though it was also effective at destroying American jet fighters.) While the Sabre was somewhat better than the MiG, the U.S.'s other jets were not nearly as good. And the Soviets had a lot more MiGs than the U.S. had Sabres.

    Evidence suggests that Stalin allowed the Korean War to be launched as a test of American military readiness. The U.S. failed this test, which made Stalin comfortable going forward with his plans to invade Western Europe. The Truman administration realized that the U.S. conventional forces in the area were no match for their Soviet counterparts–especially not after the nations of Eastern Europe had had their armies recruited, trained, and integrated into the Warsaw Pact. (The addition of Soviet satellite state forces to the communists’ army was another reason for delaying the communist invasion of the rest of Europe.)

    Because the NATO conventional forces in Germany were no match for their Warsaw Pact counterparts, the Truman administration’s plan was to respond to any Soviet invasion by using nuclear weapons on the Red Army as it moved deeper into West Germany. Stalin understood this, and his plan was to use MiG jets to shoot down American bombers before they could deliver their payloads. In any case the U.S. did not have very many nuclear weapons to use. (This was before the era of ICBMs, so any nation which could shoot down enemy bombers effectively enough could defend itself against nuclear attack.)

    Stalin died before putting these plans into effect. Had he lived another five years, it’s likely the Soviet Union would have invaded Western Europe, and that the Jews within Soviet territory would have been exterminated.

    Wow, very interesting post! I had no idea.

  • Moderator

    What I meant by saying he went insane was that his Judgement got clouded and he did not always make smart decisions and instead made decisions on an impulse, without completely thinking the thought out, and the ramifications of said thoughts.

    Take Operation Barbarossa, Had Hitler thought out the ramifications of a long war with Russia, instead of, kick in the door and the rest will fall apart attitude, I don’t think he would have started a war with Russia so soon, at least not until the British were properly dealt with first. Had he thought it completely through and realized Germany could not win a 2 front war, like WWI, he would have realized he was just repeating history all over. Also if he would have thought through the actual combat capabilities of his Allies, (Italy,Romania etc.)  He would have realized that those countries were no where ready for a war on such a Grand Scale, and he also would have realized that his third Reich could not Supply his Allies along with it self with the number of Materials Needed for all those involved on his side.

    Another thought he did not think out was the Down play of Military spending on his Air force and it’s technology research. Instead he thought the Luftwaffe was the Best Air Force in the world and would stay that way for ever, without the need to constantly improve it, so it would stay ahead of the curve ball.

    Another thought that was not thought thru to it’s end was with the Kriegsmarine. He had to fight the Royal Navy, the worlds largest navy at that time, and by all aspects only had a token Navy himself, with the exception of the U boat fleet. Had Hitler Waited a another year or 2, the Kriegsmarine Z-plan would have been off to a great start, and not at war with the UK.

    Another thought was the STG 44. the worlds first assault rifle, Instead of dismissing it at first because it was ugly, and gave that weapon a chance, His armed forces would have been better from the start.

    What the Hell does the Luftwaffe need a fully armoured division for? they had one just cause Goering wanted it. what a waste of Armour and Men, both tactically and strategically. That was another thought not thought thru to the end.

    Don’t forget the battle over Britain and the decision to change targets from pure military one to civilian ones, just cause 1 city got bombed on accident. The Germans were beating the Hell out of UK and actually winning in my opinion up until that decision was made

    So yes maybe insane was the wrong word to use, maybe stupid is better, or impulsive is even better then that.


  • @Deaths:

    What I meant by saying he went insane was that his Judgement got clouded and he did not always make smart decisions and instead made decisions on an impulse, without completely thinking the thought out, and the ramifications of said thoughts . . .

    That hardly equates to “insanity”; your description would not stand up in court as an insanity defense.  But let us say perhaps that it was an ill chosen word at the time.

    For the rest -

    Hitler attacked Russia for its oil, and for Lebensbraum (living space land).  If anything, it was because he anticipated needing proper resources for war that he attacked.  Hitler initial strategies did not properly anticipate Britain’s response; in fact, he considered that Britain and Germany would ally against the rest of the Continent for racial reasons.  But even considering the position once UK was at war with Germany, there were good and solid reasons why Germany’s advance against UK slowed, starting with UK bombing against German civilian targets and Germany’s civilian bombing response (for propaganda reasons, but German civilian bombing was less helpful to the German war effort than German military bombing was), plus UK radar, plus UK decryption of Enigma.  So much for Hitler being stupid or unprepared; considering unanticipated circumstances and military secrets, plus the delicate political situation within Germany, he performed quite reasonably - in fact, unbelievably well at the start of the war.

    It wasn’t Hitler that was responsible for the air force and technology, nor did he have some stupid conception about the Luftwaffe being monodominant.  Hitler relied on Goering’s advice.  It was Goering that really screwed things up during the war.  So maybe Hitler was still irresponsible for putting an incompetent in charge?  But there were solid reasons for Hitler to trust Goering, namely past performance.  There were also plenty of reasons for Hitler to distrust the advice of a lot of “establishment” German military, past performance again making this quite clear.  So in the end, Hitler made a mistake with Goering, but that sort of mistake was the one that was very understandable.  Only with 20/20 hindsight is Hitler’s mistake with Goering clear.

    Hitler did not plan for open war as early as it came to pass.  This was particularly relevant to the Kriegsmarine because Hitler’s initial plan involved a serious buildup of the Kreigsmarine, which would have changed the balance of things significantly.  So it is not a matter of Hitler being stupid, once again.  The circumstances changed, and Germany had to work with what it had.  As far as why open war came about sooner than Hitler had anticipated, again considering the history before the beginning of World War II, there were solid reasons based on politics and recent history between Germany and the rest of the world for Hitler to believe Germany would have more time before war started.

    As far as the STG44 - no idea what you’re talking about.  Again, there was political infighting in Germany, and the production of machine guns was one of the fields affected, so yes, development of the STG44 was stalled.  But when did Hitler dismiss such a gun for being ugly, or not give it a chance?  As far as the “problem” of political infighting, that was of course not something that Hitler could in any way reasonably prevent, only control; infighting is inevitable whenever disparate groups are forced to work together, as in war.  The Allies themselves had their share of similar problems (Henry Ford, Manhattan project).

    Regarding Goering - I have already spoken to some degree, but I will continue.  Again, Hitler had reason to trust Goering to start with.  Again, looking at history, Goering had a good number of blunders, some deliberate.  But then, Goering covered up, so Hitler had insufficient reason to displace Goering until it was too late.  As far as Luftwaffe controlling an armored division, that is well within reason.  The political situation in Germany, again, and infighting, meant that cooperation between different branches could be problematic.  Besides that there was the simple fact that for speed of command, some force integration was proper and necessary.  Properly speaking, an air force and navy are two separate entities, but does that mean that fighters on carriers would have to obtain clearance from air force headquarters before launching into an unexpected sortie when the carriers were under attack?  Clearly not.  For similar although not identical reasons, an armoured division for the Luftwaffe made perfect sense.

    Regarding the battle over Britain - war is an instrument of the state, and in war, a state must consider both political and military reasons for action.  For example, imagine the political impact of Germany detonating a nuclear bomb in Washington, D.C. in 1943.  Such action would have been quite costly for the Germans in terms of setting up the operation, and would have zero impact on the military situation in Europe.  But it can be said with certainty that such action would have almost certainly sealed an Axis victory over the Allies.

    Now looking at the Blitz - again, a mention of Goering’s foul-ups, and add in a relatively weak German Intelligence system, plus a lack of coherent German strategy for the Blitz, none of which Hitler could be held personally accountable for, at least not to the point that he could be called stupid or weak-minded.  Add in that Hitler probably considered bombing as more of a political weapon rather than a military weapon.  This did not indicate Hitler was stupid; in fact, bombing and the threat of bombing had worked quite well as a political weapon for Hitler in the past, after all.  It merely indicates that Hitler was not a visionary in terms of the proper use of air power, which again is understandable, particularly given the role of aircraft in warfare to that point in history.

    Now throw in the fact that the Luftwaffe’s attacks against RAF airfields were becoming far less effective, that the RAF airfields could be withdrawn to the north (whereas of course factories and industries could not be similarly relocated), plus Hitler’s aim for the use of bombing to demoralize Britain to the point of cessation of hostilities, plus the fact that Luftwaffe fighting in hostile territory were taking the brunt of casualties and that morale was a consideration, again - the use of the Luftwaffe was not restricted to Hitler, or even to Goering, but resulted from a conflicted balance of political and military interests.

    Hitler’s political and military actions had serious mistakes visible in hindsight, but considering the actual situation as presented to Hitler at the time, those mistakes are quite understandable.  In fact, considering the resources Hitler had to work with, he did brilliantly.

    Consider the numerous mistakes of the Allies.  Failure to build a US submarine fleet in the Pacific (failure of the US to recognize submarine warfare as Germany failed to consider use of airpower).  Stalin’s refusal to recognize the reality of the German invasion threat.  (analogous to Hitler’s mistake regarding political relations with Britain).  Appeasement (hugely damaging to the Allies, but analogous to political problems in Germany, in that it seems much stupider given 20/20 hindsight vision, but makes much more sense considering the decisions were made as the situation developed, rather than after the fact.)  The simple fact of Germany’s huge rearmament leading up to World War II (another wonderful thing to shoot down in hindsight, but far less visible at the time.)  And so on and so forth.  The fact that the Allies screwed up repeatedly, that the Allies lacked vision, and so on and so forth hardly indicates the Allies were “insane”, any more than they indicate Hitler was “insane”.

    Considering Hitler’s actions in the framework of the time, Hitler cannot correctly be regarded as “insane” or even “evil”.  Rather, he was a person with great capabilities (although certainly lacking in some areas), put in a particular situation, who acted as he thought best, which makes him no different from many, or even most, people today.

    I consider it a serious problem that people think of Hitler as “insane” or “evil”.  It’s not that it’s bad to distinguish between right and wrong.  But such one-word labels as “insane” and “evil” are dismissive of the often cogent reasons behind “evil” actions.  Without consideration and understanding, people in the same situations will again act similarly, and after the fact will cite “extenuating circumstances”, namely those underlying cogent reasons.  But their arguments will be dismissed by their judges, the victims will term the perpetrators as “evil”, and the whole stupid cycle begins again.  So humankind is locked into a neverending cycle of stupidity.

    Suppose someone grows up, always thinking that “Hitler” was the cause of World War II.  Such people are all set to look for racist insane dictators that gas people and pop them in ovens.  They completely miss the fact that Hitler was lauded not just by Germany but by much of the world (easily supported by Hitler being Time’s “Man of the Year” before the outbreak of World War II).  They completely miss the conditions that led to Hitler’s rise to power.  In such ignorance, they pave the way for new Hitlers to arise.  Sadly, though, world leaders tend to learn from the mistakes of history; Hitlers of future generations will NOT make the mistakes that previous Hitlers made.  So the situation that is being created is that most people are primed to look for the wrong thing.  Because they don’t even understand the original Hitler, they cannot prevent even the rise of another original Hitler!  But even more than that - they are COMPLETELY unprepared to deal with new IMPROVED Hitlers.

    This abstract argument is a bit hard to grasp, so I will put it in other terms.  Suppose someone is out late night on a cold winter’s night and is caught in the rain.  Now suppose that person happens to catch a cold a few days later.  Suppose that person has been brought up to believe that ailments of the body are caused by witches!  It is therefore logical that the person’s cold is a direct result of a witch’s intervention.  Since that person knows that there is a witch abroad, it is the responsible and appropriate thing to do to look for the witch.  However, witches can be dangerous.  They have evil powers.  So what could be more appropriate than to find a few friends and let them know about the witch?  Strength in numbers, after all.  So the mob of people go out, looking for a witch.  It so happens that a nearby farm has a young person with Down’s syndrome.  But we will say that these pure-hearted witch hunters do not know what Down’s syndrome is.  It is obvious to them that such an afflicted person must have been struck by God for being born evil, that its slanted eyes are the devil’s mark, and that its slurred speech is what it uses to communicate with wolves, devils, and to work its evil magic.  So the witch hunters - again, quite sensibly mind you - burn that young person at the stake, to purify his soul.  What a great triumph for the forces of good!  Surely, they have finally ensured that no awful colds will afflict the innocent people of the village again!

    But then, because was so busy burning the witch and having a festival, they are late bringing the crops in.  So much of the harvest is lost, and a proportion of the village people die of famine.  But also, some people work late to bring in as much crops as they can.  Sadly, there are rains in the cold late night, and some other people catch colds.

    But not to worry, because a new round of witch hunts begin!  Surely THIS time the evil shall be stamped out.  To ensure this time that the witches are rooted out, all suspicious people should of course be put to heavy torture!  This includes naturally all visitors to the village, the humpbacked crone that lives on the hill, the prosperous blacksmith (clearly, he must be using witchcraft to ensure his prosperity), the tavern maid (using her evil wiles to tempt men into the ways of Satan), plus a few other people just to be sure.  Not surprisingly the use of properly sanctified tools of torture elicit confessions from many of the suspects.  A few die before admitting guilt - perhaps a few such dead ones were truly innocent, but as they died in a state of grace, their souls are not in peril so no lasting harm was done.  The newly found witches are of course burned.

    So the winter passes, with people secure in the knowledge that they have done right, and the spring comes.  Sadly, with the spring come certain problems, particularly because the blacksmith and carpenter are both dead, and traders avoid the town because they don’t want to be burned as witches.  So the prosperity of the village goes on a decline, and there is some moderate suffering.  With the depressed mindset of the village people, they are more vulnerable to disease, and it is not long before one catches a cold . . .

    So the cycle repeats, and repeats.  The lack of comprehension of cause and effect leads another cycle to begin.  Each time, the cycle is subtly different, making people think there has been “progress”.  Each time, the problems that arise from the “solution” are subtly different, making people think there are new causes and effects.

    It only requires the identification of one or two key motive forces that propel this cycle around and around, to make the whole thing end.  But those motive forces are not identified, nor WILL they be identified, because they are not examined!  They are not examined because people think they ALREADY understand the motive forces in the cycle (even though they don’t!)  So the cycle WILL continue!

    This is what it is to call Hitler “insane” or “evil”  People don’t think they need to examine the underlying conditions because they think they already understand them.  They say Hitler was “insane/evil”, plus add in a few other little things, and think they have the solution.  But they don’t.  So the situation repeats.

    One interesting thing to note is that the United States of America for damn sure learned a great lesson from World War II (although granted, the same lesson has been pounded into nations since the dawn of war as an instrument of policy).  A strong military and good relations with other nations is vital, and the leaders of the USA know it.  Sadly, many of the people of the USA seem to have completely overlooked it, and now think that US can abandon its foreign aid programs, and disarm its military, while still somehow maintaining its position of power relative to the rest of the world.  Which is frankly astonishing to me, but then, the pattern of degradation of major powers is a familiar theme through history, and I suppose for good reason.

    It is quite interesting to compare the position of the United States of America to the position of Rome at the decline of the Roman Empire.  Although the geographic isolation from the USA from other relatively militarily powerful nations will slow its decline, the parallels are obvious.  I suppose social reform could reverse the decline, but considering current trends, I consider that unlikely.  But then again, particular individuals can make a difference, and there is still plenty of time for such an individual to arise.  Perhaps a certain . . . wise and influential Bunny . . . will develop a cult following, which will develop into a popular movement . . .

    http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qMs2vdMjMGQ&feature=related

  • Moderator

    Hitler Attacked Russia because he thought it was an easy target. The Resources that u speak of were the benefit of success.
    The process was not looked at both ways, or if Russia had not been easy.

    Hitler hoped he wouldn’t have to fight UK and didn’t want to either, so he ignored them. Hoping they would go away.

    The first time UK bombed a German civilian target was on accident, which Pissed off Adolf, who in return switched bombing targets of civilian nature. Had he not switched, the so called radar chain would have been destroyed along with the RAF

    How can u say he did not plan for war so fast, when he KNEW if he invaded Poland, The United Kingdom would have to respond and even if it was just little ol poland, he sure did not wait long to go in the other direction

    As for the Air force- After the Bf 109 started rolling off the production lines, the German government spent less $ on Air force Technology and air craft design. Because they (Germany) had at that time the best land based Military aircraft available in the world, so they cut the defense budget. Only after they realized the capabilities of Foreign Aircraft did they ramp up their Defense Spending on the Luftwaffe.

    Yes Britain can move airfields North, but that also positions them far away from other military targets, ie radar chain, which could be systematically taken out, Push the radar further in to UK, means UK can no longer see German AF Marshaling above France, instead too indiscriminately bomb towns and Cities is what hitler ordered. 
    Now Bombing Factories in a city is not the same thing as Bombing Houses in a city. But hitler bombed both instead of concentrating is power on the one that could most impact his military. Sure trying to diminish ones enemies morale can help, But the last time i checked, morale doesn’t shoot down planes.

    As for the the STG 44, Watch Weaponology, history of the assault rifle
    An episode of History of the Gun also mentions the STG 44 and Adolfs disliking of the gun. In fact the gun was put into production before it was officially approved by adolf.  I also remember hearing some where, when Asked what his troops attacking stalingrad needed the most, the generals reply was more STG 44’s

    How did hitler see bombing as a political weapon, Blitzkrieg was completely based off of Stukas providing close air support for ground units.

    What I don’t understand is how one could even think Hitler was not evil, and it appears that u don’t.
    He may have done good things and a bunch to boot, but he also allowed the Halocaust. To extinguish a group of people because they are different in on way or another, is evil. to extinguish Human life in a meaningless way, is evil. weather you do it 1 time, or 8 million times, it is still evil.

    Too make a long story short. Hitler Signed the checks, He was the man in charge, so He gets the blame, all of it. Reguardless of who technically made the decision.


  • @Deaths Head 420:  Your understanding of WWII history is so completely different to mine, your conclusions and reasoning have almost zero relevance to what I wrote.  It seems to me that dialogue in detail between us is useless as long as our premises differ so wildly.

    Apart from the points on which we so completely disagree that I consider not worth discussing, though, you brought up a few specific points that I will address.

    1.  How can I say Hitler did not plan for war so fast?  Germany’s pre-war military and political plans make it clear.  As far as military plans, the interruption of Plan Z and study of Kreigsmarine buildup in prewar years alone supports my view.  As for political plans, before the invasion of Poland, Hitler was concerned with consequent possible conflict with Britain, but Ribbentrop assured him it would not happen.  Hitler’s displeasure with the early entry of Britain and France into war was made evident with his angry retort “Now what?” to Ribbentrop upon learning of it.

    Something to remember also in terms of politics was Hitler’s view of a German-Italian-British alliance as presented in Mein Kampf.  Certainly, in the prewar years, Hitler viewed Britain as an adversary.  But considering the past history of the British Empire, and the writings of Houston Stewart Chamberlain, Hitler had at least some reason to believe that the British Empire would end up sympathetic to his cause.  (Almost completely wrong of course.  But this is far more visible in hindsight, particularly since we know (after the fact, mind you) that Churchill would replace Chamberlain).

    2.  Regarding your questioning regarding Hitler seeing bombing as a STRATEGIC (not strictly “political” weapon), Douhet and Mitchell’s theory, which was widely accepted by both Axis and Allies, was that the means of production and civilian will to resist could be broken by bombing; that is, the use of bombing to achieve not only military but also political goals.  Clearly Hitler’s strategy was influenced by this school of thought, as he switched from military to civilian targets during the Blitz.  It would have supported the argument that Hitler saw bombing in terms of tactics and operations had he continued orders for the Luftwaffe to hit military targets, but he didn’t.

    Why break Britain’s morale?  Your argument is that morale doesn’t shoot down planes.  My argument is Vietnam, Afghanistan, take your pick of any number of real world examples.  Granted, IF Germany had kept pounding military targets instead of civilian ones, the Allies MIGHT have been in trouble, but that is a position held by historians in RETROSPECT after the fact - and those historians had access to Allied records, which Hitler obviously did not.

    Regarding the failure of the Axis to have long-range bombers for use against Britain and Moscow when needed, again, I say it is reasonable that Hitler did not anticipate things would develop in those regions as they did.

    Regarding the use of bombers in blitzkrieg - so what?  Your whole issue in the first place was regarding Hitler’s switching between military and civilian targets during the Blitz, to which I consider I reasonably and correctly replied that Hitler’s reasons in doing so were that he viewed bombing in that situation best used strategically rather than at tactical or operations level, which I have further detailed above.

    3.  You state that Hitler’s death camps were meaningless.  On the contrary.  First, the Holocaust was organized by Himmler and Heydrich; the existence of any direct order from Hitler authorizing the killings has not yet been made known to the public.  Second, although Hitler spoke openly against Jews, and had a history of racist thought, this is understandable considering the popularity at the time of “The Protocols of the Elders of Zion”.  Understanding of the details, background, and history of reception of that document, as well as the fact that Hitler proclaimed it authentic, is vital to making sense of what happened, and with that perspective, “meaningless” hardly applies.

    As I wrote previously, there are good and sound reasons for attempting to understand the past, rather than simply dismissing parts of it as “insane” or “evil”.  Mere insistence that your views are correct will not change my views.  Should you present evidence that Hitler consistently acted irrationally, I would of course reconsider.  All the evidence you have provided to support that view to this point, though, either relies upon Hitler having information he did not actually have, or does not consider the actions of others than Hitler that could have caused him to act as he did.  That is why I do not consider your evidence at all compelling.  I am not looking for absolute proof, but I find a complete lack of even a single real point in favor of your argument.

    Your insistence that “a long story should be made short” is exactly the same sort of reasoning that led to the Holocaust.  That is, a lack of reasoning, a lack of research, a lack of willingness to invest time in either, and simple constant dogmatic insistence upon a single point.  But then, that sort of reasoning is hardly unique.  It is common practice among politicians and people in general, so I can quite understand that you would take exception to my distaste of such practice, and consider my insistence on understanding cause and effect unreasonable, and in fact distasteful.

    I am not so much a relativist as to classify insanity and evil as pure abstractions.  (In fact, I consider most of the population to be in some degree insane, particularly because of the common practice of insistence on what I consider to be narrow-minded views for what I consider to be insufficient reasons.  But I digress.)

    For an illustration of what I consider “real” insanity and evil, Albert Fish is a far better example than Adolf Hitler.  Albert Fish was a pedophile and cannibal; the following link contains graphic and disturbing details.  But readers will have a better understanding of what I consider insanity to be - namely, not merely consistent but slight divergence with social norms, nor wild divergence with social norms under unusual or extreme circumstances, ut consistent AND wild divergence of social norms to the extent that nothing other than insanity, by definition, could be the case.

    (Please do not read the following if you are sickened or offended by the thought of killing and eating children.  Since that SHOULD be everyone, nobody should click this link . . .)

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Albert_Fish

  • Liaison TripleA '11 '10

    I also remember hearing some where, when Asked what his troops attacking stalingrad needed the most, the generals reply was more STG 44’s

    Are you on DRUGS?

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Stalingrad

    The battle of Stalingrad was OVER in February 1943.  Soviet Liberation

    German Occupation Began in Late Summer/Fall 42. (THEY CONQUERED 90% of THE CITY, leaving just a sliver on the east of the Volga - and attempted to defend it.)

    STG 44’s didn’t even arrive until late 43.  You won’t even find Stalingrad mentioned at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/StG_44


  • This is turning out to be a thread well worth reading! I’d like to thank Death’s Head and Bunnies P Wrath for the time they’ve invested into their posts.

    Death’s Head’s post prompted me to do a little reading about the STG 44. Death’s Head was correct: “Development [of the assault rifle] temporarily came to halt when Hitler suspended all new rifle programs due to administrative infighting within the Third Reich.” Hitler “strongly disagreed with the use of the new ammunition,” perhaps because it’s easier to manufacture and distribute one ammunition type than many different types. However, “once Hitler was given a chance to see and test-fire the MP 44, he was impressed and gave it the title Sturmgewehr.”

    Edit: I wrote the above before reading Gargantua’s most recent post. Gargantua is correct that the assault rifle was not used at Stalingrad. But other than the reference to Stalingrad, Death’s Head seems to have correctly remembered the quote.


    In July 1944, at a meeting of the various army heads about the Eastern Front, when Hitler asked what they needed, a general exclaimed, “More of these new rifles!”.


    Leading up to WWII, one bone of contention between Germany and the Western democracies was Czechoslovakia. In 1935, Czechoslovakia had signed a defensive alliance with the Soviet Union. In 1938, Hitler took the opportunity to annex Czechoslovakia, both to provide Germany with some of the industrial strength it would need to resist later threats, and to send a message to any other Eastern European nations which might otherwise have felt tempted to side with the Soviet Union in its cold war against Germany. Finally, German military planners feared the prospect of a Soviet invasion of Germany launched from Czech soil. The annexation secured Germany from that threat. However, it damaged the prestige of Britain and of Chamberlain. In 1939, the main apparent goal of Chamberlain’s foreign policy was to reclaim that prestige, even if it meant war. It is not clear what plan, if any, he had to prevent that war from resulting in Soviet occupation of most of Europe.

    In 1939, Chamberlain cooperated with France’s policy of making false promises to Poland. Daladier had promised Poland that, if Germany attacked Poland, France would launch a general invasion of Germany. Polish leaders mistakenly believed Daladier’s promises; which is why Poland adopted an anti-German foreign policy in '39. Unknown to the Polish, actual French war plans involved remaining on the defensive, behind the Maginot Line.

    Combined Anglo-French military spending had exceeded Germany’s in '39. The extremely anti-German foreign policies adopted by Britain and France in '39 had also not gone unnoticed by Hitler. Those policies convinced him that war with the Western democracies was unavoidable, however much he might have wanted to avoid it. That being the case, he felt it was better to strike relatively soon, while force levels were still relatively balanced. (According to historian John Toland, Hitler had been informed by a German government official that the Poles were killing ethnic Germans in the German territory they occupied. That reported killing was another reason for Hitler’s decision to invade Poland.)

    After Hitler conquered Poland, he offered a peace treaty to Britain and France. They both refused. After conquering France, Hitler offered a peace treaty to Britain. The British refused. In 1940, Britain produced more military aircraft than did Germany. In addition, the U.S. sent large numbers of military aircraft to Britain. Plans had been made to astronomically expand American military aircraft production; with half that production getting sent to Britain. All this was known, at least in a general sense, to German military planners.

    For anyone who hasn’t already done so, I strongly recommend Adam Tooze’s book The Wages of Destruction.. The Times (London) called it, “A magnificent demonstration of the explanatory power of economic history.” The Financial Times described it as “Masterful . . . Tooze has added his name to the roll call of top-class scholars of Nazism.” Below is a synopsis of some of the points Tooze made.

    As 1940 came to a close, German military planners believed that, unless they did something to change the equation in Germany’s favor, Germany would ultimately be doomed by the Anglo-American air production effort directed against it. Another concern was food. The British did not allow food to pass through their naval blockade against Germany. Germany was a food deficit nation, as were the nations of Western Europe it had conquered. Germany’s leaders were alarmed by the way the British food blockade had caused their grain reserves to plummet during 1940.

    Hitler, along with many or most German military planners, believed the solutions to these problems could be found in the east. Conquering a large portion of the Soviet Union would provide Germany with the labor force and industrial capacity with which to defend its cities from the Anglo-American bombing effort, the oil and other raw materials its war effort required, and the food with which to prevent starvation in Western Europe. However, most of the Soviet territory to be conquered also ran at a food deficit. The German conquest would not eliminate the starvation which would otherwise have been caused by the food blockade. It would merely transfer the starvation out of Western Europe and into formerly Soviet territory. If anything, the overall magnitude of the starvation problem would be greater than it otherwise had been.

    Another reason for invading the Soviet Union was that the Red Army was clearly unprepared for war in 1940, as shown by its dismal performance when it invaded Finland. Hitler knew the Red Army’s problems would be corrected eventually, and felt it made sense to invade before they were. Hitler also believed that Stalin would invade Germany once he felt the time was right. (While Tooze does not address whether Hitler’s belief on this point was accurate, evidence from other sources indicates it may well have been.)

    In 1941, the German Army conquered large portions of Soviet territory, and achieved a better than 10:1 exchange ratio against the Red Army. But in 1942, the Soviet Union produced three to four times as many weapons as Germany in every major land category; and even produced nearly twice as many military aircraft as Germany. In addition, the Red Army became vastly larger than its German counterpart. German military planners had expected the Red Army to have 200 divisions. By the fall of '41, it consisted of over 600 divisions. And it proceeded to recruit 500,000 men a month for most of the rest of the war. The sheer scale of the Soviet war effort came as a shock not just to Hitler, but to the German military generally.

    As the war went on, Germany began taking the food it needed from the Polish and Soviet territory it occupied. This caused millions of people to starve in those territories. In addition, widespread starvation occurred among Soviet POWs. Those POWs had been put to work in German factories to build weapons for the war. That is probably the main reason why Hitler ordered that they be fed. However, the man tasked with feeding them lacked the food with which to feed both them and the German people. The Nazis remembered the starvation of Germany’s civilian population caused by the British food blockade of WWI. They blamed that starvation for Germany’s surrender in 1918; and were determined not to make the same mistake twice. The fear of another November 1918, in combination with their own ideology, explains why the German people received a significantly higher food priority than Soviet POWs. The Nazi ideology also explains why, in the face of famine conditions, it was felt necessary to reduce Jewish caloric consumption to zero through starvation and extermination camps.

    Another thing Tooze described was how Germany’s lack of oil had affected its military options. Leading up to WWII, Hitler had insisted on the construction of a large synthetic oil refinery. He was told such a refinery was impossible due to economic realities. However, those who had told Hitler this had underestimated Hitler’s “sheer bloody-mindedness.” The synthetic oil refinery was built, and provided a portion of the oil Germany needed. The Romanian oilfields provided a larger portion. Despite this, Germany was still oil-poor. This meant that supplying its army in the field would be done mostly via coal and animal power. A coal-powered train would move supplies most of the way to front line troops, and horses would carry them the rest of the way. This supply system made it difficult for the German Army to achieve rapid advances over large areas, because it took time to build new rail lines. Germany had enough oil and enough military trucks to supplement this system with motor transport. But the faster the German Army advanced, the worse its supply situation would become. One of the reasons its attack on Moscow failed in late '41 was because its soldiers had outrun their (weak) supply lines, and lacked the bullets, artillery ammunition, winter uniforms, and food they required to remain an optimal fighting force. With more oil Germany could have solved problems like this, which is one reason why Hitler wanted to conquer the Caucasus oilfields in 1942. The conquest of Caucasus would also have improved Germany’s food situation, and would have significantly added to its industrial capacity.

    Thus ends the synopsis of Tooze’s work. But before I end this post, I’d like to throw in a tidbit about Goering. Goering had joined the Nazi Party back in its early days. He was a WWI ace, and his decision to join may have added desperately-needed credibility to that small party. It’s possible that Goering’s decision to stand by Hitler in those early years may help explain why he was not later dismissed due to sheer incompetence and braggadocio.

    In 1940, there was a question about whether the German Army should attack the fleeing British force in France. Goering said that no attack need be launched, and promised he could destroy the British Expeditionary Force from the air. Instead, that force escaped at Dunkirk. (Hitler was uneager to engage that force in the first place because he felt the German Army’s strength needed to be conserved for the second stage of the war against France.) Also in 1940, Goering greatly reduced the number of engineers allocated to the development of a German jet.

    In late '42, a large portion of the German Army had been encircled at Stalingrad. Goering promised that he could supply the encircled soldiers by air. The Stalingrad force would remain in place until the rest of Army Group South could push eastwards to reconnect with it. Relying on Goering’s promise, Hitler decided to keep the Stalingrad force in place. The Stalingrad force slowly starved, and desperately lacked ammunition. Its combat value slowly withered away due to lack of adequate supplies.

    Goering also lied to Hitler about the performance of at least one experimental weapon. Goering felt Hitler placed too much faith in new technology, and needed to be steered toward tried and true weapons systems instead. Goering played a direct role in the most notable defeats Germany suffered in the war: Dunkirk, the Battle of Britain, Stalingrad, the late war Allied bombing effort against German cities. Germany probably would not have won WWII even with a competent head of the Luftwaffe. But it would have put up a much better fight!


  • @Gargantua:

    Are you on DRUGS?

    Uhm, I won’t answer any questions without my lawyer present.   :wink:

    I regard most television documentaries as highly entertaining, but at least sometimes containing information of dubious reliability.  They are there to entertain and inform, and sometimes propagandize, not simply inform.

    It is in stacks of dry dusty books that one finds interesting facts, and hot lonely librarians.   :evil:  The internet also does decently as a search tool, although you often have to have a good idea of what you are looking for.  (For example, you won’t typically find mention of “The Protocols of Zion” in any discussion of the Holocaust, which is, well, really bad.)

    My understanding of the history of the StG 44 is that production of the gun itself was generally approved of by Hitler.

    The MKb 42, FG 42, and MP43 were the predecessors.  I think the referred to “stoppage of the StG 44 by Hitler” (to paraphrase an earlier post) referred to the real infighting in Germany over the design and production of these various predecessor guns.  To sum up, there were various plans for various assault rifles / machine guns, but there was a lot of bureaucratic infighting.  Rather than allowing them to continue arguing to no positive end, Hitler at various points told them to shut up and shut down.

    So naturally there was some delay in StG 44 production, but saying Hitler made a stupid decision, or that he completely lacked vision, is like yelling at your cat after you burn your toast.  It’s not the cat’s fault, even if it was in the room at the time.

Suggested Topics

Axis & Allies Boardgaming Custom Painted Miniatures

37

Online

17.0k

Users

39.3k

Topics

1.7m

Posts