Axis and Allies Revised: Standard Tactics: Planning, Risk Assessment, and Calculation

| May 26, 2008 | 1 Comment

This article will cover the following topics:

I. Steps for Assessing Risk
II. Approximation Methods for Large Battles
III. Assessing Utility Gain (IPC Loss and Gain)
IV. Calculation Methods for Small Battles
V. Other Utility Gain Calculations
VI. Assessing the Board Situation
VII. Long-Term Goals

I. Steps for Assessing Risk

I thought I’d write a few words regarding proper risk assessment and calculation. The proper steps for a turn are:

1. Determine long-term goals.
2. Determine short-term goals.
3. Determine minimum acceptable required to maximum available forces to carry out those short-term goals
4. Determine
differing probable battle outcomes and the utility gained from each
likely scenario, and opponent responses to minimum acceptable forces to
maximum available forces allocated to those goals, along with the
opponent’s utility gained from each opponent’s countermove. Determine
what contingency plans to undertake in case unfavorable odds occur
during a battle. Determine what battles are unacceptably risky in case
unfavorable odds occur.
5. Determine whether or not, by factoring
in probable opponent response, possible unfavorable odds, and
unacceptable risk, whether or not a given short-term goal is viable, in
context of long-term goals and available units.
6. Depending on
calculated net utility gain, including both your own immediate utility
gain, and anticipated opponent utility gain in response to your moves,
allocate forces as necessary to carry out goals of greatest importance.
As final allocation of forces for the most important goal is made, the
available forces for other less important goals will change, changing
the maximum available forces to carry out other short-term goals. So
repeat steps 3 through 6 until a list of acceptable short-term goals is
made (in context of the long-term goals).
7. Purchase units and/or research tech based on what is required for the long-term goal, and make appropriate combat moves.
8. Carry out the combat whose result should be known first to determine the desired outcome of other combats.
9. During
combat, press the attack or retreat as is determined to be best, based
on other combats still to be carried out, the anticipated non-combat
move, and the anticipated unit placement at the end of the round..
10. Repeat steps 9-10 until combat is over.
11. Make a final reassessment of the board situation, and make the appropriate non-combat movement and placement.

That
is, in a few words – figure out what you want to do in the long run,
figure out what you want to do right now, figure out the what benefit
your moves will give you, figure out the possible benefits your
opponents can get from your moves, make sure your plans don’t conflict
with one another, do what you want to do, but reassess the situation
constantly, and act appropriately to your reassessments.

How can
you figure out what a probable battle outcome is? How do you calculate
utility gain? How can you determine what unacceptable risk is? How do
you determine long-term goals, and how do you reassess the board
situation?

A full answer of the last question does not fall into
the scope of basic risk assessment and calculation. However, all of
these questions will be addressed below.

II. Approximation Methods for Large Battles

An
approximation of the most probable battle outcome can be determined by
adding up the attack values and defensive values of the attackers and
defenders, and dividing by 6 in each case to determine the first round
losses on each side, then repeating that process to determine the
second round losses, and so forth. In the case of fractions, round
down or up as appropriate.

That is, suppose you have a bomber
and two infantry attacking one infantry. The attackers are a bomber
(which attacks at 4 or less) and two infantry (each of which attack at
1 or less). If you add up the attack values of the attackers, they add
up to 6; similarly, if you add up the defense value of the defender (a
single infantry, which defends at 2 or less), that adds up to 2.
Dividing by 6 for both indicates the most likely first round result is
the attacker inflicting (6 (total attack value) / 6), or 1 casualty,
and the defender inflicting (2 (total defense value) / 6), or 0
casualties, making the most likely outcome will be a bomber and two
infantry surviving, against no infantry surviving.

III. Assessing Utility Gain (IPC Loss and Gain)

Sometimes,
a player will want to make a more precise estimate of gained utility,
though. In such cases, the probabilities should be calculated, and the
immediate utilities factored in. An example of such an estimate, and
the way to estimate utilities, follows.

Example: Your opponent
has 11 infantry and 4 tanks, and 1 fighter in West Russia. You have 5
infantry, 2 tanks, and 1 fighter in Eastern Europe. Your opponent
controls Belorussia with 1 infantry. In a REAL game situation, the
rest of the board would be relevant, but we will ignore the rest of the
board for most of this example.

A veteran player would
immediately discard the though of attacking Belorussia with all
available forces. This is because even if Belorussia were taken with
no losses, Russia could follow up with their own all-out attack,
crushing the Germans. Even assuming the best case scenario of 5
infantry 2 tanks in Belorussia (having taken no casualties on the
attack), you must consider the Russian attack on the Russian turn.

Since
there are so many units involved, the approximation system already
described will be used. The Russian attack of 11 infantry 4 tanks 1
fighter has an attack value of 26 against the Germans’ defense value of
16 for 5 infantry and 2 tanks. Even were the odds skewed in favor of
the Germans again, giving the attacker only 4 inflicted casualties on
the first round and the defender 3 inflicted casualties, that still
leaves the Russians with 8 infantry 4 tanks 1 fighter (attack value 23)
against the Germans with 1 infantry 2 tanks (defense value 8),
with the next round likely ending with the Russians with 6 infantry 4
tanks 1 fighter (at the worst), and the Germans with nothing. In the
end, then, the Russians lost 1 infantry in Belorussia, and 5 more
infantry on the attack, which is 18 IPC worth of units. The Germans
lost 5 infantry and 3 tanks, which is 30 IPC worth of units, and gained
Belorussia for a turn, gaining 2 IPC of territory for one turn. All in
all, though, 18 + 2 = 20, and 20 is much less than 30. So if the
Germans stand to gain 20 IPC worth of units and IPCs, and lose 30 IPC
worth of units and IPCs, then the Germans should not carry out the
attack.

It may be, though, that a lesser force could attack, and
thereby increase Germany’s expected utility. Consider what happens if
a German infantry and a German fighter attack the Russian infantry in
Belorussia.

IV. Calculation methods for small battles

For
this small battle of three units, although the probability calculation
is a bit cumbersome, it is not awful. So, I will list it, and also
show how simple utility gain (or IPC gain) is calculated.

The
German fighter has a 3/6 chance of inflicting a casualty, and a 3/6
chance of missing. The German infantry has a 1/6 chance of inflicting
a casualty, and a 5/6 chance of missing. The Russian infantry has a
2/6 chance of inflicting a casualty, and a 4/6 chance of missing.

The
probability the Germans will get two hits, that is, both the fighter
hitting and the infantry hitting, is 3/6 * 1/6, or 3/36. The
probability the Germans will get one hit is the probability of only the
fighter hitting (3/6 * 5/6) added to the probability of only the
infantry hitting (3/6 * 1/6), or 15/36 + 3/36, or 18/36. The
probability the Germans will get no hits is (3/6 * 5/6), or 15/36. To
error check, we add up the probabilities; 3/36 + 18/36 + 15/36 = 1.
The probabilities are correctly estimated. Since the Germans can only
get one casualty (even if they hit twice), the probability of wiping
out the Russians is thus 3/36 + 18/36, or 21/36. Note that this is NOT
the same as you would get if you simply added the probability of the
German fighter hitting to the probability of the German infantry
hitting. (That is, if you add 3/6 to 1/6, you will get 4/6, or 24/36.
You will not get 21/36). The probability of missing is still 15/36.

The probability the Russians will get one hit is 2/6, and the probability the Russians will miss is 4/6.

Now
we combine the two probability sets. The probability the Germans will
get one hit and the Russians will get one hit is 21/36 * 2/6, or
42/216. The probability the Germans will get one hit and the Russians
will get no hits is 21/36 * 4/6, or 84/216. The probability the
Germans will get no hits and the Russians will get a hit is 15/36 *
2/6, or 30/216. The probability the Germans will get no hits and the
Russians will get no hits is 15/36 * 4/6, or 60/216. Again, we add up
the probabilities to error check; 42/216 + 84/216 + 30/216 + 60/216 =
216/216 = 1. The probabilities are correctly calculated.

If the
Germans inflict a casualty, and the Russians inflict a casualty, the
combat is over. If the Germans inflict a casualty, and the Russians do
not inflict a casualty, the combat is over. If the Germans do not
inflict a casualty, and the Russians do inflict a casualty, a new
situation arises. If neither the Germans nor the Russians inflict a
casualty, the exact same combat of one German fighter and one German
infantry against one Russian infantry repeats.

Let us examine
what happens when a new situation arises (that is, when the Germans do
not inflict a casualty, and the Russians do inflict a casualty).
Either the German infantry will be chosen as a casualty, or the German
fighter will be chosen as a casualty, and at that point, the German
player will either choose to press the attack or retreat. What should
the German player do?

If a German fighter is chosen as a
casualty, the Germans immediately lose 10 IPC worth of units. If the
German infantry is chosen as a casualty, the Germans immediately lose 3
IPC worth of units.

If a German fighter attacks a Russian
infantry, the German fighter has 3/6 a chance of hitting. The Russian
infantry has a 2/6 chance of hitting. Calculating the probabilities as
above, the chance of both the German fighter and Russian infantry
hitting is 6/36, the chance of the German fighter hitting and the
Russian infantry missing is 12/36, the chance of the German fighter
missing and the Russian infantry hitting is 6/36, and the chance of the
German fighter missing and the Russian infantry missing is 12/36.

Whether
the Germans and/or the Russians inflict a casualty, the combat is over.
If neither Germans nor Russians inflict a casualty, the combat
repeats. If we assume that the German player will continue to press
the attack (after all, the German player could have retreated to begin
with) until the battle is decided, then we can effectively eliminate
the probability of neither side inflicting casualties, as the combat
will repeat until one side or the other or both is destroyed.

So,
instead of having the probability of both German fighter and Russian
infantry hitting as 6/36, or 6 out of 36 times, the probability of the
German fighter hitting and the Russian infantry missing at 12/36, or 12
out of 36 times, the probability of the German fighter missing and the
Russian infantry hitting at 6/36, or 6 out of 36 times, and the
probability of both missing at 12/36, or 12 out of 36 times, we are
going to calculate as if the last case did not exist. That is, the 12
out of 36 times that both Germans and Russians miss will be eliminated.

After
that happens, there will only be 24 different instances instead of 36.
And of those 24, both Germans and Russians will hit 6 times, German
hit and Russian miss 12 times, and German miss and Russian hit 6 times.
(Effectively, you eliminate the probability of all parties missing,
and you create a new denominator based on the sum of the remaining
numerators, then you slap that denominator on all the remaining
fractions).

That is, 6 out of 24 times (1/4) of the time, the Germans will hit and
the Russians will hit, 12 out of 24 times (1/2) of the time, the
Germans will hit and the Russians will miss, and 6 out of 24 times
(1/4) of the time, the Germans will miss and the Russians will hit.

At
this point, we will calculate a simple version of utility gain and
loss. In a real game, actual utility gain and loss depends on the
placement of units on the board as well as their raw IPC value; ten
infantry in Western Europe would probably be infinitely more valuable
in the Balkans on the Germans’ second turn, for example. But I
digress; that is a topic that is beyond the scope of this article.

If
the Germans and the Russians both hit, the Germans lose a 10 IPC
fighter and the Russians lose a 3 IPC infantry. If the Germans hit and
the Russians miss, the Germans lose nothing, and the Russians lose a 3
IPC infantry. If the Germans miss and the Russians hit, the Germans
lose a 10 IPC fighter and the Russians lose nothing. We will sum this
up as the Germans losing 7 IPC, the Germans gaining 3 IPC, and the
Germans losing 10 IPC, respectively. (That is, the amount of IPC
damage that the Germans inflict, minus the amount of IPC damage in
units that the Germans take.)

Figuring this out, that’s ((1/4) *
-7) + ((1/2) * 3) + ((1/4 * -10) = -7/4 + 3/2 + -10/4, or -11/4. The
Germans should expect to gain -11/4 IPC worth of units if they send one
German fighter against one Russian infantry. That is, the Germans
should expect to LOSE unit value overall. So unless there are
mitigating factors, the Germans should not carry out the attack of a
single German fighter attacking a single Russian infantry.

What
are mitigating factors? What may be lost or gained as an indirect
consequence of the battle, what the overall board situation is, and
(closely related to the overall board situation) the perceived value of
a piece. That is, suppose that Moscow is only defended by four
infantry, and IF Germany succeeds in its one German fighter on one
Russian infantry attack, twelve Japanese tanks will be free to blitz
into Moscow. (Assume there is no UK unit that can move into that
emptied territory on the UK turn.) Or, say that the Germans are
capturing Ukraine, and want to leave enough units there so that Russia
can’t take Ukraine back on its turn; in that case, German fighters may
be chosen as casualties before German tanks, as German fighters can’t
land in the Ukraine to strengthen the German defense of that territory,
but German tanks can stay in the Ukraine, strengthening the German
defense there. And so forth, including values of mobilized units that
are on the front as opposed to IPCs in the bank, and so on. The
subject of mitigating factors does not fall within the scope of an
article addressed to beginners, though, so there will be no further
explanation of that topic here.

Getting back to the subject –
notice that in the calculations for a German fighter going against a
Russian infantry, the fact that a German infantry is already lost at
that point is not taken into account, as at this point, the German
infantry is lost. The fact that the German infantry could be lost is
figured into the calculations at the time when deciding what forces to
allocate to the initial attack.

Probability of both German
infantry and Russian infantry hitting is (1/6) * (2/6), or 2/36.
Probability of German infantry hitting and Russian infantry missing is
4/36. Probability of German infantry missing and Russian infantry
hitting is 10/36. Probability of both missing is 20/36. Again, we
eliminate the last possibility, arriving at a final probability of 2/16
chance of both Russians and Germans hitting, a 4/16 chance of the
Germans hitting and the Russians missing, and a 10/16 chance of the
Germans missing and the Russians hitting.

This time, if the
Germans and Russians both hit, both sides lose 3 IPC worth of units. If
the Germans hit and the Russians miss, the Germans lose nothing, gain a
2 IPC territory (the value of Belorussia), and the Russians lose a 3
IPC infantry. If the Germans miss and the Russians hit, the Germans
lose a 3 IPC infantry. We will sum this up as the Germans losing 0
IPC, gaining 5 IPC, and losing 3 IPC, respectively. (That is, the
amount of IPC damage the Germans inflict, minus the amount of IPC
damage in units that the Germans take, plus the IPCs in the bank that
may be gained from captured territory).

Using the same formula,
that’s ((2/16) * 0) + ((4/16) * 5) + ((10/16) * -3), or -10/16. That
is, the Germans should expect to gain -10/16 IPC worth of units if they
send one German infantry against one Russian infantry to gain a 2 IPC
territory. That is, the Germans should expect to LOSE unit value. So,
once again, unless there are mitigating factors, the Germans should not
undertake the attack.

Now that we know that the battle of German
fighter against Russian infantry is unfavorable, and that the battle of
German infantry against Russian infantry is unfavorable, we return to
the earlier given figures of what happens when a German fighter and a
German infantry attack a Russian infantry in a 2 IPC territory.

Remember,
in a battle of a German fighter and a German infantry against a Russian
infantry, the probability that both sides will inflict a hit is
42/216. The probability that only the Germans will inflict a hit is
84/216. The probability that only the Russians will get a hit is
30/216. The probability that both will miss is 60/216.

Now, we
know that if both Russians and Germans inflict casualties, the combat
is over, the only decision left is for the German player can choose to
lose the 10 IPC fighter, and gain a 2 IPC territory (net -8 IPC), or
lose the 3 IPC infantry (net -3 IPC). If the Germans inflict a hit and
the Russians do not, the combat is over. If the Germans do not inflict
a hit, and the Russians inflict a hit, previously, we only knew that a
new situation arose, we did not know the outcome. We now know that,
ignoring mitigating factors, the German player should retreat, as
pressing the attack does not result in IPC gain.

Since we now
know the outcome anticipated action for each of the combat results, we
can eliminate the probability of no casualties occurring. What are the
new probabilities? They are: 42/156 chance of both sides inflicting a
casualty, 84/156 chance of only the Germans hitting, and 30/156 of only
the Russians hitting.

If both sides inflict a casualty, the
German player must decide to either lose the German fighter (losing the
10 IPC in fighter value, but gaining 2 IPC in the bank from gained
territory for net loss of 8 IPC), or lose 3 IPC from the infantry.
Barring mitigating factors, the German player should lose the
infantry. In this case, taking the amount of IPC damage the Germans
inflict, minus the amount of IPC damage in units that the Germans take,
plus the IPCs in the bank that may be gained from captured territory,
the Germans can expect to gain 0 IPC. If only the Germans inflict a
casualty, the Russians lose 3 IPC worth of infantry and the Germans
gain 2 IPC worth of territory, for a net gain of 5 IPC. If only the
Russians inflict a casualty, the Germans can either lose a 10 IPC
fighter and retreat, or a 3 IPC infantry and retreat; in the absence of
mitigating factors, this means the Germans should retreat with an
effective loss of 3 IPC.

Given this, then, what is the expected
change in German utility from the attack of German fighter and German
infantry against Russian infantry?

The immediate result is:

((42/156)
* 0) + ((84/156) * 5) + ((30/156) * -3), or 330/156 IPC. That is, the
expected gain in unit value from the attack is a little under 2 IPC.

However,
remember that IF the Germans capture the territory, the Germans will
then have an infantry in that territory. If the Allies don’t recapture
that territory, the Germans will retain that territory and the IPC
income from that territory. If the Allies do recapture that territory,
though, the German infantry will have some chance of inflicting a
casualty on the enemy attackers, though (barring battleship support
shots, which are a possibility). So, really, if the Germans DO capture
the territory, there is every chance that the Germans will have at
least a 2/6 chance (that is, the value of a German defender) of
destroying a unit worth at least 3 IPC (that is, an enemy infantry).
That adds an effective anticipated IPC gain of 1. (That is, the
possibility of inflicting a casualty multiplied by the value of the
casualty inflicted). In practice, the anticipated gain is really a bit
MORE than 1, because there is a chance that all the opponent’s attacks
will miss on the first round but the German infantry will hit, leaving
the German infantry free to inflict additional casualties, and there is
also a chance that the opponent will not have any infantry free to
attack the German infantry with, so the Allied player may have to risk
a more valuable unit, such as a tank, in case an attack is decided
upon. Of course, though, if the Germans do have an infantry in that
territory at that point, the Germans will lose an infantry, so will
lose a 3 IPC unit.

So, the expected previous result is
modified. Even though we know that the anticipated IPC gain of the
German defender is worth a bit more than 1 (barring battleship support
shots), we will only add 1 to the anticipated IPC gain if the Germans
capture the territory with no defenders. Adding -3 to that result, for
the anticipated loss of the German infantry gives us, in the 84 out of
156 cases when the Germans capture the Russian territory with no German
casualties, an additional -2 IPC expected out of the German defender
(that is, it is anticipated the Germans will lose a 3 IPC infantry, but
have about a 1/3 chance of destroying an enemy 3 IPC infantry in turn),
making the former figure of 330/156 into 330/156 + ((-168/156) * 1),
that is, 162/156, or a still respectable
1.0384615384615384615384615384615 IPC gain.

Yet, the picture is
still not complete. Even though the Germans stand to gain from the
attack, there is a question of what the Germans stand to lose if the
attack fails; this question goes beyond the immediate IPC gain or loss
already described. Also, we have not yet determined whether or not
some other German attack may be even more cost effective. Finally, we
have not yet determined what benefit the opponent may receive from the
proposed move, or what cost the opponent may yet have to pay for the
proposed move.

V. Other Utility Gain Calculations

If
the calculated utility of a move is to be considered completely
calculated, we must figure in the fact that in the example above, the
Russians can attack the Germans on the Russian turn, with the exact
same expected utility gain as listed above – but for the Russians. In
turn, the Russian counter will be subject to whatever German counter
the Germans can muster – and, of course, the Russians will in turn be
able to counter that German counter, etcetera ad infinitum.

The
example given at the beginning of section III shows that if your
opponent has considerable forces, an attack that is profitable for you
in the short term may be very unprofitable in the long term.

However,
what that example does not show is that if your opponent does not have
considerable forces, an attack that is profitable for you may end up
being even more profitable.

Say that instead, there were one
German infantry and one German fighter in Eastern Europe, one Russian
infantry in Belorussia. Also assume that Russia cannot bring any
forces to Belorussia on the Russian turn. Now, the utility
calculations change.

Previously, we assumed that if the German
infantry captured the territory, that the Russians would
counterattack. At that point, it was anticipated that the Germans
would lose a 3 IPC unit, and gain about 1 IPC (for a 1/3 chance of
destroying a 3 IPC Russian infantry). In this example, though, the
Russians cannot counterattack. Nor can they gain back that territory
on their turn.

So in the 84 out of 156 cases that we assumed a
German infantry would be destroyed, we instead now know that the German
infantry cannot be destroyed, so we can add back the ((84/156) * 2) IPC
that we subtracted. Furthermore, the Germans will still be collecting
income from that 2 IPC territory on the next German turn, as the
Russians cannot recapture that territory, so we add an additional
((84/156) * 2) IPC.

Instead of 162/156 IPCs anticipated, then,
the Germans in this case anticipate a gain of 498/156 IPCs. That is,
3.1923076923076923076923076923077 instead of
1.0384615384615384615384615384615 IPCs, a fairly considerable
difference.

Usually, there will not be a case in which the
Germans have units with which to attack, and the Russians have both
insufficient defense, and no units in the surrounding attacks that can
counter the German attack next turn. However, it may well be the case
that the Russians will be unable to respond in a cost-effective manner
to all of the German attacks. For example, if the Germans control
Karelia, Belorussia, and Ukraine, each with one infantry, Russia will
very likely have the infantry required to respond, but it is very
possible that Russia will not have the necessary fighters, as the
Russians would need three fighters, but fighters are very expensive and
Russia only starts with two.

VI. Assessing the Board Situation

When
you look at the board at the start of your turn, you know how many IPCs
you have, where your opponent’s units are, and where your own units
are. With this knowledge, you can plan your attacks, and in turn, what
units and/or tech research you will purchase.

Deciding what the
most cost-effective allocation of your units for your combat move phase
will be is difficult. Sending an additional infantry to attack on this
turn will mean a better chance of succeeding at the immediate battle,
but will probably mean that you won’t have that infantry available next
turn to respond to your opponent’s countermove. Sending an additional
fighter to participate in a naval battle may save valuable naval units,
but may also mean that you don’t have good odds in a land battle, which
can potentially be more important in the long run.

As difficult
as this is, though, it is even more difficult to assess what the most
cost-effective allocation of your opponents’ units will be, and what
your opponent is therefore likely to build. It may be that even though
you have a move that will greatly increase your utility, that your
opponent has a countermove that will greatly decrease your utility.

The
complexity is increased another degree by the fact that units can be
produced. Although the units your opponent is going to build on his or
her turn can’t counterattack any attack you made this turn, the units
your opponent is going to build on his or her turn can counterattack
any counter that you make to your opponent’s counterattack to your
attack, and vice versa.

Even yet, there is more to the
situation. The units that you build on your turn may not be
immediately usable to attack. However, even if the units you build on
your turn cannot be used to attack on your next turn, or even the turn
after that or later, those units can still be moved into position so
that you can attack later. This last is the reason why it is effective
for Germany to produce mostly infantry on the first two turns, but
produce tanks starting about three turns before serious pressure is to
be exerted on Russia. Infantry that are produced early can march
towards Russia, and the tanks’ speed means that the German infantry and
the German tanks can hit the Russian lines at the same time, creating a
difficult situation for Russia to deal with.

There is still one
more thing to address; the use of friendly powers’ units to help defend
your own. The most common examples of this are for the Allied fleet in
the Atlantic, and the German attack on the Ukraine and/or the
Caucasus. In both cases, the powers in question unite their forces to
make themselves more difficult to attack. Specifically, when the
Allies control 1 Russian sub, 2 UK transports, a UK battleship, a US
destroyer, a US carrier, and 2 US transports, that is quite difficult
for Germany to take down, if the Allied players make sure the German
navy and airforce can’t both hit the Allied fleet. Or, if Germany puts
a lot of units in the Ukraine or Caucasus, Russia can very likely make
a very damaging attack, but if Japan lands some fighters in the
Ukraine, any Russian attack becomes considerably more expensive.

VII. Long-Term Goals

The
ability to figuring out the short-term risks, costs, and benefits of a
decision is important, particularly when the decision contemplated is
crucial to the course of the game. However, the short-term risks,
costs, and benefits of a single decision must be viewed in light of the
long-term risks, costs, and benefits, which are not easily calculable.

For
example, it may not immediately be obvious that if Germany loses
fighters, the Allies will have a far easier time moving infantry and
other cost-effective ground units into Europe and/or Africa. However,
that is the case; if Germany has few fighters to threaten Allied
transports, the Allies won’t need to build as many escort ships for
their transports. In turn, that will mean the Allies will have more
IPCs to build transports and ground units to transport to Europe and
Africa.

It may also not be immediately obvious that Germany
should purchase some number of infantry on Germany’s first turn in
response to a Russian infantry build. After all, if Germany produces
tanks on Germany’s first turn, Germany’s position against Russia will
become much better very quickly. However, if Germany produces nothing
but tanks first turn, the German player won’t have the numbers of units
needed to absorb Russian counterattacks, once the Germans reach the
Balkans.

On the other hand, it may be that Germany should
purchase nothing but tanks, in response to a Russian double fighter
build and overly aggressive combat move. Russia will have more units
that it can use immediately on its next turn, and the German front will
be depleted, but Germany’s counterattack can be very costly to the
Russians, and the German tank build may well stop the Russians from
counterattacking. In the end, German numbers and speed may mean that
the Germans may be able to secure more territory on the Russian front,
and together with the Japanese, eventually secure Moscow.

Category: Axis & Allies Revised, Strategy

About the Author (Author Profile)

Comments (1)

Trackback URL | Comments RSS Feed

  1. PD says:

    Great summary, I will be referencing this article the next time I play axis and allies.

Leave a Reply