This article will cover the following topics:

I. Steps for Assessing Risk

II. Approximation Methods for Large Battles

III. Assessing Utility Gain (IPC Loss and Gain)

IV. Calculation Methods for Small Battles

V. Other Utility Gain Calculations

VI. Assessing the Board Situation

VII. Long-Term Goals

—

**I. Steps for Assessing Risk**

I thought I’d write a few words regarding proper risk assessment and calculation. The proper steps for a turn are:

1. Determine long-term goals.

2. Determine short-term goals.

3. Determine minimum acceptable required to maximum available forces to carry out those short-term goals

4. Determine

differing probable battle outcomes and the utility gained from each

likely scenario, and opponent responses to minimum acceptable forces to

maximum available forces allocated to those goals, along with the

opponent’s utility gained from each opponent’s countermove. Determine

what contingency plans to undertake in case unfavorable odds occur

during a battle. Determine what battles are unacceptably risky in case

unfavorable odds occur.

5. Determine whether or not, by factoring

in probable opponent response, possible unfavorable odds, and

unacceptable risk, whether or not a given short-term goal is viable, in

context of long-term goals and available units.

6. Depending on

calculated net utility gain, including both your own immediate utility

gain, and anticipated opponent utility gain in response to your moves,

allocate forces as necessary to carry out goals of greatest importance.

As final allocation of forces for the most important goal is made, the

available forces for other less important goals will change, changing

the maximum available forces to carry out other short-term goals. So

repeat steps 3 through 6 until a list of acceptable short-term goals is

made (in context of the long-term goals).

7. Purchase units and/or research tech based on what is required for the long-term goal, and make appropriate combat moves.

8. Carry out the combat whose result should be known first to determine the desired outcome of other combats.

9. During

combat, press the attack or retreat as is determined to be best, based

on other combats still to be carried out, the anticipated non-combat

move, and the anticipated unit placement at the end of the round..

10. Repeat steps 9-10 until combat is over.

11. Make a final reassessment of the board situation, and make the appropriate non-combat movement and placement.

That

is, in a few words – figure out what you want to do in the long run,

figure out what you want to do right now, figure out the what benefit

your moves will give you, figure out the possible benefits your

opponents can get from your moves, make sure your plans don’t conflict

with one another, do what you want to do, but reassess the situation

constantly, and act appropriately to your reassessments.

How can

you figure out what a probable battle outcome is? How do you calculate

utility gain? How can you determine what unacceptable risk is? How do

you determine long-term goals, and how do you reassess the board

situation?

A full answer of the last question does not fall into

the scope of basic risk assessment and calculation. However, all of

these questions will be addressed below.

—

**II. Approximation Methods for Large Battles**

An

approximation of the most probable battle outcome can be determined by

adding up the attack values and defensive values of the attackers and

defenders, and dividing by 6 in each case to determine the first round

losses on each side, then repeating that process to determine the

second round losses, and so forth. In the case of fractions, round

down or up as appropriate.

That is, suppose you have a bomber

and two infantry attacking one infantry. The attackers are a bomber

(which attacks at 4 or less) and two infantry (each of which attack at

1 or less). If you add up the attack values of the attackers, they add

up to 6; similarly, if you add up the defense value of the defender (a

single infantry, which defends at 2 or less), that adds up to 2.

Dividing by 6 for both indicates the most likely first round result is

the attacker inflicting (6 (total attack value) / 6), or 1 casualty,

and the defender inflicting (2 (total defense value) / 6), or 0

casualties, making the most likely outcome will be a bomber and two

infantry surviving, against no infantry surviving.

—

**III. Assessing Utility Gain (IPC Loss and Gain)**

Sometimes,

a player will want to make a more precise estimate of gained utility,

though. In such cases, the probabilities should be calculated, and the

immediate utilities factored in. An example of such an estimate, and

the way to estimate utilities, follows.

Example: Your opponent

has 11 infantry and 4 tanks, and 1 fighter in West Russia. You have 5

infantry, 2 tanks, and 1 fighter in Eastern Europe. Your opponent

controls Belorussia with 1 infantry. In a REAL game situation, the

rest of the board would be relevant, but we will ignore the rest of the

board for most of this example.

A veteran player would

immediately discard the though of attacking Belorussia with all

available forces. This is because even if Belorussia were taken with

no losses, Russia could follow up with their own all-out attack,

crushing the Germans. Even assuming the best case scenario of 5

infantry 2 tanks in Belorussia (having taken no casualties on the

attack), you must consider the Russian attack on the Russian turn.

Since

there are so many units involved, the approximation system already

described will be used. The Russian attack of 11 infantry 4 tanks 1

fighter has an attack value of 26 against the Germans’ defense value of

16 for 5 infantry and 2 tanks. Even were the odds skewed in favor of

the Germans again, giving the attacker only 4 inflicted casualties on

the first round and the defender 3 inflicted casualties, that still

leaves the Russians with 8 infantry 4 tanks 1 fighter (attack value 23)

against the Germans with 1 infantry 2 tanks (defense value 8),

with the next round likely ending with the Russians with 6 infantry 4

tanks 1 fighter (at the worst), and the Germans with nothing. In the

end, then, the Russians lost 1 infantry in Belorussia, and 5 more

infantry on the attack, which is 18 IPC worth of units. The Germans

lost 5 infantry and 3 tanks, which is 30 IPC worth of units, and gained

Belorussia for a turn, gaining 2 IPC of territory for one turn. All in

all, though, 18 + 2 = 20, and 20 is much less than 30. So if the

Germans stand to gain 20 IPC worth of units and IPCs, and lose 30 IPC

worth of units and IPCs, then the Germans should not carry out the

attack.

It may be, though, that a lesser force could attack, and

thereby increase Germany’s expected utility. Consider what happens if

a German infantry and a German fighter attack the Russian infantry in

Belorussia.

**IV. Calculation methods for small battles**

For

this small battle of three units, although the probability calculation

is a bit cumbersome, it is not awful. So, I will list it, and also

show how simple utility gain (or IPC gain) is calculated.

The

German fighter has a 3/6 chance of inflicting a casualty, and a 3/6

chance of missing. The German infantry has a 1/6 chance of inflicting

a casualty, and a 5/6 chance of missing. The Russian infantry has a

2/6 chance of inflicting a casualty, and a 4/6 chance of missing.

The

probability the Germans will get two hits, that is, both the fighter

hitting and the infantry hitting, is 3/6 * 1/6, or 3/36. The

probability the Germans will get one hit is the probability of only the

fighter hitting (3/6 * 5/6) added to the probability of only the

infantry hitting (3/6 * 1/6), or 15/36 + 3/36, or 18/36. The

probability the Germans will get no hits is (3/6 * 5/6), or 15/36. To

error check, we add up the probabilities; 3/36 + 18/36 + 15/36 = 1.

The probabilities are correctly estimated. Since the Germans can only

get one casualty (even if they hit twice), the probability of wiping

out the Russians is thus 3/36 + 18/36, or 21/36. Note that this is NOT

the same as you would get if you simply added the probability of the

German fighter hitting to the probability of the German infantry

hitting. (That is, if you add 3/6 to 1/6, you will get 4/6, or 24/36.

You will not get 21/36). The probability of missing is still 15/36.

The probability the Russians will get one hit is 2/6, and the probability the Russians will miss is 4/6.

Now

we combine the two probability sets. The probability the Germans will

get one hit and the Russians will get one hit is 21/36 * 2/6, or

42/216. The probability the Germans will get one hit and the Russians

will get no hits is 21/36 * 4/6, or 84/216. The probability the

Germans will get no hits and the Russians will get a hit is 15/36 *

2/6, or 30/216. The probability the Germans will get no hits and the

Russians will get no hits is 15/36 * 4/6, or 60/216. Again, we add up

the probabilities to error check; 42/216 + 84/216 + 30/216 + 60/216 =

216/216 = 1. The probabilities are correctly calculated.

If the

Germans inflict a casualty, and the Russians inflict a casualty, the

combat is over. If the Germans inflict a casualty, and the Russians do

not inflict a casualty, the combat is over. If the Germans do not

inflict a casualty, and the Russians do inflict a casualty, a new

situation arises. If neither the Germans nor the Russians inflict a

casualty, the exact same combat of one German fighter and one German

infantry against one Russian infantry repeats.

Let us examine

what happens when a new situation arises (that is, when the Germans do

not inflict a casualty, and the Russians do inflict a casualty).

Either the German infantry will be chosen as a casualty, or the German

fighter will be chosen as a casualty, and at that point, the German

player will either choose to press the attack or retreat. What should

the German player do?

If a German fighter is chosen as a

casualty, the Germans immediately lose 10 IPC worth of units. If the

German infantry is chosen as a casualty, the Germans immediately lose 3

IPC worth of units.

If a German fighter attacks a Russian

infantry, the German fighter has 3/6 a chance of hitting. The Russian

infantry has a 2/6 chance of hitting. Calculating the probabilities as

above, the chance of both the German fighter and Russian infantry

hitting is 6/36, the chance of the German fighter hitting and the

Russian infantry missing is 12/36, the chance of the German fighter

missing and the Russian infantry hitting is 6/36, and the chance of the

German fighter missing and the Russian infantry missing is 12/36.

Whether

the Germans and/or the Russians inflict a casualty, the combat is over.

If neither Germans nor Russians inflict a casualty, the combat

repeats. If we assume that the German player will continue to press

the attack (after all, the German player could have retreated to begin

with) until the battle is decided, then we can effectively eliminate

the probability of neither side inflicting casualties, as the combat

will repeat until one side or the other or both is destroyed.

So,

instead of having the probability of both German fighter and Russian

infantry hitting as 6/36, or 6 out of 36 times, the probability of the

German fighter hitting and the Russian infantry missing at 12/36, or 12

out of 36 times, the probability of the German fighter missing and the

Russian infantry hitting at 6/36, or 6 out of 36 times, and the

probability of both missing at 12/36, or 12 out of 36 times, we are

going to calculate as if the last case did not exist. That is, the 12

out of 36 times that both Germans and Russians miss will be eliminated.

After

that happens, there will only be 24 different instances instead of 36.

And of those 24, both Germans and Russians will hit 6 times, German

hit and Russian miss 12 times, and German miss and Russian hit 6 times.

(Effectively, you eliminate the probability of all parties missing,

and you create a new denominator based on the sum of the remaining

numerators, then you slap that denominator on all the remaining

fractions).

That is, 6 out of 24 times (1/4) of the time, the Germans will hit and

the Russians will hit, 12 out of 24 times (1/2) of the time, the

Germans will hit and the Russians will miss, and 6 out of 24 times

(1/4) of the time, the Germans will miss and the Russians will hit.

At

this point, we will calculate a simple version of utility gain and

loss. In a real game, actual utility gain and loss depends on the

placement of units on the board as well as their raw IPC value; ten

infantry in Western Europe would probably be infinitely more valuable

in the Balkans on the Germans’ second turn, for example. But I

digress; that is a topic that is beyond the scope of this article.

If

the Germans and the Russians both hit, the Germans lose a 10 IPC

fighter and the Russians lose a 3 IPC infantry. If the Germans hit and

the Russians miss, the Germans lose nothing, and the Russians lose a 3

IPC infantry. If the Germans miss and the Russians hit, the Germans

lose a 10 IPC fighter and the Russians lose nothing. We will sum this

up as the Germans losing 7 IPC, the Germans gaining 3 IPC, and the

Germans losing 10 IPC, respectively. (That is, the amount of IPC

damage that the Germans inflict, minus the amount of IPC damage in

units that the Germans take.)

Figuring this out, that’s ((1/4) *

-7) + ((1/2) * 3) + ((1/4 * -10) = -7/4 + 3/2 + -10/4, or -11/4. The

Germans should expect to gain -11/4 IPC worth of units if they send one

German fighter against one Russian infantry. That is, the Germans

should expect to LOSE unit value overall. So unless there are

mitigating factors, the Germans should not carry out the attack of a

single German fighter attacking a single Russian infantry.

What

are mitigating factors? What may be lost or gained as an indirect

consequence of the battle, what the overall board situation is, and

(closely related to the overall board situation) the perceived value of

a piece. That is, suppose that Moscow is only defended by four

infantry, and IF Germany succeeds in its one German fighter on one

Russian infantry attack, twelve Japanese tanks will be free to blitz

into Moscow. (Assume there is no UK unit that can move into that

emptied territory on the UK turn.) Or, say that the Germans are

capturing Ukraine, and want to leave enough units there so that Russia

can’t take Ukraine back on its turn; in that case, German fighters may

be chosen as casualties before German tanks, as German fighters can’t

land in the Ukraine to strengthen the German defense of that territory,

but German tanks can stay in the Ukraine, strengthening the German

defense there. And so forth, including values of mobilized units that

are on the front as opposed to IPCs in the bank, and so on. The

subject of mitigating factors does not fall within the scope of an

article addressed to beginners, though, so there will be no further

explanation of that topic here.

Getting back to the subject –

notice that in the calculations for a German fighter going against a

Russian infantry, the fact that a German infantry is already lost at

that point is not taken into account, as at this point, the German

infantry is lost. The fact that the German infantry could be lost is

figured into the calculations at the time when deciding what forces to

allocate to the initial attack.

Probability of both German

infantry and Russian infantry hitting is (1/6) * (2/6), or 2/36.

Probability of German infantry hitting and Russian infantry missing is

4/36. Probability of German infantry missing and Russian infantry

hitting is 10/36. Probability of both missing is 20/36. Again, we

eliminate the last possibility, arriving at a final probability of 2/16

chance of both Russians and Germans hitting, a 4/16 chance of the

Germans hitting and the Russians missing, and a 10/16 chance of the

Germans missing and the Russians hitting.

This time, if the

Germans and Russians both hit, both sides lose 3 IPC worth of units. If

the Germans hit and the Russians miss, the Germans lose nothing, gain a

2 IPC territory (the value of Belorussia), and the Russians lose a 3

IPC infantry. If the Germans miss and the Russians hit, the Germans

lose a 3 IPC infantry. We will sum this up as the Germans losing 0

IPC, gaining 5 IPC, and losing 3 IPC, respectively. (That is, the

amount of IPC damage the Germans inflict, minus the amount of IPC

damage in units that the Germans take, plus the IPCs in the bank that

may be gained from captured territory).

Using the same formula,

that’s ((2/16) * 0) + ((4/16) * 5) + ((10/16) * -3), or -10/16. That

is, the Germans should expect to gain -10/16 IPC worth of units if they

send one German infantry against one Russian infantry to gain a 2 IPC

territory. That is, the Germans should expect to LOSE unit value. So,

once again, unless there are mitigating factors, the Germans should not

undertake the attack.

Now that we know that the battle of German

fighter against Russian infantry is unfavorable, and that the battle of

German infantry against Russian infantry is unfavorable, we return to

the earlier given figures of what happens when a German fighter and a

German infantry attack a Russian infantry in a 2 IPC territory.

Remember,

in a battle of a German fighter and a German infantry against a Russian

infantry, the probability that both sides will inflict a hit is

42/216. The probability that only the Germans will inflict a hit is

84/216. The probability that only the Russians will get a hit is

30/216. The probability that both will miss is 60/216.

Now, we

know that if both Russians and Germans inflict casualties, the combat

is over, the only decision left is for the German player can choose to

lose the 10 IPC fighter, and gain a 2 IPC territory (net -8 IPC), or

lose the 3 IPC infantry (net -3 IPC). If the Germans inflict a hit and

the Russians do not, the combat is over. If the Germans do not inflict

a hit, and the Russians inflict a hit, previously, we only knew that a

new situation arose, we did not know the outcome. We now know that,

ignoring mitigating factors, the German player should retreat, as

pressing the attack does not result in IPC gain.

Since we now

know the outcome anticipated action for each of the combat results, we

can eliminate the probability of no casualties occurring. What are the

new probabilities? They are: 42/156 chance of both sides inflicting a

casualty, 84/156 chance of only the Germans hitting, and 30/156 of only

the Russians hitting.

If both sides inflict a casualty, the

German player must decide to either lose the German fighter (losing the

10 IPC in fighter value, but gaining 2 IPC in the bank from gained

territory for net loss of 8 IPC), or lose 3 IPC from the infantry.

Barring mitigating factors, the German player should lose the

infantry. In this case, taking the amount of IPC damage the Germans

inflict, minus the amount of IPC damage in units that the Germans take,

plus the IPCs in the bank that may be gained from captured territory,

the Germans can expect to gain 0 IPC. If only the Germans inflict a

casualty, the Russians lose 3 IPC worth of infantry and the Germans

gain 2 IPC worth of territory, for a net gain of 5 IPC. If only the

Russians inflict a casualty, the Germans can either lose a 10 IPC

fighter and retreat, or a 3 IPC infantry and retreat; in the absence of

mitigating factors, this means the Germans should retreat with an

effective loss of 3 IPC.

Given this, then, what is the expected

change in German utility from the attack of German fighter and German

infantry against Russian infantry?

The immediate result is:

((42/156)

* 0) + ((84/156) * 5) + ((30/156) * -3), or 330/156 IPC. That is, the

expected gain in unit value from the attack is a little under 2 IPC.

However,

remember that IF the Germans capture the territory, the Germans will

then have an infantry in that territory. If the Allies don’t recapture

that territory, the Germans will retain that territory and the IPC

income from that territory. If the Allies do recapture that territory,

though, the German infantry will have some chance of inflicting a

casualty on the enemy attackers, though (barring battleship support

shots, which are a possibility). So, really, if the Germans DO capture

the territory, there is every chance that the Germans will have at

least a 2/6 chance (that is, the value of a German defender) of

destroying a unit worth at least 3 IPC (that is, an enemy infantry).

That adds an effective anticipated IPC gain of 1. (That is, the

possibility of inflicting a casualty multiplied by the value of the

casualty inflicted). In practice, the anticipated gain is really a bit

MORE than 1, because there is a chance that all the opponent’s attacks

will miss on the first round but the German infantry will hit, leaving

the German infantry free to inflict additional casualties, and there is

also a chance that the opponent will not have any infantry free to

attack the German infantry with, so the Allied player may have to risk

a more valuable unit, such as a tank, in case an attack is decided

upon. Of course, though, if the Germans do have an infantry in that

territory at that point, the Germans will lose an infantry, so will

lose a 3 IPC unit.

So, the expected previous result is

modified. Even though we know that the anticipated IPC gain of the

German defender is worth a bit more than 1 (barring battleship support

shots), we will only add 1 to the anticipated IPC gain if the Germans

capture the territory with no defenders. Adding -3 to that result, for

the anticipated loss of the German infantry gives us, in the 84 out of

156 cases when the Germans capture the Russian territory with no German

casualties, an additional -2 IPC expected out of the German defender

(that is, it is anticipated the Germans will lose a 3 IPC infantry, but

have about a 1/3 chance of destroying an enemy 3 IPC infantry in turn),

making the former figure of 330/156 into 330/156 + ((-168/156) * 1),

that is, 162/156, or a still respectable

1.0384615384615384615384615384615 IPC gain.

Yet, the picture is

still not complete. Even though the Germans stand to gain from the

attack, there is a question of what the Germans stand to lose if the

attack fails; this question goes beyond the immediate IPC gain or loss

already described. Also, we have not yet determined whether or not

some other German attack may be even more cost effective. Finally, we

have not yet determined what benefit the opponent may receive from the

proposed move, or what cost the opponent may yet have to pay for the

proposed move.

V. Other Utility Gain Calculations

If

the calculated utility of a move is to be considered completely

calculated, we must figure in the fact that in the example above, the

Russians can attack the Germans on the Russian turn, with the exact

same expected utility gain as listed above – but for the Russians. In

turn, the Russian counter will be subject to whatever German counter

the Germans can muster – and, of course, the Russians will in turn be

able to counter that German counter, etcetera ad infinitum.

The

example given at the beginning of section III shows that if your

opponent has considerable forces, an attack that is profitable for you

in the short term may be very unprofitable in the long term.

However,

what that example does not show is that if your opponent does not have

considerable forces, an attack that is profitable for you may end up

being even more profitable.

Say that instead, there were one

German infantry and one German fighter in Eastern Europe, one Russian

infantry in Belorussia. Also assume that Russia cannot bring any

forces to Belorussia on the Russian turn. Now, the utility

calculations change.

Previously, we assumed that if the German

infantry captured the territory, that the Russians would

counterattack. At that point, it was anticipated that the Germans

would lose a 3 IPC unit, and gain about 1 IPC (for a 1/3 chance of

destroying a 3 IPC Russian infantry). In this example, though, the

Russians cannot counterattack. Nor can they gain back that territory

on their turn.

So in the 84 out of 156 cases that we assumed a

German infantry would be destroyed, we instead now know that the German

infantry cannot be destroyed, so we can add back the ((84/156) * 2) IPC

that we subtracted. Furthermore, the Germans will still be collecting

income from that 2 IPC territory on the next German turn, as the

Russians cannot recapture that territory, so we add an additional

((84/156) * 2) IPC.

Instead of 162/156 IPCs anticipated, then,

the Germans in this case anticipate a gain of 498/156 IPCs. That is,

3.1923076923076923076923076923077 instead of

1.0384615384615384615384615384615 IPCs, a fairly considerable

difference.

Usually, there will not be a case in which the

Germans have units with which to attack, and the Russians have both

insufficient defense, and no units in the surrounding attacks that can

counter the German attack next turn. However, it may well be the case

that the Russians will be unable to respond in a cost-effective manner

to all of the German attacks. For example, if the Germans control

Karelia, Belorussia, and Ukraine, each with one infantry, Russia will

very likely have the infantry required to respond, but it is very

possible that Russia will not have the necessary fighters, as the

Russians would need three fighters, but fighters are very expensive and

Russia only starts with two.

VI. Assessing the Board Situation

When

you look at the board at the start of your turn, you know how many IPCs

you have, where your opponent’s units are, and where your own units

are. With this knowledge, you can plan your attacks, and in turn, what

units and/or tech research you will purchase.

Deciding what the

most cost-effective allocation of your units for your combat move phase

will be is difficult. Sending an additional infantry to attack on this

turn will mean a better chance of succeeding at the immediate battle,

but will probably mean that you won’t have that infantry available next

turn to respond to your opponent’s countermove. Sending an additional

fighter to participate in a naval battle may save valuable naval units,

but may also mean that you don’t have good odds in a land battle, which

can potentially be more important in the long run.

As difficult

as this is, though, it is even more difficult to assess what the most

cost-effective allocation of your opponents’ units will be, and what

your opponent is therefore likely to build. It may be that even though

you have a move that will greatly increase your utility, that your

opponent has a countermove that will greatly decrease your utility.

The

complexity is increased another degree by the fact that units can be

produced. Although the units your opponent is going to build on his or

her turn can’t counterattack any attack you made this turn, the units

your opponent is going to build on his or her turn can counterattack

any counter that you make to your opponent’s counterattack to your

attack, and vice versa.

Even yet, there is more to the

situation. The units that you build on your turn may not be

immediately usable to attack. However, even if the units you build on

your turn cannot be used to attack on your next turn, or even the turn

after that or later, those units can still be moved into position so

that you can attack later. This last is the reason why it is effective

for Germany to produce mostly infantry on the first two turns, but

produce tanks starting about three turns before serious pressure is to

be exerted on Russia. Infantry that are produced early can march

towards Russia, and the tanks’ speed means that the German infantry and

the German tanks can hit the Russian lines at the same time, creating a

difficult situation for Russia to deal with.

There is still one

more thing to address; the use of friendly powers’ units to help defend

your own. The most common examples of this are for the Allied fleet in

the Atlantic, and the German attack on the Ukraine and/or the

Caucasus. In both cases, the powers in question unite their forces to

make themselves more difficult to attack. Specifically, when the

Allies control 1 Russian sub, 2 UK transports, a UK battleship, a US

destroyer, a US carrier, and 2 US transports, that is quite difficult

for Germany to take down, if the Allied players make sure the German

navy and airforce can’t both hit the Allied fleet. Or, if Germany puts

a lot of units in the Ukraine or Caucasus, Russia can very likely make

a very damaging attack, but if Japan lands some fighters in the

Ukraine, any Russian attack becomes considerably more expensive.

**VII. Long-Term Goals**

The

ability to figuring out the short-term risks, costs, and benefits of a

decision is important, particularly when the decision contemplated is

crucial to the course of the game. However, the short-term risks,

costs, and benefits of a single decision must be viewed in light of the

long-term risks, costs, and benefits, which are not easily calculable.

For

example, it may not immediately be obvious that if Germany loses

fighters, the Allies will have a far easier time moving infantry and

other cost-effective ground units into Europe and/or Africa. However,

that is the case; if Germany has few fighters to threaten Allied

transports, the Allies won’t need to build as many escort ships for

their transports. In turn, that will mean the Allies will have more

IPCs to build transports and ground units to transport to Europe and

Africa.

It may also not be immediately obvious that Germany

should purchase some number of infantry on Germany’s first turn in

response to a Russian infantry build. After all, if Germany produces

tanks on Germany’s first turn, Germany’s position against Russia will

become much better very quickly. However, if Germany produces nothing

but tanks first turn, the German player won’t have the numbers of units

needed to absorb Russian counterattacks, once the Germans reach the

Balkans.

On the other hand, it may be that Germany should

purchase nothing but tanks, in response to a Russian double fighter

build and overly aggressive combat move. Russia will have more units

that it can use immediately on its next turn, and the German front will

be depleted, but Germany’s counterattack can be very costly to the

Russians, and the German tank build may well stop the Russians from

counterattacking. In the end, German numbers and speed may mean that

the Germans may be able to secure more territory on the Russian front,

and together with the Japanese, eventually secure Moscow.