What country had the best trained infantry in WWII?


  • I would have to side with Imperial Japanese Army…when u are trained to fight till your last breath…that has got to be some serious brainwashing…BANZAI!!!


  • Japan had the best trained soldiers individually, but Germany had the most effective troopers as per military doctrine ( in battlefield conditions). So for results with given equipment which was usually meager,the Germans faired best.

    AS far as having logistical support and many tools to fight, the American soldier had the best of everything and was the most effective with what he actually had, ( which was alot more than the German or Japanese).

    Soviets were not great fighters, but had some great commanders.

    I have to totally agree with IL here.
    As far as Pilots, Japan, Germany, Britain,and even Russia had very good pilots.  I think that the United States made the most of their pilots, the Japanese, Russians, and Germans flew their pilots to death.  This is really stupid because (although the pilots hated it) they can be better used back off the line to train the next generation of pilots.  Even if you have a great pilot (Red Barron/Richthoven is a great example) his number could be up anytime, any day.  Its better to pull off great pilots and make them instructors before they get killed.  I believe the Brits and other Allied nations also adhered to this principle.


  • I have to totally agree with IL here.
    As far as Pilots, Japan, Germany, Britain,and even Russia had very good pilots.  I think that the United States made the most of their pilots, the Japanese, Russians, and Germans flew their pilots to death.  This is really stupid because (although the pilots hated it) they can be better used back off the line to train the next generation of pilots.  Even if you have a great pilot (Red Barron/Richthoven is a great example) his number could be up anytime, any day.  Its better to pull off great pilots and make them instructors before they get killed.  I believe the Brits and other Allied nations also adhered to this principle.

    I think you meant the German Rammjaeger wich was a Sonderkommando to delay or stop the USAAF of Daylight bombingraids but it was not a success…most of those NAPOLA fighters were shot down before they even could land a hit, some of them rammed their target and around 50 planes came back safe…that is as far as I know the only time where German Pilots on purpose tried to some degree pull off a “Kamikazee”…Lack of fuel and the closing Enemy and the Nazi cult drove them to desperate meassures…but still 50 people refused to do an insane stunt like that…
    I’ve never heard about Soviet Kamikazees ,only that they shot ambulances and red cross b/c the Soviets have not been in the Geneva Convention…

    My Grandpa used to say that the Japanese was the best soldier b/c he would go and fight everywhere for a bowl of rice, and he was dead serious about that!!..


  • Spectre04 wrote: As far as Pilots, Japan, Germany, Britain,and even Russia had very good pilots.

    This link gives you a list of WWII aces, sorted by number of victories. The top non-German ace on that list is Ilmari Juutilainen of Finland, with 94 victories. Juutilainen is pilot #122 on that list: there are 121 Germans in front of him. The top 200 contains four non-Germans: two pilots from Finland (including Juutilainen) and two from Japan.

    To return to the subject of the OP: one way of measuring infantry training levels is combat effectiveness. According to a study done by the U.S. military, American infantry were 80 - 100% as combat-effective as their German counterparts. Another study performed by the U.S. military suggests that may have been an overestimate; and that American infantry were no more effective than British infantry. The latter were 50% as combat-effective as the Germans. Soviet infantry were 20 - 33% as combat-effective as the Germans, with the higher number being the more likely. The study suggested that Italian infantry may have been less combat-effective than the Soviets, but did not go into detail. Unfortunately, the study did not examine the combat-effectiveness of Finnish, Canadian, Australian, or Japanese infantry.

    The U.S. typically achieved a 2:1 - 4:1 exchange ratio in its land battles against Japan. A large part of that was undoubtedly due to America’s superior industrial strength. For example, Japan produced 7,000 artillery pieces during WWII, compared to 257,000 artillery pieces for the U.S.. But those favorable (for the Americans) exchange ratios may not have been based on industrial production alone. Japanese banzai attacks were very similar in philosophy and execution to French “elan” style bayonet attacks used in 1914. During WWI, the French painfully learned that it does not make sense to issue bayonets to your own soldiers, and ask them to charge enemy machine guns. The Japanese use of such tactics during WWII suggests they were less advanced in their understanding of land war (and hence, probably had less advanced training techniques) than most other major powers of the era. Japanese understanding of land war became more sophisticated as the war progressed.


  • Thoroughly enjoyed the post - one thought though

    I don’t think it helps to refer to the 2:1 - 4:1 exchange ratio of US to Japan on “land battles” because there are so many different and incomparable factors.  As you mentioned - the huge industrial strength disparity.  Also, the Japanese were pretty much always on defense - it’s not like there were a lot of both, like you have in Germany vs. Russia.  There’s just no comparing amphibious assaults on Pacific islands to a European land war….

    I’d be interested to hear analysis on USA troop performance in Europe (or any other country, just specifying USA because they had the 2 very different campaigns a world apart)


  • On US performance in Europe, has anyone read Rick Atkinson’s Liberation Trilogy? I just started reading the first book, which is about Torch and the liberation of North Africa. So far, it seems that US forces are inexperienced and lucky they were landing against French troops instead of in France against German troops close to their homeland.


  • Gamerman01 wrote:

    I’d be interested to hear analysis on USA troop performance in Europe (or any other country, just specifying USA because they had the 2 very different campaigns a world apart)

    In late 1942, American troops invaded Algeria. The result was a battle between the Americans and the French. The two sides soon negotiated a peace treaty. But before they did, America achieved a 2.5-to-1 exchange ratio against the French. As you pointed out, an exchange ratio is not necessarily a good measurement of infantry effectiveness. If one side (such as the United States) happens to have an overwhelming advantage in air power, equipment, and numbers, one would expect such a nation to achieve a favorable ratio.

    In 1943, the U.S. and Britain invaded Italy. In the opinion of the U.S. military officer who performed the study I’d mentioned earlier, that combat represented the best example of American and British soldiers going up against Germans. However, he pointed out that the German force in Italy was relatively small, that it was a reserve force, and that as such it did not have the same equipment as a front line force of equal size might have had. Also, a significant percentage of its soldiers had been sent there for rest and recovery (recovery from battle wounds, for example). Based on his analysis of Anglo-American performance against this force, the author of the study concluded that American soldiers were 80 - 100% as combat-effective as the Germans, and that the British were 50% as combat-effective. (Elsewhere, he acknowledged the possibility that he’d overestimated American soldiers’ combat-effectiveness.)

    In the Soviet Union there was a strong dislike for Stalin. When Hitler invaded, he found that a significant percentage of the population was willing to join the German Army, so that they could fight against communism. One would think that the logical place for these volunteers would be on the eastern front, against communism. However, in 1944 Germany was experiencing a dramatic troop shortage, and needed to quickly transfer soldiers to its western front to prepare against American and British invasion. Many of its best western front soldiers were placed in Calais, because that is where the Germans expected the blow to land. On most of the Normandy beachheads, American and British soldiers faced mostly Russians. Only at Omaha did the Allies face actual German soldiers. Hence the phrase “Bloody Omaha.” The U.S. lost 3000 men at Omaha, in exchange for 1200 Germans. On the one hand, the Americans enjoyed air supremacy, the benefit of battleship bombardments, far more weapons and equipment than the Germans, and a 5:1 numerical advantage over the German defenders. On the other hand, the Germans had the advantage of being the defender, and the advantage of having had time to prepare their defenses. The analysis of the Italian campaign probably provides a more accurate picture of relative combat effectiveness than does this one isolated battle.

    During the initial phases of the Battle of the Bulge, bad weather prevented the Allies from receiving much benefit from their air supremacy. That’s useful, because we want ground battles, without the complicating factor of one side pummeling the other side from the air. The Battle of the Bulge was useful in another way as well, because it consisted of both attacks and counterattacks. Over the course of the battle each side was given opportunities to be on offense and on defense.

    Many of Germany’s best soldiers were sent to the Battle of the Bulge. However, that battle occurred in late 1944. By that point, Germany was running very low on “best soldiers” it could send. To fill out its numbers, many of the German soldiers in that battle were old men or boys. A number of infantry divisions were poorly equipped. Germany’s tanks in that battle were often immobilized due to its fuel shortages. The exchange ratio in that battle was approximately 1:1.

    The Battle of Berlin began just three months after the Battle of the Bulge. While no American troops were involved in the Battle of Berlin, that battle nevertheless illustrates the types of problems the German military faced at the time.


    The German defences were mainly led by Helmuth Weidling and consisted of several depleted, badly equipped, and disorganised Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS divisions, the latter of which included many SS foreign volunteers, as well as poorly trained Volkssturm and Hitler Youth members.


    The Volkssturm consisted almost entirely of old men and children; while the Hitler Youth was of course children. The Soviets experienced 81,000 losses in the Battle of Berlin; as compared to about 95,000 losses for Germany. Just two years earlier, the usual exchange ratio between Germany and the U.S.S.R. had been 3:1 in Germany’s favor. The fact that the Soviets later attained–and even slightly exceeded–a 1:1 ratio is one of several pieces of evidence which demonstrate Germany had reached the very end of its strength.

    I’m less familiar with the Pacific war than I am the European war. That said, I know that during the early stages of the war between the U.S. and Japan, Japanese military doctrine called for the bulk of their defenses to be placed on or near beaches. That doctrine made them vulnerable to shore bombardment and attack from the air, and was a significant factor in the favorable exchange ratios American forces obtained. Late in the war, a maverick Japanese army officer used a different approach. His defenses on or near beaches were light. Once his beachhead defenses had been conquered, the Americans assumed that since the shell had been cracked, the whole defensive structure for that island would crumble. Instead of that, the Japanese officer and his men conducted a long and effective defensive campaign from the interior of the island. They used natural and artificial tunnels, caves, mountains, etc. Their plan was to hold out as long as possible while inflicting the maximum possible damage on the enemy.

    However, it’s difficult to translate that one battle into an overall comparison between Japanese and American soldiers’ combat-effectiveness. The Japanese had the natural advantages of being on defense, and the island in question had a physical structure very, very well-suited to defense.


  • I read it all

    Didn’t the Germans have a significant advantage of being on defense and often having higher ground in Italy, too?


  • @Gamerman01:

    I read it all

    Didn’t the Germans have a significant advantage of being on defense and often having higher ground in Italy, too?

    Yes, but that’s something which was taken into account when the U.S. military performed the study I’d mentioned. There were times in Italy when the German Army attacked, and of course times when the British or American armies attacked. The study looked specifically at what happened when the German army attacked, and compared those results to events when the British or American armies attacked. Same thing with defense. By looking at all available data, they were able to develop a composite picture of relative combat effectiveness.


  • You are right about the belligerents, Kurt.  Though, it always feels weird reading that the US/Brits fought the French, initially, in French-North Africa.  I like to call them the “traitor/occupied/Vichy French” and the “free French” for the other side.  It just makes me feel better, haha.


  • Very interesting, thanks for fielding both questions Kurt!

  • '22 '20 '19 '18 '17 '16 '15 '14 '12

    What I’ve read, and it’s a lot, is Germany best at the start, Russia the worst with German forces becoming very differentiated later on w/ some excellent units and increasing numbers of mediocre units.  The Russians were actually able to field some very effective divisions 44 on but still had a swath of cannon fodder. Britain, France etc were always ok.  The US was so so, but we had excellent, unsurpassed maybe, fire control w/artillery etc that made infantry effectiveness a second order issue.  On of the big lessons drawn by the US from WWII was how ineffective infantry were, especially w/rifles.

    I would never say Japanese infantry were that great.  They, at all times during the war, had mediocre to outdated equipment and horrible logistics.  Sure, they could make up some of it w/zeal, but in the end they never came out on top of the US after 42.  They had a pretty bad loss ratio to the US starting a Guadalcanal.

    Keep in mind that most of the Pacific land battles in 41/early 42 were, aside from Singapore, pretty small affairs w/ Japan swooping down, surrounding and cutting off small isolated, poorly equipped garrisons.


  • WraithZero wrote,

    I like to call them the “traitor/occupied/Vichy French” and the “free French” for the other side.  It just makes me feel better, haha.

    I would disagree with that characterization. I strongly believe that those who joined Vichy France never wavered in their loyalty or love for France. Love of France and war against Germany are not analogous concepts. It’s also worth noting that England and France had been at war against each other for more years than the United States has existed. Churchill’s decision to sink the French navy may have brought some of those memories to the surface.

    On the other hand, many of the so-called “Free French” were communists. The stated objective of communism is to overthrow the world’s existing governments and to replace them with one world government. A communist government. Undoubtedly, many or most of these communist Free French still felt love or loyalty toward France. Perhaps communist leadership felt it would be better to wait until after the war was over to ween these men of their love for France; and to attempt to replace that love with a love for a global dictatorship of the proletariat.

    Karl wrote,

    What I’ve read, and it’s a lot, is Germany best at the start, Russia the worst

    By the summer of 1941, 80% of German men ages 20 - 30 were members of the military. (The other 20% were considered too vital to industry to be released for military service.) Over 80% of German military losses were incurred on its eastern front. Together, these two facts meant that the enormous losses Germany would sustain on its eastern front would be made good not by drafting men of military age, but by adding men who were of non-ideal age. At first it was adding men who were maybe a few years older than that ideal range. But as the war progressed and casualties mounted, the age range of German soldiers broadened. By mid to late '44 there were plenty of old men and boys in the German Army. Also, the percentage of non-Germans in the German Army increased as the war progressed. Military historians describe the German Army of '44 as having been a shell of the German Army in '41.

    Stalin tended to downplay the accomplishments of the pre-Barbarossa Red Army, so as not to alarm his neighbors. But if that propaganda effort is stripped away, we see that the Red Army had some remarkable achievements in 1939 and 1940. In 1939, the Soviet Union found itself in an undeclared war against Japan. The Red Army won a crushing victory in '39 in the Battles of Khalkhin Gol. They achieved an offensive victory over the Japanese by having a weak center, strong flanks, a high level of mobility, and excellent air power. The objective was to use enveloping tactics and mobility to surround an enemy force; while using air power to knock out roads and bridges the enemy had needed. It was a sound philosophy, soundly executed. However, Stalin ordered total censorship of this Soviet victory. The Japanese were of course less than eager to advertise their defeat. As a consequence the rest of the world did not learn of what the Red Army had accomplished in 1939.

    Prior to WWII, Finland had built multi-layered defenses on the Karelian isthmus, to guard against Soviet invasion. Many or most military experts considered those defenses impregnable. Due to the layout of the land, it was impossible to bypass those defenses. The only way to conquer Finland was to go straight through some of the best-defended terrain on the entire surface of the Earth. The Red Army achieved exactly that in 1940–albeit with substantial losses. Soviet propagandists claimed that the Red Army performed poorly in that engagement; and that it would be years before it was ready for war. Those claims are evidence that the Red Army performed well; and that Soviet leaders were planning a war of aggression. (Had the Red Army actually performed badly, Soviet leaders would hardly have wanted to advertise that weakness to their expansionistic neighbors.)

    It’s true that the Red Army performed poorly in Operation Barbarossa. Germany achieved a 10:1 exchange ratio in the summer and fall of '41.

    Well prior to Barbarossa, each Soviet officer had been issued a sealed packet. A packet was only to be opened upon outbreak of hostilities. When Germany invaded, each officer opened his packet. Upon doing so, he found plenty of information about what to do if the Soviet Union invaded Germany–and nothing at all about how to respond to a German invasion of the Soviet Union. The Soviet military’s deployment, weapons mix, troop movements and doctrine would have made perfect sense for a Soviet invasion of Germany in August 1941. They were completely unsuited to defending against a German invasion. The fact that the Soviet military leadership was taken completely off-guard was the main reason Germany achieved a 10:1 exchange ratio in Barbarossa. (As opposed to the 3:1 ratio which would become normal later in the war.) Also in '41, Soviet generals had a far less sophisticated understanding of tactics and strategy than did their German counterparts. During the Nazi-Soviet war, Soviet generals learned by example from German generals; thereby partly closing the sophistication gap. “We taught them too well,” General von Manstein remarked.


  • Just going to touch on a few things here as this discussion has moved towards Eastern Front fighting and most of my research has been in this particular theater of the war. Firstly, to consider the Soviet invasion of Finland a success is, frankly, ridiculous. The Red Army was orders of magnitude larger and better equipped than the Finnish army, there is no level of preparedness that could have come even close to bridging the gap between those two armies. That the Red Army stumbled so badly against Finland demonstrates the sheer ineptitude of Soviet military leadership and it was rightly seen by the rest of the world, and Stalin himself no doubt, as a failure. Furthermore, the assertion that this blunder was intentionally made known to the rest of the world by Soviet propagandists is erroneous. There was no covering that up, that’s how badly that campaign went.

    I must also take issue with the assertion that Stalin attempted to downplay the accomplishments of the Red Army prior to Barbarossa for two reasons:

    1. Germany and the Soviet Union were very interested in exchanging military research, and experts were sent and received by both countries to evaluate the capabilities of the other during the 1930s

    2. There was nothing to cover up, the Red Army’s only notable campaign before Barbarossa was against the Japanese and the Finns and neither of those were secrets

    Additionally, Stalin had no reason to downplay the quality of the Red Army prior to Barbarossa. Indeed, one of the (many) reasons Barbarossa was such a surprise for Stalin was his belief that Hitler would not deliberately open a second front without completely dealing with the first. In fact, Stalin held this belief so ardently that he refused to believe intelligence given to him not only by the British but also his own staff, and even believed Hitler when he informed Stalin that Axis troops being redeployed to the Eastern frontier were simply training for the invasion of the United Kingdom.

    On top of THAT is the fact that the Red Army was being completely reorganized and reequipped at the time that Barbarossa occurred, and Stalin knew that that was going to be a dangerous time for any major confrontation with his neighbours. It literally makes zero sense that he would try to downplay the quality of his troops and their accomplishments given these facts. If anything, they’re reasons that he would have been much more overt about the strength of the Red Army.

    Apologies to KurtGodel7 if any of this sounds abrasive, but a lot of your assertions fly in the face with my research on the Eastern Front and interwar politics. I am only interested in scholarly discussion and have no wish to hurt anyone’s feelings.


  • @creeping-deth87:

    Just going to touch on a few things here as this discussion has moved towards Eastern Front fighting and most of my research has been in this particular theater of the war. Firstly, to consider the Soviet invasion of Finland a success is, frankly, ridiculous. The Red Army was orders of magnitude larger and better equipped than the Finnish army, there is no level of preparedness that could have come even close to bridging the gap between those two armies. That the Red Army stumbled so badly against Finland demonstrates the sheer ineptitude of Soviet military leadership and it was rightly seen by the rest of the world, and Stalin himself no doubt, as a failure. Furthermore, the assertion that this blunder was intentionally made known to the rest of the world by Soviet propagandists is erroneous. There was no covering that up, that’s how badly that campaign went.

    I must also take issue with the assertion that Stalin attempted to downplay the accomplishments of the Red Army prior to Barbarossa for two reasons:

    1. Germany and the Soviet Union were very interested in exchanging military research, and experts were sent and received by both countries to evaluate the capabilities of the other during the 1930s

    2. There was nothing to cover up, the Red Army’s only notable campaign before Barbarossa was against the Japanese and the Finns and neither of those were secrets

    Additionally, Stalin had no reason to downplay the quality of the Red Army prior to Barbarossa. Indeed, one of the (many) reasons Barbarossa was such a surprise for Stalin was his belief that Hitler would not deliberately open a second front without completely dealing with the first. In fact, Stalin held this belief so ardently that he refused to believe intelligence given to him not only by the British but also his own staff, and even believed Hitler when he informed Stalin that Axis troops being redeployed to the Eastern frontier were simply training for the invasion of the United Kingdom.

    On top of THAT is the fact that the Red Army was being completely reorganized and reequipped at the time that Barbarossa occurred, and Stalin knew that that was going to be a dangerous time for any major confrontation with his neighbours. It literally makes zero sense that he would try to downplay the quality of his troops and their accomplishments given these facts. If anything, they’re reasons that he would have been much more overt about the strength of the Red Army.

    Apologies to KurtGodel7 if any of this sounds abrasive, but a lot of your assertions fly in the face with my research on the Eastern Front and interwar politics. I am only interested in scholarly discussion and have no wish to hurt anyone’s feelings.

    Creeping Deth wrote:

    Apologies to KurtGodel7 if any of this sounds abrasive, but a lot of your assertions fly in the face
    with my research on the Eastern Front and interwar politics. I am only interested in scholarly
    discussion and have no wish to hurt anyone’s feelings.

    No apologies necessary. Prior to having read Victor Suvorov’s book, I would have agreed with the majority of your post. I was frequently surprised by the information Suvorov had brought to light, and gradually came to modify my perspective as a result of that new data. As for Suvorov’s credentials: he had been a member of the KGB, until defecting to Britain in the '70s. As a member of the KGB he had been given access to Soviet archives denied to all non-Soviets, and also denied to the vast majority of Soviet citizens. Suvorov pointed out that the Soviet Union had been a criminal regime, and that therefore the tactics of a criminal investigator were appropriate. Historians–with their reliance on journalists to write the “first draft” for them–do not always use the tactics needed to penetrate the Soviet veil of secrecy. Suvorov’s bias is anti-communist but pro-Russian. He is proud of the military achievements of the Red Army–his fellow Russians–while strongly condemning Stalin’s evil legacy of terror and mass murder.

    Firstly, to consider the Soviet invasion of Finland a success is, frankly, ridiculous.

    Finland had built very powerful defenses on the Karelian isthmus. Those defenses were seized during the Winter War, leaving the nation helpless against any subsequent Soviet invasion. The objective of the Winter War was (according to Suvorov) to seize those Karelian defenses, and that objective was achieved. (Despite having been considered a military impossibility.) Having rendered Finland defenseless, why didn’t Stalin grab the nation as a whole? Suvorov believes that Stalin had planned to do exactly that–after he had invaded Germany. To grab it ahead of time would be to alert Germany to Stalin’s aggressive intentions.

    That the Red Army stumbled so badly against Finland demonstrates the sheer ineptitude of Soviet military leadership

    In comparison with the Germans, the Red Army’s leadership was indeed inept. (Probably to a much greater degree than Stalin had realized.) But in the undeclared war between Japan and the Soviet Union, the Red Army won a series of stunning victories. Anyone looking at the results of that undeclared war would conclude the Soviets had a very high level of military preparedness in 1939; which of course had significantly increased by 1941. The favorable exchange ratio the Finns achieved during the Winter War could be seen as evidence of the strength of Finland’s defenses and the difficulty of the task of conquering those defenses.

    1. Germany and the Soviet Union were very interested in exchanging military research, and experts were sent
      and received by both countries to evaluate the capabilities of the other during the 1930s

    I remember having read something along those lines myself. However, Suvorov pointed out that on the domestic front, Stalin had a habit of allying with B against A. Then he’d align with C against B. Finally, he’d eliminate C. Suvorov believes that Stalin took exactly that same approach to Soviet foreign relations. The fact that the Soviet Union and Germany had cooperated during the '30s is not evidence of benign intent on the part of Stalin. Suvorov believes that it was more of the same “align with B against A, then align with C against B” strategy seen so often in Stalin’s domestic political affairs.

    1. There was nothing to cover up, the Red Army’s only notable campaign before Barbarossa was against the Japanese and the Finns and neither of those were secrets

    Suvorov points out that all mention of the Soviets’ victories over the Japanese were censored from the Soviet media. Also, the Soviet propaganda machine sold the Winter War as a “defeat,” even though the Red Army succeeded in conquering Finland’s defenses. (Leaving Finland with no means of defending itself from subsequent Soviet attack.)

    Indeed, one of the (many) reasons Barbarossa was such a surprise for Stalin was his belief that Hitler would not deliberately open a second front without completely dealing with the first.

    It is true that Stalin believed Germany would not attack first. Soviet officers were given sealed packets, to be opened in the event of hostilities between Germany and the Soviet Union. When Germany invaded, each officer opened his packet. Upon doing so, he found plenty of information on what to do if the Soviet Union invaded Germany. And nothing at all on how he should act if Germany invaded the Soviet Union. This surprise effect was pivotal in Germany’s achieving a 10:1 exchange ratio during Operation Barbarossa. (As opposed to the 3:1 ratio which would become normal later in the war.)

    Stalin’s certainty about his theory was not based on blind faith only. He was also conducting an extensive spying campaign within Germany. To create proper winter uniforms, it is absolutely necessary to use sheepskin. Stalin’s spies monitored German sheep markets, and found no evidence of preparation of such winter uniforms. Also for winter war it is necessary to have winterized fuel supplies and lubrication oil supplies. Stalin’s spies found no evidence to suggest Germany was winterizing any of its fuel or lubricant supplies. Further, Stalin’s spies had found that Germany had only enough fuel reserves for two to three months of active campaigning, after which its military operations would slow down precipitously due to lack of fuel. Finally, Stalin had a considerable numerical advantage on that front, including (IIRC) a better than 10:1 ratio in available tanks. Based on these data Stalin reasonably concluded that Hitler would be a fool to invade. According to Suvorov Hitler understood the basic logic of not invading. And he added that Hitler had had no plans to invade, until he’d gotten wind of Stalin’s plan to invade Germany. Even though Germany’s massive troop movements to the Eastern front began after Stalin’s, Germany’s were finished first. This was due to a variety of factors: Germany had a good transportation system, Germany had to send its soldiers a shorter distance than did the Soviet Union, and Germany had fewer soldiers to send. Germany’s troop concentration was therefore completed several weeks ahead of the Soviet schedule, allowing Germany to strike first.


  • I appreciate that synopsis Kurt, thanks for typing it up
    I think it helps clear up some fog I’ve always had with this particular area of history


  • @KurtGodel7:

    And he added that Hitler had had no plans to invade, until he’d gotten wind of Stalin’s plan to invade Germany

    Right here is where you lost me. I could have maybe bought all the other stuff you’re telling me this Suvorov has written until I got to this sentence. There is no way anyone is going to convince me Stalin had plans to invade Germany around the time Barbarossa occurred, not with the sheer scale of the reorganization the Red Army was going through and certainly not with the gradual phasing out of the obsolete BT7 and T-26 tanks that made up the bulk of the Soviet Union’s tank fleet. It doesn’t make a single iota of sense and makes all of Suvorov’s other claims highly circumspect. I have no doubt Stalin intended to eventually invade Western Europe, but the war he wanted was years away, not weeks as your post suggests.


  • Creeping Deth wrote:

    There is no way anyone is going to convince me Stalin had plans to invade Germany
    around the time Barbarossa occurred, not with the sheer scale of the reorganization
    the Red Army was going through and certainly not with the gradual phasing out of the
    obsolete BT7 and T-26 tanks that made up the bulk of the Soviet Union’s tank fleet.

    Suvorov addresses the subject of tanks in great detail. A search for the word “tank” in his Kindle book yielded over 200 results. He makes some very good points:

    1. Prior to WWII, no nation in the world had heavy tanks–except the Soviet Union. The Soviets began producing heavy tanks in 1933 (the T-35). By June '41, the Germans had begun working with pencil and paper to design their own heavy tanks. Germany would become the second nation in the world to have heavy tanks. At least as of 1943, there was no “third place” nation, because no third nation had heavy tanks.

    2. Prior to WWII, no nation had amphibious tanks–again with the exception of the Soviet Union. When Hitler invaded, Stalin had more amphibious, light tanks than Germany had total tanks. Light, amphibious tanks are very poorly suited for defense, and thousands of such tanks were abandoned when Germany invaded. But if you are on offense, such tanks are an absolutely vital tool: for crossing rivers, securing bridgeheads, and for pushing deep into the enemy rear.

    3. In 1941, no German tank or other non-Soviet tank was the equal of the Soviets’ T-28 medium tank.

    4. The Soviets had begun producing the KV heavy tank in 1940. (At a time when, again, no one else in the world had heavy tanks.)

    5. In 1941, no non-Soviet nation had anything comparable to the T-35. The T-35 was nevertheless labeled “obsolete” by a Soviet government trying to explain away Germany’s successes in Barbarossa.

    6. In September of 1939, Germany had 3,195 tanks. As of January 1st 1939 the Red Army had 21,000 battle-ready tanks.

    7. BT stood for bystrokhodnyi (high speed) tank. The T-34 was a direct descendant of the BT. The BT had sloped frontal armor. The 45 mm gun on a BT could penetrate the armor of any non-Soviet tank. Later versions of the BT were armed with 76 mm KT-26 cannons: a better weapon than any non-Soviet tank at the time. (In 1941, the most powerful American tank had a 37 mm cannon.) Germany’s Pz-I had no cannon, the Pz-II had a 20 mm cannon, and the Pz-III had a weak 37 mm cannon. The Pz-IV had a 75 mm cannon, but the shortness of its barrel made it unsuitable for tank-versus-tank battles. The BT-2 had a 400 horsepower engine. Germany would not have a tank engine that powerful until the end of 1942. The BT had a specific power of 36.4 horsepower per ton of mass: a better specific power than any non-Soviet tank. The German tank with the highest specific power was the T-IIIJ tank; with a specific power of 13.9 horsepower per ton of mass. Early BTs had a top speed of 69 mph, or 110 km/hr. Again, that is better than any non-Soviet tank. Unlike non-Soviet tanks, the BT could cross rivers underwater. The BT’s armor was merely “bulletproof,” which was no worse than the armor of German tanks of comparable size. (And in terms of firepower, mobility, and top speed it was significantly better than non-Soviet tanks of its size, including German tanks.) Due to its wide treads, the BT was excellent at dealing with mud, snow, and other such conditions.

    8. At the beginning of WWII the Red Army had 6,456 BT tanks–as many BT tanks as all other nations in the world, combined, had total tanks.

    9. The BT was unsuitable a defensive role, and was not optimized for warfare on Soviet soil. Its main advantage was its speed. But to achieve ideal speed, it would be necessary to remove its treads and replace them with wheels. Then, it would drive on well-paved highways. (Of which the Soviet Union had few.) Germany, however, had an excellent highway system. There was general agreement that the BT was at its best when using wheels rather than treads. (But it was considered necessary to have both available.)

    Below is a quote from Zuvorov’s book


    Polesye–the biggest region of swamplands in Europe, possibly even in the world–lies between the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea. Polesye was unsuitable for the mass movement of troops and the conduct of military operations. The area divided the [Soviets’] western theater of operations into two strategic directions. . . .

    Invasion into Central Europe, north of Polesye, would be a direct blow on Berlin. However, in the attacker’s way lay heavily fortified Eastern Prussia and Koenigsberg. A blow to the south, however, was a diversion to the side, a roundabout route. However, it would be a blow to almost unprotected Romania, the oil heart of Germany. On synthetic fuel alone, Germany could not survive. Therefore, it was decided to play two games, compare the results, and make the choice. In the first game, the main attack on Central Europe was carried out north of Polesye, from Belarus and the Baltic. In the second game, the invasion was carried out from Ukraine and Moldova. If Germany were crushed, the rest of continental Europe would shower Stalin with flowers and his tanks would have an open road right up to the Atlantic Ocean.

    In the second game, Zhukov, in command of Soviet troops, attacked Romania and Hungary. He found it easy to advance. First of all, there were no modern fortifications there, like those in Eastern Prussia. Zhukov had indisputable superiority of aviation, tanks, and paratroops. “The second game . . . ended with the ‘Eastern’ decision being made to attack Budapest.” . . . Zhukov himself already said that the games did not have an academic character, but were directly tied to the imminent war. Stalin was not present at the second game and did not conduct its debriefings, because he had already made his choice after seeing the results of the first one. The Soviet invasion of Europe would be conducted south of Polesye.



  • Absolutely none of what you just said is a compelling argument that the Soviet Union was going to invade Germany in 1941. You are correct that no other nation had heavy tanks prior to WWII, but they made up a very small portion of Russia’s tank fleet and very few crew had been trained to operate them. I’m not sure what bearing amphibious tanks has on the discussion, but a cool factoid nonetheless. You are correct that the disparity in raw numbers was massively in favour of the Soviet side, but again this is not compelling evidence the Soviet Union was going to invade. The BT7 and T-26 series tanks were in an utterly horrific state of disrepair. Many of them had severe technical failures on the march, so bad that a great deal of them never made it to the battlefield. Their maintenance problems, along with poor leadership at every level in the Red Army, ensured that the Wehrmacht came out on top in most of the armored engagements that went down in '41. What’s more, both the BT-7 and T-26 were being phased out for the T-34 and KV-1, but this gradual replacement program was in its infancy when the Germans invaded and many Soviet tankers had little to no experience in these new vehicles. There’s just no way Stalin was planning an invasion in the middle of such a gargantuan effort to reorganize and reequip the Red Army. I just don’t buy it.


  • Suvorov argues–convincingly–that all of the tanks Germany had in June of 1941 were obsolete by Soviet standards. As of June '41, the only German tank with a prayer of standing up to Soviet medium tanks was the Panzer IV. Germany produced fewer than 500 Panzer IVs during 1941, and had produced less than 400 Panzer IVs in 1940. By the end of '41, total production for the Panzer IV (including those produced during the prewar period) was less than 1,200 examples. (A number of which had been destroyed in France or other theaters.) As of June '41, the Soviet tank force consisted of over 25,000 tanks. German initial frontline strength in Barbarossa consisted of 3,350 tanks. Of those 3,350, the vast majority were inferior to the Panzer IV.

    The main armament on the BT-7 was a 45 mm gun. The main armament on the Panzer III was typically either 37 mm or 50 mm. The maximum armor thickness of the Panzer III was 50 mm; the maximum armor thickness of the BT-7 was 40 mm. The BT-7’s armor was sloping, much like the T-34’s. At least on paper, the BT-7 should have been able to hold its own against Germany’s second-best tank, the Panzer III. The Soviets had many thousands of other tanks which were more than a match for Germany’s best tank of 1941 (the Panzer IV).

    According to the Wikipedia article on the T-26, “The T-26 (mod. 1938/39, especially) could withstand most German tanks in 1941 but were inferior to the Panzer III and Panzer IV.”

    As of June '41, Stalin had a better than 8:1 advantage in total tanks. Stalin’s best tanks of '41 were the KV-1 and KV-2. A KV was worth about ten of Germany’s best tank of '41 (the Panzer IV.) The U.S.S.R. produced over 1,300 heavy tanks in '41, as compared to a total tank production for Germany of 3,600 for that year. Germany did not produce any heavy tanks prior to 1942. Given these data, it would have been reasonable for Stalin to have concluded that the Soviet Union would begin its war against Germany with a crushing superiority in tank warfare.

    The obvious question arises: if the Soviets started the war with more and better tanks than the Germans, how on earth did the Germans achieve so much initial success in Barbarossa? The Wikipedia article on the T-26 provides the answer: “all of the Red Army’s tank models suffered severe losses due to the air supremacy of the German Luftwaffe. The majority of the Red Army’s T-26s were lost in the first months of the German-Soviet War, mainly to enemy artillery and air attacks.”

    The Soviet Union started off with a 3:1 advantage in available military aircraft. The fact the Germans were able to achieve air supremacy under those circumstances was something of a surprise. Much of that air supremacy was due to the fact that Soviet aircraft were deployed as far forward as possible, and were quickly destroyed on the ground by German aircraft, or by advancing German land forces. The Germans produced 7,000 artillery pieces in 1940, and 11,000 artillery pieces in 1941. The Soviets produced 15,000 artillery pieces in 1940, and 42,000 in 1941. Stalin had every reason to be confident of an overwhelming numerical advantage in available men, planes, tanks, and artillery.

    When Operation Barbarossa began, the Soviet Union had more amphibious tanks than Germany had total tanks. Suvorov (pp. 54-57) provides the following explanation for the utility of amphibious tanks.


    What are they needed for? What use comes from amphibious tanks? If we are defending our own territory, if we are conducting strictly defensive warfare, amphibious tanks are not really needed. We can get by without them. In order to stop the enemy, one wants to have tanks with heavy armor and powerful weapons–the heavier and more powerful, the better.

    If we cannot stop the enemy in defensive warfare, we are forced to retreat. We retreat using our own bridges. Wen threatened with a takeover, we can detonate our bridges and send them up into the sky. There is little use for tanks with light armor and machine guns in a defensive war. Their ability to float also remains completely unused: there is nowhere to sail to in a defensive war.

    But if we are conducting a crusade for world domination, then in order to herd the population of the planet into concentration camps, labor armies, and barracks, we have different needs. In order to break through the enemy’s front, we need heavy tanks, more armor, and more powerful cannon. If a battle occurs, if two waves of tanks collide, once again, we need the most powerful tanks. Once the front line is broken and the enemy’s tank waves are defeated and crushed, our task becomes to take advantage of the moment and complete a thrust deep into the enemy’s rear, in order to split up his defenses, to have access to his communications and supply lines, to reach the aortas in order to cut them, to cut the enemy off from his supply bases, to reach his capital, his industrial regions, his sources of oil, and his ports. A heavy tank is not very good for such a thrust. Due to its weight, it breaks roads and bridges and gets in the way of all those who are following. A heavy tank consumes a lot of fuel–try to provide fuel to several thousand tanks and artillery tow trucks and tens of thousands of automobiles, which are pushing forward deep into enemy territory. Aside from all this, a heavy tank is also slow and not very agile. It slows down the movement of your columns. Moreover, it quickly wears out and chokes, like a heavyweight in a marathon. For a forward thrust, medium and light tanks are ideal. They have less armor, weaker weapons, but they have much higher speed, maneuverability, and cross-country ability, and they are more economical with their fuel.

    Now our armored armada is standing before a water obstacle. Here all heavy and medium tanks, and those light ones that have not been taught how to float, lose all their aggressive options. Their value is zero. They need a bridge. But the enemy protects the bridges, and blows them up when threatened with a takeover. Bridges have to be fought for. And it is better to fight for them not on our side, but from the side of the enemy, where they are not anticipating it. In this situation, the value of light amphibious tanks grows tremendously. If two, three, five, ten such tanks sail across the river during the night in the direction of the bridge, and with a sudden attack from the rear seize the bridge, this can decide the fate of an entire operation, or even an entire war. Now you can send to the enemy shores, across the newly seized bridge, your heavy and medium tanks, along with artillery, infantry, staff, hospitals, thousands of tons of ammunition, fuel, and spare parts. You can use the seized bridge to send in reserves, and to send the wounded, prisoners, and trophies to the rear, to send damaged machinery back for repair.

    If it is impossible to seize the bridge, the amphibious tanks become truly priceless. If there are no enemy bridges, we need to establish our own temporary bridges and means of sending goods across the river. For this we need to establish a bridgehead on the other side. The infantry is sent into battle. On logs, wooden planks, and inflatable rafts, they swim to the other shore. Meanwhile they are being fired upon by machine guns, mortars, and automatic rifles. Here, among the swimming men, imagine having ten or twenty light tanks. Their armor is not harmed by bullets and shell fragments, while their machine guns are capable of firing when none of the swimming men can.

    Now we have reached the other shore. The most important thing is to catch hold of something, to dig our forces into the ground into the next twenty minutes or so, so that no counterattacks can hinder us. . . . Our wet, wounded, and exhausted infantry does not carry heavy weapons or ammunition. So, in these very first, most frightening minutes on enemy shores, the presence, help, and support of even one of the lightest tanks with just one machine gun is far more valuable and important than ten more powerful heavy tanks that would be forced to remain on our side of the river. . . .

    By June 22, 1941, Hitler had on the eastern front 180 tanks in the under-six-ton category. Not one of them was amphibious and not one could compete with the Soviet light tanks. Stalin, on the other hand, had more than 4,000 tanks in this weight category. All of them were amphibious. . . . The T-40 [light] tanks were still in production, the paint not yet dried on many of them. . . . The vast majority of T-40s were less than a year old. . . . When did they have time to become obsolete? When did they have time to become worn out? On June 22, 1941, on the eastern front, Hitler had 3,350 tanks in total of all types, all of them obsolete and among all of them not a single amphibious one, while Stalin’s amphibious tanks alone numbered over 4,000.

    By overcoming stormy Lake Ilmen, even the oldest of Soviet amphibious tanks proved the possibility of crossing the English Channel. But these tanks were designed for lakes and rivers. For crossing the English Channel, Stalin had other designs in the works for the future–the amphibious PT-1 and its variants. It weighed 14 tons, had a 500-horsepower engine, a speed of 6 km/hr in the water and could reach 62 km/hr on land, and 90 km/hr when it shed its caterpillar tracks. This was a hybrid of a highway and an amphibious tank. . . . It was armed with a 45 mm cannon and four machine guns. . . .

    The fate of Soviet amphibious tanks is a sad one: they were of no use in a defensive war. Where would they sail? . . . Commanders easily parted with them: they ordered what was left of the fuel to be pumped into the medium and heavy tanks. The light ones were blown up, burned, broken, sunk, or just abandoned. . . . Why did Stalin need four thousand amphibious tanks, which he could not use in a defensive war? Where was comrade Stalin planning to sail?


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