Comparison/Contrast

Saints and Soldiers is really good equipment-wise, the movie itself is mediocre. It’s on Amazon prime instant video. It’s set in the opening days of the battle of the bulge. The only thing I noticed is that the Germans who shoot 70-plus American POW’s at Malmedy are regular Wehrmacht and not SS, but whatever.

I think I Go with the Sherman Firefly in this case, since I prefer a 5-men-crew in Tanks.
This is my plus I give to the Firefly ,for wich I choose the Firefly over the T34/85.

@ABWorsham:

Stug III if I get off the first shot.

If the engagement is any longer than the first shot, give me the T-34.

By the way love the question.

Me too. Sorry I did not say, Aequitas.

@CWO:

@Linkon:

We all look back and the 20 / 20 history that shows us “of course !”, and how obvious it was after the fact.
Hitler planned for, and then invaded France.
Most of the Western powers and the Russians would have thought such a plan was a way out long shot.
It stunned the world that a superpower such as France (at the time) would fall to a crazy person like Hitler.
This poll mainly highlights the crazy things Hitler did that failed, and not the key crazy thing done that actually succeeded beyond belief.

This is indeed an interesting question to consider: whether Hitler’s planning and invasion of France is something that would have looked crazy at the time (as opposed to how it looks now in retrospect).  My feeling is that the answer depends on what is meant by “at the time.”  If someone had suggested in 1937 or 1938 or even as late as September 1, 1939 that Germany would conquer France in a campaign lasting just six weeks, and with very acceptable casualty figures on the German side, he would quite plausibly been regarded as a lunatic…or at least as a wild optimist (if he was German) or pessimist (if he was French).  By April of 1940, however, the basic concept that a German attack against France might succeed could (and should) have been taken very seriously by well-informed observers.  Eight months of wartime experience had shown that:

Armoured forces, operating aggressively in mass formations at key points of the front, closely supported by aircraft, motorized/mechanized infantry and self-propelled artillery, could achieve strategically decisive results in a short amount of time.

France appeared wedded to a purely defensive strategy, hinging on the static position of the Maginot Line, hence completely surrendering the strategic initiative to Germany and giving Hitler the priceless luxury of attacking at whatever time, in whatever location and in whatever manner he chose.

The French Army suffered from poor morale and poor political and leadership.  General Gamelin, in the words of one French official, “had no guts at all” and seemed to consider the French government to be more of an enemy than the Germans.  The French Army had made a token advance of a few kilometers into the Saar region, then had quietly withdrawn.  French soldiers were poorly paid, which often led them to use their infrequent leave time to earn some money on the side, and they tended to get so drunk when they were about to rejoin their regiments that special rooms were reserved by the military authorities in train stations to allow the men to recover.  The French general mobilization had pulled many trained men away from vital war industries, and it was only after much confusion that they were released from military service.  There was much political bickering among politicians and social/political disunity among the population at large.

In other words: by April 1940, France was militarily much more vulnerable than it may have looked at the start of the war.  Many of these problems (such as the lack of any French offensive worthy of the name) were plain for the Germans to see, and others would have been discernable by the Germans without too much trouble.  The eventual German campaign against France succeeded to a degree that was probably beyond anything that Germany could have hoped for, but by April 1940 it was not unrealistic for Germany to think that it at least had a decent shot at waging a successful campaign against France.

Good post.

Gamelin’s strategy for France was to fight a defensive war for the first few years. At that point, the Anglo-French production advantage over Germany would have given the Allies a large military advantage over Germany. Especially when weapons purchases or donations from the United States were taken into account. After the Allies had achieved a massive numerical advantage in artillery, tanks, planes, and anything else which could be built in factories, he’d launch his invasion.

The Allies discounted the effectiveness of Germany’s blitzkrieg tactics against Poland. Germany’s excellent performance merely served to reinforce preexisting Allied beliefs about Polish inferiority. The Allies had had a low opinion of Poland from the beginning, as shown by the false promises they made regarding a French general offensive. When Person A dupes Person B, Person A will normally convince himself Person B was an idiot who deserved to be duped. All con artists think that way, and the French and British political leaders of 1939 were no exception.

During the '39 conflict between Germany and Poland, the German generals outperformed their Polish counterparts. But, again, this was seen as largely a result of horrible Polish incompetence, and not necessarily evidence of superior German generalship. The one-sided nature of the Germano-Polish conflict of '39 did far more to increase the preexisting Anglo-French contempt for Poland, than it did to increase their respect for the competence of the German military.

Von Manstein was the best general of the war on either side; and one of the best generals in human history. He recognized that Germany would lose a long war against Britain and France. However, he saw an opportunity to use good tactics to even the strategic odds. It was he who devised the plan to invade France. Hitler adopted the plan, against the advice of many of his most senior generals.

But von Manstein’s plan to invade France was only the first in a two part plan to save Germany from the Allies. The second part would have been the invasion of Britain, launched in the summer of 1940. Von Manstein’s plans generally succeeded, and he was confident this plan would have succeeded too. However, Hitler rejected von Manstein’s plan–a decision which may have cost him the war.

The eventual German campaign against France succeeded to a degree that
was probably beyond anything that Germany could have hoped for

The invasion went mostly according to von Manstein’s plan. There were times when his plan was set aside or overruled. The overruling of parts of his plan led to the Dunkirk evacuation; as well as to a longer, more painful conquest of Paris than would otherwise have been the case. But other than those two things, events transpired largely as von Manstein had anticipated. That said, most Germans, including Hitler, were surprised by the sudden, favorable turn events had taken.

They just found these… was on the news last night.  Cameron has arranged for thier shipment to the UK.

a few days after i saw this i saw an article in the news about how it was used to intimidate Russia from creating communist puppet governments in the region

The most underrated naval commander was Raymond Spruance, who assumed command at the Battle of Midway following the damage to the Yorktown, and commanded at the Battle of the Philippine Sea in June of 1944.  Overshadowed by Halsey, he never would have fallen for the Japanese carrier lure at the Battle of Leyte Gulf.

As for underrated battles, probably the most decisive underrated battle was fought prior to WW2 starting, between the Japanese and the Russians at Nomohan/Khalkin-Gol on the northeastern border of Manchuria.  The Japanese decided after their shattering defeat by the Russians that it would be safer to attack south for resources to sustain the China war than to attack the Soviet Union.

The other would be the campaign to isolate Rabaul from August of 1942 through February of 1944, which aside from costing the Japanese heavily in irreplaceable warships and transports, also essentially destroyed their carrier air power far more thoroughly than the losses at Midway.

Lastly for simple unbelievable guts and determination, the low-level attack by B-24 Liberators on the Ploesti oil refineries on August 1, 1943.

Wow, this one is even better than the civil war one.  Nice find Jermo!