Nazi Germany VS The Soviet Union

@martin-of-tours

Based on how the Japanese command and the decisions they would have likely made, there would have been almost no impact on the war. The Iowa class battleships, which were awesome, but arguably had little impact strategically would have had their resources shifted to speed up the building of the Essex class carriers, with little expense on the Soviet Union or the British. The US would not need to defend California or even shift resources for it-the US can easily just activate their militia (remember the Second Amendment). Japan would not have invaded (or even thought of) invading the continental US, and capturing Midway or Hawaii (a formidable task in itself) would still have made it hard, if not impossible, to win in an invasion. Japan would have needed more ships and men than planned for Operation Downfall, which would be impossible, considering only the US could muster that large of a force. Japan would also have to deal with China, the threat of the Soviet Union, and the British. It would have been a waste of a victory, as Japanese troops would probably have been slaughtered on the beaches of Midway.

Now if the Japanese political and military leadership was headed by people who know what they’re doing, then absolutely! This would have set the US back quite a lot. The Japanese then should have adopted a strong dug in defence, operating the capital ships only in range of powerful land based aircraft and submarines, coming up with an effective convoy system, and working with the army to coordinate operations. This could have taken up so many US resources to beat that the Soviets would have had a lesser victory at Stalingrad, and Rommel could have held out longer in Tunisia if there were less forces in Operation Torch.

The best thing for the Japanese to do, of course, is to attack the Soviet Union. The Far Eastern troops were grossly exaggerated by the Soviets (which the Japanese willingly believed after Kahlkin Gol), and replacements for the ones that have been siphoned off west were generally worse, with little training. The Japanese air force was less outnumbered by the Soviets than the Germans were, and had even more of a quality advantage. The Japanese could have easily destroyed most of the Soviet Pacific fleet in days, destroyed the Red air force in an even more total fashion than the Germans did, and captured Vladivostok. Japan’s decisions are kind of stupid when they basically thought that they had a greater chance of defeating the US, a nation that has had their resources not yet tapped in any way (except Lend Lease) than the Soviet Union, whose cream of forces were destroyed in 1941, their replacements almost always understrength (most Soviet cavalry divisions were less than a third of a real division, rifle and tank brigades were only a quarter of even a small World War 2 division, and rifle divisions were only half as effective as a German infantry division), suffered enormous equipment and officer shortages, and had horrible logistics. In addition, many Soviet units had little training, and were expected to get that on the job fighting, leading to huge casualties. And that’s the west! The Far East forces were infinitely more inferior. As for oil, Japan could have reduced American unhappiness by doing withdrawing partially from French Indochina and reducing operation in China, both of which are necessary anyway for mustering forces. Diplomatic decisions are much easier to reverse than military ones, and the US would have saw the invasion as a removal of a threat to American interests in the Pacific (both Japan and the Soviet Union would have their hands tied up). Coupled with a better German strategy, the war in the East could have been won in 1941.

I strongly recommend you read Nigel Askley’s books, who give the most detailed account of Operation Barbarossa, detailing German and Soviet mobilisations, production values, and reinforcements, all used for a war simulation. I haven’t bought them all and don’t read them entirely (only the parts I’m interested in), but they are very good books, and more are being written. The part about Soviet Far East forces (Volume 3B) is very well done, and they also cover the Soviet and German air forces and navies.

I absolutely agree with you here.  Yamato does have better range with her guns.  But I believe that PoW is better able to place her shots on target at these extreme ranges than Yamato.  Regardless, surprise is crucial for PoW.  Which is why I think the engagement would HAVE to happen at night when radar would help.

@CWO:

@jim010:

Let’s assume a chance encounter in the China sea between the two in 1942 when Churchill wanted British raiders operating the way the Germans had done in the Atlantic. � This is the only possible way I see an encounter between the two happening without other ships and carriers taking part (at least on the British side). � We’ll assume that Japanese carriers are engaged elsewhere and Yamato and other ships are hunting for the British raiders. � Low cloud ceiling, so planes can’t participate. � Prince of Wales was destined for this type of operation, so this match-up MIGHT have happened. � We’ll substitute DoY with PoW. � As the ships are identical, shouldn’t be an issue. � And PoW is most likely to have made this encounter, had she survived.

Interesting analysis, but there’s one other factor that needs to be considered: main gun range.  Yamato’s 18.1-inch guns probably out-ranged PoW’s 14-inchers; Garzke and Dulin’s books would give the exact figures, but I don’t have them on hand at this moment.  If so, Yamato would be able to open fire on PoW long before PoW could do likewise to Yamato.  Or to put it another way, any situation in which PoW is in range to hit Yamato (even at extreme range) would automatically be a situation in which PoW would be well within Yamato’s range.

On the issue of who-spots-whom-first, Japanese inferiority in radar might well be compensated by the IJN’s excellent optical rangefinders, particularly in view of the fact that Yamato’s greater size would place her optical fire-control stations (and perhaps her radars too) at a greater height than those of PoW – so Yamato might actually spot PoW first, since the horizon is further away as you observe it from higher up.  PoW did have a slight edge in speed, but in this situation the main advantage this would confer to PoW would be the ability to get away from a situation in which she was confronted with an opponent way above her weight class.  This was basically the same principle behind the Deutschland-class Panzerschiffe: with a few exceptions (these being the three British battlecruisers they might face), they were more powerful than anything faster and faster than anything more powerful…the latter point meaning that, if they encountered a fully-fledged battleship, they were supposed to run away from it.

@jim010:

Technically the Italian ship should win this one with better speed, but when you throw in Italian caution in how they used the ships and the aggressiveness of the British, I would say it would be inconclusive.  Italians would withdraw at the first sign of trouble.

Good point.  The Royal Navy benefited in WWII from a long tradition of having well-trained crews and of having  commanding officers who were encouraged to act boldly and confidently in combat.  One of the R.N.'s maxims was something along the lines of “No captain can do very wrong if he lays his ship alongside that of the enemy.”

@CWO:

@Hobbes:

@RedArmySoldier:

So it’s either ‘join together vs Russkieland’, or ‘fall together’.

Isn’t this what happened in real life?

Not really. In the last days of the war in Europe, the Nazis entertained all kinds of fantasies that the Anglo-Americans would come to their senses and would team up with them to fight the barbarous Soviet hordes, but it never happened.  The Soviet/Anglo-American alliance held together until the surrender of Germany, and indeed until the surrender of Japan: Stalin fulfilled his prior commitment to go to war against Japan three months after Germany surrendered (the time which had been allocated for him to shift some of his forces from Europe to the Far East).  Germany surrendered on May 7, and the USSR invaded Manchuria almost exactly on schedule on August 9.  In Europe, the Soviet, American and British armies all settled into the occupation zones which had been defined ahead of time for each power.  The predefined occupation zones were even respected where the fighting had taken the Americans into areas assigned to the Russians (such as Leipzig) and the Russians into areas assigned to the Anglo-Americans (such as parts of Austria, and of course the western half of Berlin).

Yeah, but afterwards the West set up the ‘denazification’ because they needed the former Nazis to run West Germany, while taking a blind eye to both the fascist regimes of Portugal and Spain since they were anti-communist as well, and had no problems in supporting dictatorships everywhere to prevent the communists from taking power.

IL2 Sturmovik and the T-34 all versions for WWII. The MIG15 for Korea. These three had a tremendous impact when they first appeared on the battlefield. Got to get the AK47 in there somewhere.

Nice. That’s really interesting

And it is a big difference if those German ships are new (build in 1939, or something), because a lot of British ships were older then that.

In some of my other posts on this forum, I’ve described how even in 1940 (when the U.S. was still technically at peace with Germany), it had devoted a significant amount of industrial potential toward winning the air war against Germany; with plans to considerably expand the effort over the next several years. America’s strongest single asset was her industrial potential, as Hitler clearly understood. But that potential was going to be increasingly turned against Germany, whether the U.S. was technically at war or not.

Hitler’s plan to counter this was to expand Germany’s industrial output over the short-term, so that he could at least keep pace with the air war over Germany in the long haul. His method of expanding Germany’s output included industrialization and conquest. The industrialization aspect of his plan meant that instead of putting everything he had into weapons output for 1941 or 1942–in a massive effort to crush the Soviet Union–he had to divide his nation’s economic activity between short-term military production and long-term output increases. The result of all that industrial investment was that Germany increased its aircraft output from 16,000 planes per year in 1941 to over 40,000 planes per year by 1944. It also increased its military production in other categories, such as tanks and V2 rockets.

In late 1941, Hitler knew that his window of opportunity to win the war was relatively slim; and that 1942 would be critical. Germany had to win a decisive victory over the Soviet Union in that year, both to take pressure off its eastern front, and to provide it with the raw materials and manpower it needed to hold its own in the air war over the long haul. Hitler believed that the overwhelming majority of America’s naval strength would be needed in the Pacific to counter the Japanese; at least until the end of 1943. That gave him what he believed was a two year window with which he could sink the American Lend-Lease Aid pouring into Great Britain and the Soviet Union. Sinking those ships would increase Germany’s chances of obtaining the victory over the Soviet Union it desperately needed.

However, the Japanese Navy proved less adept than Hitler had hoped. The Battle of Midway occurred six months after Pearl Harbor. That battle took the naval pressure off the U.S. in the Pacific, and allowed it to focus more of its efforts on convoy protection in the Atlantic. More generally, the failure of the Japanese military meant that Japan would be far less successful in taking military pressure off of Germany than Hitler had hoped.

In 1942, the Soviet Union outproduced Germany 3:1 - 4:1 in tanks, artillery, and other land combat categories, and even 2:1 in military aircraft. It also fielded a much larger army than Germany. Thus evaporated Hitler’s hope of a decisive victory on his eastern front.

Had Hitler not declared war against the U.S., large amounts of American Lend-Lease aid would still have flowed to his enemies in Europe. Over the long-term, he still would have needed to devote a significant portion of his military production to defending German skies and German cities against American-made bombers. He would have lost out on the Second Happy Time (see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Happy_Time ), which would have resulted in a stronger Soviet war effort for 1942. On the other hand, he wouldn’t have had to deal with the U.S. invasion of Algeria in 1942, its invasion of Sicily and Italy in 1943, or the Normandy invasion of '44. It’s easy to say in hindsight that the harm of the American invasions exceeded the benefit of sinking that Lend-Lease shipping in '42. But that distinction was less obvious at the time.