OK, here is the problem with adding interceptors, fighter cover, etc…
It was not until late in the war (specifically, the introducton of the P-51 Mustang) that Allied bombers had viable fighter escort for bombers. HOWEVER, the CBO was STILL effective using a combination of daylight precision and nightime runs on German targets WITHOUT figher cover.
But if you add CAP to the defender, and do not give the Allies automatic LRA by turn 4, then you have set up a circumstance where Axis air defense is, and will remain, superior to Allied bombing for the duration of the war (which is no where near accurate).
The AA roll of 1 in 6 includes CAP, the limitted FIG escort that was possible prior to the introduction of the P-51 et.al., etc. Otherwise, if it were Antiaircraft Artillery Only, the die would be 2 consecutive rolls of 1 on a d6 for a shoot down.
Also, the d6 variable for damage itself incorporates the effectiveness of defending CAP etc. This accounts for lost bombers on the run reducing total damage (as well as other factors like weather, previous bombing of the site, misses, etc.)
So… IF you want to include actual combat air patrol and fighter escorting, then any surviving bomber should do automatic damage of 6 IPC’s, since the bomber surviving to target means every single one of 1000 bombers on the raids made it to bomb their targets.
Sorry ncsc, but your idea that the allied heavy bombers was “effective using a combination of daylight precision and nightime runs on German targets” is incorrect according to the evidence as far as I can see.
Try reading the United States Strategic Bombing Survey. As JK Galbraith (the main author of rthe final version) admitted in his autobiography, it was politically influenced in favour of the bombing campaign. In fact, the whole basis of the strategic campaign was flawed.
The costly “battle of the Ruhr” in '43 reduced german steel consumption by 10%, but at the cost of 872 aircraft……each one containing some of the best-educated, longest-trained men the British had, in an extremely expensive bit of equipment.
Put it this way…they dropped (with VERY low accuracy) 58,000 tonnes of bombs, and lost about 20,000 tons of PLANES (872 planes at about 25 tons unladen each…OK maybe that should be reduced as some Wimpies may still have been shot down alongside Lancs, Stirlings and Halifaxes)!!!
So to put it in perspective, about 1/4 of the total weight of stuff hitting the ground was crashing British bombers. Does that sound like a successful effort?
All to reduce production by 4 to 6 weeks that year - when Germany had no massive problem with industrial capacity as they almost always had plenty in reserve.
The US daylight campaign was also unable to destroy German defence or industry until escorts arrived.
The famous Schweinfurt ball-bearing factory raids reduced production by 38 and 67%, but the Germans just used existing stock or redesigned gear. The official US report says that “there is no evidence that the attacks on the ball-bearing industry had any measurable effect on essential war production.”
And yet these raids - which cost the Germans no measurable effect - cost the Americans about 60% of the B17s used. The US official report says “repeated losses of this magnitude could not be sustained; deep penetrations without escort, of which this was among the earliest, were suspended.”
That’s “no measurable effect” For the loss of about 300 B17s.
Similarly, the US campaign against the German aircraft industry in 1944 was “a decisive victory for the German fighters” according to the US’s own official historian (Frankland).
So the US official reports themselves say the campaigns failed.
As Speer said, the allied effort was “vast but pointless” and had “no important effect on the German war effort by early 1944”.
By the end of '43, German war production had increased to three times what it was in January 1942. Yet more evidence that the allied SBRs failed.
If we’re going to try to enhance realism, we should make sure we’re heading int he right direction - that means doing research.