@Caesar:
@Karl7:
Massacred on the beaches is the right answer.
From Shattered Sword:
The most likely outcome of such a haphazard and ill-supported operation
being thrown against the heavily armed and entrenched defenders at Midway was
outright disaster. While alternative history can never be absolutely predictive, we
need only fast-forward two months to the subsequent destruction of Colonel Ichiki�s
detachment early in the Guadalcanal campaign to glimpse the likely outlines of such a
landing at Midway. There, Ichiki had chosen to charge a much less well dug-in Marine
position on the banks of Alligator Creek. The result was that he and more than 700
of his men were slaughtered by a combination of automatic weapons fi re and canister
shot from the American�s 37-mm guns. At Midway, the presence of some 2,500
attackers didn�t alter this basic equation a whit.7 In fact, the Americans had vastly
superior firepower to draw on, and much better fi re lanes to boot. Their weapons
could engage the enemy at range, while they were still well out on the reef. Even if
any of the Japanese made it to the beach (in itself a dubious proposition), it is almost
inconceivable that two shattered, geographically separated light infantry regiments
equipped with nothing more than rifles, light mortars, and a smattering of medium
machine guns would have been able to prevail against an entrenched American force
backed by mobile armor. Rather, all signs indicate that the lagoon would have been
full of Japanese corpses by about the middle of the afternoon, leaving the imperial
warships witness to an unprecedented slaughter.
Once the initial wave of troops was expended, there was no reserve capable
of mounting a second offensive.
While I agree the US has better equipment and takes modern warfare more seriously than the Japanese. The US did not have history on their side if an invasion of Midway happened. At this point, the US has lost every single colony to the Japanese at this point in time and if we’re assume an invasion is happening, that means the Japs in this situation has destroyed our carriers and destroyed Midway’s airfield leaving the ��� navy to move more freely so all I can envision is the ��� navy just pounding the island before an invasion is even kicked off.
Yes, that would be assumption if japan won the naval battle, but then the authors of Shattered Sword make a compelling case:
Even postulating a naval victory, in truth the Imperial Navy was miserably
prepared to support a landing against Midway. The Japanese Navy had little in
the way of either an established ground attack doctrine for its aircraft, or a tested
naval gunfi re support doctrine. Given the hostility between the two branches of the
imperial services, this is not surprising. The Navy saw its mission as the destruction
of enemy warships, not supporting the landing of Army troops. The practical effect
of this, though, was to render distinctly less effective any air support the carriers of
Kidō Butai might be able to provide. The positions of the U.S. Marines ashore were
well sited and emplaced. In some cases, they were equipped with reinforced concrete
shelters, which were nearly bombproof. Even the less well-protected troops were well
dug in and protected by sandbags and natural fortifi cations. The attack by Tomonaga’s
strike force on the morning of 4 June, while destroying some of the more-visible
facilities on the islands, such as oil tanks and barracks, had degraded the real defensive
capacity of the Marine defenders hardly at all. Not a single heavy gun of any sort had
been put out of commission, and total personnel losses were six KIA.3 There is no
reason to suppose that one or two additional strikes by Japanese carrier aircraft on 5
June and the morning of 6 June would have appreciably altered this basic equation
before the landings occurred. In other words, the majority of the Marines’ weaponry
would likely have remained intact.
By the same token, the guns of CruDiv 7—the cruisers Kumano, Suzuya, Mikuma,
and Mogami—w were ill equipped to perform much better. Given the rigid operational
timetable laid down by Yamamoto, and the stated intention to land the troops at fi rst
light,4 their bombardment of the islands could not help but be desultory. Tarawa,
Kwajalein, and a dozen other sites in the Central Pacifi c subsequently demonstrated
to the Americans that dug-in island defenses were generally proof against heavycaliber
weapons, even when over extended periods of time. A quick bombardment
from shipborne eight-inch guns with no practice in target identifi cation or selection
simply wasn’t going to get the job done. The Marines might have been shaken by it,
but odds were that they would have survived largely undamaged.
Admittedly, the Japanese also had the ability to direct gunfi re against targets of
opportunity on Midway once the landings were under way and the American weapons
exposed themselves. But it was unlikely that any Japanese warships would want to
close the range too closely until the four seven-inch guns emplaced on the southern
shores of Sand and Eastern Islands were taken out. Even then, it is extremely doubtful
that Japanese fi re would have been terribly accurate, since such missions were not a
part of their normal doctrine. Likewise, it is almost impossible to anticipate any of
the landing troops having the ability to communicate with the warships directly—the
necessary doctrine and portable radio equipment simply weren’t there.
Beyond these hurdles, Midway’s geography also presented a very diffi