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Yes. Another "What if"


  • 2017 2016 2015

    yea there were a lot of issues with the Singapore program. I just mentioned the tanks because that was something Churchill did. Obviously if he was dead he wouldn’t have been able to : )

    Herman Wouk explains it pretty well in War and Remembrance

    Singapore.txt


  • 2017 2016 2015 Organizer 2014 Customizer '13 '12 '11 '10

    Those tanks really didnt make it to Singapore, It was Japanese on bikes riding down, The tanks were used to capture Malaya sans Singapore right?



  • Mussolini was going to be the initial mediator between Germany and Britain, and after WW1 Japan got the short end of the deal. Hitler or Mussolini may have suggested (with Tokyo’s help) that some of the Empires territory be turned over to Japan. We will never know but I love the “What if’s”
    Mussolini of all people


  • 2017 2016 2015 Organizer 2014 Customizer '13 '12 '11 '10

    Japanese tanks driving down anywhere is greatly overrated. They could never form any supply line that could bring fuel and enough parts for a 4,000 drive to Moscow in the forest, even if they followed the trans-siberian railway. I value the maximum Japanese Logistical success at 50 miles. Any more than that and failure for them at least. If they used tricycles and each soldier carried maximum load, perhaps 100 miles.



  • @Imperious:

    Japanese tanks driving down anywhere is greatly overrated. They could never form any supply line that could bring fuel and enough parts for a 4,000 drive to Moscow in the forest, even if they followed the trans-siberian railway. I value the maximum Japanese Logistical success at 50 miles. Any more than that and failure for them at least. If they used tricycles and each soldier carried maximum load, perhaps 100 miles.

    You know, about 10 % of the Russian oil were in Sibir, and the Japanese could have refined it on location, you know, but they would need a little longer time, maybe a few years, but it was doable, the impossible just take a little longer time.


  • 2019 2018 2017 2016 2015 2014 Customizer '13 '12 '11 '10

    @Imperious:

    Japanese tanks driving down anywhere is greatly overrated.

    And to take the argument one step further, note that the concept of any nation’s tanks “driving anywhere” poses problems.  Tank mobility actually involves three kinds of movement: strategic, operational and tactical, and only the third one – also called battlefield mobility – invariably consists entirely of a tank moving on its own.  Tanks as motor vehicles are tricky creatures: they’re optimized for movement over rough ground (which is achieved by their caterpillar tracks), but at the penalty of being more complicated than wheeled vehicles.  This means that they’re less fuel-efficient, more complex to drive, more prone to breakdowns, more complicated to repair when they do break down, and more demanding in their requirements for spare parts.  (That last element is often overlooked when tank performance in WWII is discussed.  It was one area where the American Sherman and the Soviet T-34 had a huge advantage over the German Panther and Tiger tanks: not only did the US and the USSR have a larger number of operational tanks, they also had generous quantities of spare parts available for repair jobs.  The Germans, by contrast, were so short-numbered in Panthers and Tigers that they tended to use their parts to build complete tanks rather than keeping them in reserve as spares.  As a result, broken Germans tanks sometimes had to be abandoned for lack of spare parts.)

    Driving a heavy vehicle like a tank on caterpillar tracks (especially over rough terrain) puts a lot of strain on the suspension, the transmission and the treads themselves.  Tank commanders try to avoid “marching” their tanks overland for long distances because the attrition rate due to breakdowns becomes more severe as the distance lengthens.  Whenever possible, long-distance movement of tanks is done by railroad, by truck (if the tank is light enough), by air (again, if the tank is light enough) or by ship (if applicable).  When roads – especially paved roads – are available, these help make autonomous tank movement more practical.  This was particularly true for the Sherman, which – owing to its Detroit origins – was automotively a very good vehicle; I think it could even be fitted with rubberized treads for optimal paved road movement.  This proved particularly suitable for the area when the Americans were operating, Western Europe, where good roads (including paved ones) were more common than in Eastern Europe, where the T-34 operated.  My assumption is that the Siberian half of the USSR was even worse off than the European part of the Soviet Union as far as the existence (let alone the quality) of roads is concerned.


  • 2018 2017 2016 2015 2014 Customizer

    Yes agree on all but then you would need to change all global games to make this work by making tanks M1 in Europe only and all tanks cant use Siberian territories unless by Russia railroad. At least you can put in weather M1 and restrict movement M1 only in terrain, add rivers and railroad lines through out Europe.

    Get out some Colored Sharpies and start drawing. 😄


  • 2019 2018 2017 2016 2015 2014 Customizer '13 '12 '11 '10

    @SS:

    Yes agree on all but then you would need to change all global games to make this work by making tanks M1 in Europe only and all tanks cant use Siberian territories unless by Russia railroad. At least you can put in weather M1 and restrict movement M1 only in terrain, add rivers and railroad lines through out Europe.

    Just to clarify my previous post, I wasn’t talking about making any changes to A&A rules to reflect reality; I was just giving background information in response to a point made by I.L. about the hypothetical WWII scenarios that are being discussed in this thread.


  • 2018 2017 2016 2015 2014 Customizer

    @CWO:

    @SS:

    Yes agree on all but then you would need to change all global games to make this work by making tanks M1 in Europe only and all tanks cant use Siberian territories unless by Russia railroad. At least you can put in weather M1 and restrict movement M1 only in terrain, add rivers and railroad lines through out Europe.

    Just to clarify my previous post, I wasn’t talking about making any changes to A&A rules to reflect reality; I was just giving background information in response to a point made by I.L. about the hypothetical WWII scenarios that are being discussed in this thread.

    Yes CWO I know what you meant.  I just went off topic a bit for adjusting an AA map and such.


  • 2019 2018

    @CWO:

    And to take the argument one step further, note that the concept of any nation’s tanks “driving anywhere” poses problems.  Tank mobility actually involves three kinds of movement: strategic, operational and tactical, and only the third one – also called battlefield mobility – invariably consists entirely of a tank moving on its own.  Tanks as motor vehicles are tricky creatures: they’re optimized for movement over rough ground (which is achieved by their caterpillar tracks), but at the penalty of being more complicated than wheeled vehicles.  This means that they’re less fuel-efficient, more complex to drive, more prone to breakdowns, more complicated to repair when they do break down, and more demanding in their requirements for spare parts.  (That last element is often overlooked when tank performance in WWII is discussed.  It was one area where the American Sherman and the Soviet T-34 had a huge advantage over the German Panther and Tiger tanks: not only did the US and the USSR have a larger number of operational tanks, they also had generous quantities of spare parts available for repair jobs.  The Germans, by contrast, were so short-numbered in Panthers and Tigers that they tended to use their parts to build complete tanks rather than keeping them in reserve as spares.  As a result, broken Germans tanks sometimes had to be abandoned for lack of spare parts.)

    Driving a heavy vehicle like a tank on caterpillar tracks (especially over rough terrain) puts a lot of strain on the suspension, the transmission and the treads themselves.  Tank commanders try to avoid “marching” their tanks overland for long distances because the attrition rate due to breakdowns becomes more severe as the distance lengthens.  Whenever possible, long-distance movement of tanks is done by railroad, by truck (if the tank is light enough), by air (again, if the tank is light enough) or by ship (if applicable).  When roads – especially paved roads – are available, these help make autonomous tank movement more practical.  This was particularly true for the Sherman, which – owing to its Detroit origins – was automotively a very good vehicle; I think it could even be fitted with rubberized treads for optimal paved road movement.  This proved particularly suitable for the area when the Americans were operating, Western Europe, where good roads (including paved ones) were more common than in Eastern Europe, where the T-34 operated.  My assumption is that the Siberian half of the USSR was even worse off than the European part of the Soviet Union as far as the existence (let alone the quality) of roads is concerned.

    Huh. Never knew the logistics in moving Tanks around was this big of a challenge. Thanks for the lesson.


  • 2019 2018 2017 2016 2015 2014 Customizer '13 '12 '11 '10

    @DoManMacgee:

    Huh. Never knew the logistics in moving Tanks around was this big of a challenge.

    It can get even worse when you start pushing the limits of tank weight and/or size.  In terms of weight, sixty-five tons or so is roughly as high as you can get before you start running into problems with the load-bearing capacity of bridges.  In terms of size, rail transportation becomes a serious problem when a certain tank width is exceeded because it violates the loading limits for standard rail traffic; over that limit, rail transportation on parallel tracks has to be scheduled to avoid trains going in the opposite direction, and has to use circuitous routes which avoid any railway tunnels and bridges which are too narrow.  Germany’s notorious experimental Panzer VII Maus superheavy tank had both those problems.  As I recall, rail transportation of the Maus not only needed careful planning but also required removing the tank’s treads and wheels.  And its staggering weight of 188 tonnes – three and a half times the weight of a Tiger I – made it unable to use bridges; it was fitted with a detachable snorkel to enable it it to cross rivers on its own, semi-submerged.  As for battlefield movement, the thing could barely crawl; it was more of a mobile bunker than a practical tank.


  • 2017 2016 2015 Organizer 2014 Customizer '13 '12 '11 '10

    It would be easier for them to re-gauge the railway…Adlertag… or Foxy



  • Yes, they got lots of options. But my case was, that it was doable and smart to attack Russia from both sides. Of course, the German and Japanese Tanks could not meet in Moscow, like they used to do in A&A Classic, but they could have reached Irkutsk, grabbing a lot of oil and resources, while Germany pushed Stalin east of the Urals mountains. Then a minor Russia would be from the Archangel-Astrakhan line to Irkutsk in the east. The German High Command did in fact suggest this, but some admirals from the Japanese Navy declined the proposal, sabotaging the Khalgin Gol battle in 1939 to make the Russians look invincible, forcing Hirohito to follow the Pacific way. I’ll make a specific thread on this issue some day, stop derailing this thread. Not that anybody cares


  • 2018 2017 2016

    I would love to read a post with credible and specific arguments showing how/why Japanese admirals sabotaged their own army at Khalkin Gol – and I would love for it to be on another thread that’s not this one. So I care, at least.


  • 2019 2018

    @Argothair:

    I would love to read a post with credible and specific arguments showing how/why Japanese admirals sabotaged their own army at Khalkin Gol – and I would love for it to be on another thread that’s not this one. So I care, at least.

    Not Narvik but the tl;dr is “something something Japanese Army and IJN absolutely hated each other”

    Slightly longer answer is that the WW2-era Japanese government was a hot mess where the separate armed forces branches had a strong political pull, but were also largely autonomous of each other. That’s more-or-less why the war for Japan was so heavily divided between the China/SEA theater Vs. the Pacific. Others can probably explain it in more detail than I can, though.



  • In simple terms, the Japanese did not have a concept of Combined Arms because they had no reason for it up to this point. You have to remember that before WWII, the only invasions they ever launched basically in their entire history has a culture was against Korea and Manchuria both which lacked a military when Japan invaded it and the only combat experience at this point in time was a naval war against Russia and a brief land war against Germany so they never needed a situation that required the military might of both branches. The irony here is that the majority of the Japanese Admiralty was trained by the British and UK took Combined Arms very seriously so I have no idea why the Japanese took the hint of it. I think at the end of the day, this can be blamed on the Emperor because Japanese High Command was fight between each other for his will.


  • 2018 2017

    Nippon-wa;

    no interservice cooperation
    no shore bombardment support doctrine
    no replacement potential for skilled pilots or crews
    no landing craft of note
    no formal logistics regime or preparations
    no heavy bombers, airplane armor or ss/drop fuel tanks
    no complex engineering (hydraulics, alloys, useful radios, automation, remote control, computers)
    no radar of note
    no secret code integrity
    no plan to defeat the worlds largest economies and militaries all at the same time
    no nearby allies
    no substantial refineries, oil resources, or reserves
    weak knowledge of their adversaries capabilities, technologies and dispositions
    pre-modern battlefield tactics
    outmoded and suicidal warfighting doctrine

    CSA;

    no iron or steel production of note
    no railroads or rolling stock of note
    no allies
    no trading partners to save them
    no independently backed currency or central bank credibility
    no significant natural resources except agricultural ones
    no logical or universal political doctrine
    no unified command of state-based units
    no central political control over taxation or policy
    minimal ability to produce gunpowder, rifles, and cannon
    capital located 100 miles from the capital of the more powerful side
    no plan except to survive until the Union gave up

    WHAT WERE THEY THINKING!?!?!?


  • 2018 2017 2016 2015 2014 Customizer

    @taamvan:

    Nippon-wa;

    no interservice cooperation
    no shore bombardment support doctrine
    no replacement potential for skilled pilots or crews
    no landing craft of note
    no formal logistics regime or preparations
    no heavy bombers, airplane armor or ss/drop fuel tanks
    no complex engineering (hydraulics, alloys, useful radios, automation, remote control, computers)
    no radar of note
    no secret code integrity
    no plan to defeat the worlds largest economies and militaries all at the same time
    no nearby allies
    no substantial refineries, oil resources, or reserves
    weak knowledge of their adversaries capabilities, technologies and dispositions
    pre-modern battlefield tactics
    outmoded and suicidal warfighting doctrine

    CSA;

    no iron or steel production of note
    no railroads or rolling stock of note
    no allies
    no trading partners to save them
    no independently backed currency or central bank credibility
    no significant natural resources except agricultural ones
    no logical or universal political doctrine
    no unified command of state-based units
    no central political control over taxation or policy
    minimal ability to produce gunpowder, rifles, and cannon
    capital located 100 miles from the capital of the more powerful side
    no plan except to survive until the Union gave up

    WHAT WERE THEY THINKING!?!?!?

    Sweet ! But you got to much time on your hands  😄


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