WWII–-75th ANNIVERSARY DISCUSSION--#34---MAY 1942 (3)

It is pretty obvious that if UK bombed Russia, then Russia had no other choice than to declare war against UK, and the only way Russia could stop the air raids was to occupy Iran, where the UK airfields were. So yes, the War would have taken a different path

The “just sit and wait for the Phony War to end in April 1940” option is a bit perplexing as an answer to “You are the German High Command!  What is your next Combat Movement?” because it seems to imply that the Phony War was operating on a fixed timetable, and that this timetable was in someone else’s hands.  The lack of action on land on the Western Front is certainly due in part to inaction by France and Britain (whose strategy was basically to sit around for a couple of years to built up their strength for a showdown, while simultaneously hoping that the Nazi regime would be overthrown by a coup), but it was also very much a deliberate choice by Germany.  The Wehrmacht needed to analyze the Polish Campaign, fix the tactical and operational elements that hadn’t worked as well as expected, plan the upcoming campaign against France and the Low Countries, rest and replenish its forces, give them more training, provide them with additional equipment, and redeploy them to the west.  Doing this properly took time, but Germany could afford to take the time to do the job right because of the lack of Anglo-French pressure on the western front. ( In other words, by sitting on their collective hindquarters France and Britain surrendered the strategic initiative to Germany, which gave the Wehrmacht the luxury of attacking at the time and place of its own choosing.)  Moreover, the time period during which these activities took place were the fall of 1939 and the winter of 1939-1940, which was conveniently timed because this meant that the Wehrmacht wouldn’t have to fight in the fall (manageable, but rainy and muddy) or in the winter (far less harsh in the West than in Russia, but still potentially nasty as veterans of the Battle of the Bulge will recall).  The late spring / early summer period chosen for the offensive in the West was much more congenial for military operations.

@Gargantua: I would take chesty 1 on 1. So long as I get a bayonet on my flamethrower! Garg, ––While I’m usually on your side,…I don’t think you’d stand a chance against “Chesty” Puller even if you had a 16" naval gun strapped to you back!   “Tall Paul”

Escaping Montevideo Harbour – possibly.  Getting all the way back to Germany – extremely doubtful. In terms of getting out of the harbour, Langsdorff would have had two options: heading across the river Plate to Argentina, or making a break for the open sea.  If he’d headed for Argentina, there was no guarantee that he’d be any better off than in Uruguay.  Argentina had some Axis sympathies, I think, but it was still nominally neutral, and the British and French would have put the same diplomatic pressures on it as they had put on Uruguay to respect the Geneva Convention and either intern the ship or force it to leave.  Making a break for the open sea was problematic too.  The British had made sure that the Graf Spee’s departure from Montevideo was in a carefully defined time window by making use of an article in the Geneva Convention that prohibited a warship from sailing from a neutral harbor less than (I think) 24 hours after an enemy merchantman had left the same harbour.  There were British merchant ships in Montevideo at the time of the Spee incident, and the British arranged for one of them to leave the harbour at the right moment to put Langsdorff in a bind between the Geneva Convention and the expiration of the Uruguayan government’s deadline for the Spee to leave.  Harwood’s cruisers were lying in wait nearby, and it’s doubtful that the Spee could have given them the slip.  Moreover, the shallow waters of the Rio de la Plata area were unsuited for combat from Langsdorff’s perspective because his water intakes might have gotten clogged with mud.  Additionally, having the ship sink in combat in shallow water carried the risk that secret equipment and papers would have fallen into Allied hands (this being less of a concern if, as eventually happened, the ship was scuttled under controlled conditions). Assuming for the sake of argument, however, that Langsdorff had managed to elude Harwood, getting back to Germany would have been very challenging.  Although the Spee was technically still able to sail and fight, the damage she had suffered in the original battle with Harwood had left her in very poor condition to make a long sea voyage.  Harwood, even if he’d initially been eluded, would still have been close by and would have sent his ships (and his scout plane) to look for the Spee; additionally, some British and French naval groups were already converging on the general area following Harwood’s initial battle a few days earlier, so Langsdorff would have had an awful lot of sea power focused on finding him.

Germany had essentially two options here. 1) Capture the city quickly, before the defenses could be built up. 2) Capture it via siege. I don’t think that creating an urban combat situation, in which Germany attempted to capture the city street by street, would have been viable. In typical combat situations German soldiers had a 3:1 or 4:1 advantage in combat effectiveness over their Soviet counterparts. But in urban, street-to-street fighting the ratio was about 1:1. Germany could not afford anything even remotely approaching that 1:1 ratio, which is why something other than street-to-street fighting was necessary. Von Manstein wrote that during the Barbarossa operation of '41 there had been a perfectly good opportunity to take Leningrad. But that this was wasted, allowing the Soviets to fortify it. The other option would have been to do a better job of putting it under siege. This would have entailed tightening the cordon around the city, preventing just about anything from making it through. I think there was a case when Germany attempted exactly that. However, at the same time the Soviets were attempting to break the siege, so each side’s offensive encountered the other’s. From a tactical view there may have been more Germany could have done. But I think the real problem was strategic: the Soviet Union had too much military strength. A discussion on how to address that problem is probably outside the scope of this thread.

@221B: While they probably would never fight it out directly against each other, I think that the submarines of that era could be compared to each other in terms of how well they did (and how well they potentially could have) against merchant marine ships. I’d have to place them in this order with regards to their potential: Japan Germany US UK Italy Of course, the Japanese squandered the potential of their subs by using them to attack warships, rather than merchant ships.  So in order of actual performance, I’d say this order: US (Japan was devastated by lack of supplies) Germany UK Italy Japan. Part of the reason for my placing Germany below the US is because the allies, particularly the British developed effective defenses which the Japanese did not (and the Germans did not need to as they were a continental power).  Not sure where to place Russia, but since (like Germany) she is a continental power, there was very little, if any, efforts regarding submarines that I am aware of. I’d also like to point out that Germany had some very interesting submarine ideas on their drawing boards, but either chose not to (or were unable to) develop these in any meaningful fashion. Thoughts? Good post, and I agree with what you’ve written. I’d like to expand on what you’d written about Germany’s very interesting sub ideas. Late in the war, Germany had begun building highly advanced Type XXI U-boats. These were built in sections, to allow for a faster rate of production. These submarines had more in common with postwar nuclear subs than with their WWII contemporaries. Most WWII-era submarines were intended to spend most of their time above water, surfacing only when threats were detected or battle expected. Type XXI U-boats were intended to spend nearly all their time underwater. The batteries of Type XXIs lasted several times longer than normal subs’ batteries before being recharged. These subs had a snorkel–a snorkel which allowed them to run their diesel engines and recharge their batteries while still submerged! Type XXI subs had a rubber coating, making them far more difficult to detect with radar or sonar. Even if a sub was detected, it could use its battery-powered electric motor to quietly move to some other place. These subs could also move quickly! Unlike other WWII-era subs, Type XXI subs moved more quickly under the surface than they did on the surface. This was because of their hydrodynamically advanced, streamlined design. These subs also had very sophisticated electronics suites, perfectly suited to an underwater game of cat and mouse. These U-boats could fire large numbers of torpedoes in a small space of time; allowing them to strike a devastating blow and then disappear. Most torpedoes of the era were diesel powered. Compressed air was mixed with diesel fuel and burned, thereby turning the torpedo’s propeller. The compressed air used in this left a trail of bubbles–a trail which both alerted people to the torpedo’s arrival, and provided a path back to the launching submarine. In some places, that bubble trail would glow at night due to phosphorescent microorganisms. Japan’s torpedoes used compressed oxygen with which to burn diesel. That meant a much smaller bubble trail, and significantly longer-ranged torpedoes. (The Allies’ bubble trails consisted mostly of nitrogen gas, which of course is useless for burning anything.) Germany used electric torpedoes. These had the advantage of being much quieter and more difficult to detect than diesel-powered torpedoes. And of course they left no bubble trail. The problem with Germany’s early electric torpedoes was that the batteries weren’t that good, causing the range to be too short. But batteries improved throughout the war, thereby extending the torpedoes’ range. While Germany’s electric torpedoes never came close to the range of Japan’s Long Lance torpedoes, they nevertheless had a very respectable range by the war’s end. When that range was combined with the overall stealth and sophistication of Germany’s Type XXI U-boats, the effect was absolutely devastating. Or would have been, had those Type XXIs seen service. In 1944, Albert Speer ordered the construction of large numbers of Type XXI U-boats. Some of those Type XXIs were in the testing/working up phase when the war ended. None saw action against the enemy. A smaller version–Type XXIII U-boats–appear to have been very effective in limited action against the enemy. However, Type XXIII U-boats could only carry two torpedoes each, and were limited to coastal duties.

@barnee said in WWII Mohawk Code-Talkers: @CWO-Marc On a side note, the Tlingit’s were/are badasses. They kicked ass on the russians and were hired to pack 200lb packs up the chilkoot trail. They all seem to be naturally strong. Probably weeded out the weak genes long ago : ) I saw something similar in a 1950s US Army film about the Korean War, part of which showed UN troops employing locals as porters to haul impressively large loads of supplies and equipment up steep trails to hilltop positions. Another example of a simple-yet-sophisticated solution which the Americans used to address a WWII problem was the Marston Mat, which was conceptually similar to those Meccano construction sets for kids. It required heavy industry to manufacture it in the required huge quantities, but the device itself was mechanically straightforward: standardized sheets of steel mesh which could be laid down in an interlocking pattern, at whatever length and width was desired, to construct runways for aircraft in places where they were needed in a hurry, or in remote locations like Alaska and the Pacific Islands. The Marston Mat, combined with the use of heavy equipment like backhoes and bulldozers – which were commonplace in the US civilian construction industry – and chainsaws, allowed the Navy’s SeaBees (in the Pacific) and the Army’s Corps of Engineers (in Alaska) to turn an area of wilderness into an operational runway in just a few days.

Also on the subject of Italian POWs: some Italians captured by the British in North Africa ended up being interned in the Orkney Islands, where they were put to work constructing concrete barriers to seal off the eastern entry route into Scapa Flow (the route taken by U47 when it torpedoed the battleship Royal Oak in October 1939).  Sometimes, arguments would break out between the Italians and the British personnel supervising the work, and an Army interpreter would be called in to sort out the dispute.  After one such altercation, a Navy officer took the interpreter aside and asked him why he had been translating for the Italian man who’d been complaining, saying that, “This fellow can speak English!”  The interpreter retorted that the man couldn’t “even speak Italian!” – an answer which no doubt baffled the Navy officer until the prisoner later confided that he’d been speaking in dialect.  (“Churchill’s Prisoners: The Italians In Orkney, 1942-1944.” St Margaret’s Hope : Orkney Wireless Museum, 1992.) CWO Marc