Anyone who places all of their strategic decisions on “simple math” will fail at Axis & Allies. Period.
Like it or not, A&A is a game about economics (math) and statistics (math). The less mathematically efficient a strategy is (in total, for example you can sacrifice direct economic stat efficiency to save positional efficiency by building mechs and tanks in Global), the more likely it is to fail. If I’m missing something here, please tell me.
Well, CC, I think we’re falling victim to the shortcomings of a lively discussion online. I’ll only reply to things that I feel will create a worthwhile discussion and not get into the tit-for tat things. I assume you love the game too, because we’re on the forums of A&A, and I haven’t really met too many on here that are terrible people.
Some of my comments that you may have viewed as the ego-stroking variety were in response to the insinuation that my play group was stupid. The point was, there were not any mistakes along the lines of “I forgot to move my transport!” or leaving a capital wide open. The play was solid, though some strategies may not have been.
MATHEMATICS
It is clear that A&A has a lot of economic factors to it. My point was that you can’t make ALL of your decisions based upon just the simple math.
Anyone who places all of their strategic decisions on “simple math” will fail at Axis & Allies. Period.
Like it or not, A&A is a game about economics (math) and statistics (math). The less mathematically efficient a strategy is (in total, for example you can sacrifice direct economic stat efficiency to save positional efficiency by building mechs and tanks in Global), the more likely it is to fail. If I’m missing something here, please tell me.
What you’re missing is what I can intangibles, or added value you can’t assign an IC to.
While every piece has a value, it is the strategic value of intangibles that also need to be considered to determine a “best course forward” in a game.
Example 1 1914: Transports cost money, but it’s not just the ability to move troops, it allows you access to areas you couldn’t get to otherwise, and the ability to threaten MULTIPLE territories at once. One loaded transport by the UK can hit 3 German territories, 3 Russian TTs if German owned, and the neutrals of Norway, Sweden, and Denmark if applicable. Without a naval counter, Germany has to defend ALL of that, or else buy navy. So if Germany has no navy, or they lost it, the value of a single UK transport goes up exponentially, no?
AND, at times you can influence your opponent’s actions and spending with yours. What if your transport buy is a ruse. If he does nothing, you benefit, if he buys navy, France/US are prepared to make that a foolish buy with their own naval purchases, etc.
Example 2 G40: I 100% disagree that if you sacrifice economic efficiency for positional efficiency the more likely you are to fail. It times it is absolutely necessary to win the game. One common G40 strat as Germany is all tanks/mechs to head to Moscow. There are so many moving parts in an Axis & Allies game that you simply cannot look at just the IC value.
To further explain, if Germany uses mechs/tanks for their added movement, they get to the fight faster. You can hasten the assault on Moscow. If you look at JUST the cost of the units, you may determine that you will have less units in your assault than if you had purchased INF/ART instead. That is true.
HOWEVER, you are paying for speed. While you may buy more units, that is more than offset by the additional rounds needed to get to Moscow from Berlin. If Russia has three more rounds to buy, then you’ll end up facing 30 more defensive infantry than if you had raced there and attacked three rounds sooner.
To maximize a Moscow assault, I time my buys. When inf/art won’t get there, I switch to mech/tank, and for the round prior to the fight, I purchase as many planes as necessary. Per your statement, that should make my assault more likely to fail, but in fact it does the opposite. More expensive, yes. Less units purchased, yes. But ultimately, those 8 inf I could have had in Berlin won’t help me in Moscow the next round.
Everything is a trade off in this game. The key to the most effective strategy is realizing what tools you have available and the best time to use each one. If you need to take out Moscow in 2 rounds otherwise a stack of US fighters will land in Moscow, then you’d be foolish to purchase inf/art and take 5 rounds to march there. Conversely, if they already have a more sizeable stack than you, but very low income (say Japan is also knocking on their door), then you can afford the slow march and spend the saved money on other fronts.
SO IN SUM (as I suffer from logorrhea), the key to most A&A games is knowing when to trade your economic efficiency for positional efficiency. Sometimes as the Axis there is only a window of opportunity, and once closed, the Allied economic might will be your fate.
A NOTE ON TRANSPORTS AND THEORYCRAFTING
It is more expensive to move units via transport, but only at the cost of the transports. In a game where transports provide no hits or defensive rolls, you should never have more than needed to transport the number of units you can buy in a round. And if you’re splitting fronts between the UK and India, not even that much. A total of 24 IC s over the course of the game isn’t that much. Once purchased, unless you’re careless, you don’t need to buy them every round. A transport on round one that moves 20 infantry in the game added only about 0.3 ICs to each inf they moved.
“I appreciate this, but my comments aren’t based on theorycraft; they’re based on actual game experience.”
Theorycrafting is usually a negative attempt to tear down a proposed strategy, without adequately taking into account the negatives of their proposed counter strategy. If it is not intentionally negative, it often involves hypotheticals to the point of becoming strategically irrelevant.
It’s not saying your ideas are based on theory, it’s saying that you can propose hypothetical counters to any stated move without the confines of an actual board setup in front of you. The game has a myriad number of options, so when a specific is stated, someone can always come up with a “I got in the last word” type of counter. It usually occurs along the lines of “This strategy would never work against me, because I would simply do X or build Y.”
EXAMPLE: I state that you only pay for transports once.
COUNTER: Except that you have to defend them if Germany builds navy to threaten them, sinking more IPCs into there. If you don’t have those transports, you aren’t forced to spend on navy to “counter” German navy
We’re into “what if” territory. Your counter is all highly conditional. It could happen, if the Allies buy transports, CP builds a navy, and then the Allies build protection. It could also not happen. What if the CP say screw it, I’m not going to build a navy, I’ll stick to all INF? Or the Allies want the CP to waste money on navy and simply don’t build protection? See my point?
In G40, a theorycrafting example is:
STRATEGY: I’d go heavy navy as the US in the Atlantic in a KGF (Kill Germany First move).
COUNTER: Oh yeah, well my all-bomber German strategy would shut that down because you couldn’t cross the Atlantic.
COUNTER-COUNTER: Really? Then you have no infantry left for the Russia front!
After a few exchanges, the scenarios are so extreme as to have lost most of their merit for discussion. But really, no strategy happens in a vacuum or survives contact with the enemy.
It is also partly in how theorycrafting is presented. It is rarely stated like: “that’s an intriguing idea, but you’d have to be wary of X Y and Z as possible counters.” Instead it’s usually “That would NEVER work (i.e. you’re stupid), because I would simply (dismissive idea about how easy it is to counter) (insert theorycrafting #1).”
LONDON VERSUS INDIA
My open ended question could highlight my theory crafting idea.
I believe there are benefits to deploying in either, but I don’t think feel that the strategy is as cut and dry as you make it out to be.
Part of the advantage of transports landing in Germany is that it is another front for Germany. Less troops going to Russia/France means they will be collecting less money. Instead of growing the UK economy by destroying the Ottomans first, instead you are keeping German grown in check via UK support. It’s a trade off. How that plays out is up to numerous factors. You may have a preferred way to play the UK, but I can’t state one is superior to the other.
The Ottomans have usually done well in my games, even when the UK is attacking them. I dispute that you’ll eventually get Ankara and Smyrna as a given. A lot of luck is involved along the way, as well as other factors like Russian interference or gained Ottoman money by going into Russia.
Question: How would your UK strategy change if Austria gets control of SZ17 with transports? All Ottoman forces go straight east, and their coast is protected and reinforced by Austria?
See the above? I tried phrasing it in a positive way. If I were to theorycraft against you, it would have looked like “Whatever, that would never happen. Austria always gets SZ17 in my games and starts landing support and threatening Egypt. You’d never take Smyrna or Ankara.”
Instead I try to strength strategies by mentioning things to consider.
VICTORY CONDITIONS
I think you’re short-selling the Allied ability to put the hurt on Germany. There are two over-arching strategies for the Allies, Berlin + Austria, Berlin + Constantinople.
“There’s not much Britain can do in Europe to take Germany and Austria when the Ottomans are making more than them and sending it all to defend Vienna (or even navy to stop America).”
Questions: How long does it take for the Ottomans to make more than Britain. By the time they reach that income, how much support have they really been able to send to Vienna? Couldn’t the US send support to Africa down south and France support Egypt?
Ultimately I’m not saying your strategy is bad. In fact it is quite sound. However, you seem to think it better at the exclusion of all other options. How many times have you tried to take Berlin/Vienna at the exclusion of the Ottoman’s? Have you tried to adapt the strategy if it didn’t work? I need evidence to prove something won’t work before dismissing it.