Maybe Chamberlain was not enough of a coward?

@Zooey72:

What if Chamberlain said “bah, who needs the Polish - not worth fighting a war over”.  What would have happened next?

Even if Poland was considered expendable, the alliance between Germany and the Soviet Union demanded a response from the UK and France. They could not afford to simply stand by and watch Germany and the USSR divide eastern Europe between them.

@Aretaku:

Even if Poland was considered expendable, the alliance between Germany and the Soviet Union demanded a response from the UK and France. They could not afford to simply stand by and watch Germany and the USSR divide eastern Europe between them.

Hypothetically speaking, suppose the Western democracies had simply chosen to ignore the fact that Eastern Europe was being carved up between the Nazis and the communists. What would have been different?

1. Humanitarian concerns. A lot of people would have been killed, especially by the Soviet government. But that would have (and did) happen anyway, due to the Soviet victory in WWII. Western democratic intervention in WWII did not improve the wartime or postwar humanitarian situation in Eastern Europe.

2. Balance of power. Prior to the start of hostilities, there had been a cold war between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. The Soviets had the edge in that cold war, as measured by population size, industrial potential, access to raw materials, access to oil, and geographic position. In siding with the stronger party (the Soviet Union) against the weaker party (Nazi Germany), the Western democracies further unbalanced Europe.

In the postwar era, the Soviet Union was so strong that the nations of Western Europe would have been completely helpless to resist Soviet intervention. Only American military strength posed a realistic deterrent to Soviet aggression. However, prior to 1948, nearly all major American political figures had either been isolationist or pro-Soviet. Back in the late '30s, there was no reason for any European politician to believe the United States would ever help resist Soviet expansionism.

During the Cold War, Truman recognized that American conventional forces would not have been the equal of their Soviet counterparts. In the event the Soviet Union invaded Western Europe, the American plan was to drop nuclear weapons on the Soviet armies pushing westward through Germany. Large numbers of West German citizens would have died as the result of collateral damage–a fact which did not please the West German government. Stalin’s plan to counter the American nuclear threat was to use MiG jets to shoot down American bombers before they could deliver their nuclear payloads. While he recognized that some nuclear weapons would get through his MiG screen to attack his ground forces, he saw that as the price of doing business. Fortunately, Stalin died before he could launch his invasion of Western Europe.

The point here being that in the postwar era, Western Europe was saved from Soviet invasion by the combination of anti-Soviet American intervention (which the Western democratic politicians of the '30s could not have expected) and America’s possession of nuclear weapons (which those '30s politicians could also not have reasonably anticipated). Western Europe’s democracies were saved from Soviet invasion entirely by good luck. Europe’s Western democratic politicians of the '30s and early '40s did not have a viable long-term plan to escape Soviet invasion; and their entire diplomatic and military strategy merely served to increase the certainty of that invasion.

If Europe’s Western democratic politicians did the wrong thing, what would the right thing have been?

As long as the cold war between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union seemed reasonably well-balanced, they could have sat back and done nothing. If it seemed to be becoming unbalanced, they could have taken the side of the weaker party to balance it out again. In 1942, the Soviet Union outproduced Germany by a factor of 3x or 4x in every major ground weapons category; and by a factor of nearly 2x for military aircraft. Its prewar population was about two-and-a-half times larger than Germany’s. In the event of war between the Soviet Union and Germany, the Western democracies would probably have needed to send aid to Germany–at least if their goal was to prevent outright Soviet hegemony over all of Europe.

But if the Western democracies’ main objective was self-preservation, an active war between Germany and the U.S.S.R. would not have been desirable. There was too much potential for either side in such a war to gain a commanding advantage over the other. The hoped-for outcome would have been a long-term, three way cold war between the Nazis, the communists, and the democracies.

@KurtGodel7:

@Aretaku:

Even if Poland was considered expendable, the alliance between Germany and the Soviet Union demanded a response from the UK and France. They could not afford to simply stand by and watch Germany and the USSR divide eastern Europe between them.

Hypothetically speaking, suppose the Western democracies had simply chosen to ignore the fact that Eastern Europe was being carved up between the Nazis and the communists. What would have been different?

1. Humanitarian concerns. A lot of people would have been killed, especially by the Soviet government. But that would have (and did) happen anyway, due to the Soviet victory in WWII. Western democratic intervention in WWII did not improve the wartime or postwar humanitarian situation in Eastern Europe.

2. Balance of power. Prior to the start of hostilities, there had been a cold war between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. The Soviets had the edge in that cold war, as measured by population size, industrial potential, access to raw materials, access to oil, and geographic position. In siding with the stronger party (the Soviet Union) against the weaker party (Nazi Germany), the Western democracies further unbalanced Europe.

In the postwar era, the Soviet Union was so strong that the nations of Western Europe would have been completely helpless to resist Soviet intervention. Only American military strength posed a realistic deterrent to Soviet aggression. However, prior to 1948, nearly all major American political figures had either been isolationist or pro-Soviet. Back in the late '30s, there was no reason for any European politician to believe the United States would ever help resist Soviet expansionism.

During the Cold War, Truman recognized that American conventional forces would not have been the equal of their Soviet counterparts. In the event the Soviet Union invaded Western Europe, the American plan was to drop nuclear weapons on the Soviet armies pushing westward through Germany. Large numbers of West German citizens would have died as the result of collateral damage–a fact which did not please the West German government. Stalin’s plan to counter the American nuclear threat was to use MiG jets to shoot down American bombers before they could deliver their nuclear payloads. While he recognized that some nuclear weapons would get through his MiG screen to attack his ground forces, he saw that as the price of doing business. Fortunately, Stalin died before he could launch his invasion of Western Europe.

The point here being that in the postwar era, Western Europe was saved from Soviet invasion by the combination of anti-Soviet American intervention (which the Western democratic politicians of the '30s could not have expected) and America’s possession of nuclear weapons (which those '30s politicians could also not have reasonably anticipated). Western Europe’s democracies were saved from Soviet invasion entirely by good luck. Europe’s Western democratic politicians of the '30s and early '40s did not have a viable long-term plan to escape Soviet invasion; and their entire diplomatic and military strategy merely served to increase the certainty of that invasion.

If Europe’s Western democratic politicians did the wrong thing, what would the right thing have been?

As long as the cold war between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union seemed reasonably well-balanced, they could have sat back and done nothing. If it seemed to be becoming unbalanced, they could have taken the side of the weaker party to balance it out again. In 1942, the Soviet Union outproduced Germany by a factor of 3x or 4x in every major ground weapons category; and by a factor of nearly 2x for military aircraft. Its prewar population was about two-and-a-half times larger than Germany’s. In the event of war between the Soviet Union and Germany, the Western democracies would probably have needed to send aid to Germany–at least if their goal was to prevent outright Soviet hegemony over all of Europe.

But if the Western democracies’ main objective was self-preservation, an active war between Germany and the U.S.S.R. would not have been desirable. There was too much potential for either side in such a war to gain a commanding advantage over the other. The hoped-for outcome would have been a long-term, three way cold war between the Nazis, the communists, and the democracies.

I Agree that only America protected Europe from Soviet aggression.

However, I do not believe that sitting back and doing nothing in 1940 would have been in Western Europe’s best interest. Hitler’s Germany would have attacked France (if not Britain) first, before the Soviet Union. France and Britain thought they could make a stand in Poland (defeating the immediate Nazi threat, to concern themselves with the later with the non-imminent Soviet threat), but underestimated the speed at which Germany could conquer the Poles.

I could probably do research and back up the idea that Hitler would have invaded France first with hard history, but let’s make a simple A&A comparison:

As Germany at the start of G40 (Let’s assume France and Britain are not at war), which is it easier to do: Kill France first, and then attack the Soviet Union, or attack the Soviet Union first?

@amanntai:

I Agree that only America protected Europe from Soviet aggression.

However, I do not believe that sitting back and doing nothing in 1940 would have been in Western Europe’s best interest. Hitler’s Germany would have attacked France (if not Britain) first, before the Soviet Union. France and Britain thought they could make a stand in Poland (defeating the immediate Nazi threat, to concern themselves with the later with the non-imminent Soviet threat), but underestimated the speed at which Germany could conquer the Poles.

I could probably do research and back up the idea that Hitler would have invaded France first with hard history, but let’s make a simple A&A comparison:

As Germany at the start of G40 (Let’s assume France and Britain are not at war), which is it easier to do: Kill France first, and then attack the Soviet Union, or attack the Soviet Union first?

Hitler’s Germany would have attacked France (if not Britain) first

This is where we disagree.

Both before and during the war, German naval spending was a steady 10 - 12% of overall German military spending. This low level of naval spending is very strong evidence that Hitler did not intend to attack Britain. Further evidence is provided in General von Manstein’s book Lost Victories, in which he expressed frustration with the fact that the German general staff was thrown into confusion after their decisive victory over France. Von Manstein opined that it is one thing for a general staff to be thrown into complete confusion when their plans utterly fail. But it was far less understandable for them to adopt the attitude of “What do we do now?” after their plans completely succeed. Hitler had expected Churchill to agree to a ceasefire after the fall of France; and didn’t know what to do after Churchill proved completely unreceptive to any sort of peace negotiations.

You will recall that in 1939, Britain and France declared war on Germany before Germany declared war on either of those nations. After the fall of Poland, Hitler offered peace to both Britain and France. (They both refused.)

From Germany’s perspective, a war with the Western democracies entailed plenty of downside and little upside. There was no Nazi plan to find lebensraum in France or other Western European nations. Germany did not attempt to colonize France with Germans during the war, and had no intention of doing so after the war ended. On the other hand, it was very difficult for Germany to be at war with France without also being at war with Britain. A war against both nations opened the door to American industrial (and later military) involvement against Germany. Why would Hitler want a long, unwinnable, pointless war like that when the main goal of his foreign policy was to invade the Soviet Union?

From Hitler’s perspective, a war against the Soviet Union would have many advantages. He pointed out that no nation had ever imposed a Versailles Treaty on the United States. If Germany could conquer the Soviet Union–or at least the portion of the Soviet Union west of the Urals–it would be as strong relative to Europe as the United States was relative to North America. Access to Soviet manpower, raw materials, and industrial capacity would allow Germany to become a superpower. Access to Soviet farmlands would reduce German vulnerability to Allied food blockades.

But just as Germany was eyeing the Soviet Union, Stalin was eyeing Germany. In 1939 Stalin instituted a military draft, and began greatly increasing the size of the Soviet army. In 1940 he successfully seized Finland’s equivalent of the Maginot Line. (Except that the Finnish version was better, in many ways, than the French version.) Having taken Finland’s defenses, he chose not to take the rest of the country–at least not at that time. The conquest of the rest of Finland would come later, and its purpose would be to cut Germany off from its supply of Swedish iron ore.

On the southern portion of that front, Stalin helped himself to a slice of Romanian territory. Romania was to be the main initial target of the Soviet attack; with the intention being to cut Hitler off from his supply of Romanian oil. Having conquered Romania, the Soviet army would then wheel northwest into the heart of Europe.

The British and French estimated that Poland should be able to defend itself for two to three months, while Poland estimated it could do so for at least six months. Poland drafted its estimates based upon the expectation that the Western Allies honor their treaty obligations and quickly start an offensive of their own. In addition, the French and British expected the war to develop into trench warfare much like World War I. The Polish government was not notified of this strategy and based all of its defence plans on promises of quick relief by their Western allies.[61][62]

See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Invasion_of_Poland#Polish_defence_plan

Why did the British and French governments deliberately make false promises to Poland? If they had absolutely no intention of launching a general offensive against Germany–which they didn’t–why did they go through such trouble to reassure the Poles that they did?

Poland’s entire diplomatic and military strategy for 1939 was based on the quicksand of lying French politicians’ promises. In the absence of those promises, Polish leaders would have possessed a more realistic view of its actual options. Instead of being tricked into adopting an anti-German foreign policy, they would have probably come to some kind of understanding with Germany. In the presence of such an understanding, Germany and the Soviet Union could have gone to war against each other, without Germany being weakened and distracted by a pointless war in the west. It is far from clear which side would have won such a war. But Western democratic interference in the Nazi-Soviet conflict benefited no one except the Soviet Union.

Not sure about the USSR vs France as Hitler’s no. 1 target.  Could go to one of my books, but am sure others have the facts.

Am confident that G had no designs on the UK and its empire.  There was an underlying belief/hope that the UK would accept G domination of Europe, as some in the British government were to advocate.

So the UK could have avoided the war.  But I can think of a number of reasons why to do so would have been wrong.

1.  Europe was dominated by dictatorships - Franco, Mussolini, Stalin & Hitler.  Democracy was at bay.  It is hard to imagine the democracy under siege feel of the time.  Somewhere a line needed to be drawn.  It was not a question of which monster had killed the most, nor of accepting collateral damage in the hope that “we” would escape whilst those we might have called friends were targeted one by one.

2.  The UK’s constant policy since Marlborough was to defend a balance of power on the continent. G were the immediate threat to that balance, not R.

3. It is far from certain that the UK & USA could have beaten a victorious G (or R) + J.

I nearly started an analogy to Europe today, but history is safer!

As others pointed out, Hitler hated France. He also isn’t known for making rational decisions.

But it still would have been rational to attack France. France added to Germany’s economy, its production, and even its military. More French fought for the Axis than for the Allies.

Furthermore, Hitler may have had no designs on Britain, but as you pointed out, Hitler expected Britain to surrender when France fell.

Hitler’s plan appeared to be:

• Austria
• Czechoslovakia
• Poland
• Denmark
• Norway
• Holland
• Belgium
• France
• Russia

If he expected Britain to surrender, of course preparations to invade Britain never entered his mind. But the invasion of France did, as evidenced by his moving troops into the Rhineland.

With France out and Britain at peace, Hitler would have nearly all the Continent to bring against Russia, and a one-front war. Not a bad plan.

Yes amanntai - Britain to surrender in terms of accepting the new status quo, not surrender of sovereignty or territory.

As you say G vs R as a two sided fight may well have resulted in a G victory.  Then the US & UK would have been faced by a much tougher task.

Another interesting what if would be whether the UK & R would have won if the US had not entered the war?

Good thing the Blokes had Churchill :)

@Private:

Another interesting what if would be whether the UK & R would have won if the US had not entered the war?

An Excellent question indeed. I believe Soviet manpower would’ve won “won?” in the end . They had 47 million in their national guard. The Germans didn’t know how to plan for it so they ignored it. Not a good solution.  Japan would have stayed in line though. Then again maybe not. :)

You are probably right barney.  Provided UK & R benefitted from “neutral” US industrial might.  But it would have taken longer due to the UK’s understandable Med focus sucking resources from any attempt at a northern Europe second (well third) front.

Or perhaps R’s progress on the eastern front was not overly helped by D-day? Hard to believe, but I don’t have the facts to hand - Where’s that Max Hastings book ….?  :-)

Hang on a mo - I am forgetting one of the guiding principles of my life - never let the facts get in the way of a good opinion!  :wink:

@Private:

Or perhaps R’s progress on the eastern front was not overly helped by D-day?

Although it’s a fair point that the USSR did the bulk of the land fighting in the European Theatre in WWII, and could perhaps even have won single-handedly, the Anglo-American opening of a second front in western Europe was far from unimportant – a point illustrated by Stalin himself, who spent spent 1942 and 1943 and the first half of 1944 badgering the British and the Americans to get on with the job of opening a second front instead of (from Stalin’s perspective) sitting on their hindquarters and letting the Red Army do all the work.

Yes CWO.

Of course Stalin attributed more importance before the event than he did afterwards!

Plus the fact that R received help from the UK/BE & US in other ways - pressure in the Med, particularly the Italian campaign, bomber raids, Archangel convoys, distraction of J from a Far East incursion ….

Would R really have won on its own?

Cheers
PP

Can I just add that I am amazed at how knowledgeable some of you guys are. :-)

I thought I was pretty well informed, but I have forgotten most of the facts and remembered some of the broad-brush conclusions, then muddied those with my own meanderings.

I look forward to learning from future threads on this board.

Cheers
PP

@Private:

Not sure about the USSR vs France as Hitler’s no. 1 target.  Could go to one of my books, but am sure others have the facts.

Am confident that G had no designs on the UK and its empire.  There was an underlying belief/hope that the UK would accept G domination of Europe, as some in the British government were to advocate.

So the UK could have avoided the war.  But I can think of a number of reasons why to do so would have been wrong.

1.  Europe was dominated by dictatorships - Franco, Mussolini, Stalin & Hitler.  Democracy was at bay.  It is hard to imagine the democracy under siege feel of the time.  Somewhere a line needed to be drawn.  It was not a question of which monster had killed the most, nor of accepting collateral damage in the hope that “we” would escape whilst those we might have called friends were targeted one by one.

2.  The UK’s constant policy since Marlborough was to defend a balance of power on the continent. G were the immediate threat to that balance, not R.

3. It is far from certain that the UK & USA could have beaten a victorious G (or R) + J.

I nearly started an analogy to Europe today, but history is safer!

1.  Europe was dominated by dictatorships - Franco, Mussolini, Stalin & Hitler.  Democracy was at bay.

A good point. But how much did democracy really gain as a result of its decision to go to war?

In August of 1939, France, Britain, Greece, and Scandinavia were under democratic rule. Germany and Italy were fascist, and Poland was a military dictatorship. By 1948 (as the dust from the war cleared), the democracies controlled everything they had in August 1939, plus Italy and western Germany. Almost every European nation east of that line had fallen under Soviet dominion. So it’s not like the democracies gained very much–especially not when compared with the sheer scale of Soviet gains.

2.  The UK’s constant policy since Marlborough was to defend a balance of
power on the continent. G were the immediate threat to that balance, not R.

I agree that defending a balance of power is typically a sensible policy for democracies to employ. However, I feel the Soviet Union was the true threat to that balance of power.

Germany’s prewar population was 69 million, as opposed to 169 million for the Soviet Union. The Soviets had about 2.5x as many people as the Germans.

In Marx’s writings, he described a one world communist government. The stated long-term goal of Soviet foreign policy was world conquest; and that goal was reiterated in publications such as Pravda. Every nation on the Soviet Union’s western border in August of 1939 had been partially or fully annexed by May of 1941. Soviet expansionism predated the Nazi-Soviet War.

In June of 1941, Germany had 3,000 tanks on its eastern front, as opposed to 23,000 tanks for the Soviet Union on its western front. The Soviets also had a commanding advantage in terms of artillery, infantry, and planes; albeit not to the same extent as their advantage in tanks. The reason Stalin did not expect a German invasion was because he knew Germany could not defeat the Soviets in a quick war, and was not well-positioned for a long war. On the other hand, the Soviet Union was superior to Germany in terms of industrial strength, access to oil, farmland, and raw materials. Its supply of manpower (available for infantry) was much, much greater than Germany’s.

Hitler’s invasion of the Soviet Union was in many ways a desperation move, taken after he’d correctly determined that Stalin was planning an invasion of Germany. Hitler struck a month before the Soviets’ invasion preparations would have been complete. Every Soviet officer had a packet of information, to be opened in the event of Nazi-Soviet hostilities breaking out. Every Soviet officer opened his packet, and found plenty of information on what to do if the Soviet Union invaded Germany, and nothing at all on how to respond to a German attack against the Soviets. The Soviets were thrown into confusion. Adding to that confusion was the fact that in many cases, tank crews and artillery crews were hundreds of miles from the machines they were supposed to be operating. That was one of the problems the Soviets intended to solve during the month they thought they had before beginning their invasion of Germany. Due to the Soviet Union’s lack of preparedness for any sort of defensive struggle, it was possible for Germany to make excellent initial gains; while achieving an astonishing 10:1 exchange ratio in combat against Soviet soldiers.

Later in the war that ratio declined to 3:1. Due to the fact that the Western democracies pulled German attention away from its eastern front; and given the Soviets’ massive advantage in manpower, that 3:1 ratio was not sufficient for Germany to achieve victory. Also, the Soviets came very close to achieving a 1:1 exchange ratio at Stalingrad. German losses were close to a million men in that battle–over 1% of its entire prewar population.

In 1941, Germany’s army had 150 divisions–slightly larger than the French Army had been in 1940. By the end of 1941, the Red Army consisted of a staggering 600 divisions. Not only that, it added 500,000 new men every month for most of the rest of the war. That was a replacement rate far beyond anything Germany could possibly hope to match.

In preparing for its invasion of Germany, the Soviet military had developed light tanks capable of traveling across rivers. These tanks had even traveled across Lake Ladoga. The next generation of that particular tank was planned to have the capacity to cross the English Channel. Stalin had hoped Hitler would conquer England in 1940, so that the Red Army could later “liberate” it from Nazi occupation. He would then have established a communist dictatorship.

3. It is far from certain that the UK & USA could have beaten a victorious G (or R) + J.

During the Cold War, Truman recognized that if the Soviet Union invaded Western Europe, American and German forces would be no match for their Soviet counterparts. Had the Soviets attacked, the main defense would have been to use nuclear weapons against advancing Soviet troops. Stalin intended to counter the American nuclear threat by using MiG jets to shoot down American bombers before they could deliver their nuclear payloads. Stalin had a lot of MiG jets. However, he died before he could put into effect his plans to launch WWIII.

It’s hard to imagine that a German or Japanese victory in WWII would have resulted in a weaker American postwar position than the one described above. Germany and Japan had very limited populations. During the war Japan expended a great many of its soldiers in its war against China, just as Germany lost many men against the Soviet Union. These losses, in combination with their relatively small population sizes–would have prevented them from overwhelming the Western democracies with sheer numbers. (As the Soviet Union could easily have done.)

@Private:

I thought I was pretty well informed, but I have forgotten most of the facts and remembered some of the broad-brush conclusions, then muddied those with my own meanderings.

Ha Ha! Well Said! My mind is quite muddied as well. :)

@KurtGodel7:

I agree that defending a balance of power is typically a sensible policy for democracies to employ. However, I feel the Soviet Union was the true threat to that balance of power.

Yea too bad the nazis were/are so nutted up. You have to be really bad to be worst than the commies.

@barney:

Ha Ha! Well Said! My mind is quite muddied as well. :)

Yea too bad the nazis were/are so nutted up. You have to be really bad to be worst than the commies.

Yea too bad the nazis were/are so nutted up. You have to be really bad to be worst than the commies.

As of August of 1939, the Soviet government had murdered about 1,000 people for every person the Nazi government had murdered. Given that the communists were much worse than the Nazis–at least by that measurement–why did the Western democracies adopt pro-Soviet, anti-Nazi foreign policies during the years leading up to the war?

One possible explanation for the Western democracies’ actions is that the communists had achieved much, much better penetration of the Western democracies than the Nazis had achieved. There was no pro-Nazi contingent in Hollywood, or among radio stations, or in American academia. There were no pro-Nazi members of the administrations of FDR, Truman, or Daladier. No effort whatever–either prewar or during the war–had been made to hush up any of the Nazis’ crimes. On the other hand, there had been a number of efforts to make deliberately dishonest accusations against the Nazis; such as accusing them of having plans for world domination or creating lampshades made of human skin.

Compare that to the scale of communists’ penetration. FDR’s administration contained about 300 Soviet agents, including Harry Dexter White, author of the Morgenthau Plan. Communists had very strong influence in Hollywood and other segments of the media and in academia. FDR’s first major foreign policy decision–taken half a decade before the start of WWII–was to extend diplomatic recognition to the Soviet Union. In order to set the stage for his decision, FDR hushed up the Ukrainian famine–a famine in which the Soviet Union deliberately starved seven million of its own citizens to death.

One reason why the communists had achieved so much influence over Western democracies–and the Nazis so little–is that the communist movement has always been intended as a global movement. Whereas the Nazis were focused almost exclusively on Europe.

A second factor is that an ideology based on Aryan supremacy can appeal only to primarily Germanic or Nordic nations, such as Germany itself. Whereas an ideology based on the proletariate overthrowing the bourgeoise can have appeal in any nation which contains economic disparities.

Well… marching people into the “showers” didn’t help their image. And yes the commies were our “friends” at the time so criticism of them was largely muted during the war years. Their (russia) true colors come shining through easily if one looks.

Did R pose more of a threat than G?

Perhaps in terms of military might, but numbers and quantities are only part of that judgement.  Probably also in terms of ideological penetration of the West.

But it was G’s geographical location in central Europe and its militarised border with the foremost continental democracy that ratcheted up its threat status.

Sorry for the brevity of this response but struggling with this bloody tablet!

@KurtGodel7:

Hitler’s invasion of the Soviet Union was in many ways a desperation move, taken after he’d correctly determined that Stalin was planning an invasion of Germany. Hitler struck a month before the Soviets’ invasion preparations would have been complete.

Back on the PC now!

That’s news to me KurtGodel7. Either I have (re-?) learned something or this is a debated point? Look forward to hearing what others have to say.

@Private:

That’s news to me KurtGodel7. Either I have (re-?) learned something or this is a debated point? Look forward to hearing what others have to say.

There was a lengthy discussion of this topic over here:

http://www.axisandallies.org/forums/index.php?topic=34786.0

In a nutshell, some board members argued for the revisionist theory that the USSR intended to invade Germany as a first step towards global domination by the Communists, while other board members (myself included) argued for the mainstream theory that the Soviets were planning a forward defense of their territory against an anticipated Nazi invasion whose aim was to secure Lebensraum, slave labour and resources for the Third Reich.  Such discussions can be found scattered all over this forum (the present thread on Chamberlain being one such example).