Need Atom bomb input…

Yeah, if destroying a victory city is how the A bomb works, I would say it first has to be captured by the enemy. Say the Germans/Italians have 7 cities and were about to capture Cairo for their 8th city. The Allies couldn’t simply nuke Cairo as a preventative measure. But once the Axis capture Cairo, then nuking is allowed.
So, assuming the US is the one who develops nukes, it would be up to them to simply have a nuclear bomber within range of an Axis held victory city ready to go. It would be up to the Axis to guard all victory cities with lots of AA guns and interceptors.

Again, just permanently award the VC to the enemy, or if you don’t like that language, say “lower the number of VC’s needed for victory by 1”. This means that if Germany has 7 VC’s and the Allies nuke Cairo, the Axis win by default.

I think the loophole is indeed gamey and an important one to close if you use this houserule, but closing it is quite simple.

For those who like history,
this article explained the significance of Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombing against the heavy bomber cities attack (66 cities vs 2 cities). Some cities were more damaged by conventional bombing (Tokyo for instance), other have more casualties (Hiroshima was only second, Tokyo was first with 120 000 deaths), a conventional intensive bombardment was around 4-5 kilotons vs 16.5 and 20 kilotons for the two nuclear bombing:

Hairuo Guo, a temporary congregation of wandering atoms

Japan didn’t surrender because we obliterated two of their cities with atomic weapons.
They surrendered because Russia declared war on them.

Rather than typing out a long-winded explanation, here is a well-written and well-supported article: The Bomb Didn’t Beat Japan… Stalin Did - By Ward Wilson

http://www.quora.com/World-War-II/What-are-some-common-misconceptions-about-World-War-II?share=1

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/05/29/the_bomb_didnt_beat_japan_nuclear_world_war_ii

It really change the way of seeing USSR. :-o

Someone has made a summary:

Rohit Shinde, Swimmer, Avid Reader, Computer Engineer

The biggest misconception surrounding the second World War is that bombing Hiroshima and Nagasaki with a nuclear bomb led to the surrender of the Japanese.

While this may sound outlandish, there is evidence to show that nuclear bombing had little to do with Japan’s unconditional surrender.

Hiroshima was bombed on 6 August. Three days later, Japan’s Supreme Council to decide whether to surrender or not. Incidentally, just after Japan’s Supreme Council meet finished(which ended in a stalemate), Nagasaki was bombed.(August 9)

The question is, why didn’t they discuss surrendering earlier? I mean, if the Hiroshima bombing was intense, why wait three days for a meeting? And they met before the Nagasaki was dropped. So it doesn’t add up.

The USA had bombed 66 of Japan’s cities with conventional methods. Taking into consideration the fact that a conventional bomb spreads more energy than a nuclear bomb because in a nuclear bomb energy is concentrated to be released all at once, I think we can state that a conventional did more damage(obviously the nuclear weapons do more long-term damage, but the fact is, conventional weapons rained more destruction than their nuclear counterparts).
 
  The bombs dropped weighed around 4-5 Kilotons. The Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs weighed around 15 Kiltotons.

Coming to the damage, Hirsohima came 2nd in the number of deaths caused due to the war. It came 4th in the number of square miles destroyed and 17th in percentage of city destroyed.
(Hirsoshima is compared to other Japanese cities which had been bombed before). So, the nuclear bomb did not damage as much as we think it did.

If, according to Japan’s leaders, the damage done to Hiroshima was nothing abnormal, why was a meeting of the Supreme Council convened? That too before Nagasaki had been bombed?
   
The reason was that although the Japanese wanted to surrender, they did not want to surrender unconditionally. They wanted to keep their present form of government and their leaders didn’t want to be tried for war crimes.

Japan had signed a five-year neutrality pact with the USSR. They would use Stalin to negotiate light surrender terms. Something, which Stalin would agree to since he wouldn’t want the US increasing its power in Asia. Also, they wanted to inflict heavy casualties on the US with their army. These were the two options which Japan was contemplating.

But the USSR decided to attack Japan, so now, Japan was being attacked by two superpowers in two directions. The USSR diplomacy option was closed and even the army option was closed since it would be foolhardy to fight two powers invading in different directions.

Owing to this, Japan surrendered unconditionally.

Why were the nuclear bombs made the reason for Japan’s surrender?
This was so because the US wanted to increase its reputation of power. Also, since Japan’s leaders did not want to be tried for war crimes, it stands to reason that they would not object to the US glorifying nuclear power as the reason for surrender.

@Baron:

For those who like history,
this article explained the significance of Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombing against the heavy bomber cities attack (66 cities vs 2 cities). Some cities were more damaged by conventional bombing (Tokyo for instance), other have more casualties (Hiroshima was only second, Tokyo was first with 120 000 deaths), a conventional intensive bombardment was around 4-5 kilotons vs 16.5 and 20 kilotons for the two nuclear bombing:

Hairuo Guo, a temporary congregation of wandering atoms

Japan didn’t surrender because we obliterated two of their cities with atomic weapons.
They surrendered because Russia declared war on them.

Rather than typing out a long-winded explanation, here is a well-written and well-supported article: The Bomb Didn’t Beat Japan… Stalin Did - By Ward Wilson

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/05/29/the_bomb_didnt_beat_japan_nuclear_world_war_ii

It really change the way of seeing USSR. :-o

part of the point of the bomb was it was one bomb. Look at what we can do with just this one bomb. Imagine what we’ll do to you when we fully load our fleet of bombers with them.

It was a diplomatic poker game threat. (There was no more atomic bomb in the hands of the US player.)

@Baron:

It was a diplomatic poker game threat. (There was no more atomic bomb in the hands of the US player.)

ssshhh… don’t say that to loud they might hear you.

@Yavid:

@Baron:

It was a diplomatic poker game threat. (There was no more atomic bomb in the hands of the US player.)

ssshhh… don’t say that to loud they might hear you.

Doh!!!   :-D

It’s no more correct to say that the Soviet invasion of Machuria was the single factor that caused Japan to surrender (whereas other factors did not) than to argue that the A-bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was the the single factor that caused Japan to surrender (whereas other factors did not).  Japan’s capitulation was brought on by a combination of factors, so it’s simplistic to declare one to be decisive and to discount the others.  The American submarine campaign against the Japanese shipping routes had the effect, over several years, of starving Japan of oil and other vital supplies.  The American advance in the South-West Pacific and in the Central Pacific dealt Japan a succession of military defeats, thus eroding the twin myths 1) that Japanese troops and sailors and airmen were invincible, and 2) that the decadent, undisciplined, un-militaristic and soft-living Americans did not have any convictions for which they were willing to fight and die.  The American advance ultimately enabled the US, once it had seized the Marianas, to reach Japan from their air with large-scale strategic bombing missions, and in the following months they gradually burned most of Japan’s major cities to the ground.  The American capture of Okinawa, right on Japan’s doorstep, demonstrated that the US had the means and the will to mount a full-scale invasion of the Japanese home islands.

So: by the time of the summer of 1945, Japan was economically and militarily close to collapse.  It could still have managed to stay in the war a while longer by scraping the bottom of the barrel – much as Germany managed to stay in the war until its tropps were practically fighting back to back down the middle of a devastated Germany – but its situation was hopeless and its only two options were to either give up or to fight to the proverbial last man (including, as was envisioned by some Japanese leaders, starving civilians armed with bamboo spears) in an act of national suicide.  Japan’s leadership dithered between these two options, unable to reach a consensus.  By hesitating, they allowed the Allies to administer three massive additional blows in quick succession: Hiroshima, Manchuria and Nagasaki.  To use the trite analogy about the straws that broke the camel’s back, these blows – which were as much psychological as physical in their impact – finally gave the logjammed Japanese leadership the excuse it needed to let the Emperor make the decision for them, and gave Hirohito the excuse he needed to surrender without admitting anything more precise than the fact that “the war situation has developed not necessarily to Japan’s advantage” – arguably the most massive understatement in recorded history.

@CWO:

It’s no more correct to say that the Soviet invasion of Machuria was the single factor that caused Japan to surrender (whereas other factors did not) than to argue that the A-bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was the the single factor that caused Japan to surrender (whereas other factors did not).  Japan’s capitulation was brought on by a combination of factors, so it’s simplistic to declare one to be decisive and to discount the others.  The American submarine campaign against the Japanese shipping routes had the effect, over several years, of starving Japan of oil and other vital supplies.  The American advance in the South-West Pacific and in the Central Pacific dealt Japan a succession of military defeats, thus eroding the twin myths 1) that Japanese troops and sailors and airmen were invincible, and 2) that the decadent, undisciplined, un-militaristic and soft-living Americans did not have any convictions for which they were willing to fight and die.  The American advance ultimately enabled the US, once it had seized the Marianas, to reach Japan from their air with large-scale strategic bombing missions, and in the following months they gradually burned most of Japan’s major cities to the ground.  The American capture of Okinawa, right on Japan’s doorstep, demonstrated that the US had the means and the will to mount a full-scale invasion of the Japanese home islands.

So: by the time of the summer of 1945, Japan was economically and militarily close to collapse.  It could still have managed to stay in the war a while longer by scraping the bottom of the barrel – much as Germany managed to stay in the war until its tropps were practically fighting back to back down the middle of a devastated Germany – but its situation was hopeless and its only two options were to either give up or to fight to the proverbial last man (including, as was envisioned by some Japanese leaders, starving civilians armed with bamboo spears) in an act of national suicide.  Japan’s leadership dithered between these two options, unable to reach a consensus.  By hesitating, they allowed the Allies to administer three massive additional blows in quick succession: Hiroshima, Manchuria and Nagasaki.  To use the trite analogy about the straws that broke the camel’s back, these blows – which were as much psychological as physical in their impact – finally gave the logjammed Japanese leadership the excuse it needed to let the Emperor make the decision for them, and gave Hirohito the excuse he needed to surrender without admitting anything more precise than the fact that “the war situation has developed not necessarily to Japan’s advantage” – arguably the most massive understatement in recorded history.

Well spoken, sir.

very true.

As A&A makes no rule for collapsed defenses,  an atomic bomb drop, under any other conditions, against an enemy of any potency, would still suffer teh same flak and interceptor attacks as any other strategic bombing.