Why no flanking amphibious invasion in WWI?

Because that would be too easy.  :-D It depends how many troops that would be landed. With a large army supply lines become a major problem. Even at Normandy, right on England’s doorstep, it was tough supplying the troops. In WW1, with neither side having clear naval supremacy, logistics would have been a nightmare. Besides, after the catastrophe at Gallipoli, neither side was eager for a repeat. It would most likely it would result in another bloodbath, with no clear winner.

Well they didn’t exactly have the “landing craft” or the amphibious doctrine to complete such a task.

Coasts were also probably defended by mines, subs, and long range artillery.

A significant amount of troops would also need to be moved (100,000?)  And as mako says - without the logistical support to do it… it would fail.

Gallipoli is also a very good example of why this would be unpopular.

Here is a plan that was drafted!

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baltic_Project

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Hush

Operation Hush was another one of the same… which got scrapped at the last minute.

I’m reading that an operation or battle called Zeeburges had an amphibious element.

Very little channel coast was in German hands and most if it was poor invasion terrain- low laying water soaked terrain, channels and water ways everywhere.

The northern German coast was guarded plus there was no control of the North Sea by either side. The lost of three British Cruisers by a U-BOAT early in the war  and the loss of several old capital ships at Gallipoli the fear in the British if keeping capital ships stationary for long periods of time.

Gallipoli and the Baltic Project – two ideas Churchill supported – were conceived (or more correctly ill-conceived) as flanking atttacks.  Both operations were poorly planned, with little understanding of what was needed to mount a serious amphibious landing against a well-defended position.  Arguably, the proper techniques and equipment for amphibious landings were only really perfected during the second half of WWII.  Britain’s abortive invasion of Norway in 1940 – another Churchill project – had the similar defects of poor planning and infrastructure, with the additional problem of underestimating the importance of providing adequate air cover.

If I recall correctly, Hindenburg’s dismissive retort to the suggestion that the British might one day try a landing in the Baltic was that, if they ever did so, he would send the police to arrest them.

Logistics. The entire Great War can be summed up by that word. First off all you have to scrape together half a million men. Then you have to find some ground held by the Germans that could be landed on (there wasn’t) with enough costal infrastructure to supply the men you land (which there wasn’t). You also had to hope the Kriegsmarine was sleeping (they weren’t) and then somehow move your landing force fast enough (which never happens) to positions unoccupied by the enemy (spoiler: they’re always occupied).

In the end it’s impractical and there would likely be little real success as the Germans would simply be able to pull their Belgian front back, thus shorting the line they had to hold, giving them better interior lines and freeing up more men, and likely result in the same type of casualties figures we saw on regular land attacks if not worse. And rule #1 of war: If Churchill thinks it’s going to work splendidly, it’s all going to go terribly wrong.

@DarthShizNit:

Logistics. The entire Great War can be summed up by that word. First off all you have to scrape together half a million men. Then you have to find some ground held by the Germans that could be landed on (there wasn’t) with enough costal infrastructure to supply the men you land (which there wasn’t). You also had to hope the Kriegsmarine was sleeping (they weren’t) and then somehow move your landing force fast enough (which never happens) to positions unoccupied by the enemy (spoiler: they’re always occupied).

In the end it’s impractical and there would likely be little real success as the Germans would simply be able to pull their Belgian front back, thus shorting the line they had to hold, giving them better interior lines and freeing up more men, and likely result in the same type of casualties figures we saw on regular land attacks if not worse. And rule #1 of war: If Churchill thinks it’s going to work splendidly, it’s all going to go terribly wrong.

Great Post and so very true!

If they did attempt they would have found themselves in an “Anzio” situation anyway.  It would have tied up more Allied troops and logisitcs than the Germans would need to contain them with their interior lines of communication and supply.

Besides, didn’t most “Successful” amphibious operations in WW2 still have extremely high casualty ratios?

@Gargantua:

Besides, didn’t most “Successful” amphibious operations in WW2 still have extremely high casualty ratios?

Certainly yes in the case of US amphibious landings on many of the Japanese-held islands in the Pacific.  A prime example was Iwo Jima, where (as I recall) there was one US Marine casualty for every yard or so of terrain gained – and where most of the Japanese defenders died too.  On the other hand, the Allied landings in Europe weren’t quite so lethal (for either side).  On four of the five Overlord invasion beaches on D-Day, for example, the Allies managed to get ashore without too much trouble; there was sharp fighting in several places, but it tended to be brief.  The exception was Omaha beach, which turned into a bloodbath for the GIs who had the misfortune of landing there.

@CWO:

@Gargantua:

Besides, didn’t most “Successful” amphibious operations in WW2 still have extremely high casualty ratios?

Certainly yes in the case of US amphibious landings on many of the Japanese-held islands in the Pacific.  A prime example was Iwo Jima, where (as I recall) there was one US Marine casualty for every yard or so of terrain gained – and where most of the Japanese defenders died too.  On the other hand, the Allied landings in Europe weren’t quite so lethal (for either side).  On four of the five Overlord invasion beaches on D-Day, for example, the Allies managed to get ashore without too much trouble; there was sharp fighting in several places, but it tended to be brief.  The exception was Omaha beach, which turned into a bloodbath for the GIs who had the misfortune of landing there.

And the Japanese defending Iwo Jima were from a second class division. Its been said by historians of the Pacific War that had the Japanese defended the island with a top notch division the situation on the Island would have been even more serious.

Dieppe was to see how Canadians fight. Obviously, they used less of them for the real thing.

As I recall, it the Canadians were the only ones to accomplish all of their set objectives on D-Day.

They didn’t take Caen correct. Nobody got their objectives on D+1

There where 5,000 Canadians raiding the Dieppe harbor, of which about only 1,500 returned to England that day.

Hello joke.

Churchill always uses ‘colonial troops’ for invasions he has little confidence in.

@Imperious:

They didn’t take Caen correct. Nobody got their objectives on D+1

There where 5,000 Canadians raiding the Dieppe harbor, of which about only 1,500 returned to England that day.

Hello joke.

Churchill always uses ‘colonial troops’ for invasions he has little confidence in.

In other words, he used them all the time.