Scorched Earth/IPC Degradation
Just had an idea on the subject of scorched earth….Since areas that were fought over in WW1 eventually turned into ‘lifeless moonscapes,’ it’d be kind of cool if the IPC values of contested tt’s gradually degraded, like maybe -1 IPC every 2 turns. Might be adding unnecessary complexity, but it adds the effect of contested tt’s eventually becoming literally worthless.
Chacmool last edited by
IÂ´ve written earlier about that but my intention was an scorched earth withdraval like Operation Alberich was.
On the Western front in March 1917 German troops moved back to the heavily fortified Siegfriedstellung (you call it Hindenburg Line) But the Operation started already in October 1916, they devastated the area largely shared and mined it partially. With this operation the Germans shortened the front line and retreated to a line that was much better to defend because of the terrain relief.
I have a book called “Die Deutschen an der Somme” (the germans at the somme) that contents lots of original diaries and letters. One soldier reports of an officer who painted an inscription on a toilette-door to welcome the british:
You crie: poor little Belgium
Poor Ireland you donÂ´t care
Protecting culture, God and law
You brought the niggers there
I know you always hypocrites
No hear, what I you tell,
Our Germany will go to head
But you oh, go to hell!
With every good wish for a Happy Xmas
and bright New Year at Metz en C. ï¿½ (Metz en Couture)
" ï¿½ ï¿½
At Peronne a table and chairs were put on an command post. The table was set with plates some with herring others with rats. Finally a glass of champagne with a card: “Dear Tommy, bon appetit! Do not fret, just wonder!”
All decored with a bunch of grenades, one of them a seemingly loose, so that she had to detonate when beeing picked up.
In Storms of Steel (ger: In Stahlgewittern) (For me the best book to get a first side view into ww1 battles) Ernst JÃ¼nger describes poisened fountains, undermined Streets that targeted on heavy artillery transports and the placing of time fuse bombs in the cellars of houses that weren`t destroyed already. (these bombs worked with acid)
IÂ´m writing all this to clarify that there shouldnÂ´t be a gain in IPCs for the allies when the germans retreat on western front.
Especially late in the AA 1914 game a situation like this could happen when more and more us troops arrive in northern france and they build up for a big push offense. Now for example if there were only a few German ifs remainig in contestet Picardy that could not be reinforced because of slow movement they may consider to go back to belgium and hold a stronger line together with units that arrived there. But before they leave they may devastate the area to slow the allies down.
As a houserule this could mean if you retread with units from an contestet region the enemy won`t get the IPC from this zone in the following round(s).
First of all, unless I misunderstand the rules, it will almost always be worth having one infantry in a region even if you evacuate the rest of your forces, simply because the enemy will have to fight it before they move through (supposing the tt to be contested). Surely its worth losing one infantry to hold up the enemy for an entire round?
Secondly, we need something to simulate the reaction of the German forces after they over-ran the Allied positions in the Spring Offensive of 1918. After two years of eating sawdust bread and drinking acorn coffee they discovered the Allies had vast storehouses of provisions, with more arriving on a daily basis. Nothing did more to damage the morale of the German troops, indeed many went on drunken rampages after ransacking Allied wine cellars, and were not in a fit state of mind to follow through the offensive, which soon petered out.
Chacmool last edited by
There are many reasons for the failure of the Spring Offensive the nutritional status of the German Army, the Deciphering of German radio traffic by Georges Painvin, 1 mio CP Soldiers still hanging out in the East, but the main reason were the Strategic errors of the German leadership.
Ludendorffs decision to reinforce troops who encountered the stubborn resistance led to an improper use of the powers. The findings of the subsequent World War showed that to maximize the shock effect precisely those troops should be increased, which had already achieved the greatest success. Generally, the reserve management during the offensive was problematic, since only the troops in the front line were reinforced and that no full new units were brought there. This led to rapid fatigue of the deployed forces. Furthermore, the fixation of the General Staff only on the military concept of the breakthrough. The offensive had been planned by the OHL consistently methodically, but only up to the supposedly decisive goal, the shock through the enemy lines. An orderly plan for the exploitation of the resulting gaps, something like an (donÂ´t know whats it in english) “UmfassungsmanÃ¶ver” was not hit. The shock of the attack had been identified as shock troops tactically decisive factor, however, to use this principle as a strategic moment, was not considered.
Hey Flash, will you also simulate the Christmas Peace of 1914 ? Maybe with a little football on the map ?