I have never tried this but given it much thought over the years.
First of all, A J1DOW does not get Japan Hawaii. They can attack the USN there but not the harbor, unless you want to gamble with the Japanese 1INF + 1ART versus the American 2INF + 2FTR…
Nothing else can get there, so Japan should know Honolulu is out of reach.
This also means Panama is out of reach for the J2 since it is 3 away and Japan does have only 2 movement.
USA can indeed consolidate and build a fleet in WUS.
What follows is a war of attrition and Japan can only hope to at least compete with the US buildup in WUS by fully focusing on this theatre. The DEI will permanently be India + ANZAC and the Chinese will be having a much easier time (especially with the massive aid from India).
I don’t think Japan can attack Panama even J3 because of pesky little ANZAC/USA blockers.
Hoping to get there J4, Japan must be using blockers itself to protect the IJN from the US-counterattack. Really, the fleet-advantage of Japan is not that big. Japanese LandBasedAircraft are the problem and they can only become a factor 2 turns later than Hawaii is taken, so J4 (J2 take Hawaii, J3 LBA rebases there, J4 they can start doing things).
This leaves the USA with 4 turns of production before Japan can start threatening all of the WUS, CUS and EUS at once, but since the Japanese LBA (now at Hawaii) cannot reach a single one of them yet, this will give the USA even 1 more turn of building up.
The Japanese LBA in Hawaii won’t even be able to attack the USN in SZ10, because there are not enough Japanese landing spots available.
So it is even not very unlikely that the USA will have 5 turns of production before Japan can finally project a threat to all the important US areas and to add insult to injury, a single allied blocker in SZ89 (the other side of the Panama-canal) prevents Japan from threatening EUS and CUS.
All this will give the USA a final 6 turns (!) of full production for its defences. If they build a lot of air and fleet units (Carriers and subs mostly) and a few land units, the USA can have a big enough army on land to make each and every landing short lived, or even outright prevent any. The USN should even be in shape to withstand the IJN + LBA, since during those 6 turns the USA will have had >400 IPCs to spend and Japan ~200.
So in the end for Japan this means investing everything into gaining nothing economically.
There is 1 big thing on the plus side though: no USA involvement in the Euro-war for 6 turns. Maybe the USA can spare a few resources to go into Europe but I think not. Whatever they are able to send into Europe will not matter much anyway.
AFAICS, the big strategical picture for this plan is a free hand for Germany + Italy in Europe for 6 to 10 turns (hard to predict anything beyond that 6 turn mark) and a strong China + India + ANZAC. The Axis will have to win the war in Europe because Japan is going to collapse. With no meaningful US involvement in Europe, Germany + Italy indeed will have no small chance of achieving victory. So I think this early Panama approach, even though doomed in itself, does serve a much stronger greater purpose.
So far my 2 cents in the bag of thoughts Â 8-).