FinsterniS wrote,
“Also the Japanese were already defeated, the “they would have not surrender”, is a very bad excuse…”
No, it is a very GOOD excuse (though I wouldn’t call this an “excuse”). Let’s take a look at those, quotes you used shall we?
“The Japanese were already defeated and ready to surrender. … The use of this barbarous weapon at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against Japan.”
This Chief of Staff seems to be contradicting others of the Allied Planners. First Hiroshima was a major military target, as stated by President himself. Hiroshima was a city of considerable military importance. It contained the 2nd Army Headquarters, which commanded the defense of all of southern Japan. The city was a communications center, a storage point, and an assembly area for troops. To quote a Japanese report, "Probably more than a thousand times since the beginning of the war did the Hiroshima citizens see off with cries of ‘Banzai’ the troops leaving from the harbor.
The city of Nagasaki had been one of the largest sea ports in southern Japan and was of great war-time importance because of its many and varied industries, including the production of ordnance, ships, military equipment, and other war materials. The narrow long strip attacked was of particular importance because of its industries. Nagasaki was the home to the very important Mitsubishi torpedo factory and Mitsubishi Steel and Arms Works.
Truman wanted the Atomic bomb to be a military weapon, not some weapon of malice to purposely spite the Japanese. Truman’s feelings that the bomb can be seen in his diary on 25 July 1945, in which he recorded that he had told “Sec. of War, Mr. Stimson, to use [the atomic bomb] so that military objectives and soldiers and sailors are the target and not women and children.”
“Japan was already defeated. …It wasn’t necessary to hit them with that awful thing.”
The second comment is fruitless. It would take a damn fool to notice that Japan had not been defeated by 1944, some say right after Midway for that matter. However, there’s a difference between being defeated and actually admitting it (ie surrendering). Even a defeated Japan was not ready to give in that easily. The Japanese began the stockpiling of aircraft, amassed a giant conscripted military force, and commenced the creation of a civilian army. This awe-inspiring army included "so-called ‘Sherman Carpets,’ children with dynamite strapped to their bodies and trained to throw themselves under American tanks. The Allies would be faced with the enormous task of destroying an armed force of five million and five thousand suicide aircraft, belonging to a race that had already amply demonstrated its ability to fight literally to the death.
Also, FinsterniS suggested showing the power of the bombing by dropping it in a desolate area with international observers or the dropping of the bomb on an unpopulated area of Japan. This alternative was brought up twice, once on 31 May 1945 at the Interim Committee Lunch and again in the Frank Committee report on 11 June 1945. The recommendation by the Scientific Panel (presided over by the four principal physicists involved in the Manhattan Project–Fermi, Lawrence, Compton and Oppenheimer) was to use the bomb only in “direct military use.” This recommendation was collectively embraced by Stimson, Truman, Byrnes, and others because they feared that the bomb might turn out to be a “dud” and thus prove counterproductive toward intimidating the Japanese, and also because there was a severe limit to the materials on hand. Stimson later wrote “we had no bombs to waste.” Also logistical problems had to be overcome. Allied military and political advisors were not sure the Japanese observers would be allowed to report the demonstration to the Japanese Emperor accurately (which was virtually a hostage of the Japanese Military War Council).
“Japan would have surrender, only if they knew the Emperor would have stay in power, the Japanese people fear the “unconditional surrender” which threatened the Emperor. For a shintoist, the Emperor is like Jesus for Christian, i am sure to protect Jesus a lots of Christians would have done the same thing.”
Again this is pure speculation. This option was discussed by many American officials, such as Joseph Grew and Harry Hopkins, who both believed that Japan was already on the verge of defeat. Admiral Leahy recommenced to Truman on 18 June 1945 that the demand for unconditional surrender be modified. Truman commented that he would think it over. In the end Truman did not accept this recommendation mainly because he feared that such a modification might “embolden the Japanese to fight on for better terms.”
As mentioned I before, the Emperor was more of a dupe to the Japanese War Council. On July 25 1945, Japanese Premier Kantaro Suzuki announced to the Japanese press and the Emperor that the Potsdam declaration of “complete annihilation” was to be ignored. The Magic Summaries (highest levels of Japanese code) further revealed that throughout June and July 1945, Japan’s militarist leaders were adamantly determined that they would never surrender unconditionally to the British and the Americans.
The Emperor later admitted it himself a quote regarding to the stormy sessions with the war advisors right before Japan surrendered. “There was no prospect of agreement no matter how many discussions they had…I was given the opportunity to express my own free will for the first time.”
If Japan had agreed on a Conditional Surrender, would the Japanese War Council (which were the real rulers of Imperial Japan) be tried for war crimes or granted amnesty? Would the “conditional surrender” leave those in power responsible for Japanese atrocities committed since the start of the Sino-Japanese war in 1937?