Poll - The surrender of France and the outcome of WWII

[CWO Marc]

@Private:

Thanks to all who voted or commented. 2/3 do not think France joining Axis was ever a possibility, which challenges my pet (and clearly ill-informed!) theory that Hitler made a mistake when he humiliated rather than courted defeated France.

A further point to consider is the “Would you buy a used car from this man?” issue.  In other words: given the track record of conquest by subversion, of conquest by aggression, of backstabbing, of policy reversals and of treaties signed-then-torn-up which Hitler had accumulated by June 1940, would anyone in France have believed or trusted Hitler if he’d tried to court them?

[Private-Panic]

Excellent points from both Narvik & Marc.

My theory was based not on any possibility of warm French feelings towards Hitler, but the lengths to which France might go to avoid the humiliations that Hitler would otherwise pile on them. A defensive (pseudo aggressive given a constructed provocation) alliance including troop commitments in return for territorial retention and a façade of sovereignty and self government? Encouraged by the extent to which Vichy forces resisted the Allies.

But I have accepted that the attractions of an unusual / innovative argument caused me to ignore too many facts.  Darn those facts!

[CWO Marc]

@Private:

My theory was based not on any possibility of warm French feelings towards Hitler, but the lengths to which France might go to avoid the humiliations that Hitler would otherwise pile on them. A defensive (pseudo aggressive given a constructed provocation) alliance including troop commitments in return for territorial retention and a façade of sovereignty and self government? Encouraged by the extent to which Vichy forces resisted the Allies.

The “to what lengths would France go to avoid humiliation?” angle you raise is an interesting point, and I think the answer would go something like this.  The answer is a bit long because it reflects a fundamental split in French society exemplified by the Petain/Vichy side and the de Gaulle / Free French side.  Both of these sides had to deal with an identical starting point: the fact that France had suffered a swift and comprehensive military defeat.  This was a massive humiliation for France, and nothing which Germany could have offered France would have expunged that memory – so in one sense it was impossible for France to “avoid” humiliation because by the time Petain’s representatives arrived at Compiegne for the surrender the country had already been humiliated.  Where the two sides differed sharply was how they dealt with what happened from that point onward.

Petain and the people around him were quite prepared to accept (and indeed did accept) the humiliation that Hitler heaped upon them at Compiegnes (an event which was designed to add insult to injury), even though they weren’t happy about it.  They did so partly because their priority was to end the fighting, and partly because they rationalized it by convincing themselves that they were in fact surrendering with honour.  The “territorial retention and facade of sovereignty and self government” you mentioned is in fact precisely what they got from the whole “unoccupied zone / Vichy France” thing, and this allowed Petain and his associates to maintain the fiction – in their own minds, if nowhere else – that they had salvaged France’s honor.

Over in Britain, where de Gaulle and the nucleus of the future Free French forces had taken refuge, the point of view was entirely different.  In their opinion, France had suffered two humiliations: the initial military defeat, and the Petain government’s “sell-out” to Germany – a sell-out which left half the country under German occupation and turned the other half into a collaborationist puppet state.  In their view, the only bit of honour which France had salvaged was the fact that they themselves had not surrendered, that they themselves (and the people in France who began to form the Resistance-- the “French Forces of the Interior” as they were later called) were determined to keep on fighting.  To them, the only thing which would eventually serve as an antidote to the humiliations France had suffered would be the liberation of the country from the Nazis and the institution of a new republic.

This is something which Churchill and Roosevelt never really understood (or only understood very late in the game) about de Gaulle.  They tended to see him as a politically ambitious general whose ultimate aim was to seize power in France – but in actual fact, his fundamental motivation was to restore France’s honour and dignity.  Interestingly, both Petain and de Gaulle regarded each other (and their respective sides) as traitors, and each took pride in what the other one was faulting him for – in other words, each man thought that he had done the honourable thing and that the other guy was doing something shameful.

[Private-Panic]

Thanks Marc.

Although I have given up on my argument I’ll attempt to clarify it. Vichy France does not represent the territorial retention and façade of sovereignty I was positing, as it was only half of France, the other half being ceded to Germany. The Vichy settlement was a humiliating peace on top of a humiliating defeat and so encouraged many patriots to resist when they could.

I was vaguely grasping at a “generous” peace settlement (following the humiliating defeat) which might allow enough of those same patriots to feel that France’s best interests lay with Germany rather than the UK, which had “abandoned” them.

If France could have been cajoled into an active Axis role before US entry into the war, then the what if implications begin to multiply.

I guess I particularly liked the possibility that Hitler’s biggest mistake might have been his treatment of France, even before the invasion of Russia.

[Narvik]

@Private:

……alliance including troop commitments in return for…

Franco only committed the Blue Division of 14000 men in return for a 3 year German commitment in the Civil War, and Mussolini send an Army Corps, not much in return compared to what Hitler send to Africa. Why should  France commit more than Spain and Italy ?

[Witt]

To start with they only went a Corps (CSIR) of 60000. But Italy sent the 8th Army in 42, comprising the best they had: the Alpine Corps and 2xxx to join the semi Mechanised CSIR. Over 220000 men went into the Ukraine, then onto Stalingrad as the Northern Shoulder of Germany’s 6th Army.
France would have had the Mechanised forces to go as far as the Italians. And would have been obliged to do do too. They would have been a Allied to Germany only in name. More of a puppet.

Hitler send more troops to Africa, once Stalingrad had been lost. He knew he had to do so. The next step for the Allies was Southern Europe. Italy.
Not sure Franco’s 41 and Hitler’s 43 commitment are a fair comparison.

[CWO Marc]

@Private:

I was vaguely grasping at a “generous” peace settlement (following the humiliating defeat) which might allow enough of those same patriots to feel that France’s best interests lay with Germany rather than the UK, which had “abandoned” them.
If France could have been cajoled into an active Axis role before US entry into the war, then the what if implications begin to multiply.

Thanks for the additional information.  I previously outlined my reasons for thinking that the consequences (particularly as regards Russia) would not have been significant even if Germany had managed to cajole France into joining the Axis after its defeat – but here I’ll add something about the general concept of peace terms so generous that they instantly turn bitter defeated adversaries into non-humiliated allies.  Frankly, I can’t think of any clear-cut historical examples of any victorious power pulling off such an accomplishment, even when we include progressive, democratic states (which Nazi Germany was most certainly not).

The closest parallel I can think of is the successful American post-WWII transformation of Germany (or rather West Germany) and Japan into staunch US allies – a process which took many years.  In Europe, this was accomplished partly through such measures as the Marshall Plan.  In Japan, it was done in part by allowing the Japanese to retain the Emperor as the symbolic head of state, with a purely ceremonial role (an arrangement acceptable to both sides), and as in Germany by helping the Japanese to rebuild their shattered country.  The Americans didn’t act out of pure altruism in each case (part of their motivation was to acquire allies as the Cold War with the USSR developed), but this doesn’t alter the fact that they poured billions of dollars into both countries and that they helped Germany and Japan transform themselves from dictatorships into democratic states.  Contrast this with Nazi Germany, which looted France (to the tune of millions of Reichsmarks per day in occupation taxes) and turned it into a bleak, authoritarian puppet state.

The point to take from this isn’t that Germany would have been wiser to offer more enlightened peace terms to France; the point is that Germany’s treatment of France is a lot closer to being typical of what conquerors tend to do to defeated enemies than America’s treatment of Germany and Japan.  The classic approach taken by conquerors is to annex pieces of the loser’s territory and to extract lots of money from the loser in the form of reparation payments – which is exactly what Germany did to France after the Franco-Prussian War, and what the Allies did to Germany after WWI.  So from that perspective, it’s the American treatment of Germany and Japan after WWII which is the exception rather than the norm.

Leonard Wibberley made fun of this unusual approach to handling defeated enemies in his clever 1955 satirical novel The Mouse That Roared (which was later made into a heavy-handed farcical film of the same name).  In the novel, a fictitious European micro-state which is facing bankruptcy – its prized wine industry is being undersold by a cheap Californian knock-off product – decides to solve its economic problems by declaring war on the United States.  This plan is based on the premise that Americans are strange people who act with inexplicable generosity towards their vanquished foes.  The leaders of the Dutchy of Grand Fenwick figure that if they declare war against America on Tuesday, the Dutchy will be defeated by Wednesday (its army consists of only a few dozens guys armed with longbows), and the Americans will then start pouring economic aid into the country by Thursday or Friday.  (The plan goes off the rails, by the way, when Grand Fenwick ends up accidentally winning the war, leading its Duchess to angrily ask her First Minister if this means that Grand Fenwick will have to give economic aid to the United States.)

[Private-Panic]

@CWO:

Frankly, I can’t think of any clear-cut historical examples of any victorious power pulling off such an accomplishment, even when we include progressive, democratic states (which Nazi Germany was most certainly not).Â

There are some historical examples of former enemies swiftly becoming allies, but an enemy is not the same as a defeated enemy I agree. The element of defeat will create additional barriers, but the need to get those “generous” peace terms might also provide some impetus.

Such swift alliances generally require a threat from a greater enemy. I guess that the UK’s actions in France’s overseas territories and against their Med fleet might have generated sufficient animosity if the resulting conflict had been bloodier and more extended than loyalty to the Vichy “rump” would allow.

But I am clutching at straws.

I have a vague memory of seeing The Mouse That Roared many years ago. Sounds like I should try the book. :-)

[CWO Marc]

@Private:

I have a vague memory of seeing The Mouse That Roared many years ago. Sounds like I should try the book.

The book has a more sophisticated tone than the film.  The humour in the novel is written with a light touch, whereas the film lacks subtlety.  It also helps that, in the book, the ruler of the country – called Dutchess Gloriana XII, if I recall correctly – is an attractive young woman who takes her duties seriously…not (as in the film) Peter Sellers in drag acting like a half-senile Queen Victoria.

[Gargantua]

but here I’ll add something about the general concept of peace terms so generous that they instantly turn bitter defeated adversaries into non-humiliated allies.  Frankly, I can’t think of any clear-cut historical examples of any victorious power pulling off such an accomplishment, even when we include progressive, democratic states (which Nazi Germany was most certainly not).

It’s not a national level example, but Genghis Khan was famous for re-employing embittered generals that he defeated on the battlefield in lieu of executing them.  Once said generals worked for Genghis, their ‘surrendered’ troops would then still fight for the same general, who had lost no honor or respect.

It’s how the largest land empire the world has ever seen was created.  An army that grew larger after each conflict.

Note however - that Genghis executed any officers who turned on their commanders.  Loyalty was the valued commodity.

[Narvik]

@Gargantua:

It’s not a national level example, but Genghis Khan was famous for re-employing embittered generals that he defeated on the battlefield in lieu of executing them.�  Once said generals worked for Genghis, their ‘surrendered’ troops would then still fight for the same general, who had lost no honor or respect.

It’s how the largest land empire the world has ever seen was created.�  An army that grew larger after each conflict.

Note however - that Genghis executed any officers who turned on their commanders.�  Loyalty was the valued commodity.

You cant compare the Bronze age with WWII. There were no states or nations back then, just tribes and the occasional kingdom. Petain cooperated with the Germans and he was hanged for being a traitor after the war. Back in the Bronze age days a warrior could change side, back and forth, and that was not a problem to anyone. But today, if I as an ethnic European living in a free democratic country, want to join a foreign military unit in Africa as a contractor, then I am a criminal and my country put me in jail. So I guess the average Frenchman back in 1940 was not keen on being hanged or face the wall as a traitor when Germany would eventually lose the war

[aequitas-et-veritas]

@Narvik:

Yes it is correct that a fistful of killers and psykos, accidentally born in France, joined the SS so they could kill other people for fun and not go to jail for it, but the % of rational Frenchmen in SS was the lowest in Europe.

Dear Narvik, please do not mix up SS with Waffen SS.

@Narvik:

@Gargantua:

It’s not a national level example, but Genghis Khan was famous for re-employing embittered generals that he defeated on the battlefield in lieu of executing them.� Â Once said generals worked for Genghis, their ‘surrendered’ troops would then still fight for the same general, who had lost no honor or respect.

It’s how the largest land empire the world has ever seen was created.� Â An army that grew larger after each conflict.

Note however - that Genghis executed any officers who turned on their commanders.�  Loyalty was the valued commodity.

You cant compare the Bronze age with WWII. There were no states or nations back then, just tribes and the occasional kingdom. Petain cooperated with the Germans and he was hanged for being a traitor after the war. Back in the Bronze age days a warrior could change side, back and forth, and that was not a problem to anyone. But today, if I as an ethnic European living in a free democratic country, want to join a foreign military unit in Africa as a contractor, then I am a criminal and my country put me in jail. So I guess the average Frenchman back in 1940 was not keen on being hanged or face the wall as a traitor when Germany would eventually lose the war

So Légion étrangère is a corpse full of criminals??

[calvinhobbesliker]

@Narvik:

@Gargantua:

It’s not a national level example, but Genghis Khan was famous for re-employing embittered generals that he defeated on the battlefield in lieu of executing them.�  Once said generals worked for Genghis, their ‘surrendered’ troops would then still fight for the same general, who had lost no honor or respect.

It’s how the largest land empire the world has ever seen was created.�  An army that grew larger after each conflict.

Note however - that Genghis executed any officers who turned on their commanders.�  Loyalty was the valued commodity.

You cant compare the Bronze age with WWII. There were no states or nations back then, just tribes and the occasional kingdom. Petain cooperated with the Germans and he was hanged for being a traitor after the war. Back in the Bronze age days a warrior could change side, back and forth, and that was not a problem to anyone. But today, if I as an ethnic European living in a free democratic country, want to join a foreign military unit in Africa as a contractor, then I am a criminal and my country put me in jail. So I guess the average Frenchman back in 1940 was not keen on being hanged or face the wall as a traitor when Germany would eventually lose the war

Wasn’t Petain pardoned by de Gaulle?

[CWO Marc]

@calvinhobbesliker:

Wasn’t Petain pardoned by de Gaulle?

As I recall, de Gaulle commuted Petain’s death sentence (handed out by the court when Petain was convicted of high treason or something along those lines) to life imprisonment.  Petain did indeed spend the rest of his life (which didn’t amount to many more years) behind bars, though I think that he was moved to less harsh facilities during his last few months as he sank into advanced senility.

[KurtGodel7]

I voted that France could have been persuaded to join the Axis, and that this could have affected the outcome of WWII.

The key psychological moment was when Britain attacked the French fleet. Imagine this scenario: a day or two after that attack, Hitler approaches Petain with a proposal. France becomes a full member of the Axis, and declares war on Britain. In exchange, Hitler returns Paris to French control. (While maintaining German occupation over most of the rest of northern France.)

The second step in getting France to fight for the Axis would consist of returning the rest of northern France to French control in exchange for a French declaration of war against the Soviet Union. Plus a major troop commitment to that front, to prevent the declaration of war from being a mere formality.

I’m less than 100% certain that the French would have accepted the above-described offers. But I feel those proposals would have represented Germany’s best chance for getting France to fight for the Axis. (Especially if they were coupled with promises of French acquisition of British colonial territory in Africa.)

As for the idea that France would never fight against the Western democracies or in favor of the Axis: it did both those things in the early stages of Operation Torch. The United States lost about 500 soldiers fighting against France; and France lost over 1300 soldiers fighting against the Americans. On the surface, those numbers imply that American soldiers were about 2.5x more combat-effective than the French. However, other factors may have contributed to that seemingly one-sided exchange ratio, such as Allied air attacks against French soldiers. But even if that 2.5x ratio is an accurate assessment of the relative combat effectiveness of French and American soldiers, it still would have meant that French soldiers would have been about as combat-effective as their would-be Soviet opponents.

France deployed 144 divisions in the Battle of France. It experienced 360,000 dead or wounded, and 1.9 million captured. In other words: the vast bulk of French soldiers had not been killed or injured, but rather were in German custody, or else had escaped either fate and were physically located in Vichy France. Given those data, Vichy France could have assembled about 100 divisions for use against the Soviet Union. Also, French artillery was very good. French tanks were not particularly mobile, but were heavily armored; and would have been useful in the “heavy tank” role in major battles.

By the late fall of '41 the Red Army consisted of 600 divisions, about 400 of which were deployed on its western front against Germany. (The others were either on its eastern front to guard against Japanese invasion, or were in training/reserve.) Due to steady losses, its usual size would be 450 divisions–with 500,000 men added each month to replace losses. In the summer of '41, the German Army consisted of 150 divisions–100 of which had been sent east to fight the Soviet Union.

German soldiers were even more combat-effective than American soldiers. To the extent that Operation Torch was an accurate reflection of French soldiers’ combat-effectiveness, those 100 German divisions on the eastern front would have been much more valuable than 100 French divisions. However, Germany came very close to taking Leningrad in '41, and came close to taking Moscow later in ‘41. Perhaps 100 extra French divisions would have made the difference between failure and success. The fall of those two cities would have weakened Soviets’ ability to resist the Axis in ‘42. That–plus the benefit of French support–could have paved the way for a successful Axis invasion of the Caucasus and its oilfields. With Leningrad, Moscow, and the Caucasus in German hands, Hitler would have been in position to negotiate peace terms with Stalin. Stalin might well have agreed to peace, on the theory that 1.5 years of war would have brought him nothing but losses, and on the theory that the loss of Moscow’s industrial capacity and the Caucasus’ oil would have rendered future victories far less likely.

The French naval presence could also have had an impact on that eastern front. One of Germany’s biggest problems was the British food blockade. The French navy could have helped it break that blockade–at least in the Mediterranean. While the breaking of the blockade in the Mediterranean alone would not have solved Germany’s food problems, it would have made the food situation somewhat less dire. In the actual war, the dire food situation in German-occupied Soviet territory seemed to reinforce Soviet claims that the Germans had launched a war of racial extermination. If the food situation in those territories could have been improved upon, the German invasion might have seemed like a liberation from the brutality and terror of Stalin’s evil regime. Even with the food situation as bad as it was, 1 million Soviet citizens served in units directly or indirectly controlled by the German Army. Boosting that number to 2 - 4 million could have significantly altered the situation on Germany’s eastern front.

[Private-Panic]

Thanks for the well informed post KG7. Nice to know that someone with your level of knowledge is able to support my ill-informed hypothesis!