Sorry, I forgot I posted here.
Well, I suppose some disclosure is in order. I used to work as an international affairs analyst in the region, touching in heavy measure on China-U.S.-Taiwan trilateral relations. From my experience, SUD and Mary are more on target in their opinions. Economically, China is playing a waiting game, but it’s not quite so simple. Economic integration is one thing, but China is concerned that this will occur without political integration, which is of primary concern. They rattle their saber, yes, but they still aren’t quite adept at it. Recall that in the 1996 and 2000 elections, their plans backfired. Similarly, the CCP’s passage of an anti-separation law which justified its use of force was a key factor in scuttling the European effort to lift the conventional arms ban. They still aren’t quite that good at understanding the subtleties of democratic politics, and they’re not quite as patient as SUD and Mary have suggested.
Secondly, the military balance. Current reports put China and Taiwan at near parity, with a slight edge going to Taiwan. Around 2008 to 2012, China will gain a decisive advantage over Taiwan. However, in terms of tactics, the U.S. does not need to launch a conventional invasion, and, if it does get involved, I seriously doubt it will. Look at the purchases that Taiwan has made recently: surface to surface missiles, short range interceptors, a big push for submarines and especially the Aegis destroyer system. These are weapons geared to delay or prevent a naval invasion. China also doesn’t really have a comprehensive seaborne landing capability. And in war gaming calculations, this, combined with Taiwan’s superior command and control and targeting systems, is what gives the island its current advantage. As such, U.S. intervention need only bolster that capability, not launch an invasion. I also referred to Summer Pulse '04, where the U.S. moved seven of its 12 carrier groups into the region simultaneously and largely undetected until they were right in the South China Sea. The CCP, while railing against the move, openly admitted that it could at most handle 3-4 groups (at a stretch), but would be easily overwhelmed by seven. Similarly, the detection by Japan of a Chinese sub far off its shores indicated to Beijing that they still have a long way to go in maritime capability. Also, the imminent introduction of the F-22, which is projected to have complete air superiority until 2050, as well as the JSF, further ensures an American ability to intervene.
Moreover, you all are assuming that China will invade. Given this trilateral (and perhaps soon quadralateral) military balance, the PRC is unlikely to do so without greater political signals that the U.S. and maybe Japan will keep out. As such, a more logical scenario, in case the DPP declares independence, is that China will launch a couple missiles at military and maybe civilian targets and attempt to force a mass revolt against the Taiwanese government. The problem here is escalation. There have been rumors that Taiwan is developing a ballistic missile capability. Given its superior guidance systems, there is probably a chance of quick escalation which results in quite a bit of destruction. But I’m not certain how much this will escalate into a full scale invasion.
A couple small points: as far as I know, China does not hold the majority of US foreign debt. That’s Japan, at least as of last year. Also, I haven’t touched upon Sino-American economic and political relations, and that’s partly purposeful. I don’t have time right now, and I think the military aspect is more relevant. That said, the economic and political avenues do erode U.S. leverage, and in this sense, SUD and Mary are right, but only to a limit. A point on cyberspace warfare: it’s really hard, in part because the U.S. also has a decisive military and technological advantage over the EM spectrum. I don’t know if I find it convincing, especially since the “.com” assigner is a U.S. based institution. Eminent domain readily comes into play there, and the U.S. could shut down every site in a hostile nation pegged to the web in that way, given sufficient provocation. Finally, China is not going to invade Taiwan if the US pulls out of Iraq. Please, be serious here. If anything, China will be less likely to invade if the U.S. pulls out, as greater force capabilities can be brought to bear. And the “cut and run” plan, aside from being a misreading of Murtha’s comments, has actually been concurrently advanced by those in DOD (where do you think those leaks come from?).
