@aequitas:
The Allies didn’t pull off Overlord all by them self, it was an inside job.
“The Allies didn’t pull off Overlord all by them self, it was an inside job” is a little vague, and I’m having trouble understanding precisely what this is meant to imply. “Inside job” presumably refers to the German side, and probably more specifically to senior political and/or military leadership of Nazi Germany, which is what I’m going to assume; if you mean somthing else, could you clarify what you’re refering to?
If the theory being proposed here is that the success or failure of the D-Day invasion depended entirely, or even to a significant degree, on conspiratorial machinations by anti-Nazi elements within Germany itself, I have trouble buying that argument. Were there such anti-Nazi elements within Germany itself? Of course there were, and that’s no secret; to pick just the most famous example, the almost-successful plot of July 20, 1944, to assassinate Hitler and stage a coup d’etat has been the subject of many books and movies (including a 2008 one starring Tom Cruise, for goodness sake). And it’s likewise no secret that the German units manning the Atlantic Wall on D-Day included foreign conscripts of dubious quality or loyalty; as I recall, Cornelius Ryan mentions this in his book The Longest Day, which came out in the late 1950s. There’s also nothing improbable about the notion that, on D-Day itself, there some German officers and some German soldiers who privately hoped that the Allied landings would be successful and who, perhaps, even tried to gum up the German response in minor ways that weren’t too obvious (in order to avoid detection and, most likely, summary trial and execution). It’s quite a stretch, however, to extrapolate these things into the theory (if that’s what’s being implied) that they were the decisive factors in the ultimate success of Overlord – or even further, the theory that Overlord was primarily a German anti-Nazi operation rather than an Allied military operation. In my opinion, the most significant contributions made by the Germans to the success of D-Day were the contributions they made through various strategic and tactical errors, compounded by such factors as (for example) the dysfunctional command structure which prevented German’s panzer reserves from being released without the express authorization of Hitler.
The “Dolchstosslegende” mentioned in your later post, by the way, is very puzzling because it has nothing to do with D-Day or even with WWII. It’s a reference to the post-WWI German popular theory (Hitler was quite fond of it) that Germany wasn’t really defeated militarily in WWI, but rather was “stabbed in the back” by traitorous senior German politicians. And note that “Dolchstosslegende” translates as “back-stab legend”, which is in line with the conventional view that this is a mythological interpretation of why Germany lost WWI.
