• On paper – and I stress the “on paper” part – Germany, Italy and Japan did have plans to divide up the world between themselves, at least insofar as definining their respective zones of military operations.  These plans were part of a secret military agreement reached between Japan, Germany and Italy on 18 January 1942.  A translation of the text of the agreement is given in Appendix D of the book Reluctant Allies: German-Japanese Naval Relations in World War II (U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2001).  The section of the agreement concerning the division of zones of operations reads:


    The German and Italian armed forces, as well as the Japanese army and navy, will, within the framework of the zones allocated to them hereinafter, carry out the required operations.

    1. Japan

    a. The waters to the east of approximately 70 degrees east longitude up to the west coast of the American Continent, as well as the continents and islands located in these waters (Australia, Dutch East Indies, New Zealand, etc.).

    b. The Continent of Asia, east of approximately 70 degrees east longitude.

    2. Germany and Italy

    a. The waters to the west of approximately 70 degrees east longitude up to the east coast of the American Continent, as well as the continents and island located in these waters (Africa, Iceland, etc.).

    b. The Near East, the Middle East, and Europe west of approximately 70 degrees east longitude.

    3. In the Indian Ocean, each side may carry out operations across the above-agreed boundary according to the situation.


    Even though this agreement merely defines zones of military operations (as opposed to dividing up the world for purposes of conquest and occupation), it’s still a rather optimistic aspirational document; as far as the Eurasian landmass is concerned, it doesn’t reflect realistically how far to the east Germany could have advanced nor how far to the west Japan could have advanced.

    In its campaigns in the Pacific and Southeast Asia from December 1941 to May 1942, Japan gave the US and the UK and the Netherlands the impression that Japan was a military juggernaut…but Japan’s campaigns against China and Russia in the period from 1937 to 1941 paint a different picture.  Despite the fact that Japan was unified, regimented, industrialized country with fairly advanced military technology, and that China in contrast was a politically fragmented, industrially backward, militarily weak country, Japan never managed to conquer more than about a third of China, even though on paper it should have beaten the pants off of both Chiang and Mao.  And Japan did even worse in its undeclared Manchurian/Mongolian border wars against the USSR in the late 30s and early 40s; it failed to make territorial gains of any significance, and in the last of those conflicts it got trounced by the Soviets (headed by an at-the-time relatively obscure general named Georgi Zhukov).  The USSR was in quite a different league from China, both industrially and militarily, and it showed.  Japan had been operating on the basis of the fond memories it had of the years immediately after WWI, when it had occupied some significant stretches of real estate in Eastern Russia, and Japan had fantasies of recapturing those past glories; those fantasies, by one account, included controlling all the Russian territory east of Lake Baikal.  In their only attempt to turn those fantasies into reality, however (meaning the border wars I’ve mentioned), the Japanese failed lamentably and they eventually agreed to a non-aggression pact with the Soviets.

  • '22 '20 '19 '18 '17 '16 '15 '14 '12

    Returning to “If Moscow fell…”

    I am a big reader of the eastern front, so I like to think I have some knowledge on this.

    I think if Moscow fell, the Soviet Union would have been thrown into major disarray.  Looking at the transport maps of Russia, Moscow was the major hub.  Supplying and reinforcing much of the front would have become exponentially harder. Leningrad and the entire north/western sector would have been cutoff and then withered and surrendered.  The south had the Volga some better rail-links directly eastward, but not much.

    Yes, Stalin would have fallen further back and probably continued fighting, but further major fighting would have likely only been possible on the Moscow-Gorky Axis.  This would have favored the Germans going on the defensive and letting the remnant Russians ram their heads into the wall.

    Finally, Stalin would have had to have faced the political implications of losing the capitol.  The Soviet government wasn’t entirely monolithic, and I could imagine creeping dissent starting to bubble up, especially from the southern and eastern republics (which did happen during the real war, although the dissenters were brutally suppressed).

    So, I think capturing Moscow would have lead to an eventual victory in the east.  It wouldn’t have been immediate, but it would have gutted the USSR’s ability to continue fighting regardless of their continued build up.

    (Of course I say that acknowledging the possibility Hitler, upon victory, would have stupidly withdrawn forces for other adventures leaving the door open for a Russian resurgence.  Pacifying and effectively securing the east would have taken many years.)


  • But didn’t the Russians have major producing factories in the Urals and with some time would of pushed back the Germans with or without Stalin. Germany would be a long way from home so they would need to build there own Factories in Russia to keep up with the demand.


  • @Karl7:

    Returning to “If Moscow fell…”

    I am a big reader of the eastern front, so I like to think I have some knowledge on this.

    I think if Moscow fell, the Soviet Union would have been thrown into major disarray.  Looking at the transport maps of Russia, Moscow was the major hub.  Supplying and reinforcing much of the front would have become exponentially harder. Leningrad and the entire north/western sector would have been cutoff and then withered and surrendered.  The south had the Volga some better rail-links directly eastward, but not much.

    Yes, Stalin would have fallen further back and probably continued fighting, but further major fighting would have likely only been possible on the Moscow-Gorky Axis.  This would have favored the Germans going on the defensive and letting the remnant Russians ram their heads into the wall.

    Finally, Stalin would have had to have faced the political implications of losing the capitol.  The Soviet government wasn’t entirely monolithic, and I could imagine creeping dissent starting to bubble up, especially from the southern and eastern republics (which did happen during the real war, although the dissenters were brutally suppressed).

    So, I think capturing Moscow would have lead to an eventual victory in the east.  It wouldn’t have been immediate, but it would have gutted the USSR’s ability to continue fighting regardless of their continued build up.

    (Of course I say that acknowledging the possibility Hitler, upon victory, would have stupidly withdrawn forces for other adventures leaving the door open for a Russian resurgence.  Pacifying and effectively securing the east would have taken many years.)

    Thank you for the input. This is not my area of expertise.
    “Pacifying and effectively securing the east would have taken many years.” Adding to this, unlike Lenningrad, which was just under siege for years, the Germans attempted to actually CAPTURE Stalingrad. Heavy fighting in an urbanized industrial stronghold, where the defenders used the rubble to further their defense. To take Moscow seems an even bigger nightmare. House-to-house fighting, and snipers and booby-traps. Lets say the Germans did capture it…holding this would be a nightmare I can imagine. The area is so vast around the city, the Russians could counterattack supply lines leaving the Germans besieged in an unfriendly city.

    The amount of time needed to secure and pacify the area would require a huge garrisons and time for the Russians to work out their own supply lines from their new center of operations. Again, this isn’t my area of expertise, but I’m just throwing things out there.


  • You are forgetting something. Moscow did in fact fell in 1812 when Napoleon took it. But that did not matter, because Russia is not centralized like France. Every time Paris fell, France fell to. But Russia is different. When Napoleon captured Moscow, the Russians just burned it down. This too happened during winter, so Napoleons army had to walk back home to France, and we all know that history.

    So what I think, the battle of Moscow would be like that one in Stalingrad, streets to streets, and at some time maybe Stalin would retreat his HQ to Jekaterinburg in the Urals, this city was in fact a communist stronghold during the revolution in 1917, so no change of any uprising there.

    Now lets have a look at the numbers. The economics of WWII by Mark Harrison. The USSR Gross Domestic Production, from now GDP, was 359 billion dollars in 1938, inclining to 417 billion dollars in 1940 when it reach the peak, and falling to 318 billion dollars at the low in 1942. Now, the military production dont reflect this, USSR had mobilized 5 000 000 men in 1940, increasing to 11 000 000 men in 1942, and 12 000 000 the next year. Even production of tanks and rifle did increase, coming from the new factories east of Ural. Stalin just raised the military outlay and burden, on expense of the civillian life. The Russian losses from the occupied part of USSR in 1942 was 134 billion dollars, and a population of 62 400 000 people. But that people were not Russians. They were Ukraineans, Belorussians, Baltic people and a lot of minorities, like Poles etc. Mainland Russia was almost not effected.

    The German gains was very limited. The gain from France was like 20 billion dollars, and the gain from occupied USSR was even less. Germany occupied scorched earth, the factories was bombed, cities was burned down, the people killed or refugees. War dont pay off. The German GDP was 384 billion dollars in 1939, increasing to 387 in 1941, and to 417 billion dollars in 1942. And at this time, German manpower even started to get drained. Meanwhile, USA had raised the GDP from 800 billion dollars in 1938 to 1 500 billion dollars in 1944, more than 3 times the production of Germany, and USA was just in the start, had more to go. Japan never was very strong, and could never make any difference.

    Hope this answered your question, man

  • '22 '20 '19 '18 '17 '16 '15 '14 '12

    @Narvik:

    You are forgetting something. Moscow did in fact fell in 1812 when Napoleon took it. But that did not matter, because Russia is not centralized like France. Every time Paris fell, France fell to. But Russia is different. When Napoleon captured Moscow, the Russians just burned it down. This too happened during winter, so Napoleons army had to walk back home to France, and we all know that history.

    So what I think, the battle of Moscow would be like that one in Stalingrad, streets to streets, and at some time maybe Stalin would retreat his HQ to Jekaterinburg in the Urals, this city was in fact a communist stronghold during the revolution in 1917, so no change of any uprising there.

    Now lets have a look at the numbers. The economics of WWII by Mark Harrison. The USSR Gross Domestic Production, from now GDP, was 359 billion dollars in 1938, inclining to 417 billion dollars in 1940 when it reach the peak, and falling to 318 billion dollars at the low in 1942. Now, the military production dont reflect this, USSR had mobilized 5 000 000 men in 1940, increasing to 11 000 000 men in 1942, and 12 000 000 the next year. Even production of tanks and rifle did increase, coming from the new factories east of Ural. Stalin just raised the military outlay and burden, on expense of the civillian life. The Russian losses from the occupied part of USSR in 1942 was 134 billion dollars, and a population of 62 400 000 people. But that people were not Russians. They were Ukraineans, Belorussians, Baltic people and a lot of minorities, like Poles etc. Mainland Russia was almost not effected.

    The German gains was very limited. The gain from France was like 20 billion dollars, and the gain from occupied USSR was even less. Germany occupied scorched earth, the factories was bombed, cities was burned down, the people killed or refugees. War dont pay off. The German GDP was 384 billion dollars in 1939, increasing to 387 in 1941, and to 417 billion dollars in 1942. And at this time, German manpower even started to get drained. Meanwhile, USA had raised the GDP from 800 billion dollars in 1938 to 1 500 billion dollars in 1944, more than 3 times the production of Germany, and USA was just in the start, had more to go. Japan never was very strong, and could never make any difference.

    Hope this answered your question, man

    Good points.

    I would respond that warfare of 1812 was vastly different from that of 1941.  The major difference being in 1812 you didn’t maintain a constant and continuous front that had to continuously be supplied and organized.  Losing Moscow didn’t mean in 1812 what is meant in 1941.  It wasn’t even the capitol in 1812.  The armies were much smaller and relied more on forage than direct supply (although supply was starting to become important).

    Further, Napoleon invaded basically on one narrow Axis: Kovno to Moscow. There was no broad invasion threatening multiple points. Thus losing ground or cities to Napoleon’s advance didn’t threaten other sectors.  Giving up Moscow in 1812 didn’t mean that St. Petersburg was now threatened.  Quite the opposite in 1941.  If Moscow fell, all other sectors, especially the north west of the USSR would be under serious threat.

    Taking Moscow in 1941 meant the Soviets would have to fall back to Gorky for their next major jumping off point for major offensives.  That’s over 200 miles back and then that much further to all points south and north than from Moscow.

    Would taking Moscow have meant the immediate collapse of the USSR?  Probably not.  But it would have pushed the Soviets far enough back that Germany could then go on the strategic defensive in a holding pattern around Moscow. The Germans then could easily conquer all points north and south while the Soviets rammed their heads into the defensive wall around Moscow.  In 1941, Moscow was the proverbial “center position” that controlled access to all other points.

    Also, I don’t think Moscow would be like Stalingrad.  Stalingrad was initially a secondary objective of the 1942 offensive, basically a city the Germans wanted to protect the flank of the Caucasus invasion.  Thus the German thrust was not a maximal effort, allowing time for the Soviets to reinforce.  Further, the Volga presented a natural defensive break from which the Soviets could drip reinforcements into the city without fear of having these resupply points attacked.  If things went according to plan, Moscow would have been enveloped, cutting it off from reinforcements and then cleared, sure in house to house fighting, but not as prolonged or vicious.

    That’s what I postulate. But, hey, reasonable people could disagree.


  • Mostly all fine. Very good Points and Arguments, Karl.
    You did your homework :-D

  • '17 '16 '15

    Don’t know if Japan would’ve declared. Probably would’ve increased the chance of it anyway. Even if it fell after they attacked Pearl Harbor, they still might have. Not that they would probably have had much success, other than tying down some soviet forces, which would be success enough. Especially as far as the Germans were concerned.

    Good chance Turkey jumps in as well and who knows maybe Spain gets on the bandwagon too. Obviously none of those things are going to help Russia.

    Still no guarantee Russia would’ve quit or even lost. Definitely would be much more difficult. Idk if others do it, but sometimes I make the mistake of thinking of Nations as unfeeling. Not impacted by emotions when they make decisions. Obviously that’s completely false. If the above events occurred, would most likely have been pretty devastating for morale. For all the Allies.


  • Turkey actually wanted to join the Allies several times during WWII but each time the Allies rejected their Just Cause and asked that they remained neutral as that would actually work more favorably for the Allies. Turkey for example wanted to join the Allies and then proceed to liberate Eastern Europe and the Middle East. I read that UK wasn’t favorable about this because it screamed Ottoman Empire again since the areas they wanted to ex Ottoman territories. However, the US and USSR wanted them to remain neutral because they were afraid that if Turkey join the Allies, it would allow Italy and Germany to attack USSR territories next to the Black Sea which would allow those navies to reinforce Romania’s navy and knock out USSR med fleet (which is ignored in almost every AnA game for some reason) and since the Wehrmacht destroyed France, the Allies assumed they would walk all over Turkish military and now have a “land” access to the Middle East which UK did not want and neither did USSR because it would give oil nations to Germany and they could attack USSR from the south.


  • As for Spain, history is basically in agreement that Franco wouldn’t join the Axis unless he got everything he wanted which was former French colonies in Africa and Gibraltar.

  • '21 '20 '18 '17

    Everyone has an interesting point of view and comments here.

    Moscow as a lynchpin, is given too much emphasis by its enemies, and by commentators before and since.  Yes, the loss of Moscow would have been a major blow to the USSR, but as the Ural-Plan and Barbarossa show, no one angle of attack or attained objective can put such a massive nation, industry and people out of the game no matter how much materiel is destroyed or relocated or manpower lost.  This also demonstrates why strategic bombing, destruction of physical assets (or even a nuclear attack) without more cannot defeat a nation in a total war.

    Moscow falls, symbolic victory etc. lets for the sake of argument presume that Stalingrad fell, now its 1942 and the German’s “won” at a massive cost in lives and materiel, and critically, time, and they still have many more such pyrrhic “victories” left to fight, attempting to hold and pacify such a gigantic nation.  Even if they’d kept Von Paulus’ Army, the armor, air and men were totally exhausted and its hard to imagine a cakewalk victory over any one of these theatres, much less all of them.  Without replacing the leadership that kept driving these pyrrhic and unsustainable efforts…how can we imagine a different set of outcomes?

    I don’t think the USSR or other Allies would have sought a peace, because there was no hope of constraining Germany to any borders or conditions by such a peace, and no way to enforce it without Germany first defeating itself through attrition.

    I don’t think war would not have ended there, ts equally plausible that even after 2 or even 10 such “victories” (and there were many victories) that there would be 10 more required to disintegrate the Soviet Union.    In fact, the national defense of the USSR seems to have solidified its philosophical conception, unified it, killed off a lot of potential opposition (in multiple ways) and probably empowered it quite a bit by focusing it on external, rather than internal strife.

    The idea that Japan could have effectively invaded the Soviet Union seems implausible.  1) there was nothing of economic or strategic interest in that area at that time for over a thousand miles west, endless untapped wilderness  2) Japanese power projection away from the sea and mechanization were deeply wanting whereas the Soviets had heaps of well-suited irregular troops and a sweet new railroad leading right to the front 3) all Japan’s efforts were long term tied up by a huge, endless intervention in the most populous nation on earth and could not be redirected without major consequences (loss of manchuquo, former UK areas) 4) Japan had looked from sea to land, land to sea, back and forth until they were defeated everywhere 5) both the USSR and USA dwarf Japan in terms of economic power and projection and those were all new all-in enemies for 1941.

    Even if they’d been foolish enough to attack, it still may have done little to affect the Russian economy, as they could simply scorch earth and hide behind literally thousands of miles of tundra and boreal forest without any roads.

    One last thing to mention is that the Axis’ and their leadership had great contempt for Russia and the United States, considering them weak and not unified.    This belief was a major undoing, as the conduct of the actual war did not support this view, at all.

  • '17 '16 '15

    @taamvan:

    …One last thing to mention is that the Axis’ and their leadership had great contempt for Russia and the United States, considering them weak and not unified.    This belief was a major undoing, as the conduct of the actual war did not support this view, at all.

    heh heh reminds me of a WW II German vet my OM worked with. He said “I was brought up to believe Americans were weak. Then i moved to Minnesota” lol


  • Well the reason why the Axis was foolish enough to think that the West and USSR wouldn’t work with each other is because the West tried to to destroy Communism in the 20-40’s by support the exact opposite side of any conflict involving Communism and you have to remember that the Axis and Allies had their military’s in the Soviet Union trying to destroy the Red Army while supporting the White Army during the Civil War.

    As for Germany conquest, Germany never intended to drive the Wehrmacht to Soviet Far East, they wanted the large cities in the west and push the Red Army pasted the Ural Mountains and just hold on those lands and hope USSR would eventually seek peace otherwise force to depend on attrition warfare as that was already working in favor for the Axis during the opening invasion. Japan just wanted to cease moment and invade USSR in the east if Stalingrad fell as they figured engaging Soviet Eastern Army would not have support in the long run and it would be easy for the Japanese navy to easily support the Army in the invasion. The real problem is that if USSR did get invaded by Japan, it would put USSR as a direct ally with the US in Asia so the question really would be, would Stalin allow US forces on Soviet lands?


  • Stalin would not have surrendered, and while the psychological impact of losing the capital sucks… that would not have won the Germans the war.  The biggest impact from losing Moscow would be that it was the central hub of the railways for the USSR.  That in and of itself may have caused Russia to collapse.  It would be like the U.S. losing Chicago.  While Chicago is an important US industrial city, the biggest ramification of its loss would be to cut the US in 2.

    I think it would have taken a one, two punch from losing Moscow and Stalingrad to force a Russian surrender.  Loss of its major rail hub and the Volga would have split up the Russians too much and Germany could have divided and conquered.


  • As for the statement that there isn’t resources in the eastern USSR that Japan couldn’t take is factually inaccurate, do people forget that Japan was in eastern USSR stealing coal until 1922?

  • '21 '20 '18 '17

    This is minor stuff though sir, in the 20th century world there were so many areas where they were driving back and forth over untold riches and resources they didn’t even know about (eg Libya)?


  • Sure however we’re taking about 1940’s when coal is a dominate resource, it still is for the most part today. My point is that Japan had reason to invade USSR and even though people will argue the claim, it doesn’t change the fact that Japan did have plans in place to invade USSR. And as I argued and this is something that Axis and Allies doesn’t teach is that Japan imperialism was for one simple reason at the end of the day, Japan was getting over populated and they needed more lands for cities and farms, simply conquering nations for their lands was good enough, that’s why they went into China.

  • '21 '20 '18 '17

    Those lebensraum arguments sound empty because their current populations are 100% greater than they were back then, and there is no problem whatsoever.  That had nothing to do with space or limited natural resources–it was technology they needed, not physical space.  They don’t even produce their own food (and didn’t then either).

    The green revolution was the solution, the idea that some kind of crowding or overpopulation makes zero sense when the world’s population has doubled (in spite of tens of millions of deaths during the war) and are far better fed than in the past.  The difference is that agricultural production takes a fraction of the effort/resources that it did in 1900, so there is plenty of food for everyone and they can stack up on top of each other as much as they want, because they’re not starving.

    The entire idea was a propaganda effort that focused on the myth of scarcity.  The development of nuclear weapon and power should emphasize that it was technology that was the limiting factor on available power, inputs, not space or a lack of production.


  • @Caesar:

    As for Spain, history is basically in agreement that Franco wouldn’t join the Axis unless he got everything he wanted which was former French colonies in Africa and Gibraltar.

    Didn’t Hitler send admiral Canaris to Madrid to get Franco to fully commit, with Canaris then doing the exact opposite telling Franco to stay out at all cost?

  • '17 '16 '15

    yea Y think Spain was war weary after their civil war. Surprising Franco lasted as long as he did : )

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