Anti-Sub Tech Delayed (YG's 8d - G40)

[Witt]

@Young:

@Benito:

That’s a great idea! Do you think it would work in 42.2?

Don’t know about 42.2, but in G42 it would certainly save the 2 German subs that the Americans always kill first.

Larry Harris and Krieghund have said that one of those Subs can be moved to an adjacent SZ, YG.

[GeneralHandGrenade]

I’ve been reading this thread and not sure how to respond because of this question that keeps coming up in my head.
Why? What have you got against killing subs? Why are you trying to save them?

Why not save the tanks, or the fighters, or the whales?

Why do you want to save all of the subs until the 3rd round?

I’m not saying there’s no reason to do that, I’m just saying that I don’t know what that reason is.

[Benito Mussolini]

Save the whales!!!

[baron Münchhausen]

@CWO:

@Young:

Lets face it… A.S.D.I.C was not deployed as early in the war as oob suggests, 1940 encompassed the “happy days” of German U-boat dominance in the Atlantic, which in turn forced the Allies to develop anti-submarine equipment.

The situation you’ve described – at its most fundamental, “the Germans had the advantage during the first half of the Battle of the Atlantic, and the Allies had the advantage during the second half” – is basically correct, with the turn-around point being mid-1943. In finer detail, however, the advantage actually swung back and forth between the two sides several times during the war. And it wasn’t a case of “before ASDIC, the Axis had the advantage; after ASDIC, the Allies had the advantage.” ASDIC already existed when the war broke out; the real problem was that the British had tested it in unrealistic conditions in peacetime, and had an overly-optimistic opinion of how effective it was going to be in actual combat and in rough weather. Moreover, ASDIC was only one part of a very long (1939-1945) and large and complex battle involving multiple technologies and tactics on both sides. These technologies (like centimetric radar, high-frequency direction-finding, and acoustic torpedoes) and tactics (like British hunter-killer groups and German wolfpacks) kept evolving during the war; intelligence and code-breaking also played a huge part, as did the weather.

On code-breaking, did you heard about this these (put forward in History Channel doc: Dieppe Uncovered) that August 1942 Dieppe raid was in fact an ultra-secret pinch to capture new codes and enigma machines unnoticed in the harbor while the other troops were making the diversion? The famous Ian Flemming was part of this intelligence raid.
At that time, for about 4 months, the Allies were no more able to break Enigma code and were having a much harder time to watch subs.

[CWO Marc]

@Baron:

On code-breaking, did you heard about this these (put forward in History Channel doc) that August 1942 Dieppe raid was in fact an ultra-secret pinch to capture new codes and enigma machines unnoticed in the harbor while the other troops were making the diversion? The famous Ian Flemming was part of this intelligence raid.
At that time, for about 4 months, the Allies were no more able to break Enigma code and were having a much harder time to watch subs.

David O’Keefe’s theory that the assault on Dieppe was an elaborate diversion to capture a four-rotor Enigma machine appears to be based on the premise that the Dieppe raid otherwise seems unexplainable, especially in view of its high casualty rate.  I haven’t read his book…but if it indeed revolves around the concept of “explaining the unexplainable”, then that would be a case of (to translate a Quebecois expression) “looking for noon at four o’clock.”  The Dieppe operation had a logical strategic purpose: it was fundamentally a test invasion of continental Europe, intended to help the Allies plan the real invasion that would come two years later.  It may plausibly have had an intelligence mission tacked on to it, but its basic purpose was to test concepts and techniques for an amphibious invasion of Fortress Europe.  And the reason it produced so many casualties is that many of those concepts and techniques were disastrously flawed, including the core concept of trying to capture a port city head-on.  Dieppe basically taught the Allies how NOT to mount an invasion, and they learned their lesson; for example, in June 1944, they landed on open beaches between the major ports of Cherbourg and Le Havre (which were both heavily fortified), not in the ports themselves.

[baron Münchhausen]

@CWO:

@Baron:

On code-breaking, did you heard about this these (put forward in History Channel doc) that August 1942 Dieppe raid was in fact an ultra-secret pinch to capture new codes and enigma machines unnoticed in the harbor while the other troops were making the diversion? The famous Ian Flemming was part of this intelligence raid.
At that time, for about 4 months, the Allies were no more able to break Enigma code and were having a much harder time to watch subs.

David O’Keefe’s theory that the assault on Dieppe was an elaborate diversion to capture a four-rotor Enigma machine appears to be based on the premise that the Dieppe raid otherwise seems unexplainable, especially in view of its high casualty rate.  I haven’t read his book…but if it indeed revolves around the concept of “explaining the unexplainable”, then that would be a case of (to translate a Quebecois expression) “looking for noon at four o’clock.”  The Dieppe operation had a logical strategic purpose: it was fundamentally a test invasion of continental Europe, intended to help the Allies plan the real invasion that would come two years later.  It may plausibly have had an intelligence mission tacked on to it, but its basic purpose was to test concepts and techniques for an amphibious invasion of Fortress Europe.  And the reason it produced so many casualties is that many of those concepts and techniques were disastrously flawed, including the core concept of trying to capture a port city head-on.  Dieppe basically taught the Allies how NOT to mount an invasion, and they learned their lesson; for example, in June 1944, they landed on open beaches between the major ports of Cherbourg and Le Havre (which were both heavily fortified), not in the ports themselves.

“looking for noon at four o’clock.”

Do you meant:
“To look for noon at two pm”?
translate from “Chercher midi a quatorze heures.”

[CWO Marc]

@Baron:

Do you meant:
“To look for noon at two pm”?

I’ve heard both “chercher midi a quatre heures” and “chercher midi a quatorze heures”.  I quoted the first variant and you quoted the second variant.  They’re both popular restatements of Occam’s Razor, which is the principle that when there are competing explanations for a given problem the simplest explanation is the most likely one to be correct, which is the point I was trying to make.

[baron Münchhausen]

In that case, the more important thing for Allies was to test an amphibious assault instead of making the Intelligence Raid, right?

P.S.
If the historical meaning of this expression is true, then you can find noon at 16h.
It said that, in past times (circa 1501+), Italians had the habit to start zero hour just after dusk, then from 8 PM to noon, it makes 16 hours.

[General 6 Stars]

I would leave sub at D2. Still gives Germany something without changing the rules for subs.
Also for the Pacific side too.

After playing some games then you’ll know if u need to change it.

[baron Münchhausen]

You are not a daredevil SS…
:-D

You don’t want to see a lot of Nautilus Subs roaming during first two game rounds?

[General 6 Stars]

@Baron:

You are not a daredevil SS…
:-D

You don’t want to see a lot of Nautilus Subs roaming during first two game rounds?

Yes,  I am a daredevil. But every body I know seems to want to favor the UK all the time.  :-D

[General 6 Stars]

I think I got this right. Make the sub A2 D2.

It loses - 12.5 % on attack but gains back + 12.5 % on defense.

Maybe this was mentioned in YG other thread D8. Then you wouldn’t have to change sub rules. For C6 sub what is loses on attack it gets to make up for the other things subs can do.
Are you open for D6 die rolls for subs and keep the d6 values ? You are still rolling for AA, SBR and convoys.

[Fiera]

@Young:

Anti-Submarine Technology Delayed What I would like to suggest when using the 8 sided dice system, is a house rule that would delay the submarine ability cancelation powers of all destroyers until the beginning of the third game round.

I like the idea and will suggest it to our game round (eventhough we are using D6)!

[baron Münchhausen]

@GeneralHandGrenade:

I’ve been reading this thread and not sure how to respond because of this question that keeps coming up in my head.
Why? What have you got against killing subs? Why are you trying to save them?

Why not save the tanks, or the fighters, or the whales?

Why do you want to save all of the subs until the 3rd round?

I’m not saying there’s no reason to do that, I’m just saying that I don’t know what that reason is.

Bumped.
Still a good question…

[Young Grasshopper]

Winston Churchill once said, “the only thing that really ever frightened me during the war was the U’Boat peril”

Subs in Axis & Allies 1940 Global are not scary.

[GeneralHandGrenade]

The problem that I have with it is that a sub is virtually indestructible for the first 2 rounds. Unless the owner of the sub chooses it as a casualty there is no way to kill it. How about doing what you propose for the first round of combat only? After the first round the other boats know that it’s in the water and can at least defend themselves. In other words, the sub gets one free shot each time it attacks another boat for the first 2 rounds. That would be consistent with your assertion that there was no way to see them coming without making them indestructible.

[Young Grasshopper]

I would like to know how subs were destroyed in 1940?… I’m not being sarcastic, can anyone tell me how to destroy a submarine before ASDIC technology?.

[GeneralHandGrenade]

There is a lot of information in this article;
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Atlantic

There seems to be some technological advances that helped the battle against submarines, but from what I can gather here a great deal of the problem for the allies early in the war was a lack of destroyers. They still had sonar but it wasn’t developed enough to deal with wolf packs. It was more geared to having 2 destroyers vs 1 submarine. The addition of the number of escorts and the increase in size of the convoys were a big reason why the effectiveness of the subs decreased over time. The article gives a much more detailed answer to your question.

[baron Münchhausen]

Many u-boats were tracking merchant ships and convoy while on surface.
The underwater speed was too slow: around 8 knots. Convoy would travel up to 15 knots.
Also, many were sunk by Liberator and other longe range patrol bombers either by cannons or depth charges dropped while the sub was still visible  from above surface.

Underwater movement was difficult for Subs, they rather travel on sea then dive only when danger was seen.

[CWO Marc]

@Young:

I would like to know how subs were destroyed in 1940?… I’m not being sarcastic, can anyone tell me how to destroy a submarine before ASDIC technology?.

“Destroying” submerged submarines in both World Wars was in most cases done in the same basic way: through underwater explosive charges, also known as depth charges.  What changed during the course of WWII wasn’t the basic method for destroying a submerged submarine; what changed were the techniques and technologies for finding them (either submerged or on the surface) and the tactics for hunting them.  These evolved constantly.  Early in the war, these produced a poor sub-kill rate; over time, the kill rate got better.  To give just a couple of examples:

• The British experimented with hunter-killer groups whose function was to roam the ocean looking for subs.  These failed lamentably.  The British later realized that a better tactic was to keep escorts close to the convoys, because it was a win-win situation: if a sub found a convoy, the escorts would be in the right place to attack it; if a sub didn’t find a convoy, then the convoy would reach port safely.  On a related point, the British were too focussed early in the war on killing subs; they later realized that their priority should be top ensure “the safe and timely arrival” of convoys to their destination.

• ASDIC, a.k.a. sonar, actually comes in two flavours: active sonar and passive sonar.  Active sonar involves sending a high-frequency sound “ping” into the water, then listening for a return echo to determine the depth and direction of a submerged sub.  The critical point is that it only works against submerged subs.  Passive sonar involves listening on a hydrophone for the noise of a sub’s engines.  This works both with submerged subs and with surfaced subs, but it has limitations.  Early in the war, U-boat captains figured out that the best way to attack a convoy was on the surface at night, rather than submerged in the daytime (which is what the British had expected the Germans to do).  On the surface at night, a U-boat was almost immune from detection early in the war: active sonar was useless against it because it wasn’t submerged; passive sonar had trouble distinguishing a U-boat’s engines from those of the ships in the convoy; a U-boat was hard to see (even with night glasses) because it was small and low in the water; and early long-wave radar was too crude to pick up a U-boat amid surface clutter.  A crucial advance in the latter regard was the later introduction of short-wave (centimetric) radar, which did have the ability to clearly detect a surfaced U-boat.