@Argothair:
It’s interesting to see mathematically where the IPC value would even out for a bombing raid with and without interception, but usually the “bombee”, that is, the bombing victim, strongly prefers to avoid trades that are near a 1:1 ratio.
For example, if Germany and Japan are ganging up on Russia in 1942.2, you can expect the Axis to attack with a force worth roughly 200 IPCs against a Russian + Allied defensive stack worth roughly 150 IPCs. A 4:3 ratio doesn’t make for a crushing attack, because infantry defend more effectively than they attack, so at first the Russians are relatively safe. But if you give the Axis an opportunity to trade 125 IPCs of Axis pieces for 125 IPCs of Allied pieces, now the ratio is 75 IPCs of offense to 25 IPCs of defense – a 3:1 offensive advantage, which will easily crush the remaining Russian defense. So every time the Russians trade planes with the Germans at even odds, or even at 3:2 odds in the Russians’ favor, the Russians’ position gets worse from a strategic perspective. The Russians will often prefer to suffer the extra industrial damage rather than trade planes at close-to-even odds.
For me the most interesting question is not “what ratio of bombers to fighters will yield zero net profit for the attacker?” but “what ratio of bombers to fighters will actually prompt the defender to use fighters for interception, and what ratio will actually prompt the attacker to avoid bombing?”
Also, I’m not sure why you think the 1942.2 economy is too small to support air combat. When I play 1942.2, I often have 4 Russian fighters, plus another 4 Allied fighters defending eastern Europe. The German air force often grows as large as 8 fighters and 2 bombers, and the Japanese can easily afford to build 4 or 5 bombers in addition to their 6 starting fighters. Maybe I’m missing something, but that sounds consistent with the ratios (e.g. 1:1, 2:1, 5:1, 7:6) that you’re discussing in your post.
Your comment contents many interesting points.
It’s interesting to see mathematically where the IPC value would even out for a bombing raid with and without interception, but usually the “bombee”, that is, the bombing victim, strongly prefers to avoid trades that are near a 1:1 ratio.
I’m not sure here we follow the same basis of understanding on ratios.
A 1:1 ratio, assuming your numbers (Fg A2 D3 and StB A1 but damage 2D6, see quote below), shows that it is a loosing proposition for attacker (-0.883 IPC/StB raider).
Maybe I wrongly assumed that any attacker would trigger an SBR only if he gets positive odds, hence the break even ratio seems the attacker bottom line.
Going below seemed to me like playing on dumb luck.
On 1:1 basis, it means for the attacker a grossly -1 IPC TUV swing.
But, 1 StB: 1 Fg ratio is not exactly a 1 IPC :1 IPC ratio because it implies a StB C12 against a Fg C10 (1.2 :1 ratio, in fact).
So a 1.2 break even ratio means 14.4 (1.212) attacker IPCs against 10 (110) defender IPCs = 1.44 :1 IPC ratio.
To translate into 1:1 IPC ratio, that can be translate into 10 StBs vs 12 Fgs or 0.833 StB/Fg ratio.
Such combat ratio would meant: -14.33 for 10 StBs or -1.433 IPC per StB
How I get this result:
1 StB A1 vs 2 Fgs D3 gives +1.667 (1/610) - 9 (27/3612) + 3.5 = -3.833 IPCs2= -7.667
1 StB A1 vs 1 Fg D3 gives +1.667 (1/610) - 6 (3/612) + 3.5 = -0.833 IPCs8= - 6.667
10 StBs vs 12 Fgs = -14.33 IPCs
In Axis Germany against Allies Russian example, according to these combat values and fighting 1 IPC vs 1 IPC, Germany bombing Russia can lost near 1.5 IPCs per StB unit bombing.
Germany would lost 144 IPCs while Russia 100 IPCs.
Assuming “Axis to attack with a force worth roughly 200 IPCs against a Russian + Allied defensive stack worth roughly 150 IPCs”.
This would put Germany near 66 IPCs against a 50 IPCs Russia. In your example, it would not be a winning proposition.
Said otherwise, Germany needs to invest 144 IPCs to destroy 100 Russian IPCs (or have an income greater than 77 IPCs per turn against 50 IPCs).
For me the most interesting question is not “what ratio of bombers to fighters will yield zero net profit for the attacker?” but “what ratio of bombers to fighters will actually prompt the defender to use fighters for interception, and what ratio will actually prompt the attacker to avoid bombing?”
I wrote this:
And this give a huge and interesting Fighter Interception Gap (FIG) of 1.2 to 5 StBs/Fg
This is the “ratio of bombers to fighters” which “actually prompt the defender to use fighters for interception”.
Anything below 5 StBs against 1 Fg makes for lesser odds of receiving damage if Fighter(s) intercept.
This includes “what ratio will actually prompt the attacker to avoid bombing”: anything below 1.2 StB/Fg is a loosing proposition.
That’s why I called it FIG because this Gap consider both attacker (break even point) and defender (Fighter Interception Threshold) interest.
Below (1.2), the ratio doesn’t worth the risk of bombing and, above (5), there is too many attackers to commit interceptors, there is less damage taken on IC if Fgs stay on the ground.
If attacker want to taunt the defender to risk interceptions, it cannot overwhelmed it with too many StBs. The Fighter Interception Threshold or FIT (5 StBs/Fg) provides the guideline to follow. So, for instance, a German attacker can throw 3 StBs A1 for each Russian Fgs D3 knowing it gives positive damage results and if there is no interception, odds of damage on ICs will be greater.
The only trouble about 1942.2 is that IC are easily maxed out (16 for Moscow, 8 for Caucasus, 4 for Leningrad) and there is no Bases to take additional damage.
So, in our last example, if 6 StBs attack 2 Fgs, Moscow IC will be maxed out anyway: (3.56) 21 IPCs with no interception or (28.713) 17.426 IPCs with interception.
3 StBs A1 vs 1 Fg D3 gives +4.213 (91/21610) - 6 (3/612) + 10.5 = + 8.713 IPCs on average.
So with enough planes involved in 1942.2, maxing out damage on IC and no interception seems ironically the optimal behaviour, simply because a lot of attacker’s damage points are wasted above the maximum damage allowed on IC. This is my prediction.
However, I said huge and interesting FIGap because with a 5 to 1 ratio, combat values for Fg D3 provides a rare opportunity to make interception an optimized choice even with such a high number of attackers. Such high Threshold is uncommon amongst other SBR possible mechanics.
That’s why I think G40 is more suited to your high air combat values than 1942.2
Once this said, I would be very interested to ear any report about someone play-testing your air combat values.
I like them because of the scaled values imply for each unit: 1, 2, 3.
Proportionate to intuitive historical depiction: Bomber weakest in the air, escort Fighter better and intercepting Fighter stronger.
And it makes room to integrate TcB A2 D1 between StB A1 and Fg A2 D3, as far as I understand TcB air combat capacity.
Also, I’m not sure why you think the 1942.2 economy is too small to support air combat. When I play 1942.2, I often have 4 Russian fighters, plus another 4 Allied fighters defending eastern Europe. The German air force often grows as large as 8 fighters and 2 bombers, and the Japanese can easily afford to build 4 or 5 bombers in addition to their 6 starting fighters. Maybe I’m missing something, but that sounds consistent with the ratios (e.g. 1:1, 2:1, 5:1, 7:6) that you’re discussing in your post.
My experience of play on 1942.2 is maybe to bias by time restriction. No player is really trying to turtle and doing as little as possible in early rounds. This imply many battles and losses. Probably why I don’t see much of these planes. For instance, my experience is that Japan is craving to built enough Infantry (and Tank) to fully load its TPs each turn to rush for the center. Getting more than 2 StBs for Japan seems an exploit in our fast pace, less cautious, game.
Damage on interceptor / damage on StB / 2 D6 Damage on IC or Base = average damage per SBR
1 StB A1 vs 1 Fg D3 gives +1.667 (1/610) - 6 (3/612) + 3.5 = -0.833 IPCs on average. [OOB G40: +1.819 IPC damage/SBR]
1 StB A1 vs 2 Fgs D3 gives +1.667 (1/610) - 9 (27/3612) + 3.5 = -3.833 IPCs on average. [OOB G40: - 0.206 IPC damage/SBR]
2 StBs A1 vs 1 Fg D3 gives +3.056 (11/3610) - 6 (3/612) + 7 (23.5) = +4.056 IPCs on average. [OOB G40: + 5.793 IPCs damage/SBR]
3 StBs A1 vs 1 Fg D3 gives +4.213 (91/21610) - 6 (3/612) + 10.5 = + 8.713 IPCs on average.
4 StBs A1 vs 1 Fg D3 gives +5.177 (671/129610) - 6 (3/612) + 14 = + 13.177 IPCs on average.
5 StBs A1 vs 1 Fg D3 gives +5.981 (4651/777610) - 6 (3/6*12) + 17.5 = + 17.481 IPCs on average.
Break even ratio approximate: 7/6= 1.167 StB/Fg
1 StB A1 vs 1 Fg D3: -0.833*5 = - 4.165
2 StBs A1 vs 1 Fg D3: +4.056 *1= + 4.056
7 StBs vs 6 Fgs =-.109
Interception Threshold: 5/1 = from 5 StB/Fg and below
5 StBs vs 1 Fg: +17.481
5 StBs vs no interception 5*3.5 = +17.5 IPCs (Diff.: -.019)
For example, if Germany and Japan are ganging up on Russia in 1942.2, you can expect the Axis to attack with a force worth roughly 200 IPCs against a Russian + Allied defensive stack worth roughly 150 IPCs. A 4:3 ratio doesn’t make for a crushing attack, because infantry defend more effectively than they attack, so at first the Russians are relatively safe. But if you give the Axis an opportunity to trade 125 IPCs of Axis pieces for 125 IPCs of Allied pieces, now the ratio is 75 IPCs of offense to 25 IPCs of defense – a 3:1 offensive advantage, which will easily crush the remaining Russian defense. So every time the Russians trade planes with the Germans at even odds, or even at 3:2 odds in the Russians’ favor, the Russians’ position gets worse from a strategic perspective. The Russians will often prefer to suffer the extra industrial damage rather than trade planes at close-to-even odds.
I want to explore a bit more what can happen assuming something like 3 StBs:2 Fgs ratio or 1.5 StBs/Fg for a 18 IPCs/10 IPCs ratio.
Let’s suppose Germany has a 180 IPCs 15 StBs air force and 20 IPCs (2 Fgs as back up) while Russia has 10 Fighters ready to intercept.
Assuming no IC damage cap.
So 15 StBs are attacking 10 Fgs.
1 StB A1 vs 1 Fg D3: -0.833 IPCs 5 = -4.165
+8.333 (5/610) - 30 (15/612) + 17.5 = -4.165
2 StBs A1 vs 1 Fg D3:+4.056 IPCs5 = +20.28
+15.28 (55/3610) - 30 (15/612) + 35 (10*3.5)= +20.28
15 StBs vs 10 Fgs D3: +16.115 IPCs
+23.613 - 60 + 52.5 =
2.4 Fgs lost (24) + 52.5 on IC. - 5 StBs lost (60)
Change in TUV:
Russia loose 76 IPCs while Germany loose 60 IPCs.
On the next assault, Russia have 7.6 Fg remaining and Germany 10 StBs remaining.
If assuming Cap on IC, there will be only 16 damage on IC for a total lost of 40 IPCs, for a Russian TUV change +20.
Next assault, 10 StBs vs 7.6 Fgs would be 1.32 StB/Fg ratio.
If we keep same loss ratio as above: 30% StBs vs 24% Fgs
it becomes 3 StBs vs 1.8 Fg.
Sum: 7 StBs vs 5.8 Fg, a new ratio: 1.21 StB/Fg ratio
As we start with a good ratio of 1.5 and still going down to 1.3 and 1.2 the rate of loss on German attacking compared to defending Russian will not improve.
From this little prospective scenario, I doubt a German player would first do SBR against such opposition at 1.5 StB/Fg ratio for 16 points of damage to maxed out IC?
15 StBs A1 (15 pts) were cut in pieces by 10 Fg D3 (30 pts).
Maybe a better ratio like 10 StBs A1 (10 pts) against 5 Fgs D3 (15 pts) would work.
Ultimately, it comes to damage cap on IC. Need to be maximized but not way maxed out.
At a certain point, bringing a lot of StBs add nothing more.
Only Fgs escorts taking casualty and killing interceptors with an improve rate of A2 vs D3 than A1 vs D3, would be a better tactics.
For example, 5 StBs and 8 Fgs (5+18 = 23 pts) 140 IPCs against 10 Fgs D3 (30 pts) 100 IPCs
Do you believe a Russian player would intercept at 1.3 StB+Fg/Fg ratio?
No doing that generate 16 damage points on IC for sure, but think about the strategic impact on Germany of not using 8 Fighters for ground support.
So launching bombers only is more like suicide missions with little reward (16 IPCs on IC) while bringing escorting Fg becomes a waste of combat resources.
Such fleet in regular combat would bring 20 (54)+ 24 (83)= 44 attack points against 40 defense points instead of 23 vs 30 pts.
A much more interesting perspective for a German players.
More I write on it, more I’m being doubtful about these high air combat values, especially but not exclusively about 1942.2…