The indicated numbers of the stated aircraft would all have been helpful to the Germans in fighting the war, but I’m not sure any of them would have enabled the Germans to actually win the war (either in 1940-41 or later), assuming that everything else about German strategy and tactics remained unchanged. Winning the war in 1940-41 (or at least taking a major step towards doing so) basically amounts to knocking out either Britain or Russia or both.
As far as defeating Britain goes, the two possible approaches would have been direct invasion (a successful Sealion) or economic strangulation (winning the Battle of the Atlantic). No Sealion-type amphibious invasion would have been possible without the Germans achieving solid control of the air over the Channel (someting for which more bombers and fighters would have been helpful), but even assuming such airspace control it’s debatable whether Germany had the equipment and the naval experience to mount a cross-Channel invasion. Britain and America, which were both first-rate naval powers, needed two years of build-up and training – plus the development of all sorts of specialized equipment such as the Higgins boat, the LST, the Mulberries and the PLUTO fuel pipeline – to pull off Overlord successfully. Germany, by contrast, viewed Sealion as basically just a large river crossing, and had to scrounge general-purpose river barges from all over western Europe to improvise an amphibious capability. The JU-52 would have had some use in landing troops as part of a primarily seaborne Sealion, but an invasion of Britain could not have been mounted (or kept supplied) by air alone.
As for defeating Britain purely from the air, more German bombers and fighters probably wouldn’t have been decisive either, especially given the way Goering kept flip-flopping on his choice of primary targets during the Battle of Britain. Even assuming a more focused campaign by the Luftwaffe, however, Germany simply wouldn’t have been able to destroy Britain’s ability or will to resist via strategic bombing alone. The British and American strategic bombing campaign against Germany in the period from 1943 to 1945 dwarfed the Luftwaffe’s efforts during the Battle of Britain, yet even this massive round-the-clock two-year-long campaign failed to break Germany on its own, despite the belief of generals like Harris and LeMay that airpower alone could win the war in Europe.
Regarding the Battle of the Atlantic goes, the FW-200 Condor did have some success in that theatre as an anti-ship bomber and as a recon plane for U-boats, so more of them would have been a plus on the German side in this strategically vital campaign. Unfortunately, the FW-200 was operated by the Luftwaffe (since Goering wanted to have control over anything that flew in Germany) rather than the Kriegsmarine. Inter-service cooperation between the Luftwaffe and the Kriegsmarine was poor, so operational use of the Condor wasn’t nearly as effective as it might have been. It’s also arguable whether adding more Condors without also adding more U-boats would have made a war-winning difference.
On the Russian side, I’m not sure that more aircraft (either bombers or fighters or transport planes) would have compensated for the various factors that caused Barbarossa to fail…things like the enormous logistical problems of operating on such a huge territory, the ability of the Russians to absorb massive losses yet keep fighting, the onset of the Russian winter and so forth.