The fact that there weren’t many divisions in Germany at the time. Obviously Germany would have brought several armies if they landed in Berlin, but maybe they could have assassinated some top Nazis beforehand.
Allied Pacific Convoys
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Convoys get attention on different fronts, however I hear little about protection of Pacific convoys. How protected were Allied Pacific Convoys?
I read that in 1944 the Japanese did send three heavy cruisers into the Indian Ocean in the hopes of capturing shipping for the depleting Japanese merchant Navy. They sunk an old British steamer.
How would the threat of Japanese Carriers and Cruisers in Allied Shipping Lanes effected the battle readiness of the Allied Fleet?
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Funny they did not think of doing it earlier.
Suppose they were stretched enough as it was.
In your example one old steamer was not a successful convoy disruption, was it?
Afraid I cannot help on this one. -
The Japanese had a strange attitude about convoys – both their own and those of the Americans. In their view, the proper task of combat vessels (including submarines) was to attack enemy warships rather than enemy merchantmen. This fixation, which might have something to do with the Bushido tradition, seems to have led the Japanese to underestimate the importance of logistics in modern warfare. The Japanese didn’t bother too much with attacking US convoys, so this made the job of US convoy protection easier for the Americans. On the flip side, the Japanese also didn’t bother too much with giving their own convoys proper protection, which simplified the job of US submarines who were blockading Japan. I think it was only in the second half of the war, for example, that the Japanese started developing small escort vessels (along the lines of corvettes and frigates), whereas Britain – like Japan, an island nation dependant for survival on its maritime trade – turned right from the beginning of the war to the production of “cheap and nasty” escorts. The irony of all this is that Japan went to war primarily to secure raw materials such as the oil of the Dutch East Indies, yet didn’t devote enough thought or energy to protecting the convoy routes that were needed to bring these materials back to Japan. As a result, a lot of this stuff got no closer to Japan than the bottom of the ocean. By 1945, US submarines were starting to run out of Japanese targets and Japan’s economy was sliding towards collapse.
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I’m with CWO on this one… It wasn’t the axis doing the convoy raiding in the pac. It was the allies…
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Thank you.
I did wonder if the Japanese thought it a cowardly use of their ships.
I am so unamerican and love the Japanese sense of honour(and the medieval one obviously). -
Instead of wastefully using light infantry without any support against well entrenched Marines guarding Henderson Field the Japanese would have been better off attacking supplies needed for the Solomon offensive.
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It’s just like starcraft… if you want to mess em up, go for the SCV hit!
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The Japanese shipping losses were so great that Admiral Ozawa had to anchorge the Imperial Fleet at Tawitawi where an oil refinery exist to fuel the fleet.
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I find it strange that the Japanese used the submarine in the war to shell targets rather than hunt shipping lanes.
On February 25, 1942 the Japanese submarine I-17 surfaced in the area of Santa Barbara at 5:30 pm. Its target was the Elwood Oil Field.
On June 21, 1942 Commander Tagami of the Imperial Japanese Navy ordered submarine I-25 to shell Ft. Stevens in Oregon.
June 5, 1942 I-168 fired shells in Midway Island in attempt to take the island after the carriers were sunk.
Japanese boats shelled Henderson Field many times during the Guadalcanal Battle.
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@ABWorsham:
I find it strange that the Japanese used the submarine in the war to shell targets rather than hunt shipping lanes.
The use which the Japanese made of their military resources was sometimes odd – or, let’s say, less-than-optimal. I don’t recall the details, but another example is the fact that Japanese military transport ships shuttling between Japan and the forward areas of operations (like the Solomons and the Dutch East Indies) would sometimes travel completely empty on one leg of the journey because of such factors as lack of coordination or cooperation between the Army and the Navy. This was an inefficient use of Japan’s transport tonnage. Better planning would have ensured that outward-bound ships were always packed with fresh troops and equipment and that inward-bound ships were always packed with raw materials and other items needing to be brought back to Japan.
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