Dreadful Axis Mistakes

[Pvt.Ryan]

So what do you think were the worst mistakes done by the Axis? Me and my friend were talking and he thinks the reason we won was because we (The US) got involved. Personally I don't like to be over patriotic because thats why everyone dislikes Americans to some degree so I agreed and disagreed. I think Japans big mistake was attacking America. Germanys main mistake was attacking the Soviets. What do you think?

[ABWorsham]

For the Italians not taking Malta in the opening days of the war.

For Germany declearing war on the U.S after Pearl Harbor.

[221B Baker Street]

What you say makes sense, but its also possible to look at alternative mistakes as being the decisive decisions.

In the case of Japan, they started a war they knew they could not win over the long term (as it turned out to be a longer war than they hoped - the US had no desire to negotiate a peace).  However, I think their mistake was their invasion of China.  This was the reason for the US oil embargo, and all negotiations prior to Pearl Harbor regarding the oil embargo was dependent on Japan leaving China (which they obviously could not do for political reasons).  China was also too large of a country for them to take and hold it all, so the Chinese kept up the fight from Chongqing as well as by guerrilla warfare.  A war they could not win, could not leave and cost them their badly needed oil imports.

One must ask why Germany attacked the Russians, when the Russians were giving them everything they wanted before the attack?  (Though some theorize Stalin was preparing to attack Germany by surprise, but was attacked first by the Nazis) So it is indeed easy to say this was Germany's main mistake.  But I think instead the mistake was not attacking Russia, but not taking Moscow before winter.

In the case of Germany, they came very, very close to defeating the Russians.  Had they done so, it is unclear if they would have been in a similar situation as the Japanese.  Bogged down with both a strong guerrilla force to contend with and a large never-ending front to defend and fighting (and losing) a naval and aerial battle against superior forces.  

Alternatively, perhaps a defeat of the Russians would have instead provided the resources Germany needed for at least a stalemate.  Certainly, the Germans could have maintained sufficient manpower and technological advantage to hold off the US/UK forces had they won in Russia early.  As this is quite possible, the mistake probably wasn't the invasion of Russia so much as some decision made which prevented victory against the Russians.  IMHO, the failure to take Moscow before winter was the key mistake.  

Winter arrives in Moscow a full month before either Leningrad or Stalingrad.  Moscow was the last Railway which permitted the Soviets to transport North-South, taking of Moscow would have effectively fractured the nation into separate units...making simple a divide and conquer strategy.  Taking the capital would have been an immense political statement.  As such, I think the Nazi failure was devoting insufficient resources to Moscow.  As their plan was three massive invasion forces (north, center, and south); they could have sent far less towards the North and the South so that victory in the Center (Moscow) was absolutely assured.  The rest of Russia could have been taken the following spring, if necessary, under this scenario.

[ghr2]

I agree, I hate it when people say that invading russia was a bad idea, the situation was far more complicated than that.  And Germany did not have the resources for a prolonged war with the UK, especially when the BEF was evacuated from Dunkirk and the failure of the BoB.  Invading Russia was based all on economic neccesity, and  ideological rivalry.

[Pvt.Ryan]

So it wasn't a bad idea? Please tell me who took Berlin. THE RUSSIANS! AND HAVE YOU PLAYED WORLD AT WAR! THEY ARE BAD ***ES!

[CWO Marc]

Winter arrives in Moscow a full month before either Leningrad or Stalingrad.

Moscow is about 500 miles north of Stalingrad, so I can understand winter arriving there a month earlier, but it's about 200 miles south of Leningrad, so I'm puzzled at the notion that winter would arrive in Leningrad a month later.

[Zhukov44]

Germany should have concentrated on getting United Kingdom out of the war before attacking the Soviets.  If the Soviets had made the preemptive attack then the Germans would have the propaganda advantage (and of course, the Soviets were not actually planning to go through with a preemptive attack any time soon).  If Germany had secured the Suez Canal and Jordan it probably could have bent Turkey to its will, and potentially had access to all the fuel it needed.

[Subotai]

As IL and many others have pointed out earlier in similar threads, Germany was not (enough) ready for a war against Russia in 41. And Germany should never have attacked Russia before finishing off UK.

And if Germany and Japan was as "alliefied" as UK+US they would have had a much better chance of winning the WW2, conducting different strategies which was not coordinated was a bad choice, but "playing together" would have made a very big difference.

[221B Baker Street]

Winter arrives in Moscow a full month before either Leningrad or Stalingrad.

Moscow is about 500 miles north of Stalingrad, so I can understand winter arriving there a month earlier, but it's about 200 miles south of Leningrad, so I'm puzzled at the notion that winter would arrive in Leningrad a month later.

Leningrad is by the sea which delays, and moderates, winter.

[Pvt.Ryan]

Yes Russia was a big mistake by the Germans. Just like an A&A game. Who plans Sealion and Barbarossa on the same turn?

[221B Baker Street]

While it would make sense (as others have stated here) for Germany to win against the UK prior to any military action against the USSR, I would like to point out that a German victory against the UK at the time of Barbarossa had become most unlikely. 

Operation Sealion was unlikely to succeed even had it been undertaken in ideal conditions in July 1940.  The longer time went on, the better prepared the UK was against a German invasion. 

Likewise the U-boat campaign never destroyed sufficient shipping to really force England to negotiate a peace; and the British (and Americans) were continuously improving their defenses against the U-boats.

The African campaign faltered; but even had it succeeded, might not have been sufficient to bring the UK to the negotiating table. 

Even with the Soviets providing the Germans pretty much everything they wanted, Germany would be hard pressed to keep up with the UK with virtually unlimited manpower from her colonies and immense industrial support from the US.  And how for long would Stalin be so accommodating?  Doing nothing seems like simply waiting for defeat as Germany is still in a strategically weaker position over the long term.

What other options (besides a successful invasion of the UK) did Hitler have to either negotiate a peace, or ensure at a minimum a stalemate?  Invade Gibraltar via Spain? Pour resources into the African campaign? Go to the middle east via Turkey?  Technological advances (jet planes, V-1, V-2, etc. - this was attempted later in the war without success)? or grab the rich resources of the USSR to ensure sufficient resources to compete? 

Of these choices, the attack of the Soviets seemed the most likely to succeed, with most Germans believing their war would be over in a matter of weeks (just like the rest of Europe). No one, believed they would hold out for long at all, let alone turn the Germans back.  Russia was easily accessible to Germany (sharing a border across what used to be Poland), unlike most of the other strategic options.  And of these choices, the Soviet territory was by far the richest in potential return, with large surpluses of Ukrainian wheat, Caucasus oil, and other resources the Germans needed.

 But I think more importantly, the attack on the Soviets was something the Nazi party had advocated all along.  Ideologically, it was the perfect next move.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leibensraum

(German for "habitat" or literally "living space") was one of the major political ideas of Adolf Hitler, and an important component of Nazi ideology. It served as the motivation for the expansionist policies of Nazi Germany, aiming to provide extra space for the growth of the German population, for a Greater Germany. In Hitler's book Mein Kampf, he detailed his belief that the German people needed Lebensraum ("living space", i.e. land and raw materials), and that it should be found in the East. It was the stated policy of the Nazis to kill, deport, or enslave the Polish, Russian and other Slavic populations, whom they considered inferior, and to repopulate the land with Germanic peoples.   

[Pvt.Ryan]

You do know the reason why most of these plans (Africa) "faltered" was becaues of US involment. Also whats your nationality Baker?

[McMan]

In my opinion, while there are obviously many factors that one can look at when analyzing the Axis loss, I think the biggest mistake was getting the US involved. However, by the nature of the war and the goals of the Axis, US involvement may have been inevitable from the start.

Honestly, I don't see how you can beat American production. When a unified and willing nation has the capacity to build more guns, tanks, planes, and ships than much of the rest of the world combined, how can any opponent possibly oppose it?

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_production_during_World_War_II#Summary_of_production

Check out the first table and compare just how much more the US alone produced than the rest of the Axis combined. If you're a power that has massive goals (control and military domination of large swaths of territory), and you try to wage war against that kind industry, you're in for a walloping. Of course, in a situation like Vietnam, where the flexing of industrial might is limited by small scale guerilla-warfare in jungles, American power isn't invincible.

[Zhukov44]

While it would make sense (as others have stated here) for Germany to win against the UK prior to any military action against the USSR, I would like to point out that a German victory against the UK at the time of Barbarossa had become most unlikely. 

Operation Sealion was unlikely to succeed even had it been undertaken in ideal conditions in July 1940.  The longer time went on, the better prepared the UK was against a German invasion. 

Likewise the U-boat campaign never destroyed sufficient shipping to really force England to negotiate a peace; and the British (and Americans) were continuously improving their defenses against the U-boats.

The African campaign faltered; but even had it succeeded, might not have been sufficient to bring the UK to the negotiating table. 

Even with the Soviets providing the Germans pretty much everything they wanted, Germany would be hard pressed to keep up with the UK with virtually unlimited manpower from her colonies and immense industrial support from the US.  And how for long would Stalin be so accommodating?  Doing nothing seems like simply waiting for defeat as Germany is still in a strategically weaker position over the long term.

What other options (besides a successful invasion of the UK) did Hitler have to either negotiate a peace, or ensure at a minimum a stalemate?  Invade Gibraltar via Spain? Pour resources into the African campaign? Go to the middle east via Turkey?  Technological advances (jet planes, V-1, V-2, etc. - this was attempted later in the war without success)? or grab the rich resources of the USSR to ensure sufficient resources to compete? 

Of these choices, the attack of the Soviets seemed the most likely to succeed, with most Germans believing their war would be over in a matter of weeks (just like the rest of Europe). No one, believed they would hold out for long at all, let alone turn the Germans back.  Russia was easily accessible to Germany (sharing a border across what used to be Poland), unlike most of the other strategic options.  And of these choices, the Soviet territory was by far the richest in potential return, with large surpluses of Ukrainian wheat, Caucasus oil, and other resources the Germans needed.

Very interesting post..however I'm inclined to think the Africa campaign would have had a good chance of succeeding if a large part of the air and armor slotted for Barbarossa had been sent to Africa instead.  If Axis succeeded in shutting down the Suez Canal then perhaps amphib operations against Malta, Gibraltar, and Cyprus could have been considered.  Every little colonial defeat was a further blow to British morale and prestige.  Hitler didn't necessarily need to Sea Lion--just keep conquering one colonial possession after another, and keep offering peace to UK at terms the common people of UK could accept (eg the autonomy of UK and its colonies). 

Hitler himself had decried 2-front wars.  I see Barbarossa as the Nazi party falling victim to his own hubris.  It wasn't even clearly winning the war with UK, and somehow the solution is start another war with an even more powerful state.  They should have at least obtained the cooperation and assistance of Japan before embarking on such an absurd all-in bet.

[CWO Marc]

Very interesting post..however I'm inclined to think the Africa campaign would have had a good chance of succeeding if a large part of the air and armor slotted for Barbarossa had been sent to Africa instead.  If Axis succeeded in shutting down the Suez Canal then perhaps amphib operations against Malta, Gibraltar, and Cyprus could have been considered.  Every little colonial defeat was a further blow to British morale and prestige.  Hitler didn't necessarily need to Sea Lion--just keep conquering one colonial possession after another, and keep offering peace to UK at terms the common people of UK could accept (eg the autonomy of UK and its colonies). 

Another thing which would have put Britain in a difficult position would have been a German seizure of the Middle East, thus cutting Britain off from its source of oil there (and redirecting that oil to Germany, which needed it badly).  This move would probably not have been fatal to Britain in itself, since it was also getting oil from the U.S., but it would have put significant added strain on Britain's war effort.  It's a bit like the remark made by Nimitz (if I remember correctly) about what the effect would have been if Japan had destroyed Pearl Harbor's shipyard facilities and oil storage tanks on December 7: the U.S. would still have won in the end, but the blow would have been so damaging that it would have prolonged the war by a year.

Hitler himself had decried 2-front wars.  I see Barbarossa as the Nazi party falling victim to his own hubris.  It wasn't even clearly winning the war with UK, and somehow the solution is start another war with an even more powerful state.  They should have at least obtained the cooperation and assistance of Japan before embarking on such an absurd all-in bet.

During the planning for Barbarossa, Hitler was apparently reminded by his generals of his own statement (in Mein Kampf, I believe) that it would be folly for Germany to fight a two-front war.  Hitler responded that, given Britain's weakened condition in mid-1941, an invasion of Russia would not violate the two-front war principle because the fighting would only be on one front...provided the war against Russia was a short one.  And that's where things fell apart.  Germany and Japan, for a variety of reasons, were both only in a position to win relatively short wars, not lengthy wars of attrition.  Both planned to do so through the application of innovative tactics, good training, good leadership, and in some cases superior weaponry, combined with exploiting the fact that their potential enemies were not well prepared (again for a variety of reasons) to deal with an attack.  It was an approach that worked brilliantly for Germany in Poland and France, and for Japan in the Dutch East Indies and the British territories in the Far East.  Germany, however, failed in its bid to deliver a quick knock-out blow to Britain and Russia, and Japan likewise to the United States, and both countries ended up in lengthy attritional conflicts.